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Abstract 
 
 
 
Theology and philosophy establish that kenosis, or self-emptying, reveals the ontology of 
creativity.  But, until now, architecture – a primal expression of human creativity – has not 
been correlated with kenosis, nor has either been thought of as informing or taking the 
measure of the other.  This dissertation moves toward rectifying that lack.  It opens-up 
interdisciplinary thinking about kenosis to reveal the subject’s manifold foundations: its 
locus classicus in Christian scriptures, its antecedents in antiquity, its medieval and 
modern development, and its emergence in most major faith traditions.  Such foundations 
enable a further opening-up of kenotic thought – for the first time, through architecture.  
Accordingly, the situations of eight, widely recognised architectural projects are re-
examined, this time focusing on their kenotic claims and the kenosis they manifest.  
Located in North America, Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia – where several are 
affected by the kenotic dimensions of various world religions – these projects include 
works by Louis Kahn, I.M. Pei, Tadao Ando, Daniel Libeskind, and Peter Eisenman.  
Though newly revealing, this examination often mirrors the kenosis it seeks – holding the 
originating questions open, and opening-up still others.  In fact, this thinking about 
kenosis through architecture ultimately turns, and opens-up a unique thinking about 
architecture through kenosis – extending to architecture’s very being.  Kenotic emptiness 
asks of architecture’s fullness, of the barriers to architecture’s own kenosis.  And it asks 
how such a kenosis might influence an increasingly secularised, globalised, and 
environmentalised – indeed, aestheticised – world.  Questions of kenosis, creativity, and 
architecture are explored in the interest of elevating humanity’s thinking about the 
aesthetisation of culture; a critical pursuit, worthy to be critically considered, since such 
thinking affects virtually everyone and everything. 
xiii 
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Part One – Foundations 
  
  
1 
1 
Introduction: 
Awaiting Kenosis 
“Why do we have to change anything?”  Shouted with seeming impertinence from the 
back of the room, this question came just as the meeting was called to order, and it 
spontaneously attracted approving applause from many of those present.  Nearly 140 
people had gathered at a church hall in rural Australia to consider a subject considered 
before: the possibility of undertaking an architectural project to renew the parish’s nearly 
century-old church building.  This time, however, the parish had been told that things 
would be different.  Uncharacteristic of customary architectural practice, this was to be 
the beginning of a process that presumed no building project.  Instead, it invited the entire 
parish to participate, if they wished, in creatively discerning its situation and asking of that 
situation whether architecture was a response it called for – with either the negative or 
affirmative seen as equally legitimate.  In a very real sense, it was a process open to its 
own collapse.  It was called a ‘process’, but, more precisely, it was an event of 
engagement.  Its only strategy was openness, a characteristic that saw the first plenary 
session begin with what had the potential to close it down.  The shouted question had 
been aggressively asserted.  But what was the assertion?  Those who did not applaud 
may have heard a closed question, an answer in the guise of a question, intended to 
pre-empt listening and suppress dialogue; a kind of emptying-out without an opening-up.  
Indeed, it may well have been an assertion of resistance.  Yet the question could equally 
have been heard as a challenge to purported but, as yet, untested and unproven 
openness.  It could have been a reaction to previous processes that proved strategic and 
manipulative.  As such, it may have been an emptying-out of barriers – anything from 
frustration, exhaustion, and fear, to closed-mindedness or fundamentalism – one that 
might enable the gradual opening-up to an event that gradually proved open.  In any 
case, this event of openness needed to remain open to questions of its openness and 
challenges to its sufficiency.  No less so, the event needed to challenge the self-
sufficiency of its questioners.  Only then could there be engagement and mutual 
exchange; something more than debate.  Rather than rushing to resolve the question, it 
could be left to stand as part of the situation, the event itself being a working-out of the 
situation, including all that it comprised.1 
                                               
1
 A more complete narrative of this event – which eventually proceeds in mutual openness – is found in R.S. 
Lindstrom, "Country Know How," The Summit: Journal of the Office for Worship, Catholic Archdiocese of 
Melbourne 27, no. 4 (2000): 13-16. 
2 
Coincidentally, and not without irony, it was only four weeks earlier that this 
Catholic parish had joined the rest of Christendom in marking the pinnacle of the church 
calendar: the celebration of the mystery of Easter, or what theologians refer to as the 
paschal mystery.2  I mention irony because Easter comprises the events of the Christian 
myth that present an extreme call to open-up, to change almost everything, to turn world 
views upside-down.  These are events that have changed religious discourse, if not also 
that of philosophy and architecture, since the time of their promulgation.  They are events 
without whose stories there would be no Christianity, and without which the West and, to 
varying degrees, the world would be much different.  Their interpretation and re-
interpretation have changed and continue to change Christianity and all that is influenced 
thereby.  The celebration of the paschal mystery is a celebration of change – change 
effected by the mysteries of radical selflessness, openness, and relationality on the part 
of the divine, and by the call of humanity to the same.  In the immediate aftermath of such 
celebration, this parish found itself engaged in an event that opened-up many of the 
same ‘mysteries’ with far less abstraction; that is, in very human, practical, and 
experiential terms.  How might that affect their approach to and consideration of change, 
particularly when applied to the created and creative environment – the architecture – 
that accommodates their celebration of such mysteries?  What is it in the concept of 
Christianity’s paschal mystery, as well as in the myths of many other faith traditions and 
cultures, which may advantage the emergence of creative thinking and response, not 
least through architecture?  Answers – though likely of the sort that keep the questions 
open and maintain their mysteries – lie deeper than any religious doctrines.  Yet religion 
proves a useful threshold at which to open-up to the questions.  
GENESIS 
It is at the intersection of religion and architecture that this project finds its genesis 
(though not long resting there).  The proposition that there could be no other starting point 
is one requiring brief – and reluctant – autobiographical explication.  Although I would 
avow a strong sense of spirituality, I do not consider myself ‘religious’ and have never 
been religiously-affiliated.  I do not subscribe to theism or to atheism, the latter no less a 
belief system than the former.  Nor am I attracted to agnosticism, since ‘knowing’ of a 
deity’s existence has not only proven impossible but also largely inessential.  Regarding 
religion, I am without ‘-ism’; content to leave its questions open.  Still, I have always been 
fascinated by the subject, primarily in terms of anthropology, sociology, and architecture – 
                                               
2
 Although the term ‘paschal mystery’ is less frequently deployed in the more Evangelical and Pentecostal 
denominations of Protestant Christianity, it nonetheless describes the same events celebrated throughout 
Christianity under the banner of Easter; particularly the passion, death, and resurrection of the Christian 
messiah, Jesus Christ, but also including the events of his birth and life. 
3 
to which I now add philosophy.  Religion and I have shared a long, symbiotic but 
contentious relationship, frequently marked by coincidence, irony, and paradox.  At the 
age of first memory, I became acquainted with religion, or, more precisely, it was then 
that attempts were made to effect my indoctrination, as a religiously zealous grandmother 
unilaterally escorted me to the First (Swedish) Evangelical Free Church, where the term 
‘free’ bore no relationship whatsoever to theology.3  Yet, serendipitously and ironically, it 
was exactly this unwanted experience that provided a pre-adolescent introduction to 
architecture, long before I could foresee the consequences.  During my Sunday school 
tenure, the church’s Neo-Classical building underwent a major architectural extension, in 
the only appropriate style of the day, that of ‘Modernism’, and I was very much aware of 
its happening.  Inexplicably, my interest in the project, this first sighting of the intersection 
of religion and architecture, was more than passing curiosity.  It lay deeper and remained 
dormant for most of a decade.  Eventually, the modernised church building – its 
architectural influence only beginning to stir – would be the site of my ‘Confirmation’, an 
event offering my grandmother the illusion of a dream fulfilled but providing me with a 
coming-of-age that sanctioned rebellion and a departure from the church. 
Then, owing to an especially progressive seventh-grade Industrial Arts teacher,4 I 
was introduced to architecture as a potential vocation; an introduction that ignited my 
emergent interest and, once again, saw religion and architecture intersect, albeit 
divergently.  I enthusiastically fled religion and bounded toward architecture, not yet 
understanding its underlying potential for ‘religiosity’ – within the discipline and without.  
Coincidentally, I pursued an architectural education in the waning days of Modernism, 
perhaps the most ‘religious’ of architecture’s many movements, as evidenced by the zeal 
of its proponents and its propensity to espouse universal truths.  Architecture was on the 
cusp of Post-Modernism, which, particularly in America, proved to be an often awkward 
form of Historicism.  And, as I approached graduation, Post-Modernism was already 
being overshadowed by talk (though very little practice) of Deconstructivism.  I was 
perhaps most influenced, however, by a teacher and mentor who never spoke of ‘style’ or 
‘movement’.  Instead, he taught that “the seed of the solution is in the problem” and 
championed architecture as “one of the performing arts,” something dynamic, emotional, 
                                               
3
 In Scandinavia, the term ‘free church’ refers to a church that is not part of the official ‘state church’, and 
therefore ‘free’ of the tax that is imposed to support the state church. When migrants brought their ‘free 
church’ to the USA, they retained the term in its name. The denomination is, in fact, of very conservative 
theology; and was more so in the years I describe. 
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and of no fixed identity, something “that changes.”5  Under that influence, I began to 
wonder – when, for example, looking at the work of architects such as Richard Meier – 
how it could be that obviously differing circumstances affecting the design of a house in 
Connecticut and an art museum in Atlanta, GA (and two decades later, a church in 
Rome), could be calling for such deliberately similar architectural responses, at least in 
terms of formal expression.  What forces could be at work in such cases – exemplified by 
many architects, in many places, and in many so-called styles – that seemingly sanction 
the denial of or resistance to a situation’s entirety?  What is it that might, instead, make 
room for and focus attention on the entire situation? 
As such questions were germinating, irony was to strike a third time.  During 
graduate school and immediately following, I found myself in the employ of a generalist 
architectural firm that was establishing a specialisation in ecclesiastical design.  Initially 
successful in avoiding such projects, I was eventually coerced into one and gradually 
became compelled by the quarry of history, symbolism, and human pursuit that spirituality 
presents to architecture – if architects are willing to do the hard work of excavation and 
extraction, work made particularly difficult by spirituality’s aversion to calculative 
description and insistence on maintaining mystery.  Thus it was the church that 
introduced me to architecture and, then, architecture that ‘saved’ me from the church and, 
now, architecture that turned me back into the church’s midst, albeit largely in a 
professional capacity.  Again, I found myself at the intersection of architecture and 
religion, where I had begun.  What has followed is a career involving the design of 
buildings of almost every typology but with a focus on faith-based architecture.  Christian 
projects (Protestant, Roman Catholic, and Orthodox) led to ecumenical projects, which, in 
turn, led to interfaith projects encompassing the world’s major religions.  I can only 
surmise that my passion for such diverse engagements was born and nurtured in the 
space made for it by my childhood and early-adolescent experience, which was in fact a 
kind of ‘emptying’ through which, as Meister Eckhart famously describes it, “God … rid 
me of God.”6  Not surprisingly, however, a career situated so close to religion periodically 
presented a sense of obligation to ‘join in’ and ‘belong to’ some particular tradition.  But I 
was never able to act on such sentiments, never able to honestly accept the proposed 
creeds or engage in the suspension of thinking so often asked of those who would 
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(instead) ‘believe’.  A Chicago theologian and clergyman – a client who became a close 
friend, and whose thinking is anything but suspended – suggested that my ‘emptiness’ 
would be filled not at one ‘table’ but at many7; a suggestion that proved assuaging, as 
well as patently correct in terms of spiritual and disciplinary pursuits.  In many ways, his 
prophecy is realised by this project. 
Having never joined or belonged, and therefore having never been baptised, it is 
again ironic that I would become intrigued by the Christian concept of the paschal 
mystery, and its direct extension to baptism, as a kind of ‘dying’ that paradoxically leads 
to a fuller experience of life; and how – at least conceptually – that resonates with my 
own experience in the creative act of architectural design.  It is out of such interest that 
this project arose; initially envisaged to focus on the manner in which the concept of the 
paschal mystery might inform the creative process and, through it, architecture.  But the 
paschal mystery is a complex theological topic, many layers of which are superfluous to 
its capacity to inform human creativity.  In fact, it is primarily one layer – actually, the core 
of the paschal mystery – which proves most relevant to this discourse.  Just as there 
would be no Christianity without the paschal mystery, there would be no paschal mystery 
without its claim of divine ‘self-emptying’, or kenosis – an emptying-out that is also an 
opening-up and, as will be seen, much more.  Kenosis can be seen as the ontology of the 
paschal mystery, and thereby also that of the Christian faith that has been constructed 
around it.  The paradox, of course, is that Christianity’s institutional forms have – to 
varying degrees – been so successful in presenting the antithesis of kenosis, insofar as 
they resist opening-up; that is, they resist their own kenosis.  It is also the case that the 
doctrines of the church do not hold the origins of kenosis.  Indeed, although Christianity is 
fundamentally kenotic, kenosis is not fundamentally Christian.  The concept is much older 
and deeper than that, traceable to the earliest philosophers in both Western and Eastern 
cultures, arising in some form across most faith traditions, and the subject of 
interdisciplinary discussion across time.  In common to all such discourse, however, is the 
ultimate connection of kenosis to creativity, whether seen as divine or as cosmic, 
evolutionary, and human. 
THESIS 
On the foundations of that connection – kenosis to creativity – this project develops its 
central proposition that humanity’s approach to and execution of creative opportunity can 
be valuably informed by that which kenosis reveals.  In this proposition, I suggest that the 
understanding of kenosis can be extended from the realm of theologians and 
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philosophers to that of others who also create an increasingly secularised, globalised, 
and environmentalised – indeed, aestheticised – world.  Such creators and their pursuits 
are, of course, manifold, with no single discipline fully representative of all creativity.  
Nonetheless, I further suggest that the proposed extension of kenotic understanding can 
be profitably advanced by using architecture as exemplar.  Integrating discovery and 
design, art and science, calculation and meditation, but being none of those alone, 
architecture is a fundamental and traditional expression of human creativity – arguably 
amongst the most primal outside reproduction – one capable of transcendent imagination 
but constantly susceptible to banal (even violent) fancy.8  Owing to such promising 
vulnerability – but also raising a question as to what it is about vulnerability that is 
promising – architecture offers a worthy vantage point from which to await the approach 
of kenosis.  Thus far, however, my proposition fails to suggest why or how human 
creativity, via architecture, is advantaged by an understanding of kenosis.  Why await it? 
I proceed to argue that an understanding of kenosis offers architecture, and 
thereby human creativity, another – perhaps clearer – understanding of itself, its actuality 
and potentiality.  Therein lies the capacity to elevate the contributions that architecture 
and all of its creators make to the aesthetisation of culture.  Kenosis is not abstract.  It is 
fundamental to human being and, in turn, to human creativity and, therefore, to 
architecture.  It opens up questions of each, or, more precisely, it is the opening-up of 
such questions, and, as that, it inherently resists closure.  It asks of architecture the 
nature of its very being.  It sustains the question and refuses simple response.  In fact, 
this question that kenosis opens-up is one that asks not for answers but for kenosis as 
response, and it is such response that holds transformative potential.  Much as 
philosopher Jacques Derrida proposes a kenosis of language in order to speak anew of 
God,9 I suggest a similar kenosis – specifically, a kenosis of architectural language – so 
as to think and speak in new ways about architecture and creativity, ways that include 
kenosis, itself, as an essential concept to be spoken about.  Indeed, to speak of kenosis 
is already to speak of the creativity and, therefore, the creativity of architecture, which it 
always embeds. 
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ANALYSIS 
As this dissertation commences, it is tempting to invoke notions of an ‘investigation’ or 
‘examination’, with measurable goals, objectives, and strategies that expose the subject, 
test the proposition, and draw conclusions; in other words, to outline a definitive, 
analytical methodology.  But the very nature of kenosis resists such an approach.  
Kenosis is neither quantifiable nor calculable, and might be seen, by some, to run 
contrary to conventional logic (often unilinear).  In fact, not only does kenosis not operate 
contrary to logic, it can be seen to offer a more profound – and richly multilinear – basis 
for thinking.  Kenosis is an opening-up that precludes any conclusive shutting-down.  It 
struggles against being strategically corralled, because it ultimately is a struggle.  While it 
is common to think of a researcher approaching and apprehending – even ‘mastering’ – a 
topic (on the researcher’s terms), kenosis turns that around, suggesting instead that the 
researcher make-ready or make-room for the topic’s approach and appearance (on the 
topic’s terms).  Like all objective research, that concerning kenosis demands openness, 
but, thereafter, it less often leads to finite discoveries and more often to the “gates of 
Mystery.”10  Kenosis questions – even undermines – some of the common conceptions of 
methodology and, true to its nature, leaves the question open.  It encourages a lighter 
grip on strategy, if not a counterintuitive letting-go of it; what might be called a ‘kenotic 
methodology’.  Despite such challenges, there is no suggestion that all methodology is 
futile in the face of kenosis, or that kenosis renders unconcealment impossible.  Indeed, 
kenosis is unconcealing, and unconcealment is kenotic.  Nor is there any suggestion that 
kenotic mysteriousness dooms any unconcealment of kenosis to incoherence or 
incommunicability.  A ‘kenotic methodology’ merely calls for a sufficiently emptied and 
malleable outlook – though not one ungrounded – with which to invite, await, and engage 
an experience of kenosis: its struggle, between-ness, and incompleteness, as well as its 
opportunity. 
Thinking About Kenosis 
Accordingly, in Part One, I endeavour to establish the foundations of a kenotic outlook.  
This chapter has already revealed some of the dissertation’s foundations – its genesis 
and thesis – and shown both to be kenotic in their own right.  Now, as another 
foundational aspect of the project is exposed – its approach, or methodology – that, too, 
can be seen to be given by kenosis.  Although the pursuit of the project and its thesis is 
personal, it is not merely subjective.  It is qualitative, phenomenological, and 
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hermeneutical. It is something like that which Klaus Krippendorff, in Content Analysis, 
describes as an “interactive-hermeneutic” approach; one involving “a close reading of 
relatively small amounts of textual matter and the rearticulation of given texts into new 
narratives,” as well as an acknowledgement of “working within hermeneutic circles in 
which [the analyst’s] own socially or culturally conditioned understandings constitutively 
participate.”11  It is a kind of interpretive process (systematic, but neither unilinear nor 
determinate), which effects a thinking about kenosis and, consequently, prioritises 
interpretations that derive from the meditative rather than the calculative.  Indeed, the 
pursuit is kenotic, and the research, thinking, and writing that comprise this dissertation 
are, in many ways, events of kenosis.  It follows, then, that a reading of the dissertation 
may be equally kenotic. 
A ‘kenotic methodology’ – one of emptying and opening-up – commences its 
deployment in Chapter 2, where the foundations of kenosis, itself, are critically examined; 
foundations that cross disciplines, cultures, faith traditions, and epochs.  Such crossings 
are evidence that this project, which serendipitously (and somewhat naively) appeared to 
begin at the intersection of religion and architecture, has, in the course of its pursuit, 
come to be grounded at a much more complex nexus; one that encompasses matters of 
philosophy, theology, phenomenology and science, transcendence and immanence, 
divinity and humanity, East and West, antiquity and modernity – and always creativity.  
Chapter 2 opens-up a thinking about kenosis through the analysis, correlation, and 
presentation of kenotic principles from foundational sources; sources that include the 
orthodox, mystical, and radical.  It does so by drawing on several (but, clearly, not all) 
major theologians, philosophers, and interdisciplinary thinkers, whose work can be seen 
as contributing to kenotic thinking.  Often, however, kenosis is not the explicit subject of 
such thinker’s thinking; a fact requiring that the actual subjects be examined through a 
kenotic lens and explicated accordingly, in order to reveal kenotic value and contribute to 
this discourse.  Indeed, the critically-synthesised, synoptic view of kenosis presented in 
Chapter 2 is, itself, a contribution to kenotic thinking, previously unavailable in such form. 
I begin at the so-called locus classicus of kenosis – a short but weighty passage 
of Christian scripture by the apostle Paul – and do so, in part, by examining and 
comparing the work of theologians such as Hans Urs von Balthasar, François-Xavier 
Durrwell, and Jürgen Moltmann, as well as Anne Hunt, Martha Frederiks, and Ian 
Barbour.  Revealed is much more than the merely classical aspects of this centrepiece in 
Christian thought.  But attention then turns to essential antecedents from antiquity – 
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notions of space and place, as well as matrix, medium, and agent – not only seen in 
Pythagorean and Atomist concepts and, then, in the thinking of Plato and Artistotle, but 
also in early Judaic theology.  Modern philosophers Max Jammer and Edward Casey 
offer insight into the genealogy and relevance of such thinking, which aids in my effort to 
locate the kenotic dimensions thereof.  While such antecedents prefigure and return to 
the kenotic claim of Christianity, they also point beyond to medieval thinking, elements of 
which, I suggest, advance the discussion of kenosis.  Contributions are found in the work 
of Thomas Aquinas (and analyses by Timothy Pawl and Leo Elders), but are especially 
pertinent in Meister Eckhart’s thinking about Gelassenheit (including interpretations by 
John Caputo) and in Rabbi Luria’s doctrine of zimzum (with explications by Gershom 
Scholem).  Then, juxtaposed with Early Modernity’s renewed debate about space and 
place – most famously that between Gottfried Leibniz and Isaac Newton – I explore 
theology’s necessary engagement with philosophy and science, an engagement that 
appears increasingly framed by kenotic thinking, even if not named as such. 
My search for the underpinnings of kenotic thought continues in Late Modernity, 
where theology – particularly Christian but also Judaic – takes up a broader view of 
kenosis and hence creation, as a means to better align itself with evolving (and 
evolutionary) scientific ‘truths’.  At least in part, such movement is prompted by 
philosophy.  Each in their own ways, Georg Hagel, Friedrich Nietzsche, Alfred North 
Whitehead, and Hans Jonas posit thinking that sees concepts of the divine move 
decidedly – and, I propose, kenotically – toward secularisation.  The philosophy of 
hermeneutics, espoused by Hans-Georg Gadamer and others, closely relates to and 
expands kenotic thinking, as does the extensive and diverse work of Martin Heidegger.  
The latter’s thinking is used throughout the dissertation, but, in Chapter 2, I highlight 
Heidegger’s re-opening – and shifting – of the Eckhartian notion of Gelassenheit, or 
releasement, and I examine the nuances that Charles Guignon adds to the topic.  I also 
look to other Continental philosophers, those such as Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques 
Derrida, who explicitly discuss kenosis and endeavour to name many of its attributes and 
manifestations in human experience (though not in architecture).  Importantly, throughout 
the development of kenotic thinking in Western philosophy, there can be seen Eastern 
parallels, corollaries, and analogies – not uncommonly preceding or prefiguring Western 
thought.  The works, for example, of Chinese philosopher and poet Laotse, as well as 
that of Japanese philosophers Kitaro Nishida, Keiji Nishitani, and Masao Abe, offer ample 
evidence.  Hence, I explore enough of Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, and also Islam, to 
establish that kenotic notions pervade all of those traditions, even if sometimes revealed 
ambiguously or in ways peculiar to each.  The resulting interfaith conversation is 
significant in an increasingly globalised and secularised world.  I conclude Chapter 2 by 
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examining a more contemporary and radicalised philosophy of kenosis, one notably 
posited by Gianni Vattimo as part of his ‘weak thinking’, which unequivocally names 
secularisation (and, with it, globalisation) as kenosis; a very real and contemporary 
phenomenon.  It is largely owing to such a view – as well as that of other contemporary 
philosophers, including John Caputo – that kenosis is most fully opened-up, preparing the 
way for it to be seen manifested in creativity; indeed, in architecture. 
Despite clear linkages to creativity and creation, the kenotic nexus is absent any 
explicit invocation of kenosis in architecture.  In fact, that absence may cause some 
readers to see Chapter 2 as unrelated or unnecessary to the discussion, perhaps too 
much outside the discipline of architecture.  But kenosis cannot be heard in conversation 
with architecture unless it is first heard and understood in itself.  The purpose of Chapter 
2 is such a hearing and understanding, which, once established, reveals that in the 
conspicuous absence of architecture from kenotic discourse – precisely in that 
‘emptiness’ – the primary opportunities and contributions of this project lie. 
Thinking About Kenosis Through Architecture 
Part Two – Chapters 3 to 6 – addresses that absence and invites kenosis to manifest in 
architecture, to appear instantiated and concretised.  It expands a thinking about kenosis 
to a thinking about kenosis through architecture.  Even as kenosis informs architecture, 
architecture also informs kenosis by demonstrating that kenosis can be spatially 
manifested; an unsurprising phenomenon, since, as revealed in Chapter 2, kenosis is first 
grounded in concepts of space and place.  This part of the dissertation makes-room for 
kenosis (and its antitheses) to be unconcealed in eight specific architectural ‘situations’ 
(not merely buildings, but ‘places’ in the philosophical sense), selected primarily for what 
appear to be their kenotic claims – though none explicitly invokes kenosis.  Such claims 
are made either by those who conceived the projects or by those who have critiqued 
them, or by both.  Each chapter offers a new kenotic view of one or more of these 
projects and, consequently, a new view of kenosis as well.  Indeed, each chapter makes 
its own contribution to the topics of architecture and kenosis – and each could, perhaps, 
be read independently – but it is in the consideration of these chapters, together, that the 
fullest view of kenosis can be seen in architecture. 
Like kenosis, the selected situations cross boundaries, including those of culture, 
typology, design philosophy, style, and time.  They evidence the instantiation of kenosis 
in attitude, execution, or materialisation, or in all three, and manifest in examples that are 
seen to represent Modernism, Postmodern Historicism, Environmentalism, Regionalism, 
and Neo-Modernism, as well as Critical- and Non-Modernism.  The primary works are 
those of architects Louis Kahn, I.M. Pei, Tadao Ando, Daniel Libeskind, and Peter 
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Eisenman, but also included are projects by Michael Graves and Norman Foster.  
Located in the USA, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, the contexts of these projects 
and their architects are geographically diverse.  Several are influenced by one or more 
faith traditions: Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism, Islam, or Hinduism, all of which include 
kenotic thinking (as Chapter 2 shows).  Although these selections are well-known and 
generally large in scale – some ‘monumental’ – neither attribute produces greater or 
lesser instantiations of kenosis.  As discussed later, the most modest – perhaps 
vernacular – work can be equally revealing of kenosis.12  Indeed, all of the selected 
situations are useful and worthy to this dissertation, but they by no means exhaust 
kenotic manifestations in architecture, nor are they necessarily superior to countless 
other selections that might have been made.  Kenosis, whether by presence or absence, 
whether by embrace or rejection, is evidenced in every situation. 
The opening-up of each situation involves, as well, an opening-up to each.  
Research centres on a fine grade reading of the situations, not only by way of what 
Krippendorff calls text, or discourse – verbal, pictorial, and symbolic data – but also 
through personal visits to observe, record, and critique actual experiences of each, in 
light of historic and current circumstances.  Expanding on Krippendorff, the approach can 
be seen to align, broadly, with the notions of “interpretive-historical research,” described 
by Linda Groat and David Wang in Architectural Research Methods.  Remembering that 
kenosis tends to resist the calculative, strategic, and tactical, such an approach can 
nonetheless survey various types of evidence, including the “determinative, contextual, 
inferential, and recollective”; and, in addition to the “use of extant documents,” such an 
approach can employ other tactics, including “on-site familiarity” and “visual inspection” 
and “comparison with conditions elsewhere,” though primarily as means of opening-up to 
what kenosis might reveal.13  In some instances, my exploration of selected situations 
includes aspects of the biographic – that of architects or other situational participants – as 
inferential or recollective evidence, which, through reasoned analysis, provides a way of 
understanding an individual whose attitude or approach (either kenotic or not) 
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significantly influenced a particular situation’s outcome.14  Likewise, architectural 
assessments occasionally include aspects of the descriptive, as determinative, 
contextual, or, also, inferential evidence.  I do not use the descriptive to pictorialise.  
Rather, I see it as a means to explore – again, through reasoned analysis – particular 
aspects of kenotic instantiation, the understanding of which is somehow enhanced by 
such description.  Just as kenosis gives this project its ‘methodology’, kenosis also gives 
the dissertation various ‘voices’, as needed to open-up the diversity that is kenosis. 
Similarly, kenosis suggests the avenues of research by which it might be 
approached and by which its revelations might be invited.  Such avenues emerge in the 
theological and philosophical grounding of kenosis (outlined in Chapter 2), as well as in 
the architectural grounding of any given situation.  Indeed, each of the selected situations 
is approached, not by the application of standardised assessment criteria (the purpose 
not actually being comparison), but in ways that the situation, itself, is calling for.  
Consequently, my readings of these selected situations draw – to various extents and in 
various combinations – on the evidence provided by kenotic thinking and its thinkers, by 
architects, clients, and the other ‘creators’ involved in a situation’s realisation, as well as 
by architectural thinkers, whose reading of the situation, though not through a kenotic 
lens, is nonetheless helpful to a new, purposefully kenotic reading.  There is no 
preconceived or strategic notion to ‘use’ particular thinkers to extract the kenosis in 
particular situations.  In a sense, the particular situations call on particular thinkers and 
thinking, those that foster an unconcealment of the situations’ kenotic concealments.  
That – as Heidegger will be seen to suggest, and as will be further discussed – requires 
attentiveness not to the act of unconcealing but to the act of respecting the concealment.  
What I have referred to as a ‘kenotic methodology’ enables exactly that, and, pursuant to 
such an approach, the situations do reveal differing degrees and aspects of kenotic 
instantiation.  Some convincingly and extensively reveal kenosis, though never perfectly 
or completely.  Others reveal instantiations that initially appear kenotic but, on closer 
reading, prove less so; while still others present the converse.  And some situations 
reveal the unawareness or ignoring of kenosis, if not the outright resistance thereto.  
Even the latter revelations, however, are a kind of emptying that make them part of this 
discourse. 
Various thinkers and thinking from Chapter 2 are seen again in Chapters 3 to 6.  
Still other philosophers are introduced in connection with specific architectural situations, 
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their thinking discussed in the detail called for by each exposition.  For example, the work 
of philosopher Andrew Benjamin, especially his exploration of hope and cosmopolitanism 
and his application of such thought to the Jewish Museum Berlin and the Memorial for the 
Murdered Jews of Europe, is essential to the unconcealment – in Chapter 6 – of what I 
see as kenotic (and apparently non-kenotic) instantiations in those two situations.  
Equally important to the same pursuit is the work of two other scholars: James Young, 
professor of English and Judaic studies, who writes with first-hand knowledge of both 
projects, and philosophy professor Renée van Riessen, whose interpretation of 
Levinasian kenosis likewise benefits my readings of these Berlin projects.  A kenotic 
reading of The Church of the Light, in Japan, is similarly aided, not only by reprising 
Nishida, Nishitani, and Abe, but also by introducing aspects of the thinking of 
theologian/professor Jeannine Hill Fletcher and philosopher/professor Steve Odin, 
especially as seen in their work on religious diversity and interfaith relations, respectively.  
These and still others – including philosophers Georg Simmel, Walter Benjamin, Anthony 
Vidler, David Krell, and Bruce Benson, as well as sociologist Thomas Gieryn – add 
specific insight to the kenotic readings of various architectural situations. 
Since, like many who have theorised about architecture, I regularly refer to 
Heideggerian concepts,15 I am inevitably attracted to the work of philosopher Jeff Malpas, 
whose development of ‘topology’ and ‘thinking of place’ invaluably strengthens the 
connection of Heidegger to place and, hence, to architecture – and, so, is important to 
several of the architectural situations I discuss.  Indeed, as Chapters 3 to 6 focus on 
architecture as a vehicle for exploring kenosis, I am additionally drawn to a further 
company of diverse but specifically architectural thinkers – critics, theorists, historians, 
educators, and practitioners – amongst them, Stanley Allen, Ali Alraouf, Jin Baek, Ralf 
Brand, Deborah Barnstone, Michael Benedikt, Joseph Burton, Kenneth Frampton, Paul 
Goldberger, Sarah Goldhagen, Simon Guy, Jack Hartray, Charles Jencks, Philip Jodidio, 
John Lobell, Steven Moore, Christian Norberg-Schulz, Juhani Pallasmaa, Vincent Scully, 
Paolo Soleri, and Robert Venturi.  Regardless of discipline, however, I ask of each 
thinker’s thinking not so much what has already been told of their subjects but, rather, 
what such thinking might unconceal about the concept of kenosis, and how it might open-
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 Although I draw most heavily on the work of Martin Heidegger, I do so not to repeat a search for 
‘Heidegger’s thinking on architecture’. That search is famously and usefully undertaken by Christian Norberg-
Schulz. But, as Norberg-Schulz admits, “Heidegger did not leave us any text on architecture.” Norberg-Schulz 
thus searches for and extrapolates the ‘architecture’ in Heidegger’s philosophy, which he finds primarily 
insofar as architecture is seen in ‘place’ or ‘topology’; a farmhouse, temple, and bridge being the most 
explicitly architectural objects of Heidegger’s thinking. See C. Norberg-Schulz, "Heidegger's Thinking on 
Architecture," in Architecture: Meaning and Place (New York: Electa/Rizzoli, 1988), 39-48. As I explain later in 
this paragraph, my endeavour is not to find architectural thinking in Heidegger’s philosophy, but to find 
Heidegger’s philosophical thinking – particularly that which somehow elucidates kenosis – manifested in 
architecture. 
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up – or assist one in opening-up to – the unconcealment of kenosis in architecture; that 
which is largely untold.  It is the same that I ask of each situation. 
Thinking About Architecture Through Kenosis 
Finally, with the foundations of kenosis exposed, with kenosis shown to be manifestable 
in architecture, and still with an open and malleable outlook, Part Three – Chapters 7 and 
8 – turns to a thinking about architecture through kenosis.  Roles reverse, and kenosis 
now becomes a vehicle for exploring architecture.  Amplified is that by which kenosis can 
inform architecture and, by extension, creativity in general.  Just as Parts One and Two 
deal primarily with the (past and present) actualities of kenosis and kenosis in 
architecture, Part Three turns to potentialities.  How might architecture look, viewed 
through a kenotic lens?  How might architecture look – or what might it be – amidst its 
own kenosis; its own emptying?   
Many of the major thinkers, upon whom I draw in earlier parts of the dissertation, 
are reprised in Chapter 7, almost as an ensemble at the performance’s climax.  There 
was, however, no such calculated intent.  It is merely what happened; perhaps a 
phenomenon of writing about kenosis and doing so kenotically, rather than strategically.  
Heidegger and Vattimo continue to figure prominently, even as others – including writer 
and design critic Deyan Sudjic and architectural historian/theorist Alberto Pérez-Gómez – 
are introduced to open-up and augment particular aspects of my thesis.  Ultimately, all 
such thinkers assist in doing what needs to be done: an asking of the culminating 
questions and, then, a listening (with all senses) for response.  Chapter 7 asks of 
architecture’s ‘fullness’, of the barriers to its own kenosis, its ‘-ists’ and ‘-isms’.  It also 
asks of the horizons beyond such barriers.  It explores an emptying of architecture and 
what that might say about architecture’s ‘creators’, their creativity, their relationality, their 
participation in creating, and, ultimately, their humanity.  It also explores the nature of the 
creations that might emanate from an ‘emptied’ architecture, and asks whether the 
emptying of architecture signifies its end, or at least its end-ings.  Amidst such questions 
– and tentative but informative answers – Chapter 8 finally frames the struggle and 
inescapable paradox of kenosis, as seen through architecture and human creativity.  It 
posits that grace, the impermanent achievement of what a given situation, in its entirety, 
is calling for (what some call beauty and some credit to a god), actually lies in the 
dis-grace of kenosis.  Such is that which one cannot strive for, or presume to attain, but 
which ongoingly proposes to proceed – albeit in a complex, multilinear, indeterminate, 
and contingent manner – toward a more grace-filled world.  And, true to its kenotic 
origins, this proposition opens and sustains still more questions – perhaps the world’s 
most important. 
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2 
Kenosis: 
A Synoptic View 
Insofar as kenosis resists any notion of its ‘conquer’ or ‘seizure’, an understanding of the 
emptying and opening-up that is kenosis requires an emptying and opening-up of 
kenosis, which, in turn, requires an emptying and opening-up to kenosis.  This chapter 
invites and facilitates all three happenings.  For the opened-up reader, it reveals kenosis 
synoptically, but sufficiently, so as to establish its foundations.  Without such revelation, 
there would be little potential for the extension of kenosis to architecture, for the viewing 
of architecture through a kenotic lens, or for architecture to be informed thereby.  Indeed, 
the central thesis of this discourse requires exactly such extending, viewing, and 
informing.  Although there is almost nothing of architecture in this chapter, kenosis 
nonetheless appears on multifarious paths and reveals its inextricable embedment in 
creation and creative events; those that may be seen as acts of the divine or the cosmos 
and evolution, as well as those that are clearly acts of humanity.  Also uncovered is the 
genealogy of kenosis from antiquity to its revival and expansion in modernity, and to its 
radicalisation in postmodernity.  This chapter introduces and connects the major thinkers 
and thinking that ground the subsequent, unfolding discourse.  As they emerge in this 
initial opening-up to kenosis, they promote the ongoing opening-up of kenosis. 
LOCUS CLASSICUS 
The oft-made claim that Christian theology is the locus classicus of kenosis is not entirely 
unjustifiable, though, as will become apparent, it is neither the origin nor the culmination 
of kenosis and kenotic thought.1  Nonetheless, since it was via the Christian doctrine of 
the paschal mystery that I came to this project and was introduced to kenosis (the 
doctrine’s essence), there is an element of poetic merit in viewing kenotic genealogy with 
reference to its classical place in Christianity.  Such a viewing position requires a looking 
back to Plato and before, as well as a looking forward to the present day, not so much in 
search of a chronological history, but a thematic one.  Thus the Christian notion of 
kenosis can be seen as arising from that which preceded it, as well as that to which 
subsequent thought reacts, either by expanding or challenging it.  The fact that so much 
of Christian theology originally draws on Platonic and Aristotelian thought, and, 
furthermore, that the most contemporary and radicalised interpretations of kenosis relate 
                                               
1
 A brief, but useful introduction to 'kenosis', from a theological perspective, is provided in J. Haught, 
"Kenosis," in Encyclopedia of Science and Religion, ed. J.W.V. van Huyssteen (New York: Macmillian 
Reference USA, 2003), 500-502. 
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themselves to Christianity, makes the choice to view kenosis from this vantage point all 
the more fitting.  For purposes of this discourse, however, it is important to primarily 
consider what the Christian narrative proposes about kenosis, as a concept, and largely 
avoid the skirmishes it stirs within theology.  Even in a lengthy and comprehensive 
treatise on the paschal mystery, noted theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar (1905-1988) 
states that “the doctrine of Kenosis is so difficult from the viewpoints of exegesis, the 
history of tradition and of dogma that here we can only touch upon it, and deal with it just 
so far as it is unavoidable for our theme.”2  As if to corroborate Balthasar’s view, 
theologian Jürgen Moltmann (1926-) acknowledges not only “the many individual 
exegetical problems” associated with kenosis but also “the theological ones.”3  Although 
such difficulties and problems are amply debated in theological circles,4 they are 
essentially unresolvable and, here, largely superfluous.  I therefore echo Balthasar’s 
caveat and limit my exploration, focusing on those aspects of the Christian concept of 
kenosis that usefully inform a secular reading of kenosis and human creativity, particularly 
as it might later be applied to architecture. 
That which constitutes Christianity as a pivot point of kenotic thought is the 
fundamentally distinguishing claim of a manifested messiah, the divine in human form, 
their Christ.  (This discussion, however, is indifferent to the factuality of such a claim, 
since the concept, alone, is sufficiently pivotal.)  Although prefigured in Hebrew prophesy 
(as seen later in this chapter), the appearance of a messiah is claimed to have 
eventuated only in the Christian narrative, where it is seen through the complex salvific 
concept called the paschal mystery, referring foremost to the humiliating but paradoxically 
life-promising death of a messiah who somehow possesses two natures, divine and 
human (another topic of debate, flowing from kenosis).  The paschal mystery courses its 
way throughout the Christian scriptures but takes on a unique dimension in the [ca.] 60 
CE letter from the apostle Paul to a fledgling Christian community in Philippi (Greece).5  
In that letter, which appears in the Christian scriptures as ‘Philippians’, Paul discusses the 
merits of “imitating Christ’s humility” (Phil 2).  Most of that discussion centres on a 
recitation of what is regarded as an early Christian hymn (Phil 2:5-11), now often referred 
                                               
2
 H.U. von Balthasar, Mysterium Paschale: The Mystery of Easter, trans. A. Nichols, English ed. (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, (1970) 2005), 23. 
3
 J. Moltmann, "God's Kenosis in the Creation and Consummation of the World," in The Work of Love: 
Creation as Kenosis, ed. J.C. Polkinghorne (Grand Rapids, MI and Cambridge, UK: William B. Eerdmans, 
2001), 138. 
4
 In addition to their own extensive works, both Balthasar and Moltmann direct readers of the above cited 
references to other sources in which the noted difficulties and problems of kenosis are pursued. An example 
of such difficulties is briefly discussed at note 11. 
5
 The HarperCollins Study Bible (NRSV) indicates that Paul’s letter to the Philippians was written sometime 
between 54 and 62 CE. See H.W. Attridge and W.A. Meeks, eds., The HarperCollins Study Bible: New 
Revised Standard Version (San Francisco: HarperOne, 2006), 1908. 
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to as the ‘Kenosis Hymn’.6  Therein, an already-existing Word, or Logos, is portrayed as 
being “in the form of God” but not inclined to “regard equality with God as something to 
be exploited.”7  Instead, this Christ who would be named Jesus, “being born in human 
likeness,” is said to have “emptied himself” (the original Greek text employs the term 
ekenosen8), thereby “taking the form of a slave.”  Then, “being found in human form, he 
humbled himself” – a kind of earthly extension of his emptying – and, in obedience to 
God, willingly suffered crucifixion, all purportedly for humanity’s salvation.  Thus the act of 
‘self-emptying’ is known by the noun kenosis and, in this narrative, is that which effects 
particular kinds of servitude and humiliation.  Paradoxically, however, it also culminates in 
the “exaltation” of the self-emptied one.  This presentation of kenosis suggests a threefold 
event.  In addition to the kenosis itself, there is that which precedes it and that which 
succeeds it.  Each aspect of the event importantly characterises the conceptual nature of 
kenosis and warrants elucidation. 
Preceding the Kenosis 
Prior to his retelling of the hymn, Paul initiates the kenotic theme in his own words.  He 
asks that the Philippians “do nothing from selfish ambition or conceit …” (Phil 2:3).  Thus, 
even before the term kenosis is deployed, before the notion of self-emptying is invoked, 
                                               
6
 Theologians speculate that this hymn may have been used, originally, in connection with baptismal events 
wherein, according to Christian tradition, catechumens enter the paschal mystery by ‘dying with Christ’ in 
what is effectively their own act of kenosis; a reciprocation of Christ’s. Paul’s retelling of the hymn, as it 
appears in Philippians 2:5-11 (NRSV), is as follows:  
5
Let the same mind be in you that was in Christ Jesus, 
6
 who, though he was in the form of God, 
  did not regard equality with God 
  as something to be exploited, 
7
 but emptied himself, 
  taking the form of a slave, 
  being born in human likeness. 
 And being found in human form, 
8
  he humbled himself 
  and became obedient to the point of death - 
  even death on a cross. 
9
 Therefore God also highly exalted him 
  and gave him the name 
  that is above every name 
10
 so that at the name of Jesus 
  every knee should bend 
  in heaven and on earth and under the earth 
11
 and every tongue should confess 
  that Jesus Christ is Lord, 
  to the glory of God the Father. 
Theologian, Hans Urs von Balthasar, suggests that this is a “rounded off” version of the hymn and that, for 
emphasis, Paul added a line, “even death on a cross,” as the conclusion of verse 8. See von Balthasar, 
Mysterium Paschale: The Mystery of Easter: 23. 
7
 The New Revised Standard Version uses the term ‘exploited’ and translates it, literally, to mean “‘seized’, as 
in a robbery.” In lieu of ‘exploited’, other biblical translations use terms such as ‘grasped’ (English Standard 
Version, International Standard Version, American Standard Version) or ‘clung to’ (New Living Translation) or 
‘used to his own advantage’ (New International Version). 
8
 Other word forms, derived from the root verb kenóō (to empty, or empty out), are used elsewhere in the 
Christian scriptures to mean ‘empty’, ‘emptied’, or ‘void’, but not in direct reference to a divine emptying. 
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there is a call to abandon self-interest.  Then, the early phrases of the hymn reinforce that 
call as they announce the “regard,” or attitude, with which the still-divine and not yet 
incarnate Christ is said to approach his kenotic event.9  He seemingly recognises that 
“equality with God” is an impediment to self-emptying, as well as a contradiction to his 
forthcoming earthly situation.  Therefore he chooses not to exploit, grasp at, or cling to 
the advantage of his divinity.  He volitionally distances himself from the privilege of 
position and lets-go of aspirations to glory or power.  Paul’s preamble and the hymn’s 
initial stanzas thus reveal a kind of prerequisite to kenosis; namely, that it not be 
approached strategically, especially as a pursuit of privilege.  The kenotic paradox, of 
course, is that this renunciation of power is precisely what produces power, perhaps even 
a greater power, that of powerlessness.  That, however, is a subject to be discussed, 
later, in connection with events succeeding the kenosis. 
The Kenosis 
Paul’s preamble goes on to invoke kenosis, itself.  After his call for abandonment of self-
interest, he writes to the Philippians that they should each “look … to the interests of 
others”10 in order that they might “be of the same mind” (and also have “the same love,” 
from verse 2) “that was in Christ” (Phil 2:4-5).  It is in such a mind-set and out of such love 
that – according to the continuing hymn – Christ underwent his kenotic event, the self-
emptying by which he could be human,11 and thereby be consummately relational with 
humanity and attentive to their shared situation.  By virtue of his human-ness, he could 
open-up and make-room for others, even “to the point of death” on their behalf.  Christ’s 
kenosis, then, is his Passion.  Thus the term ‘self-emptying’ comes to be equated with 
notions such as self-contraction, self-withdrawal, self-surrender, self-humbling, self-
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 Balthasar confirms the legitimacy of reading the Kenosis Hymn to mean “that the subject who thus ‘empties’ 
himself by taking the form of a servant is not the already incarnate Christ, but he who abides beyond this 
world, being in the form of God.” See von Balthasar, Mysterium Paschale: The Mystery of Easter: 23-24. 
10
 Notes to the New Standard Revised Version indicate that ‘others’ (in the original text) can be literally 
translated to mean ‘one another’ and, thereby, see Paul suggesting that the Philippian Christians “show 
humility toward one another, not necessarily toward people in general.” Such a suggestion, however, appears 
inconsistent with the model of Christ’s earthly behaviour, and antithetical to kenosis. As such, it points to one 
of the ‘problems’ associated with the theological interpretation of this text. 
11
 It is the exact nature and implications of this ‘self-emptying’ that has stirred so much theological attention 
and debate. Indeed, the origins of kenotic theology are traced primarily to seventeenth century Lutheran 
theologians who suggested that only the ‘attributes’ of divinity had been emptied, not divinity itself. Even then, 
those in Gießen proposed that the emptying was truly a ‘renunciation’, while those at Tübingen advocated 
that the kenosis had actually been krypsis, a ‘concealment’ or ‘hiding’ of divine attributes. Then, in the 
nineteenth century, other Lutheran theologians, including Thomasius, proposed that the divine nature had 
been ‘split’ into two sets of attributes: the outward ones of “majesty,” which were renounced, and the inward 
ones of “truth, holiness, love,” which were retained. As Moltmann points out, although this dichotomous 
treatment of divine attributes found no followers, it did serve to highlight one of the inherent problems in 
kenotic theology. Balthasar’s trinitarian view – discussed here in part – goes some way to resolve that 
problem, though still not fully (sufficient, however, for the purposes of this discourse). See Moltmann, "God's 
Kenosis in the Creation and Consummation of the World," 139; and K. Ward, "Cosmos and Kenosis," in The 
Work of Love: Creation as Kenosis, ed. J.C. Polkinghorne (Grand Rapids, MI and Cambridge, UK: William B. 
Eerdmans, 2001), 155.  
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yielding, and dying-to-self.  Yet, despite all of its seeming negation, this narrative depicts 
the messianic kenosis as a bold and revelatory act of creation.  It purports the physical 
revelation of God to humanity, but, even viewed as myth, it significantly alters the human 
situation in which it ‘happens’.  The mere notion of a hypostasis of God living amongst 
humanity – not only in human form, but as that of a servant who is ultimately executed at 
the hand of humanity – dramatically elevates the possibilities for thinking and acting vis-à-
vis human-divine relationality, and therefore vis-à-vis human being.  In that dynamic, 
three important characteristics of kenosis are uncovered.  Kenosis is seen first as a 
creative act, second as one which both requires and effects relationality, and third as one 
which effects “a transition to a higher plane of action and meaning, [which] transforms the 
nature of what is happening and how it is seen.”12 
The messianic instantiation of kenosis, as a creative act – which Balthasar refers 
to as “the horizontal relationship between Crib and Cross” – leads directly to another, 
more fundamental kenosis.  Because the paschal mystery incorporates the whole story of 
this messiah’s earthly life, it necessarily includes the originating creative act of 
incarnation, by which the divine is seen to become human and be placed humbly 
amongst humanity.  Indeed, the incarnation opens up what Balthasar calls “the vertical 
[relationship] between heaven and the Crib.”13  Although Christ’s self-emptying is seen as 
that which effects his human-ness and consequent passion, it is not that which effects his 
original creation as a human being; that is, it does not effect his begetting.  It is in that 
generation – the incarnation – that Balthasar sees the primal act of kenotic creativity: the 
self-emptying of the Godhead.  As “Father,” Balthasar sees God being the first to let-go of 
his divinity “in an eternal ‘super-Kenosis’,” by which he “makes himself ‘destitute’ of all 
that he is and can be so as to bring forth a consubstantial divinity, the Son.”14  Australian 
theologian Anne Hunt offers a concise summary of the Balthasarian view: 
… all forms of kenosis ad extra are contained within that primal kenosis ad intra 
that is the Father’s generation of the Son.  The generation of the Son manifests 
the complete self-giving of the Father to the Son, a self-yielding surrender of 
divine being.  Similarly, the Son’s self-giving to the Father in his death on the 
cross is already contained within this eternal generation; in fact it is a modality of 
the Son’s procession.15 
This incarnational view not only reveals an originating kenotic event (though not 
necessarily the first, as will subsequently be seen) but also another underlying 
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 What I am naming as a third characteristic is presented and discussed in G.F.R. Ellis, "Kenosis as a 
Unifying Theme for Life and Cosmology," in The Work of Love: Creation as Kenosis, ed. J.C. Polkinghorne 
(Grand Rapids, MI and Cambridge, UK: William B. Eerdmans, 2001), 126. 
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 von Balthasar, Mysterium Paschale: The Mystery of Easter: 23. 
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 Ibid., viii. 
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 A. Hunt, "Psychological Analogy and Paschal Mystery in Trinitarian Theology," Theological Studies 59, no. 
2 (1998): 204. 
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characteristic of kenosis: that of reciprocity.  Kenosis elicits kenotic response.  (It is, 
however, important to note that, despite such response being volitional, kenotic response 
may include agonising reluctance or vigorous resistance, as illustrated in the narrative of 
Gethsemane).  Being a product of the ‘Father’s’ kenosis, the ‘Son’ responds kenotically, 
and similarly declines to cling to divine powers or attributes.  Thus, a divine desire to 
relate to humanity is fulfilled in a “double kenosis,”16 which occurs primordially in God’s 
self-emptying to create itself in human form and, then, secondarily (or consequentially) in 
Christ’s self-emptying to make-room for the desired relations with humanity.  In the latter, 
Christ is seen to be human, a constituent to his human context and earthly situation – at 
least in part.  Balthasar describes the ontological identity of the always extant Logos (and 
eventual Christ) as consubstantially divine; an identity that, despite kenotic 
transformation, is apparently not surrendered in any ultimate way.  There is some sense 
(the extent an ongoing topic of debate) in which the kenotic Christ remains divine, even 
while becoming (through incarnation) and being (through passion) human.  Theology and 
theological debate aside, this concept uncovers still more essential characteristics of 
kenosis.  Self-emptying effects heightened “receptivity” and “hospitality,” or “a conscious 
opening up to the other in order to partially become the other,” in a kind of “hybridisation” 
that finds self and others “radically contextualised” in the situation they comprise.  
Importantly, however, self-emptying does not threaten fundamental self-identity.17  In fact, 
the hybridisation and contextualisation of kenosis points to a strengthening of self-
identity, if self-identity is not regarded as something to grasp at or cling to. 
By invoking Father-Son imagery in his discussions of the incarnation, Balthasar 
takes an obviously trinitarian approach,18 which, according to Hunt, finds that “the paschal 
mystery and mystery of the Trinity are inextricably interconnected.”19  So, amidst the 
divine kenotic events, what is the nature and place of the third hypostasis, the Spirit?  
Hunt finds insight in the work of another theologian, François-Xavier Durrwell 
(1912-2005): 
In Durrwell’s theology … the Trinity is these Three: the Begetter, the Begotten, 
and the divine power of Begetting.  The Spirit … is the power of the process of 
begetting.  Durrwell thus proposes what is effectively a ‘bi-polar’ trinitarian model.  
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 The notion of a ‘double kenosis’ is explored more fully in Ward, "Cosmos and Kenosis," 162-165. 
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 Drawing on the works of Yves Raguin, Theo Sundermeier, and Tinu Ruparell, Martha Frederiks (Utrecht 
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There are only two poles, not three, he insists, for the Father has only one Son, 
who, as the only-Begotten, is the unique term of the Father’s paternal action.  The 
third divine person, the Holy Spirit, is neither the beginning nor the end, but 
envelops both poles of the paternal relationship.20 
Durrwell’s argument is reminiscent of the Augustinian view of love as a ‘trinity’, that of the 
lover, the beloved, and their love, which, used analogously, also points to the third 
hypostasis not as one begotten but as that which binds or envelops the other two.  
Neither view is inconsistent with Balthasar’s notion of “inner-trinitarian love.”21  In their 
depictions of a triune God and, in particular, their characterisation of the Spirit, both 
Durrwell and Balthasar open up additional views of kenosis. 
First, the Spirit is seen as the agent of kenotic creativity,22 thereby allowing it also 
to be seen as that which comes to fill the ‘space’ or ‘room’ made for it by self-emptying.  
As discussed, it is in a kind of double kenosis that the Spirit fills the Father’s self-emptied-
ness to effect the radical hybridisation of the divine in human form, just as it also fills the 
Son’s self-emptied-ness to effect the radical contextualisation of the divine in human 
situation and relation.23  Being ‘filled with spirit’,24 it might be said that kenotic emptiness 
is ‘in-spirited’, or ‘inspired’.  In its emptying and opening-up, kenosis effects a concurrent 
receptivity or taking-in of the other, a kind of ‘inspiration’ (a breathing- or drawing-in), and 
it is precisely this inspired kenotic activity (passive though it may be) that enables the 
happening of creative events.  Second, the Spirit – or creative love – is seen as that 
which binds the inner-trinitarian relationship, a relationship of perichoresis (or 
circumincession).25  In this relationship, “each person of the Trinity is in ecstasy out of 
itself in the other … not only subject of itself but also room for the other,”26 and, in a 
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Perspective  (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2002), 53. 
26
 Moltmann, "God's Kenosis in the Creation and Consummation of the World," 141. Here, Moltmann is 
elucidating the Balthasarian view of kenosis. 
22 
sense, each has partially become the other.  But the notion of perichoresis is not 
restricted by sacred bounds.  In fact, according to the Christian narrative, incarnational 
creation sees divine love offered to the world, with humanity thereby invited to join in “an 
extended perichoresis of sorts,”27 reciprocally responding to divine acts of kenotic 
creativity with its own.  That, in itself, secularises the concept.  Even outside theological 
considerations, the notion of spirit or inspiration – as the creative agent that is love – 
reveals in kenosis a call to human creativity through “deep interpersonal binding,”28 a call 
paradoxically made answerable through kenosis.29 
Succeeding the Kenosis 
That which follows the messianic kenosis is, like that which precedes the kenosis, also 
revealing of kenotic characteristics.  After its reference to “death,” and “even death on a 
cross,” the Kenosis Hymn makes no further reference to resurrection – and certainly not 
to bodily resurrection – yet it does link the kenotic event to Christ’s ultimate “exaltation” 
(Phil 2:9-11).  It is a curious passage, presenting more of those problems and difficulties 
to which Balthasar and Moltmann refer.  It might be read to imply that God’s exaltation is 
posthumous, but that would contradict and virtually negate the Christian story.  More 
likely, since the hymn does not end with death and, instead, goes on to describe another 
event, is the implication that the once-deceased is, by whatever means, again living (or at 
least being), presumably in full divinity.  As such, one reading of the kenotic event could 
see kenosis as a kind of deceit, a mere stratagem by which to seduce humanity with 
divine trickery and then reward God’s second form with both restored powers and 
exaltation.  But a divine being, which has only partially and temporarily taken human 
form, would have no need to be exalted, since such a being is already some integral 
aspect of the already exalted God, with no higher rank or position to which to be elevated.  
I leave the actualities of the event to historians and theologians, instead focusing on its 
potentiality as a concept in creativity. 
Recognising the implausibility – if not irrationality – of God elevating God, and the 
contradiction that a divine deceit would present in the context of a message so focused 
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on love, I would argue that, viewed kenotically, the so-called exaltation cannot be seen as 
the elevation of a divinity or the divine.  Instead, it must be seen as an elevation of 
servitude and the inspired (creative) love out of which that arises.30  It is servitude and 
love that form the very identity of the exalted God-in-human-form, as well as the essential 
nature of the originating Godhead.  In that sense, it is kenosis that is finally extolled, as 
that which invites the creativity of servitude and love.  Implicitly revealed in this exaltation 
are two further characteristics of kenosis.  To extol kenosis is to extol all of the risks 
inherent in servitude and love, for example, “the risk of rejection, the risk of suffering, the 
risk of having to give up preconceived ideas,”31 all of which – and more – are encountered 
in the deep interpersonal binding of being present and receptive to the other.  But, if 
kenosis entails nothing more than risks and demands constant (and futile) self-sacrifice, 
then there is little to extol.  The exaltation of kenosis suggests that it is not merely risky, 
challenging, and weakening, but ultimately power-producing.  In the Christian narrative 
examined thus far, kenosis is seen to produce all of the ‘power’ needed to effect fulfilment 
of messianic creation (incarnation) and creativity (passion).  Of the power that emerges in 
kenosis, Ian Barbour (1923-2013) observes that it is “not power as control over another 
person, but power as empowerment of another person.”  Such empowerment – mutual 
empowerment – is what Christianity espouses as the purpose of the divine kenotic 
events.  “Creative empowerment is not a ‘zero-sum’ game (in which one person loses 
something when the other person gains it), but rather a ‘positive-sum-game’ (in which 
both parties can gain).”32  Although ‘game’ is a dubious image in this context, Barbour’s 
metaphor serves to illustrate a crucial point, one which transcends theology: kenosis is 
mutually fulfilling, even plenitudinous.  Dispossessed of self and in an ‘exalted’ state of 
kenotic servitude, “we are able to absorb the amazing riches of others, the persons in 
themselves,”33 as well as all they embody. 
An Empty Passage 
Despite its brevity (just eleven verses), the bible’s only direct reference to divine kenosis 
presents one of Christianity’s most abundant concepts.  But it is its emptiness that 
sustains kenosis as a subject of ongoing thought in theology and beyond.  Equally or 
more important than that which is said is that which is not said, not written, and not 
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certain; that which forms and sustains mystery.  The kenosis passage is itself kenotic – 
itself emptied.  Yet it is power-filled, a paradoxical representation of the divine: “never 
mightier than in the act of [its] self-limitation … and never greater than in the act of [its] 
self-humiliation.”34  Its power is that of vulnerability or powerlessness, which asks to be 
attended.  It asks readers and thinkers to see what is unspoken and hear what is 
unwritten; to wait, but also to await.  And, in its emptiness, it invites thinking from diverse 
perspectives, especially outside theology.  That task requires a turn toward antiquity and, 
then, an about-face toward modernity. 
ANTECEDENTS 
Kenosis is not a new concept when it appears in the Christian scriptures.  Its novelty, 
there, could only be claimed in connection with its direct attribution to the divine.  But is 
such attribution actually novel?  Classical Christianity appropriates much from the 
philosophy of classical antiquity, in particular that of Plato and Aristotle.  Moreover, 
Christian theology is constructed on a foundation provided by the theology and 
philosophy of Judaism.  As constant historic conversers, and often as antagonists, 
Western philosophy and theology (both Judaic and Christian) are fundamentally 
connected, no less with regard to kenosis.  Just as this discourse cannot, and need not, 
restate all that theology has said about the advent of kenosis in Christianity, the same is 
true of its origins in philosophy and Judaic thought.  It is important, however, to 
acknowledge and outline the kenotic antecedents presented by both, especially those 
aspects, which, as seen in subsequent chapters, support the application of kenosis to 
creativity and, thereby, to architecture. 
In Philosophy 
To speak of emptying and emptiness is to ask of that which is emptied and that which it is 
emptied of.  It is to ask of the container and the contained, of space and things in space, 
and of the places that things form.  Such inquiry is found in Greek philosophy as early as 
the Pythagoreans, who, as Aristotle later tells it: 
“… asserted the existence of the void and declared that it enters into the heavens 
out of the limitless breath – regarding the heavens as breathing the very vacancy 
– which vacancy ‘distinguishes’ natural objects … since it is this void that delimits 
their nature.”35   
Some five or six centuries before kenosis appears in the Christian scriptures, the notion 
of empty space, including its role in relating the heavens with natural objects on earth, is 
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addressed philosophically.36  Like the later Christian concept of a Holy Spirit, the 
Pythagorean vacancy of limitless breath describes a creative agent, insofar as it 
delineates or creates the nature of things.  Pythagorean ‘space’, portrayed as 
dichotomous with matter, is associated with ‘air’.37  It is void and sometimes referred to as 
“the empty” or, in Greek, kenon, a term derived from the same root as kenosis, and 
therefore of interest here.  Democritus (460-370 BCE) and other Atomists deploy the 
concept of kenon with increased emphasis, seeing it as the unoccupied or empty space 
between particles of matter (but not including the matter itself), which allows for 
movement of the particles.  Atomistic kenon is what Edward Casey calls the “strict void,” 
or “no-place.”  Being utterly empty, it lacks “predetermined routes” and therefore has no 
“places or regions” that might otherwise provide “qualities of its own.”38 
Significantly expanding the concept of space – and seeing therein certain qualities 
of its own – Plato (ca. 428-348 BCE) posits space as “the natural receptacle of all 
bodies,”39 which is itself a quality.  As such, Plato’s chōra (literally ‘space’, but from which 
is derived the notion of ‘chorus’, as in that involving singers or dancers) carries with it a 
sense of boundedness, and that begins to connote the existence of place.  This 
boundedness does not suggest boundaries at which the chora and its happenings are 
stopped, but thresholds at which it and its happenings become enabled.40  Therefore, 
chora is often likened to places that enable becoming, places such as room, womb, and 
dance floor.  Chora, however, cannot be seen to possess anything like the same 
determinacy of bounds that such metaphoric references might imply.  Plato describes the 
chora as “the nurse of all becoming,”41 and elucidates its (indeterminate) qualities: 
… it continues to receive all things, and has never in any way whatsoever itself 
taken on any shape similar to any of the things that enter it; for it is by nature a 
matrix for everything which is moved and refigured by the things which enter it, 
and because of those things it appears different at different times.42 
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The ‘quality of its own’ possessed by the chora is not any particular shape or 
character but the capacity to transform, when and as needed, in order to receive 
whatever enters it.  Hence, while the Atomists contrast matter and space, Plato conjoins 
them, even while maintaining their distinction.  Matter becomes in the receptacle of 
space, because, as Max Jammer describes it, “a physical body is merely part of space 
limited by geometric surfaces containing nothing but empty space.”43  For their identity 
and existence, matter and space are mutually reliant on this matrix, which is “the 
generatrix of created things: their mater or material precondition.”44  It is important to note, 
however, as both Casey and F.M. Cornford do,45 that this matrix is not, itself, the begetter 
or creator but rather the medium of creating.  It is that which provides “a seat [or situation] 
for everything that comes to be.”46  Thus, in his turn from kenon to chora, Plato’s 
conception of space continues to reveal kenotic insights.  Through kenosis – that is, by 
emptying – room is made for receiving, and, through the active passivity of both, 
becoming is enabled not only the becoming of the received but also of the receiver.  
Kenosis is not merely an emptying but all that the emptying effects.  The emptied, 
receptive receptacle is that “in which” the qualities of the creation appear, and, by virtue 
thereof, so too appear the (always varying) qualities of the receptacle, in the same 
manner “as fleeting images are seen in a mirror.”47  It is a kind of locus of creat-ivity, 
creat-ing, and emergent creat-ion; a kind of ‘place’ of unfolding kenosis.  Plato’s chora, 
then, is by no means an empty void.  In fact, it is “richly plenary,”48 and that, too, is a 
quality that corroborates kenotic plenitude.49  Paradoxically, it is by emptying the concept 
of kenon of its utter emptiness – to posit, instead, chora – that Plato’s work can be seen 
to open-up the concept of kenosis. 
Of equal or greater importance to the unconcealment of kenosis is Plato’s concept 
of the choric happening, that which ultimately results in qualitative and sensible creation.  
Although the chora, as matrix, associates itself with matter, it is not material.  “Let us not 
say that the mother and receptacle of what has come into being as visible or generally as 
perceptible is either earth or air or fire or water.”50  Instead, the chora receives and 
transforms such matter and forces, even as it transforms its non-material self in order to 
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do so.  This transformation – this happening – is one of motion.  Motion in the chora is 
caused by its reception of dissimilar matter, which produces an imbalance of forces and a 
consequent lack of “equilibrium.”  Thus, in the original choric happening,  
the nurse of becoming … swayed unevenly in every direction as it was shaken by 
the forces, and being moved it in turn shook them.  And the things that were 
moved were constantly being separated and carried in different directions … It 
separated the kinds most unlike each other furthest away from each other and 
pushed those most like each other towards the same place, with the result that 
they came to occupy different regions of space, even before they were arranged 
into an ordered universe.51 
According to this, and as Plato goes on to suggest, it could be surmised that once 
this “winnowing” – or sorting – is finished, such a happening might end in a permanent 
state of rest.  But such is not the case in the chora.  Owing to the sphericality of its 
motion, and therefore a natural inclination “to return on itself,” a kind of compression 
occurs “in which small parts are juxtaposed with large ones, and the smaller disintegrate 
the larger, while the larger cause the smaller to combine, and all are carried … to their 
own region; for a change in size involves a change in the position of their region.”  So it is 
that the bodies are constantly “transforming themselves into each other,”52 such that 
“disequilibrium always keeps coming into being” and “perpetual motion” is ensured.53  
This vivid description reveals the chora’s constant heterogeneity and indeterminacy, but it 
also reveals its regionality and, in that, its relationality.54  By way of its regionalising 
activity, it not only empties and makes-room, so as to gather-in the various parts that 
come to comprise a region, but also establishes the relationality of each region’s parts – 
to the point of bodies becoming the other – and, as well, the relationality of diverse and 
always-changing regions.  In so doing, the chora reveals the potential for peri-chor-esis, 
the invitation and drawing-in to deeply intertwined relationship (discussed earlier in the 
context of trinitarian theology and interpersonal binding).55  Such revelations say much 
about Plato’s chora, but they say as much or more about the nature of kenosis, that by 
which the choric happenings are enabled, animated, and maintained.  Kenosis is shown 
to be an emptying effected by self-contraction, or a re-turning-in on itself.  By virtue 
thereof, it is also clearing, receiving, pluralising, relationalising, transforming, and 
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unending.  Moreover, its being all of this is contingent and indeterminate, if not also 
mysterious.  Kenosis shows to be as enigmatic as the matrix it permeates, and 
perceivable only “in a kind of dream.”56 
Just as the Pythagorean concept of kenon (void, as empty space) is advanced by 
Plato and his concept of chora (space, as receptive matrix), the latter is further advanced 
by Aristotle (384-322 BCE) and his concept of topos (place, as position in space).  And, 
like Plato’s progression, the detail of Aristotle’s progression is comprehensively analysed 
and documented elsewhere, not least in the respective works of Jammer and Casey.  Of 
concern here are those aspects of Aristotelian topos that continue to uncover the nature 
of kenosis.  As seen, Plato discusses the choric motion that establishes regions, each of 
which constitutes some sort of ‘place’, even as he also discusses the movement from 
region to region as bodies “exchange places.”57  In the Physics, Aristotle similarly 
discusses “locomotion” as “change in respect of place,”58 but does so from a significantly 
different perspective.  Plato prioritises an amorphous but essentially singular receptacle, 
or matrix.  Therein are found various regions consisting of transient and transforming 
bodies that occupy space (place) specific to them, such that their places move with them.  
Place is never fixed, and the ‘exchange’ of places is merely the result of bodily 
transformations that necessitate the occupancy of a smaller or larger ‘place’.  Aristotle, on 
the other hand, prioritises a plurality of places – positions in space – and sees bodies 
constantly moving between such places, regardless of their size.  Thus, it is the 
fixed-ness of place that allows movement to be discerned, and it is place that transforms 
according to the transformed size and configuration of what moves to it.  Space, to the 
extent Aristotle considers it, is therefore “the sum total of all places.”59  It is not a singular 
structure constituted to maintain plural and diverse complexity, but a unitary primordial 
structure whose very constitution is such complexity.60  That is an important distinction in 
itself, but it also reveals another.  Plato’s view that the chora is constituted sees its limits 
being imposed from outside itself (as by Demiurge).  His is a distinctly different view to 
Aristotle’s, in which the limits of topos are immanent,61 or, as he states it, “limits are 
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together with what is limited.”62  Such limits – seen as potentiality, not merely restriction – 
are effected in the ability of topos “to contain by surrounding” without being part of that 
which is contained.63  Place is thus vessel-like but unlike a vessel in its fixedness.  Hence 
place is “a vessel which cannot be moved around.”64 
A later Atomist, Epicurus (341-270 BCE), sees all three notions of space – kenon, 
topos, and chora – as three kinds of the same “intangible substance.”  Kenon (void) is 
“unoccupied space.”  Topos (place) is “occupied space … the [stationary] location of a 
sensible thing in space.”  And chora (room), no longer seen as a self-contained matrix, is 
the room through which bodies “roam,” through which they move to other places.  
Epicurus is thus able to maintain the Atomist distinction of kenon, accept Aristotelian 
notions of topos, and emphasise the dynamic of inter-place movement through the chora.  
In so doing, he portrays space as “giving place and room for everything,” as “the very 
medium of [atomic bodies’] situatedness and movement, the scene of their multiple 
occupation.”65  Such a portrayal sees relationality in this medium as having both fixed and 
kinetic dimensions, at once connected to and changing places.  Despite substantially 
differing views of void, something like this Epicurean medium is advanced by the Stoics 
(from the early third century BCE) in clearly physical terms: “an agent responsible for the 
propagation of physical processes through space,” manifesting as a kind of “tension 
(tonos) in its active state.”  By virtue of this agent, “distant parts of the universe are able 
to influence each other,” and the cosmos becomes “one field of action” where elements 
are not so much contained but bound together by “internal cohesion”66 (a notion that once 
again echoes perichoresis).  In all of these concepts, the resulting dynamic is a highly 
creative one, one of constant change, in which not only do things change place but place 
changes as a result, even while remaining identifiable and of fixed location. 
The progression of post-Platonic conceptions of space – including distinctions, 
contradictions, and ongoing questions – does not end here.  But even an incomplete 
outline is sufficient to harvest the essential insights that such developments contribute to 
a foundational understanding of kenosis.  To be, kenotically, is not merely to exchange 
places (in the Platonic sense).  It is not merely to move self and self’s space to a different 
location, even if as a result of self-transformation.  Instead, it is to engage with another 
place – or what is actually a place of the other – such that self, other, and place are 
mutually transformed through such engagement.  Moreover, it is to invite reciprocal 
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kenotic engagement, the dynamism of movement back and forth between places, the 
movement itself causing places to change.  Viewing such places as immoveable ‘vessels’ 
is to see them as ‘situations’, where situatedness is defined by all that is contained 
therein, as well as by all that moves thereto and therefrom.  A situation effects more than 
emptying and receiving.  It actively encompasses and surrounds.  Movement to a 
situation of the other, then, is itself kenotic; an opening-up and gathering-in of 
situatedness, whereby the moving element finds itself already in the situation to which it 
moves, the situation in which the other is likewise embedded.  So it is that the limit or 
creative potential of the situation already lies, immanently, within the situation’s 
situatedness.  Insofar as this creative movement occurs in a ‘matrix’, through a ‘medium’, 
and by way of an ‘agent’, each can be seen as a permeance of kenosis.  In the emptying 
that is filling, and in the emptiness that is plenitude, relationality is passively held in 
tension, in a creative and productive field of action.  Such dynamism reveals the complex 
relationality that kenosis animates: the diversity, plurality, and entanglement, which 
creates of itself – without imposition – a unitary and perichoretic structure. 
In Judaism 
Well before – or, at the latest, contemporaneous with – early classical Greek philosophy, 
the notions of matrix, medium, and agent are linked with creativity in the Judaic story of 
cosmogenesis, as put forth in the first book of the Hebrew Scriptures.  “In the beginning 
when God created the heavens and the earth, the earth was a formless void and 
darkness covered the face of the deep, while a wind from God swept over the face of the 
waters” (Gen 1:1-2, NRSV).67  Despite use of the term ‘void’, there is some-thing present 
in the deep (even if that is to name the non-substantive) and in the waters (already a 
name for the substantive).  Indeed, there is some-thing that gives them ‘face’.  Casey 
observes that, in this account, there is “neither chaos nor void” but a “generative matrix of 
things-to-be, things-to-come,” which is “aqueous in character.”68  I would expand that 
notion to suggest that there is a matrix to be found in the deep (as place of origin), a 
medium to be found in the waters, and an agent that takes the form of wind (or, in an 
accepted alternative translation, “the spirit of God”).69  Amidst emptiness, this generatrix – 
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an inseparable union of matrix, medium, and agent – is a situation of great creative 
potential; one which is enabled, animated, and maintained by its emptiness.  Thus the 
Judaic creation story, which is later assumed by Christianity and Islam (with certain 
variations and further developments), can already be seen to involve something of 
kenosis, insofar as this originating instance of divine self-realisation – preceding even 
Balthasar’s super-kenosis70 – emerges out of an emptiness that is nonetheless filled. 
There is yet another Torahic tale in which the notion of matrix, medium, and agent 
manifests in a creative situation.  It is a tale that meets the kenotic criterion of effecting a 
transition to a higher plane of action and meaning,71 and it does so conceptually, 
regardless of historicity.  In Exodus, the second book of the Hebrew Scriptures, Moses is 
said to be commissioned for his leadership in nothing less than an earthly encounter with 
a manifestation of the divine (Ex 3, NRSV).  Amidst the bleakness of “the mountain of 
God”72 (obviously, a place of the divine), “the angel of the Lord appeared to [Moses] in a 
flame of fire out of a bush.”  Already, in just one verse, a kenotic situation is presented.  
The appearance of bush-as-matrix and fire-as-medium and angel-as-agent is set against, 
and hence enabled by, the emptiness of the mountain.  Then, the story continues with 
Moses noticing that “the bush was blazing, yet it was not consumed.”  And it is “out of the 
bush” that the divine itself next calls to Moses, asking that he remove his sandals 
because of the site’s sacredness, a request to which Moses presumably complies.  Thus, 
as this kenotic situation unfolds, the divine matrix (the place or source of divine 
appearance) is seen to be burning in the medium of fire but does not burn up.  It 
undergoes an ultimate act of self-dying, or self-contraction, yet retains its integrity and 
can even be seen as strengthened, presencing not only the angel-agent but also its 
divine dispatcher.  Such presence signals divine attentiveness, not only to Moses and the 
immediate situation, but also to the larger human situation that Moses represents (in the 
immediate situation, the Israelites).  I would suggest that this is another narrative of divine 
kenosis – and more.  According to this story, it is in response to the kenotic event he 
witnesses that Moses responds reciprocally, in his own act of kenosis.  By removing his 
sandals, Moses is, of course, being obedient in overawing circumstances, but his act is 
ultimately volitional and subjects him to ultimate vulnerability.  He deprives himself of his 
capacity to flee the situation and thereby signals his heightened, if reluctant, 
attentiveness to it.  The removal of his sandals is a physical manifestation of self-
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emptying.73  What is created in this event of kenotic reciprocity is twofold: another divine 
self-realisation (a divine appearance to humanity) and the divine-human relationality 
arising therefrom. 
It is during this encounter that the divine presence is said to speak to Moses.  In 
addition to its matrical appearance through the medium of fire, the deity identifies itself.  
Commonly translated as “I am who I am,” an equally accepted alternative translation sees 
the divine utterance as “I am what I am,” the latter moving toward de-personification.  But, 
more important to present purposes, a third and also equally valid translation presents as 
“I am what I will be” (Ex 3:14, NRSV).74  By that, the deity is not only de-personified but 
also self-described as still becoming.  Inasmuch as its ongoing becoming is effected in 
kenotic events, like this one, its kenosis must also be ongoing, essentially without end.  
This additional act of self-realisation furthers the establishment of a divine-human 
relationship.  Even before revealing its exact identity, the deity offers Moses the 
assurance of its ongoing presence, promising that, during the impending tasks, “I will be 
with you” (Ex 3:12, NRSV, my emphasis).75  Since the deity’s presence comes to be 
through kenosis, its future and continued being-with can also be seen as kenotically 
effected.  And, by accepting and opening-up to the tasks ahead – albeit with great 
reluctance – Moses once again responds to divine kenosis by reciprocating with his own.  
There is, however, another important aspect of kenosis at work here.  Kenosis is not 
merely a matter of accepting and opening-up to a situation.  It is doing so in the face of 
challenge.  In this situation, not only does the divine challenge Moses to take on tasks for 
which he feels incapable, Moses also challenges the divine to say exactly who or what it 
is.  Both challenges imply that neither the divine nor the human is absolutely self-
sufficient, that their relationship is to some degree interdependent and effected by mutual 
and ongoing kenosis.  Both challenges are met reciprocally. 
In such biblical legends, the notion of source matrix is clearly a notion of place, a 
place out of which something (usually divine) originates.  Similarly, the notion of medium 
– for example, depicted as water or fire – is a place in which or through which something 
is realised, or made to appear.  Wind (or spirit) acts as agent, on or at these places, to 
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effect the creation of something, though not necessarily something substantive.  And 
kenosis is the emptying that makes room for and enables place; that is, it effects the 
happening of place.  It is therefore not surprising that, as early as the first century CE, 
Palestinian Judaism was commonly substituting the term “‘place’ (maḳom) as a name for 
God.”  Such usage likely came about through the abbreviation of the original term for 
“‘holy place’ (maḳom ḳadosh), the place of the ‘Shekinah,’”76 and that opens-up yet 
another important aspect of kenosis.  Shekinah (to settle, inhabit, or dwell) describes the 
concept of divine ‘indwelling’ amidst the people of Israel (itself a ‘place’),77 an inhabitation 
made particularly present in the ‘holy place’, the Holy of Holies of the Temple.78  On the 
one hand, this suggests a requisite kenosis to make room for such indwelling; some sort 
of emptying, not merely in the construct of the temple, but also of the people who would 
become inhabited (whether individually or collectively).  On the other hand, it points to the 
need for the indweller’s kenosis, and, concerning that, there are at least two views.  
Abraham Heschel posits that the divine indweller is infinite “in heaven” but finite when “in 
his exiled people.”  Such finitude, in an otherwise infinite being, presumably requires 
some sort of self-emptying, or self-withdrawal, to effect.  Equally, it would seem that 
divine self-withdrawal is required in Franz Rosezweig’s view, which sees a (clearly 
personified and masculine) God who “‘himself cuts himself off from himself [and] gives 
himself away to his people.’”79  Thus shekinah must include not only the filling of space, 
or place, with divine presence but also, at least implicitly, the emptying required by both 
the receiver and the received in order to effect such filling. 
Shekinah’s reference to emptying, however, may not be strictly implicit.  The 
Hebrew term shekinah and the Aramaic shekinta are thought to be derivatives of the 
earlier Greek noun skēnōsis,80 which, for obvious reasons, is a term of interest in this 
discourse.  Skenosis appears in the Apocryphal/Deuterocanonical Book of Second 
Maccabees, possibly completed as early as 124 BCE.81  Therein it is told that priests, 
seeking divine protection of the temple and its ‘holy place’, pray to God with a reminder: 
“You were pleased that there should be a temple for your habitation [skēnōseōs] among 
us” (2 Mac 14:35, NRSV).  In this invocation of divine habitation amongst humanity, there 
can be seen a prefiguration of the later Christian notion of incarnation.  Indeed, the idea 
of skenosis is found again in a New Testament announcement of the incarnation: “And 
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the Word became flesh and [from the verb skenóō] lived among us” (Jn 1:14, NRSV).82  
In both Old and New Testament portrayals, skenosis is the indwelling or filling of place, 
enabled by the emptying of kenosis.  Thus, not only does skenosis imply kenosis, the 
terms can be seen as two sides of the same coin.  If merely examining the structure of 
the words, it may be tempting to view kenosis as being already embedded in skenosis, 
but I would argue that the opposite is true.  It is skenosis that is already embedded in 
kenosis, because the occupation of place is reliant on the emptying by which place 
happens.  Kenosis therefore already includes skenosis; that is, emptying simultaneously 
effects filling, and to empty is to become filled, or, more simply, it is to become. 
 
So it is that antecedent philosophy and theology return this discussion of kenosis 
to the point where it began: its locus classicus in Christianity.  There, the notion of divine 
indwelling amongst humanity is radicalised to that of an earth-dwelling, situationally-
human divinity.  But all such invocations of skenosis are merely progressive steps in the 
development and portrayal of the concept of divine omnipresence.  In Jewish midrashim, 
that concept is sometimes puzzlingly conveyed, for example: “We do not know whether 
God is the place of His world or whether His world is His place.”  More directly, Rabbinic 
theology contends that “even the empty space is full of God.”83  In both cases, kenosis 
and skenosis are again shown to be conjoined, just as empty space is again shown to be 
full.  Whether emptiness is seen as being ‘filled’ by a theological divinity or, more 
philosophically, by some kind of matrix, medium, and agent, it is foremost a place brought 
about and permeated by kenosis; a place of creative potential.  Empty space is full of 
creativity.  It is the place of creativity – empty by virtue of its being full of creative 
emptiness. 
MEDIEVAL THINKING 
Having turned from Christianity, to look back at antecedent principles of kenosis in the 
philosophy and theology of antiquity, this survey now turns to look in the direction of an 
ultimately contemporary context.  But, before progressing to modern developments in 
kenotic thinking, it is important to acknowledge and briefly consider those of the Middle 
Ages.  Such contributions are once again found in both Christianity and Judaism (as well 
as in other traditions, as discussed later in this chapter).  Although consummately 
religious and Christian, the scholastic Thomas of Aquino, known as Thomas Aquinas (ca. 
1225-1274), and the mystic Johannes Eckhart, known as Meister Eckhart (ca. 
1260-1327/8), explore concepts of Being and being in such a way that both find their 
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work officially censured.84  Aquinas, however, goes on to become canonised, and both 
become recognised for their advancement of ‘philosophical theology’ (a kind of 
philosophy within theology, if that is actually philosophy).  More important to this 
discussion, each opens-up insightful aspects of kenosis, even if not intentionally or 
explicitly.  Judaic mysticism, particularly the sixteenth century strain known as Kabbalah, 
does the same with more directness.  Of particular interest, arising during the transition 
from Middle Ages to Early Modernity, is the Kabbalistic notion of zimzum, a distinctly 
kenotic concept posited by Rabbi Isaac Luria (1534-1572), which eventually provides 
impetus to the Late Modern revival and development of kenotic thought. 
Thomas Aquinas and the “Five Ways” 
Although his writings are far more prolific and profound, it is his relatively brief ‘proofs’ of 
God’s existence – known as the “Five Ways” – by which Thomas Aquinas is perhaps best 
known.  Appearing early in his Summa Theologiæ,85 and clearly influenced by Aristotle’s 
arguments concerning the existence of a ‘First Unmoved Mover’, each Way deploys a 
different argument in an attempt to reach one common conclusion; namely, that some 
ultimately causal something exists, a something that, according to Aquinas, “everyone 
understands to be God” or “everyone gives the name of God.”  The qualified nature of his 
conclusion – never quite saying that the causal something is God – invites debate as to 
exactly what Aquinas intended to prove.  It also renders his arguments susceptible to 
those critics who assert that they do not prove, at all, the existence of God (at least not 
the Christian God, or a God of religion), and, even if it were otherwise, that they do not 
necessarily lead to the same God and may only lead to a concept of God.86  Whatever 
they prove, or fail to prove, I suggest an alternative reading of the Five Ways; one in 
which they are seen to efficaciously demonstrate the reality of kenosis, or kenotic 
phenomena.  It is that reading which warrants further exploration here.  Aquinas’ 
arguments rely on sensibly perceived effects, caused by something indiscernible.  
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Therefore, the cause ‘proven’ by each is self-evidently hidden, something self-withdrawn, 
or self-contracted, but nonetheless powerful as a result.  Such attributes are already 
revealing of kenotic ontology. 
The First Way argues on the basis of motion, using Aristotelian principles from 
Physics and Metaphysics.  Aquinas describes motion as “nothing else than the reduction 
of something from potentiality to actuality,” and posits that “whatever is in motion is put in 
motion by another.”  As in all of the Ways, the first invokes the principle of causality, 
concluding that there must have been an original ‘cause’; in this case, a cause of effected 
original motion.  Here, and in the discussion of all subsequent Ways, I leave the veracity 
of that conclusion, and the constitution of that ‘cause’, to those theologians, philosophers, 
and scientists who continue to consider it.  Of greater interest is the argument’s opening-
up of a kenotic scenario.  Motion is said to be a “reduction”; that is, some sort of 
contraction or diminution.  Not only that, it is a reduction of potentiality in favour of 
actualisation.  Hence this argument suggests that whatever constitutes the original cause, 
such constitution must be seen as the sole source of potentiality for motion.  Therefore, 
the actualisation of initial motion in an initial object requires some self-reduction, or self-
emptying, of the potentiality for motion – that held solely by the original cause – until the 
originating moment.  It is thus kenosis, which requires and is itself motion, that initially 
enables motion.  It follows, then, that such initial motion is also a kenosis of the affected 
object – an emptying that makes-room for the receipt of, and filling by, the potentiality for 
motion that is given up by the original cause, and with which the object becomes enabled 
to actualise movement.  But what becomes of the self-emptied portion of the potentiality 
for motion in the original cause?  It draws-in, and is filled by, that portion of the affected 
object now also holding like potentiality for motion (albeit already partially-emptied to 
actualise this motion by which it partially becomes the original cause).  Thus, in this 
double kenosis87 – an originating act of kenosis responded to reciprocally – both original 
cause and affected object are transformed, and, despite the onset of complexity (which 
will only increase), a unitary primordial structure is maintained. 
Indeed, the First Way is fundamentally about coming-into-being, or becoming; that 
which kenosis animates.  Not only does the affected object partially become the 
originating cause (its ‘other’), the originating cause also partially becomes the affected 
object (its ‘other’), both doing so by virtue of their emptying and making-room for such 
happenings.  Since it is about becoming, the First Way is also about continuousness; the 
unending nature of kenosis.  The Thomist view of continuous movement (via Aristotle) 
finds that “as long as a movement lasts, the actualization is incomplete and continues 
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toward further fulfilment.”88  It follows that kenosis, as long as it elicits reciprocal kenotic 
response (the essence of its ‘movement’), continues unendingly, not unlike the perpetual 
motion of Plato’s chora.89  And because kenosis is potentiality without teleological ends – 
that is, without the purpose or strategy of fulfilment – it is always incomplete, never fully 
actualised.  Viewed in the context of the First Way, kenosis can be seen not only as that 
which enables originating movement and animates ongoing movement but also as that 
which thereby maintains potentiality. 
In a sense, the remaining Ways are subsidiary to the First.  Well before Aquinas, 
the Islamic philosopher Averroës (Ibn Rušd, 1126-1198) had viewed Aristotle’s argument 
from motion to be the “only decisive proof” (of first movers),90 and Aquinas commences 
his First Way by calling it “the first and more manifest way.”  Nonetheless, the others build 
the case, and, just as importantly, they continue to reveal the Ways’ kenotic bases.  The 
Second Way shifts the focus from the becoming of effects (like motion) to their being.  It 
emphasises the seriality of the causes producing such effects, whereby each effect in a 
series of effects is dependent on the causality of the one prior, which Aquinas sees as 
‘proof’ of a first cause.  Viewed through a kenotic lens, the Second Way turns its attention 
from the notion of reciprocal response to that of an “efficient” (used in the Aquinian 
sense) kenotic act.  In that act, the responding something transforms and becomes, so as 
to cause, or enable, the transformation and becoming of something else (even as the 
enabling something is consequently transformed).  Thus the being of kenosis – its 
onward extension – can be portrayed as a series of efficient acts.  In unending 
continuance, each kenotic act produces both reciprocal response and propulsive 
extension, such that becoming is being, being is becoming.  But, as it turns out, what 
appears to be neat seriality is actually complex and entangled relationality.  What then 
might be said of the necessity of being?  Aquinas turns to that subject in his Third Way, 
and therein raises the issue of being’s corruptibility, or its possibility not to be.  The 
argument is used to posit a ‘first necessity’, something “having of itself its own necessity,” 
(much like the chora, or matrix, which Plato also named ‘necessity’).  This too is not 
without implications concerning kenosis.  Insofar as kenosis is essential to an original 
happening (the enablement of motion, animation of becoming, and maintenance of 
being), it is its own necessity, the ontology of creativity.  And, even though it is continuous 
and unending, it is not incorruptible amongst that which it creates.  That is particularly so 
amongst humanity, which, being corruptible, can fail to reciprocally respond to kenosis 
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(either by ignorance or wilful choice) and thereby provisionally defer, alter, or otherwise 
violate its ongoing-ness – indeterminate as that already is. 
The Fourth Way argues that the potential of something’s being lies in that 
something’s grounding, and that ultimate grounding is to be found in that which first 
causes “being, goodness, and every other perfection” (meaning maximum potential 
development).  Once again, inasmuch as kenosis permeates an original creative event, it 
is a fundamental grounding, a primary source of potentiality.  In other words, kenosis can 
be seen to permeate the grounding of all things, such that all things have the potential to 
be kenotic.  Indeed, the potential of such things’ being – which is finally their potential to 
be somehow creative or re-creative – lies paradoxically in their potential to be kenotic, to 
be self-emptying.  The notion that such potential leads to an inevitable “end” forms the 
basis of the Fifth Way.  In the last of Aquinas’ arguments, he suggests that “things which 
lack knowledge … act for an end … so as to obtain the best result … not fortuitously, but 
designedly.”  With that, he makes a case that “some being endowed with knowledge” 
must therefore exist to direct (designedly) the movement of such things “toward their 
end.”  Not surprisingly, its use of creationist and teleological propositions has been duly 
criticised.  From the Atomists and Epicureans (notwithstanding intervening defences by 
Plato and Aristotle), through to modernity and contemporary science, the notion of 
‘design’ in nature has been challenged and debated,91 and cannot be resolved here.  
Nonetheless, it is at this juncture that the notion of a supreme creator/director can be 
seen to contradict the notion that creation is enabled, animated, and maintained by 
kenosis.  For if created things (knowledgeable or not) are purposefully ‘designed’, and 
thereby controlled and directed to inevitable and therefore preconceived ‘good’ ends 
(even by way of destruction and ‘evil’), then kenosis – an emptying and opening-up that 
ongoingly effects indeterminate creation and transformation of that created – is 
superfluous, or worse, a tool of divine deceit and gamesmanship vis-à-vis the divine’s 
creation. 
Notwithstanding such difficulties, the Fifth Way goes on to reveal more of kenosis, 
even if not exactly as Aquinas may have intended.  Its proposition that action “always or 
nearly always” moves toward the “best result” can be seen to support the notion that 
ongoing kenosis – kenotic response and extension – inevitably moves toward that which 
‘needs’ to happen, rather than toward an already designed outcome.  Furthermore, the 
kenotic happening may not result in what is ‘best’, at least not in the Aquinian sense of 
something perfect or perfectly good.  Instead it results in what is ‘necessary’ to a given 
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situation.  It is also not an ‘end’ in the sense of finality, because even the necessary result 
in a given situation already presents an altered situation, in need of its own next ‘end’ or 
‘best result’.  Becoming and being, permeated by kenosis, can only lead to interim and 
fleeting ends.  The being and end of so-called ordered things is to be constantly dis-
ordered and re-ordered, even in unordered ways.  Moreover, although Aquinas views his 
Fifth Way only through unknowledgeable things, such as “natural bodies,” it offers equally 
important insight into humanity and its ends.  Since humanity’s cognition is always 
volitional – at least in part – its awareness and embrace of kenosis is likewise.  Kenosis is 
susceptible to human resistance and therefore never a certainty in every situation.  But 
the being of humanity, and the interim ends thereby reached, are already indeterminate 
when left to kenotic unfolding, and such indeterminacy is unaltered (even if temporary 
situational responses are) by the ignorance of or resistance to such unfolding.  The latter 
may even be seen as part of what some particular situation ‘needs’ – at some particular 
moment.  Paradoxically, then, whether produced by choosing or denying kenosis, the 
‘ends’ of human being – that is, the effects of being rather than being’s demise – are of 
human design and ultimately pursuant to kenosis, even when tortuously so.  Choosing 
kenosis is neither mandatory nor prescriptive, and offers no certain outcome.  It simply – 
but importantly – offers the potential for heightened awareness and, thereby, enhanced 
creativity. 
Meister Eckhart and Gelassenheit 
A fellow Dominican who follows and draws on the work of Aquinas, but also differentiates 
himself, Meister Eckhart posits exactly such kenotic potential, albeit without deploying the 
term kenosis.  He speaks first of “detachment,” referring to a liberation “from your own 
self-will” and declaring that “undetached people” are “full of self-will.”92  His view of self-
will includes not only that which might compromise the body but also that which might 
restrict the mind (cognition).93  Philosopher and Eckhartian analyst John Caputo (1940-) 
observes:  
Eckhart associates the mystical-ascetical notion of purifying oneself … with 
Aristotle’s tabula rasa, which is the ‘emptiness’ or receptivity necessary for 
cognition.  In both the ‘detached heart’ and the ‘passive reason’ there is the same 
necessity of the subject to purify itself of its subjectivity.94 
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Clearly, the subject’s purification of itself is a self-emptying, a kenosis that grants 
heightened awareness of that which is other than self; in other words, potentiality beyond 
self.  But it is not only the desired outcome of detachment that concerns Eckhart.  He is 
also interested in the means by which such detachment might be effected, and coins a 
word to identify his concept – Gelassenheit – a word which describes existential notions 
of ‘letting-go’ and ‘letting-be’, or, in its most common translation, ‘releasement’.95  It 
follows, then, that kenosis can be seen as the emptying of self-will, realised as 
detachment and effected through releasement. 
To his notion of detachment, Eckhart ironically appends an attachment.  Inherent 
in his “releasement-from” (self-will), there is a “releasement-to – a deferral or leaving [of] 
matters and one’s own motivations up to – the will of God.”96  From that, it might appear 
that releasement is conditional and not quite fully kenotic.  But Eckhart’s view of God, 
perhaps even more so than Aquinas’, is that of a withdrawn and hidden mystery: “the 
divine abyss, the divine nothingness … the divine ‘wasteland’.”97  Any releasement-to this 
“truly divine God (der göttlich Gott),” which Eckhart contrasts with “the purely thought-up 
God (der gedachte Gott),” is itself a releasement to emptiness; that is, a self-emptying 
which makes-room to be filled by emptiness.  Caputo summarises the Eckhartian 
argument, stating that “it is not Being, but what knows Being, an openness to Being which 
is divested of Being in order to be taken over by Being.”98  Such openness and 
willingness to be taken over is clearly passive, but actively so.  It is not the posture or act 
of a bystander simply observing the situation.  It is an engagement with the situation, 
without the goal of dominating it.  It thereby invites the approach and appearance of what 
the situation itself needs; a situation already including anyone and anything engaged with 
it, and hence including their needs as well.  Such a kenotic event – incorporating 
detachment and releasement – obviates willed imposition and prioritises creativity.  It 
does so not through the seeking of novelty but through novelty’s divestiture.  In that, the 
ultimate novelty – unique appositeness – is paradoxically enabled to appear.  It is 
‘created’.  Insofar as Caputo argues that “the fully radicalized meaning of intellectus in 
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Meister Eckhart … is Gelassenheit,”99 I would propose that, in turn, such meaning grants 
another radicalisation, that in which kenosis is seen as being creative but, more 
importantly, in which creativity is seen as kenosis. 
Rabbi Luria and Kabbalistic Creation  
Although, as already noted, the Judaic story of original creation (along with others) 
implies a kenotic setting – that of nothingness or emptiness – it is not until Rabbi Luria 
develops his doctrine of zimzum that creation is explicitly suggested to be the result of 
something like an act of divine kenosis.100  Luria does not use the term kenosis, but 
zimzum closely mirrors its meaning.  Literally meaning ‘concentration’ or ‘contraction’, the 
term zimzum is translated as ‘withdrawal’ or ‘retreat’ when used in Kabbalistic contexts.  
Rejecting the cosmogony of earlier Kabbalists, which simply sees creation as a projection 
of God’s creative power, Luria approaches the subject by way of the notion of Shekinah 
(discussed earlier), positing that God, despite infinitude, is capable of sufficient self-
contraction so as to concentrate at a point; namely, inside the temple’s Holy of Holies.  
Contraction and concentration, however, can also be seen as a withdrawal or retreat 
away from a point, and it is that view that Luria attributes to original creation.  Gershom 
Scholem (1897-1982), scholar of Kabbalah and a professor of Jewish mysticism, 
explains: 
According to Luria, God was compelled to make room for the world by, as it were, 
abandoning a region within Himself, a kind of mystical primordial space from 
which He withdrew in order to return to it in the act of creation and revelation.  The 
first act of En-Sof, the Infinite Being, is therefore not a step outside but a step 
inside, a movement of recoil, of falling back upon oneself, of withdrawing into 
oneself.  Instead of emanation we have the opposite, contraction.  The God who 
revealed himself in firm contours was superseded by one who descended deeper 
into the recesses of His own Being, who concentrated Himself into Himself, and 
had done so from the very beginning of creation.101 
Despite being seen by some as bordering on blasphemy, Scholem (following Jacob 
Emden) sees the paradox of zimzum as “the only serious attempt ever made to give 
substance to the idea of Creation out of Nothing,” creatio ex nihilo.102  Creativity, 
manifested in creation, is therefore the product and ‘necessary result’ of zimzum, for 
which kenosis is arguably synonymous.  “Every new act of emanation and manifestation 
is preceded by one of concentration and retraction,” and, together, they effect the 
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“perpetual tension” and “ever repeated effort” by which everything exists.103  Kenosis is 
creative, creativity is kenosis – neither conceivable without the other – and both continue 
endlessly, such that creation is not merely what it is but what it will be. 
Emanating from the zimzum is primeval space, a kind of perpetually pulsating 
matrix in which, despite the withdrawal of divine substance, there is still “a vestige or 
residue of the divine light (Reshimu),” much like the residue of oil or wine that remains in 
a bottle that is poured-out.104  Thus, whatever non-divine substance is created in this 
matrix, now ‘separated’ from the divine, it is nonetheless inseparably part of the divine, 
even as the residual divine substance is inseparably part of the non-divine.  In this 
kenotically-created matrix of creativity, the divine and the non-divine are able to partially 
become the other without loss of self-identity.  The acts of the zimzum form a complex 
mythological story, well-documented elsewhere and unnecessary to retell here in full.105  
(Like many religious concepts, the detail gives rise to disagreement and debate.)  
Pertinent to this search for kenotic content, it suffices to say that the creative matrix 
becomes filled with divine light, in a spherical manner, and produces “primordial man” 
(Adam Kadmon); a creation not yet entirely human but a “first configuration of the divine 
light,” such light emerging as beams from its “eyes, mouth, ears and nose.”106 
Here, then, is another kenosis, an emptying of divine light into the creative matrix.  
Eventually, to effect order amidst the matrical disorder, “vessels” (kelim) emanate to catch 
and preserve particular emptied lights for the creation of various ordered things.  
Although certain of these vessels initially succeed in a methodical containment of their 
designated lights, there comes a point at which the light explodes, ricocheting through the 
matrix and impacting the vessels such that they break and shatter.107  As a result of this 
event, known as the “Breaking of the Vessels” (Shevirath Ha-Kelim), “the entire world 
process … is at variance with its originally intended order and position.  Nothing, neither 
the lights nor the vessels, [remains] in its proper place,” yet even that is seen in the 
Lurianic Kabbalah to be necessary and inevitable to the situation.108  The inability of 
certain vessels to contain and surround results in a further emptying of divine light and 
fragments of vessels, some sinking “into the lower depths of the primordial space,” such 
that “the good elements of the divine order [come] to be mixed with the vicious ones.”109  
Embedded in this imaginative invocation of incompletion and imperfection is a call to 
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mend and restore the situation, and to do so through ongoing and kenotically-animated 
creative acts – not unlike those from which the broken situation originated. 
In this Kabbalistic story, the restitution of creation is revealed as creation’s 
purpose or, to avoid implications of predetermined design, its being.  Restitution is what 
the (broken) situation calls for, what needs doing (much as suggested by Aquinas’ Fifth 
Way).  Creation goes on creating, because to be is to create.  Thus, the situation of 
creation calls for tikkun110 – the ongoing mending, restoration, or “re-integration of the 
original whole” – which, once zimzum began, was neither realised nor, as it turns out, in 
need of realisation if creation was to have the opportunity to ongoingly become what it will 
be.  In theological terms, God’s revelation “does not reach its conclusion in God,” 
because it is humanity – through the process of tikkun – that “adds the final touch to the 
divine countenance.”  Thus God’s zimzum, or contraction, is nothing less than kenosis.  It 
is an emptying of self-will, realised in detachment and effected by letting-go and letting-be 
(the latter invoking Eckhart’s releasement, or Gelassenheit), which establishes the 
interdependency of divinity and humanity.  And, since tikkun can only end with the 
coming of a messiah, “the tikkun, the path to the end of all things, is also the path to the 
beginning”111 (a concept noted here, near the beginning of this discourse, but taken up 
again nearer its end, in Chapter 7).  Since tikkun is ongoing creation, and creation is 
enabled by kenosis, it can be seen that to engage in tikkun is to enact or instantiate 
kenosis.  And since all of creation is called to tikkun, all are “raised … to the rank of 
protagonist in the great process of resitution.”112  All are participants, none are spectators.  
Taken together, tikkun and shevirath ha-kelim and zimzum grant a view of kenosis, and 
show it as that which engenders – but never compels – unending kenotic response; that 
which, amidst contingency and indeterminacy, effects movement toward completion and 
perfection, even as it precludes the attainment of either. 
MODERN DEVELOPMENT AND REVIVAL 
Long before the sixteenth-century Kabbalah, there is, as already discussed, abundant 
evidence of kenotic thought – even when only implicit – including the constituting of 
Plato’s chora and the early Judaic stories of creation and divine-human relations.  At the 
chosen starting point of this exploration, there is the explicit Christian invocation of 
kenosis on the part of a messiah in human form, and, in turn, its implication that the 
messianic incarnation may have required an even earlier kenosis by the Godhead, itself.  
Then, in the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century works of Aquinas and Eckhart, creator and 
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creation are portrayed in terms that appear suspiciously kenotic.  Such portrayals only 
increase, as original creation is more explicitly equated to notions of God’s self-limitation 
or self-humiliation – kenosis in all but name – seen, for example, in the fifteenth century 
work of Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464).113  Nonetheless, and not without irony, it is the 
Jewish mystic Rabbi Luria – with his doctrine of zimzum – who offers the fundamental 
premise by which modern Christian theologians can conclude, as Keith Ward (1938-) 
does, that “one can thus see a form of kenosis in the creation of the universe” by which 
“kenosis … belongs to the creation of rational creatures even before it belongs to 
incarnation.”114  That is a significant development, to which I will return, but the path from 
Nicholas to contemporary theology and philosophy is not so direct, and includes other 
contributors worthy of mention or, in some cases, more substantial exploration.   
Early Modernity 
At the onset of Early Modernity, philosopher Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499) discusses 
principles of relationality, which, although not concerned with original creation, are no less 
about creativity and no less kenotic.  In his Commentary on Plato’s Symposium on Love, 
Ficino reflects on the Platonic portrayal of love as “a bitter thing” and goes further, saying, 
“love is a voluntary death.”115 In so doing, he invokes two dimensions of kenosis: its 
volitionality and the extended characterisation of its self-emptying as a kind of dying-to-
self.  Such dying enables people to open-up and give themselves “to the other in order to 
receive the other.”  In that, two more dimensions of kenosis are revealed: its highly-active 
passivity, and its inherent elicitation of reciprocal response, without which there is 
effectively no kenosis, only some form of unrequited kindness (whether love, charity or 
compassion).  For Ficino, the very nature of self-dying can be seen in this mutual 
exchange.  The lover, “oblivious to himself” and with “attention … always turned to the 
beloved,” not only “does not think about himself, he certainly does not think in himself,” 
and therefore “does not exist in himself either.”  This description also reveals another 
important aspect of kenosis: the paradox of heightened situational awareness that 
proceeds from self-emptying.  Moreover, it points to the kenotic requisite of relinquishing 
aspirations of control or mastery.  Ficino confirms the same when he contrasts the “power 
of Cupid” with the “violence of Mars,” likening “love” to the former and “dominion” to the 
latter.  “The ruler possesses others through himself; the lover recovers himself through 
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another, and the further each of the two lovers is from himself, the nearer he is to the 
other, and, dead in himself, revives in the other.”  Thus self-dying effects resurrection and 
fuller life (in love); powerlessness effects power; self-emptying effects strengthening; 
kenosis effects plenitude.  But, as in the Christian kenosis story, the self who might 
dominate is called to eschew any striving for power.  While there is no mention of creation 
or kenosis in Ficino’s commentary, his thoughts on love are ultimately thoughts on the 
creation of relationality and the creative potential therein, both effected and permeated by 
kenosis.  And that is precisely the substance of the various Judeo-Christian creation 
stories, wherein divine love is a limit – a threshold or beginning – of creation by kenosis 
and the creative relationality that flows therefrom.116 
As theology continues to interact with philosophical – and scientific – views of 
space (never far from thoughts about creation), Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716) builds his 
conception of space around the notion of relation and situation.  Using the metaphor of a 
genealogical ‘tree’, he posits that there is amongst things “a certain Order of Co-
Existence, according to which the relation of one thing to another is more or less simple.  
This Order is their Situation or Distance.”117  Leibniz advances his concept as a rejection 
of the theory of “absolute space” put forth by Isaac Newton (1643-1727), in which 
“absolute space in its own nature, without relation to anything external, remains always 
similar and immovable.”118  Newton’s theory reveals the theology embedded in his 
science.  Apparently influenced by Thomas More (1478-1535; described as a “chief 
disseminator of Cabalistic and Neo-Platonic ideas”119), Newton deploys space and time to 
characterise his concept of God, saying that God is “eternal and infinite,” and that “in him 
are all things contained and moved.”120  Leibniz, too, is interested in theology, but places 
his faith in reason rather than metaphysics.  So the Newton-Leibniz debate continues 
until the latter’s death, some forty years after which, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) makes 
an attempt, early in his career, to reconcile the two views.  He eventually abandons that 
attempt in favour of the Newtonian theory, and, by the time of his Critique of Pure Reason 
(1781), he states that “space does not represent any property of things in themselves, nor 
does it represent them in their relation to one another.”121  Kant’s view clearly lacks the 
religious zeal (and bias) of Newton’s.  And, in the same document, Kant is seen to “object 
to the Ontological, Cosmological and Physico-theological (Design) arguments for God's 
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existence.”122  Kant is nonetheless with the majority in his acceptance of absolute space, 
and Newton’s theory long prevails over that of Leibniz. 
Late Modernity 
By the mid-twentieth century, however, modern science sees the theory of absolute 
space ‘overcome’, albeit in a process that Albert Einstein recognises, in 1953, “is 
probably by no means as yet completed.”123  Indeed, in the sixty years since Einstein’s 
comment, the overcoming theory – that of relational space – is itself no longer universally 
accepted by now even-more-modern science.  But, amidst such open-endedness, 
Einstein is nonetheless able to conclude that “there is then no ‘empty’ space,”124 and it is 
that summation which may be most pertinent to a discussion concerning kenosis.  For, 
insofar as kenosis is an emptying, its emptying makes room for, or makes the space of, 
an “always bounded yet … always open and dynamic” place (or situation).  Its bounds – 
ever changeable and changing – define the starting thresholds of a situation of openness 
and movement in which “things can ‘take place’,” and mark a place from which things 
move to other places.125  The potentiality of such happenings lies in the situation’s 
emptying and emptiness, the kenosis by which it gains the capacity to be filled and, 
consequently, to pour-out.  Seen through a kenotic lens, such space is relational and 
situational in its fundamental boundedness, even as it is indeterminately open and 
creative in its extendedness, with the latter ultimately dependent on the former.  This view 
of space as place of creativity can, of course, be overlaid with theology, and its 
measurement can be pursued by science.  But, as philosophy, it stands quite 
independently and offers valuable insights into the concept of kenosis embedded therein. 
From the Enlightenment forward, theology is increasingly challenged not only by 
philosophy but also by the discoveries of modern science.  The development of kenotic 
thought offers Christian theology a means of legitimately re-thinking those doctrines of 
faith that appear to give rise to major tensions, not least, those of original creation.  As 
Keith Ward explains, “In classical theories … God is exclusively infinite and perfect.”  But 
humanity’s increasing attentiveness to earthly finitude and imperfections, seen by 
theologians as “outside of God,” increasingly casts God as distant and un-related to the 
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very creation it supposedly created.  Thus, owing to the work of Georg Hegel 
(1770-1831),126 but also to others,127 post-classical theories shift toward a view of God as 
“inclusively infinite,” whereby divine perfection includes “relationship to whatever other 
realities exist.”  That view necessarily sees the divine creator involved in “giving up … 
complete control, and accepting the freedom of created beings.”  Both are acts of 
making-room for all of the indeterminacy and contingency associated therewith.  Such 
self-limitation and self-humiliation – indeed, self-emptying – is nothing less than “a kenotic 
act on God’s part.”  But this emptying is also a filling, or pleroma, in that, through self-
giving, the divine gains relationship with creation and, thereby, “the possibility of 
genuinely new creativity, undetermined even by [the divinity’s] own previous nature.”128  
Importantly, this ‘modern’ view is made possible largely by infiltration of the medieval 
Kabbalistic doctrine of God’s self-limitation – most fully developed in Luria’s zimzum – 
and it is that which grants some measure of relaxation in the tension between theology 
and science. 
As the scientific theory of evolution later emerges (culminating in Darwin, but 
prefigured in the work of others), the notion of divine self-limitation continues to be useful.  
As early as 1927-28, Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947), who challenges the necessary 
link between God and religion and calls for “the secularization of the concept of God’s 
functions in the world,”129 also posits that “the ‘consequent nature’ of God is the physical 
prehension by God of the actualities of the evolving universe.”130  Drawing on 
Whitehead’s work, the notions of zimzum are more specifically linked to evolution (and 
later to the Holocaust, or Shoah) by Hans Jonas (1903-1993).131  Although he 
philosophically struggles with the modern tension between theology and science and aids 
in secularising the concept of God, Jonas nonetheless concludes that some ‘creative 
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source’, which may be called God, “surrendered itself to the ‘endless play of the finite,’ 
the ‘inexhaustibility of chance,’ the ‘surprises of the unplanned,’ that is, the evolution of 
life.”132  In this portrayal of divine self-limitation (or zimzum or kenosis), there is a God or 
force that sets evolution into play but, then, is subject to evolve and become, even as – or 
indeed because – creation does.  This God is relational but not “a sorcerer who in the act 
of caring [for creation] also provides fulfillment of his concern: he has left something for 
other agents to do and thereby has made his care dependent on them.”  As noted by 
Christian Wiese, this sees Jonas advocating a kind of “de-Messianized tikkun” and 
making the “divine adventure” a “human responsibility.”133  Concerning kenosis, this is to 
unconceal not its surety but its dangers, risks, and responsibilities. 
Perhaps most notable in taking up the Christian correlation of zimzum (and 
therefore kenosis) with original creation, is theologian Jürgen Moltmann, particularly in his 
God in Creation, of 1985.134  There, using both Lurianic and Eckhartian (if not also 
Heideggerian) language, he states that “God ‘withdraws himself from himself to himself’ in 
order to make creation possible,” which means that “he ‘creates’ by letting-be, by making 
room, and by withdrawing himself.”135  (Embedded in this original divine self-emptying are 
the later incarnational and messianic events of kenosis, to which Christianity subscribes.)  
But, when God is seen as one that withdraws and lets-be, it is easier for humanity to 
withdraw from concepts of God and simply let God be – or not.  Indeed, well before Jonas 
and Moltmann, it is Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) – with an echo of Hegel – who 
declares, in 1882, that “God is dead” and humanity is responsible: “We have killed him – 
you and I,” says Nietzsche’s ‘madman’.136  But this ‘killing’ is not another execution.  It is 
actually another kenosis – this time humanity’s – in which humanity begins to gradually 
empty itself of the metaphysical God and, therefore, empty an intrinsic part of its self, 
ongoingly making-room for other world views.137  In the late 1960s, this kenosis is taken 
up by Thomas Altizer (1927-), a Christian theologian of the so-called God is Dead 
Movement who draws significantly on Nietzsche (and Hegel).  He sees this kenosis as an 
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emptying of “even the most awesome and oppressive manifestations of an alien 
otherness” that humanity has attributed to God – including archaic language, creeds, and 
dogmas – so as to negate “every power confining life and energy”138; that is, every power 
attempting to confine evolving creation.  For Altizer, this emptying consummates the 
death of the transcendent God, begun at the Crucifixion, and effects the emergence of an 
immanent and becoming God.139  This kenosis – and all kenosis – can thus be seen as 
an emptying of universal metaphysical truths, as well as an opening-up to the manifold 
and evolving truths of each (evolving) situation. 
The metaphysical ‘truth’ of a divine creator is, of course, that most challenged by 
an evolving body of ‘truths’ presented by physics.  Ironically, it is the conflation of kenosis 
and the Judeo-Christian creation story that grants theology a closer alignment with 
science and philosophy, even as it also challenges theology’s self-sufficiency.  The notion 
of initial and ongoing kenosis can be seen – with or without divinity – in various 
cosmogonical options, including in a “unique Big Bang,” which “assumes a beginning of 
time,” and is “closest to the ex nihilo tradition”; in the “successive cycles of an oscillating 
universe, expanding and contracting, with a Big Crunch before each Big Bang”; or in “the 
theory of quantum vacuum fluctuations,” wherein a seemingly (but not) ‘empty’ and 
otherwise energy-conserving vacuum is briefly violated by an “enormous fluctuation that 
rapidly expand[s]” into a universe amidst many coexisting universes.140  In one sense, 
such theories and their kenotic attributes fulfil Altizer’s advocacy, in that each – no matter 
how incomprehensibly expansive – portrays a world view of creation as immanent and 
becoming, as existing and evolving.  But even such portrayals are evolving with the 
evolvement of understanding, and the consequent emergence of ‘truths’.  So, as much as 
kenosis is a call to greater awareness of what exists, it is also a call to be open to being 
open; a call to be sceptical, even of one’s own scepticism. 
Awareness, openness, and other aspects of kenosis are considered and nuanced, 
in many different ways, by the philosophers of late modernity, particularly those 
associated with Continental Philosophy.  Some deal directly with the subject of kenosis, 
while others deal with variously named topics that are nonetheless somehow kenotic.  
For example, the hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002) – paralleling 
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others, such as Paul Ricœur (1913-2005) – is clearly linked to kenosis by its advocacy of 
interpretive openness as a means of ongoing transformative engagement.  Such 
connection is evidenced, first, by the strong tradition of hermeneutics in religion,141 
precisely that which prompts critical interpretation of the kenotic locus classicus (already 
discussed), and, second, by the concepts’ mutual attributability: hermeneutics is 
inherently kenotical and kenosis is inherently hermeneutical.142  Contributing to the same 
discussion is the work of Walter Benjamin (1892-1940), whose thoughts on the topic of 
‘play’ show affinity with Gadamer’s, insofar as both view play not as an act of dis-
engagement but of heightened engagement, to which one yields by way of what can be 
seen as a kenosis.143  Benjamin’s view of play further aligns with kenosis through his 
notions of ‘losing oneself’ and approaching situations as if ‘at first sight’. 
Often portrayed as being in opposition to Gadamer, the work of deconstructionist 
Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) explicitly equates kenosis with hospitality.144  Arguably, 
kenosis can be seen as that which permeates the “gap” or “abyss” that Derrida’s 
language suggests must be faced in the making of responsible and hospitable 
decisions,145 and, equally, that out of which arises the “irresolvable quality [of] Gadamer’s 
notions of meaning and truth.”146  Kenosis also bridges Gadamer and Derrida by linking 
their mutual rejection of homogeneity, of engagement as calculated rationality, and of 
universal rules.147  Approaching the topic of kenosis directly, and with certain similarities 
to Derrida (though distinctively nuanced), is Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995), who sees 
kenosis as an ethical responsibility – a kind of hospitality, but not of free choice, 
something like tikkun olam – which can and does manifest as disruption and 
dispossession.148  One of Gadamer’s teachers, and one with whom Levinas 
philosophically spars, Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) does not address the topic of 
kenosis directly, but his work nonetheless invokes and informs many aspects of kenotic 
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thought.  Indeed, one of Heidegger’s concepts is foundational to kenotic discourse, and, 
since its appearance in Heideggerian philosophy is actually the reappearance of an 
already-discussed Eckhartian concept, it thus becomes a recurrent theme in this 
discourse and warrants further mention. 
Gelassenheit Redux 
Although Heidegger respectfully takes up Eckhart’s term – Gelassenheit – he does so 
with intentional difference.  In particular, he distances his thinking from any notions of 
releasement as subordination to a deity.  As discussed earlier, such subordination can be 
found in Eckhart, where releasement appears to be left within the confines of willing – the 
very confines that Heidegger insists releasement must also be releasement from.  For 
Heidegger, there is only “non-willing”; that which “remains absolutely outside any kind of 
will,” and that which enables one “willingly to renounce willing.”149  If releasement leads to 
that outside all will, it cannot itself be willed, nor can it be strategically effected, and that is 
especially pertinent to an understanding of kenosis.  Although well-known, it is worth 
revisiting Heidegger’s explanation, as posited in “Conversation on a Country Path”: 
SCHOLAR. So far as we can wean ourselves from willing, we contribute to the 
awakening of releasement. 
TEACHER. Say rather, to keeping awake for releasement. 
SCHOLAR. Why not, to the awakening? 
TEACHER. Because on our own we do not awaken releasement in ourselves. 
SCIENTIST. Thus releasement is effected from somewhere else. 
TEACHER. Not effected, but let in. 
SCHOLAR. To be sure I don’t know yet what the word releasement means; but I 
seem to presage that releasement awakens when our nature is let-in so as to 
have dealings with that which is not a willing. 
SCIENTIST. You speak without letup of a letting-be and give the impression that 
what is meant is a kind of passivity.  All the same, I think I understand that it is 
in no way a matter of weakly allowing things to slide and drift along. 
SCHOLAR. Perhaps a higher acting is concealed in releasement than is found in 
all the actions within the world and in the machinations of all mankind. 
TEACHER. … which higher acting is yet no activity. 
SCIENTIST. Then releasement lies – if we may use the word lie – beyond the 
distinction between activity and passivity … 
SCHOLAR. … because releasement does not belong to the domain of the will. 
SCIENTIST. The transition from willing into releasement is what seems difficult to 
me. 
TEACHER. And all the more, since the nature of releasement is still hidden.150 
                                               
149
 M. Heidegger, "Conversation on a Country Path About Thinking," in Discourse on Thinking: A Translation 
of 'Gelassenheit', Martin Heidegger: Works (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 59. The distinction between 
Eckhart and Heidegger, however, may not be as great as it first appears. Earlier in this chapter, I argued that 
any releasement to Eckhart’s concept of God is actually a releasement to a form of emptiness, a kind of 
kenosis (see discussion under heading, “Meister Eckhart and Gelassenheit”). A possible ambiguity in 
Heidegger’s notion of ‘non-willing’ is taken up by John Caputo, who also argues that subordination to 
Eckhart’s God is ultimately subordination to “a nameless and will-less abyss.” See Caputo, The Mystical 
Element in Heidegger's Thought: 176-181. 
150
 Heidegger, "Conversation on a Country Path About Thinking," 60-61. 
52 
At this juncture, it may be tempting to think that releasement is kenosis, and vice 
versa.  Indeed the closeness of their relationship is undeniable, but, before concluding 
that they are also synonymous, it is helpful to look at Heidegger’s concept of releasement 
as presented by philosopher Charles Guignon (1944-) in his book, On Being Authentic.  
When his view is juxtaposed with Heidegger’s, it can be seen as offering both faithful 
interpretation and important amplification: 
The idea of releasement proposes not passive quietism in which one does 
nothing, but an activism that operates with a heightened sensitivity to what is 
called for by the entire situation.  It is a stance that is motivated less by a concern 
with making than with finding, less by calling forth than being called.  In place of 
the emphasis on calculation and insistence on one’s own ends, there is the kind of 
situational awareness of what should be done that comes readily to those who 
have cultivated in themselves a sense of decency and compassion.151 
It is not difficult to find Heidegger’s releasement in Guignon’s (with echoes of Ficino, as 
well).  Although Guignon’s releasement is not passive quietism, the activism he proposes 
instead is necessarily passive – a transcendence of activity and passivity – so as to 
maintain heightened sensitivity and avoid freneticism.  Guignon’s situational awareness 
enables what Heidegger, later in his ‘conversation’, describes as “a receiving of the 
regioning of that-which-regions.”152  Such receiving cannot be seen as something that 
one strategically sets out to do.  It is not activated or awakened by self, but in the call of 
the situation; by letting-in and letting-be the situation, free of goals – emptied of willing. 
Kenosis, I would suggest, is the latter emptying, the passive – and risk-laden – 
‘activity’ of willingly renouncing self (or “subject-ism”153), without surety of outcome and 
therefore preclusive of opportunism.  It neither effects nor awakens releasement but 
keeps one awake to releasement’s approach.  It advantages the onset of heightened 
situational attentiveness, or awareness, of what should be done.  Thus kenosis is not 
releasement and releasement is not kenosis, though they are conjoined.  Guignon’s view 
of Heidegger facilitates such a finding.  But then Guignon invokes a notion that seems to 
return to Eckhart’s alleged confinement of releasement within the realms of will and 
morality.  He conditions releasement on an apparently pre-existing and self-willed “sense 
of decency and compassion” (cultivation in oneself presumably requiring will).  As 
problematic as that may be, vis-à-vis Heidegger’s strong stance against willing and his 
desire to free releasement of morality in favour of thinking, Guignon’s conditional clause 
is at least partially redeemable in kenosis.  The clause could instead invoke decency and 
compassion as being amongst that with which releasement may fill the emptiness made 
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ready by kenosis (the in-dwelling of skenosis),154 if and as called for by the entire 
situation.  Decency and compassion would therefore also be amongst the bounds that 
define the situation’s open and creative domain.  Restated thusly (and not insignificantly), 
kenosis remains an act of will but one that is passive and, most importantly, one that 
results in the negation of will.  As such, kenosis is granted its full dimensions, whereby 
self-emptying is seen to foster self-fulfillment but is properly freed of self-serving 
connotations.155 
The benefit of awaiting releasement’s approach and in-dwelling is, according to 
Heidegger, the potential for transformed thinking.  By that he means not merely “the 
capacity to re-present what is put before us,”156 nor “calculative thinking,” but something 
more akin to “meditative thinking”; the “thinking which contemplates the meaning which 
reigns in everything that is,” or, more succinctly, thinking which fosters “an openness to 
the mystery.”157  Such thinking may not be synonymous with creativity, but the two 
notions are as conjoined as releasement is to kenosis, and as both pairings are to one 
another.  Heidegger confirms as much.  “If releasement toward things and openness to 
the mystery awaken within us, then we should arrive at a path that will lead to a new 
ground and foundation.  In that ground, the creativity which produces lasting works could 
strike new roots.”158  Moreover, Heidegger famously links his view of thinking to “building” 
and “dwelling” – particularly when the latter are engaged “poetically,”159 or, one might say, 
creatively – a linkage discussed more fully in later chapters.  Suffice to note, here, that 
kenosis, as seen throughout this chapter, is that by which openness (to mystery) is made 
possible, that which readies for awakening, for the in-dwelling of heightened 
attentiveness, and for the non-willed creativity emergent therefrom. 
 
ANALOGOUS CONCEPTS 
It is clear that, for more than two millennia, Western theology and philosophy (with the 
significant influence of science) have been engaged in an ongoing dialogue concerning 
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kenosis, even if not always obvious or explicit.  Before continuing and concluding this 
chapter with an examination of the postmodern radicalisation of that dialogue, it is 
important to see that kenotic thought is not limited to that which has occurred in the West.  
Indeed, thinking about things kenotic is something that transcends cultures and faith 
traditions, and finds considerable relevance in, for example, Buddhism, Hinduism, and 
Islam, but undoubtedly also in others.  I have neither sufficient expertise nor space in this 
dissertation to thoroughly elucidate the connections between kenosis and Eastern 
cultures,160 but even their nominal treatment is important in order to establish the inter-
culture and inter-faith relevance of kenotic concepts, especially in the context of 
globalisation.  There are also two other reasons.  First, such treatment sets the stage for 
subsequent exploration of architecture and architects, somehow influenced by Eastern 
cultures and traditions: Tadao Ando and Buddhism at The Church of the Light (Chapter 
5), I.M. Pei and Islam at the Museum of Islamic Art (Chapter 4), and Louis Kahn and 
Hinduism, the latter tradition intermixing with others to influence Kahn’s projects and 
design theories more generally (as briefly discussed in Chapter 3).161  Second, this 
overview invites more expansive and exhaustive research.  Many theologians have taken 
up the topic of kenosis for its potential as a dialogical bridge between East and West; 
amongst them Jürgen Moltmann and Thomas Altizer (discussed earlier), as well as John 
Cobb, Jr. (1925-) and Masao Abe (1915-2006).162  Philosophers such as Kitaro Nishida 
(1870-1945), his student Keiji Nishitani (1900-1990), and, more recently, Steve Odin 
(1953-) have done likewise.163  Although much more could be done, this dissertation 
takes steps toward an opening-up of the same potential in architecture, an initial step 
being the following sketch, which locates kenotic thinking in major Eastern traditions. 
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Buddhism and Taoism 
The most obvious connection of Buddhism to kenotic thinking lies in the title of Buddha 
and in the story of its conferment.  As the message of Siddhartha Gautama of the Sakyas 
fervently spread across India, people began to ask if this man was a god, an angel, or a 
saint, to which the man’s consistent reply was, “No.”  But, when finally asked, “‘Then what 
are you?’, the man answered, ‘I am awake.’”  Thus “his answer became his title … 
Buddha … the Awakened One”; the “man who shook off the daze, the doze, the dream-
like inchoateness of ordinary awareness.”164  His legend unfolds – often with remarkable 
affinity to that of Jesus, more than 600 years later165 – as he forsakes the power to rule, 
which he would otherwise inherit from his father, and chooses to withdraw from the world 
of his self and be “clothed in [the] ragged raiment” of a servant, all passive actions that 
would see his ultimate exaltation.166  Arguably, then, Buddhism is foundationally kenotic, 
insofar as the story of Buddha is a story of kenosis; that of a volitional and risky act of 
self-emptying, by which the Buddha makes-room and makes-ready for – and keeps 
awake to – the approach of releasement, its potential in-dwelling, and the even greater 
situational attentiveness accorded thereby.  Indeed, by way of kenosis, Buddha can be 
seen to exemplify Heidegger’s notion of thinking.  The root term budh not only means to 
awake but also to know.  Buddha can therefore also mean “Enlightened One.”167  But to 
know is to be aware, which need not imply already knowing or being aware of everything.  
Therefore, it may be equally or more accurate to see Buddha as becoming enlightened – 
kenotically – through an ongoing engagement with thinking (the ground of creativity). 
This notion of thinking can also be seen to connect kenosis with Taoism (or 
Daoism),168 a Chinese tradition that significantly influences Zen Buddhism (itself a branch 
of Mahayana Buddhism).169  Indeed, Heidegger begins to suggest such a connection 
when, in On the Way to Language, he writes: “The word ‘way’ probably is an ancient 
primary word that speaks to the reflective mind of man.  The key word in Laotse’s poetic 
thinking is Tao, which ‘properly speaking’ means way.”  But then he laments that, owing 
to a tendency to interpret ‘way’ superficially, Tao is often translated as “reason, mind, 
raison, meaning, logos.”  As Heidegger sees it,  
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Tao could be the way that gives all ways, the very source of our power to think 
what reason, mind, meaning, logos properly mean to say – properly, by their 
proper nature.  Perhaps the mystery of mysteries of thoughtful Saying conceals 
itself in the word ‘way,’ Tao, if only we let these names return to what they leave 
unspoken …170 
Thus, the link between Tao and kenosis is powerfully made.  Kenosis, seen as that 
original opening-up which invites releasement and, with it, thinking – more precisely, 
poetic thinking171 – surely also invites the source of such thinking’s power.  But this is not 
the only occasion on which Heidegger connects his concept of thinking with Buddhist 
thought.  In “Who Is Nietzsche’s Zarathustra?”,172 he acknowledges Buddhism’s attention 
to the overcoming of self-will, or subject-ism; such subjugation being a prerequisite for 
Heidegger’s kind of thinking.  In that attention, Buddhism is connected to what I have 
portrayed as the kenosis that makes-ready for releasement, and to the thinking, or 
creativity, that arises therefrom.  Huston Smith (with vivid echoes of Heidegger) renders 
this Tao connection to creativity as “creative quietude,” and distinguishes it from any 
notion of “do-nothingness” or “passive abstention,” instead portraying it as the 
combination of “supreme activity and supreme relaxation.”  Engaged in creative quietude, 
humanity “rides on an unbounded sea of Tao which feeds … through [the] subliminal 
mind.”  Smith elaborates: 
One way to create is through following the calculated directives of the conscious 
mind.  The results of this mode of action, however, are seldom impressive; they 
tend to smack more of sorting and arranging than of genuine creation.  Genuine 
creation, as every artist has discovered, comes when the more abundant 
resources of the subliminal self are somehow released.  But for this to happen, a 
certain dissociation from the surface self is needed.  The conscious mind must 
relax, stop standing in its own light, let go.173 
The kenotic concept of emptiness leading to fullness is directly traceable to the 
Tao Te Ching (also Dao De Jing, or Daodejing, with texts dating from ca. 300 BCE), its 
writing traditionally attributed to an ancient Chinese philosopher and poet, Laotse 
(historicity uncertain).  In fact, Heidegger quotes the entirety of its Chapter 11 in “The 
Uniqueness of the Poet”,174 wherein a wheel, a vessel, and a house are used to illustrate 
the essentiality of the emptiness in each.  For example, the wheel is only able to propel 
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the cart by virtue of the emptiness of its hub, which receives the axle, and by the empty 
space between its spokes, which allows the spokes to absorb tension and compression.  
Hence, while it is by the components of each object that they are used, such use is only 
made possible by the emptiness between those components.  Heidegger reads Laotse in 
such a way as to support his notion of Being (granted by “the Non-being”) and being 
(yielding “the utility”); a reading critiqued by some Tao scholars as too ‘violent’ and self-
serving of his own project, but defended by others.175  Nonetheless, what is at work here 
is clearly kenotic.  Underscoring the essentiality of wu (the Chinese term for ‘not to be 
present’) in relation to you (the Chinese term for ‘there exists’)176 is comparable to 
underscoring the essentiality of emptying and emptiness as a readying for that which 
might approach, be received, and in-dwell; the essentiality of kenosis in relation to 
skenosis. 
Perhaps the most kenotic aspect of Buddhism lies in its concept of śūnyatā.  
According to Masao Abe, “the ultimate reality for Buddhism is neither Being nor God, but 
Sunyata,” a term which “literally means ‘emptiness’ or ‘voidness’, and can imply ‘absolute 
nothingness’ … because Sunyata is entirely unobjectifiable, unconceptualizable, and 
unattainable by reason or will.”177  Particularly emphasised in Mahayana Buddhism, 
“Sunyata not only is not Being or God, but also not emptiness as distinguished from 
somethingness or fullness.”178  To self-empty is also to empty oneself of any attachment 
to the emptiness.  Nishitani elaborates, describing sunyata as “the point at which we 
become manifest in our own suchness,” even as it is also “the point at which everything 
around us becomes manifest in its own suchness.”  Thus it is seen as “an absolutely 
transcendent field,” yet “on our near side,” effecting an “absolute death-sive-life.”179  At 
this field – what could be seen as a bounded open domain, a ‘place’ or ‘situation’ – 
“everything that exists, including God … and the relationships between them, [are] made 
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possible.”180  Indeed, it is here “that beings one and all are gathered into one, while each 
one remains absolutely unique in its ‘being’,” and form a relationship wherein “all things 
are master and servant to one another,” in other words, a “circuminsessional” relationship 
(and thereby, a compassionate one), which also brings forth the existence of ‘things’.181  
Potentially manifested at this “field of circuminsessional interpenetration" is 
consciousness, because “consciousness is originally emptiness.”182 
Thus, the Buddhist concept of sunyata – “the pure activity of absolute emptying”183 
– shares fundamental characteristics with the Western concept of kenosis, which, if not 
precisely the same, must at least be seen as the making-room for, and enabling of, the 
field of sunyata.  Found therein are the self-emptying or self-dying of a “death-sive-life”; 
the surrender to a field or situation in which self, others, and other things exist relationally, 
in a circumincessional relationship that is perichoresis; and, finally, the potential approach 
and filling, or in-dwelling, of consciousness, also seen as awakedness, awareness, 
attentiveness, thinking, or creativity.  Moreover, like kenosis, sunyata is dynamically 
immanent, incomplete, and unending.  According to Abe: 
We are right here, right now, in Sunyata.  We are always involved in the ceaseless 
emptying movement of Sunyata, for there is nothing outside it.  And yet, in another 
sense, we are always totally embracing the ceaseless movement of Sunyata 
within ourselves.  We are Sunyata at each and every moment of our lives … In 
this living realization … true Sunyata is nothing but the true self and the true self is 
nothing but true Sunyata.  Apart from the absolute present – right here, right now 
– this dynamical identity of self and Sunyata cannot be fully realized.184 
Although little is said of the volitionality of sunyata, there is an understanding that one can 
attempt to objectify the unobjectifiable sunyata – doing so intentionally or otherwise – and 
thereby remain attached to being, or “the objects of self.”  This “endless, unconscious 
thirst to be” – avidya – “can be overcome when one completely empties oneself.”185  So, 
although sunyata is constantly underway – like kenosis – its realisation is imperfect and 
susceptible to compromise, whether by ignorance or will.  In its unceasingness, sunyata 
is also forever incomplete – like kenosis – neither a goal nor an end, but a threshold.   
 
Against the Buddhist notion of sunyata being unobjectifiable, it is worth noting that 
antecedent ideas had already become represented (a kind of objectification), when, in 
early Indian culture, the symbol for ‘zero’ – a dot – evolved to become an open circle and 
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was named by the Hindu word sunya, which also implied void or nothingness or 
emptiness.  Buddhism gradually became imbued with such ideas, which, particularly in 
Zen Buddhism, extended to conflate notions of form with emptiness.  Zen and its circle 
imagery thrived in their emigration from India to China and, in the thirteenth century, from 
China to Japan, where the figure of the circle became known as the ensō and was further 
objectified in painting and calligraphy.186  Diverse meanings are attached to this ‘circle’.  
John Daido Loori (1931-2009), a Zen Buddhist rōshi (Master teacher, or elderly wise 
man), sees the enso much as Abe sees sunyata: the “direct expression of thusness, or 
this-moment-as-it-is,” but also as “enlightenment” and the “continuing and ceaseless 
action through all time.”187  Robert Aitken (1917-2010), a Zen teacher, ascribes to these 
circles the potential for both “emptiness” and “fullness.”188  Indeed, the daily act of 
drawing an enso can be seen as a kind of self-emptying, a kind of kenosis that enables 
spiritual filling.  And Audrey Seo (1966?-), scholar and author in Japanese art, notes that, 
while it can indeed invoke universal power, the enso is at once symbolic of “the void, the 
fundamental state in which all distinctions and dualities are removed: ‘Outside – empty, 
inside – empty, inside and outside – empty.’”189  Although the enso is often drawn as a 
complete circle, it can also be drawn incompletely, with an opening in its perimeter that 
would seem to challenge its self-sufficiency, express its concurrent emptiness and 
fullness, and connect its within-ness and without-ness (see fig. 2.1).  In virtually any of its 
interpretations, the enso can readily be seen as an effective symbol of kenosis. 
 
 
FIGURE 2.1 
The Japanese enso – shown here in its incomplete or ‘broken’ form. 
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Hinduism 
Philologist and scholar of Oriental studies F. Max Müller (1823-1900) famously nominates 
the Indian culture as the one that “has most deeply pondered over the greatest problems 
of life,” and he proposes Indian literature as that from which may be drawn a way “to 
make our inner life … more truly human”190; or, it might be said, a way to become human.  
Older than Buddhism, and the ground of its origins,191 Hinduism – despite evolving with 
many differences of view and practice – shares with its ‘offshoot’ an emphasis on ‘way’.  
Like the later Taoist and Heideggerian ‘ways’, that of Hinduism also reveals kenotic 
fundamentals, volitionality foremost amongst them.  While acknowledging the vastness of 
Hindu thought, Huston Smith usefully proposes its condensation into a kind of 
conundrum.  In one breath, it says to humankind, “You can have what you want.”  Then, it 
“throws the problem back in our laps,” asking in the next breath, “For what do we 
want?”192  The wants of pleasure, worldly success, and fulfilled duty – though, in that 
order, they incrementally increase in nobility and decrease in self-focus – ultimately fail to 
liberate.  According to Hinduism, humanity’s greatest desire is liberation, or mukti: 
“complete release from the countless limitations that press so closely upon [mankind’s] 
present existence,” at once a “detachment from the finite self” and an “attachment to 
reality as a whole,” which, together, leads to being, knowing awareness, and joy.  This 
liberation is approached – or, more precisely, one is made ready for the possibility of its 
approach – by “turning away from an easy this, toward a beckoning yet-to-be,”193 a 
beckoning to become.  In fact, it is a call to become human, not only in body and 
personality, but, most importantly, in the “hidden self or Atman, [which] is no less than 
Brahman, the Godhead,” and which lies “buried under the almost impenetrable mass of 
distractions, false ideas, and self-regarding impulses that comprise our surface being.”  
Becoming an integrated human, then, commences with an emptying of those aspects of 
self that bury, block, and otherwise compromise one’s essential humanity – that being its 
godliness. 
The foregoing conceptualisation of Hinduism reveals much of a kenotic nature, 
and arising therein is the potentiality of Eckhart’s ‘detachment’, his and Heidegger’s 
‘releasement’, and Guignon’s ‘heightened sensitivity’ and ‘awareness’, all of which is 
Heideggerian ‘thinking’ made possible by the ‘way’.  Hinduism offers, to a diverse 
humanity, not one but four ‘ways’ – four yogas – to becoming: through knowledge (jnana 
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yoga), through love (bhakti yoga), through work (karma yoga), and through psychological 
exercises (raja yoga).  Likewise, there are four life stages in which such becoming can 
occur.  Presenting as problematic, however – especially to Western sensibilities – is the 
notion that there are various stations of life, or castes, which humanity occupies during its 
becoming; a peculiarity that stems from the belief that people are already what they are, 
or will be, and therefore occupy a corresponding place or station, even as they are still 
and always becoming that which they cannot avoid being.  Thus there is little opportunity 
– so coveted in the West – to become anything or anyone other than that predetermined 
and pre-existent within.  Nor is there seen to be any need for such opportunity, since the 
hidden self, if sought and found, is already infinite and perfect. 
It is Hinduism’s sense of determinacy that reveals a divergence from kenosis.  
Unlike Guignon (and Heidegger before him), who attaches his notions of sensitivity and 
awareness to the contingency of each situation and the ultimate indeterminacy of reality, 
Hinduism’s call for detachment from self is a simultaneous call for attachment, or 
attentiveness, to ‘reality as a whole’, the essence of which is seen as already existing and 
merely in need of discovery, by whatever yoga might be chosen.  Amidst such 
determinacy, self is seen as a mere spectator, detached from self and the reality of each 
present situation, and therefore able to be dispassionate and distanced from any pressing 
need to engage in the working-out and shaping of the present.  The reality to which the 
Hindu is called to attach is something eternal, the reality of a separate self that underlies 
the superficial self and transcends the individual experience of a provisionally real 
world.194  This kenosis that empties and opens-up self is actually a turning-in toward a 
deeper, pre-existing self, which may open-up to the other but, presumably, only in cases 
where such is its pre-existing essence (as pre-determined by undertakings in prior lives).  
Thus, even if such opening-up to the other did occur, there would not necessarily be the 
potential for reciprocal response (unless the other was likewise predisposed), nor for the 
mutual transformation that might arise from such reciprocity.  Of course, even in 
‘classical’ kenosis the notion of self-emptying – as an opening-up to the other – is also a 
turning-in or turning-back into oneself, in the sense that self is found already in the other.  
But the self to be found is neither pre-existent nor pre-determined, so the finding requires 
ongoing emptying, as well as an openness to the unknown – particularly the unknown 
potential for transformation of both self and other.  By contrast, the kenosis evident in 
Hinduism tends to become short-circuited by what appears as a call to open-up to a 
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closed system.  Such a call presents as a kind of ‘determinate kenosis’, itself a 
contradiction in terms. 
Three additional aspects of Hinduism are worth mentioning for their kenotic 
dimensions.  First are the well-known Hindu figures of Kali, the dancing goddess who 
brandishes a sword and severed head, and Shiva, an aspect of God as destroyer (the 
other two aspects being creator and preserver).  Both figures can be seen to imply a 
violent Hindu outlook, but, in fact, their destruction is directed toward the finite – that 
impenetrable mass of superficial being – so as to make-room for the infinite.  In effect, 
theirs are acts of emptying, which prove to enable creativity.  Second is the Hindu view of 
the world as lila, meaning ‘God’s play’.  In this view, God’s so-called destructiveness is 
actually that which empties and makes-room for a “cosmic dance,” whose energy and 
endless movements see “all creatures and all worlds” come to be.  Creation is thus 
presented kenotically, even conjuring images of Plato’s chora as cosmic dance floor.  
(There is also, in this view, some sense of indeterminacy, which stands in contrast to the 
suggestions of determinacy seen in the previous paragraph.)  Third is Hinduism’s 
ultimately kenotic inclusion of and opening-up to other faith traditions, at least in principle 
if not always in practice.  Sri Ramakrishna (1836-1886) teaches that the ways to the 
divine are various, and that “every religion in the world shows one of these ways.”195  
Smith extends the Ramakrishna view, lamenting that “as long as religions remain in the 
foothills of theology, ritual, or church organization, they may be far apart,” and then 
observing, in the manner of Hindu maxims, that “it is possible to climb life’s mountain from 
any side, [and] when the top is reached the pathways merge.”196  I would suggest that the 
pathways merge – at the ‘top’ – in their shared kenotic ontology; this pinnacle being not 
only the terminus of the pathways but also their genesis.  Although the downward paths 
to various belief systems diverge and sometimes lead to violent separations in the 
‘foothills’, they nonetheless can be seen to begin and end – to merge and dissolve – in 
kenosis.  The mystery, indeterminacy, and risk of such merger and dissolution may 
account for the fact that the foothills are so well populated and the mountaintop is so 
empty. 
Islam 
Less need be said of kenotic presence in Islam, not because Islam is of any less 
importance or is any less demonstrative of kenosis, but because its Abrahamic roots are 
shared with Judaism and Christianity, and many aspects of the kenosis evidenced in 
such roots has already been discussed.  Consequently, further discussion can focus on 
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some of the unique elements of Islam that reveal kenotic thought.  (Additional 
considerations are taken up during an exploration of the Museum of Islamic Art, in 
Chapter 4.)  As with Buddhism, the evidence of kenotic thought in Islam begins with the 
tradition’s name; a name that originates with the word salam, meaning peace but also 
surrender, particularly a surrender or emptying to God.  By such emptying, one is filled 
with ‘perfect peace’.  God, or Allah, seen as the singular and absolute Almighty, is 
immaterial and invisible, a kind of emptiness that is nonetheless something.  But, as 
Smith points out, such emptiness does not impugn divine reality for those in the Arab 
world, since they “never learned the art of ignoring everything but what could be seen” 
and have always been accustomed to “invisible hands that … swept the desert and 
formed … deceptive mirages.”197  Since the creator Allah is perfection, this creator’s 
creation is also essentially perfect; such belief in the reality of worldly matter stemming 
from Judaism and Christianity and sharply distinguishing all three traditions from the 
Hindu notion of provisional reality. 
All of Islam’s five pillars reflect the faith’s call to surrender, but three are especially 
kenotic.  The second pillar, for example, calls the Muslim to “be constant” in prayer, as a 
means to understand humanity’s subordination to God – the certain condition of not-being 
God.  This is a call to the constant self-emptying of any notions of grasping, clinging-to, or 
exploiting god-like power, or god-like centeredness; a call echoing precisely the same 
renunciation that precedes the messianic kenosis in Christianity (what I earlier called a 
prerequisite to kenosis).  In this constancy – wherein all Muslims pray five times per day 
(with some exceptions) and, regardless of their location on earth, do so facing the 
direction of Mecca (the Qibla) – there is a worldwide relationality that, once again, 
invokes a kind of perichoresis, achieved in humanity’s response to divine kenosis by the 
reciprocation of its own.  Something similar – another kind of constancy – is called for by 
the fourth pillar, the annual observance of Ramadan, during which Muslims undertake to 
fast, abstaining from food and drink during daylight hours (and moderation thereafter).  
This, too, is a self-emptying – even more literal – the purpose of which is to elevate 
thinking, heighten sensitivity to humanity’s situation, and instil compassion for others.  
Such attentiveness and compassion is to be demonstrated in fulfilment of the third pillar, 
that of charity.  This pillar calls Muslims to still another self-emptying, also constant, a sort 
of annual “graduated tax on the haves to relieve the circumstance of the have-nots.”  But, 
unlike Judaism and Christianity, this is not also intended to support the maintenance of 
religious institutions.198  The third pillar, like the fourth, invokes heightened situational 
sensitivity and a concern for, and particular kind of openness to, the other – all 
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fundamentally kenotic.  The institutionalised imposition of the pillars, however, is 
problematic to kenosis, since such imposition ultimately contradicts the volitional 
openness and emptying being sought. 
The relationality promulgated by the second pillar is a reflection of the Prophet 
Mohammed’s intent to establish the brotherhood of Islam, and his declared success in 
doing so.  It was and is an Islamic ideal, and a subject given great importance.  As a 
social framework for interpersonal relations, its objective “is precisely that of Jesus … 
brotherly love.”199  Unlike Jesus, however, Mohammed not only posited an ideal, he wrote 
the prescription for its achievement (believed by Muslims to have been revealed by God).  
The Koran presents this prescription and establishes a social order in which “faith and 
politics, religion and society, are inseparable.”200  This notion of entangled relationality is, 
of course, kenotic, at least in conception.  But in practice, the prescription that establishes 
it, like all prescriptions (not least those of other religions), is and must remain exclusive to 
its followers.  It is Mohammed, himself, who confirms the exclusivity of his religion (and 
others), even as he espouses religious toleration.  Concerning how the followers of Islam 
should deal with those of different traditions, he instructs:  
“Say, ‘O disbelievers, I do not worship what you worship.  Nor are you 
worshippers of what I worship.  Nor will I be a worshipper of what you worship.  
Nor will you be worshippers of what I worship.  For you is your religion, and for me 
is my religion’” (Koran 109:1-6, Sahih International Version).   
Thus, in Islam, as in all faith traditions that rely on exclusivity – and for that matter, all 
kinds of institutions that do the same – those principles that are largely keno-tic can, by 
virtue of the principles’ own internal barriers, be compromised and fail to manifest their full 
potentiality as keno-sis. 
 
POSTMODERN RADICALISATION 
Secularisation 
The potentiality of kenosis that transcends disciplines and cultures, and establishes its 
ultimate relevance, lies not in its religiosity but in something much deeper – its becoming-
ness, or, more precisely, its capacity to effect humanity’s becoming what humanity will be.  
Reflecting on such becoming, Indian philosopher Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (1888-1975) 
observes that “individuality is an unstable state of being which is ever growing … a 
perpetual process with nothing permanent.”  Amplifying that view, he quotes T.W. Rhys 
Davids (1843-1922): 
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There can be no individuality without putting together, there can be no putting 
together, no confection, without a becoming; there can be no becoming without a 
becoming different; and there can be no becoming different without a dissolution, 
a passing away, which sooner or later will be inevitable.201 
Nearly a century later, postmodern philosopher Gianni Vattimo (1936-) insightfully 
radicalises this view (with a debt to Hegel and a variety of theologians since the 1960s), 
specifically naming kenosis – including its instability, its plurality and differentiality, its 
perpetuality, its impermanence, its dissolutions, and its inevitability – as that which 
enables and animates humanity becoming human.  In his philosophy of ‘weak thought’, 
Vattimo, a student of hermeneutician Hans-Georg Gadamer and significantly influenced 
by Heidegger and Nietzsche, sees kenosis manifested in secularisation: the becoming 
worldly of the world and, with that, the becoming human of humanity.202  Of particular 
interest, in light of this chapter’s preceding discussion, is that Vattimo’s view is not 
necessarily atheistic.  In fact, it is quite Christian-centric, though his theism is so liberated 
from dogma and metaphysics as to be largely unrecognisable by the institutionalised 
church.  For him – an avowed Catholic, who embraces the Nietzschean death-of-God 
and quotes an Italian expression, “Thank God, I’m an atheist,” in support of his advocacy 
to “take the Bible seriously”203 – secularisation as kenosis begins with the kenotic event of 
incarnation, the moment at which God is able to be seen and spoken of as human and 
therefore secular; the moment at which God can be seen as self-emptying and beginning 
to ‘die’.  Vattimo thus returns this discussion, once again, to the locus classicus at which it 
began: the Kenosis Hymn. 
The kenotic dissolution or weakening of God paradoxically sees not the 
overcoming of Christianity but the continuation of its essence, a kind of fulfilment.  
Indeed, the overcoming of a religion only invites its replacement with another religion or 
belief system manifested in new claims of metaphysical truths.  Since it is from such 
truths that ‘violence’ can emerge – not primarily physical violence, but that arising in 
exclusivity, hubris, and mastery desires – the secularisation or desacralisation of God is 
actually a salvific process of conversion away from violence.  This weakening is a gradual 
conversion, a constant emptying, an always ongoing kenosis: 
For Christianity, history appears as the history of salvation; it then becomes the 
search for a worldly condition of perfection, before turning, little by little, into the 
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history of progress.  But the ideal of progress is finally revealed to be a hollow 
one, since its ultimate value is to create conditions in which further progress is 
possible in a guise that is always new.  By depriving progress of a final 
destination, secularization dissolves the very notion of progress itself, as happens 
in nineteenth- and twentieth-century culture.204 
Slowly, in its emptying-out and dissolution, progress becomes routine.205  Metaphysics is 
fulfilled in science and technology – and ends.  The difference between art and reality 
blurs, as art is fulfilled in philosophy – and ends.  The need for objective truth diminishes.  
Nihilism, then, is “heir to the Christian myth of the incarnation of God.”206  And God’s 
‘death’ is the revelation and realisation of God, all by virtue of God’s self-emptying.   
Christianity can therefore be seen to be fulfilled – or moving toward fulfilment – as 
its kenotic ontology and consequent tendencies toward hermeneutics and mission 
position it to sponsor secularisation.  Arising therefrom is “a wide ranging pluralism of 
religious forms that are all legitimate interpretations of the original hermeneutic event: the 
incarnation.”207  Secularisation as kenosis enables “a positive nihilism … [the] 
aesthetization of culture … the pluralization of lifestyles.”208  Amidst this plurality of 
legitimate interpretations, Vattimo invokes only one interpretive limit or threshold; that 
being caritas (and, alternatively, charity or love), by which he means “the reduction of 
violence in all its forms.”209  He sees the “indefinite drift” of secularisation as “reading the 
signs of the times with no other provision than the commandment of love, which cannot 
be secularized, because … it is a ‘formal’ commandment … which does not command 
something specific once and for all.”  Instead, it calls for “applications that must be 
‘invented’ in dialogue with specific situations …”210  This, too, is the advancement of a 
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(the) central Christian precept.211  But, somewhat startlingly, Vattimo adds to his 
proposition, arguing that such invention be undertaken “in light of what the holy Scriptures 
have revealed.”212  It must be acknowledged that Vattimo is writing from a specifically 
Christian perspective, but I would suggest that in order to embrace pluralism and avoid 
the exclusivity and peremptoriness that he argues against, the concluding phrase can 
and should be omitted, insofar as its addition imposes a very specific command indeed.  
His language might be broadened to include so-called books of wisdom from all faith 
traditions, but even that is unnecessary, since invoking the application of the non-
peremptory principle of love or caritas – to each situation – already encompasses all that 
each situation comprises, including any extant ‘wisdom’ that may influence it or those 
who are part of it, and, in some situations, which may itself be the subject of necessary 
emptying.  The initial proposition is sufficient and a more integral continuation of 
Christianity – true to its kenotic propensities – than it is when consideration of the 
Christian scriptures is imposed.  It already includes everything needed to maintain the 
unfolding kenosis.  Anything more risks the erection of barriers to emptying. 
Though not without risk, secularisation offers opportunity.  Vattimo sees the 
opportunity for an aesthetic way of being, one that is real, not superstitious or 
supernatural.  Even his invocation of the Christian scriptures is a call to their “continuing 
reinterpretation” in response to a given situation, not the commendation of a “God who … 
does not ‘exist’ as an objective reality.”213  He sees human creativity escaping the 
limitations of science and technology so as to freely shape life – beginning at the 
threshold of caritas, or love, and without need for self-assertion or other forms of 
violence.  In the absence of a transcendental and judgemental God, however, the kenosis 
that makes room for caritas and love is volitional, raising the matter of why it would be 
chosen over what may appear more expedient.  Though a less specific aspect of his 
project, Vattimo addresses this issue by once again pointing to Christian tradition – its 
inherently kenotic nature, and its consequent natural tendency toward caritas 
(notwithstanding historic and current episodes of violence) – as the impetus that guides 
choice, at least in the long-term.  Like others before him, Vattimo points to the cognition 
of violence as a condition of its rejection.  The very exposure of violence as violence 
begins a process of change or conversion.  Secularisation, as kenosis, is the matrix of 
such a process, producing heightened awareness and a willingness to name and reject 
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violence in metaphysics, theology, and ideology.214  Manifested in this matrix is an 
increasingly pluralistic and aesthetic society, which increasingly comes to value and 
deploy caritas – over self-willing – not as the result of coercion but because of its 
potentiality to unconceal the inherent ‘beauty’ in what situations call for.  To humanity and 
its creativity, kenosis grants a crucial role. 
Transformation 
Vattimo, of course, is not alone in the postmodern advancement or ‘radicalisation’ of 
kenotic thought.  John Caputo, for example – introduced earlier in connection with 
Aquinas and Eckhart (and their connections to Heidegger) – also pursues the ‘weakness 
of God’.  He sees religion and theology as “all too human,” tending to “associate 
themselves with a discourse of power,” and, therefore, “not to be confused with God.”  In 
that view, he supposes that God “belongs not to the fixed order of presence, but to the 
(dis)order of the deconstruction of presence”; that God “withdraws from the world” so as 
to be stationed “with everything that the world despises”; that God is not a “kingly power, 
but … prowls the streets (a voyou) and disturbs the peace”; that God “can do without 
religion if religion means cultic sacrifice and ritual, but not without the event of justice, 
which is not always what religion means”; that God is not intent on establishing “an 
oppressive patriarchal model of sovereign power, but the revitalization of worldly power”; 
and, finally, “that God moves not by force but by attraction, like a call,” harbouring “an 
event of solicitation.”215  In each of his suppositions, Caputo ultimately describes God in 
kenotic terms and reprises many aspects of kenosis, already discussed: the self-emptying 
that deconstructs what is present, effects withdrawal, causes disruption, promotes justice 
(caritas and love), eschews power in order to power, and that calls humanity to action – 
to the passive activity of reciprocal kenosis. 
Caputo rejects the classical view of kenosis that culminates in majestic exaltation, 
because “the power of the cross is a power without power, particularly without sovereign 
power.”216  For him, kenosis is best evidenced in the transformation of sovereignty, in the 
shift from “my sovereignty, or our sovereignty, to the sovereignty of the other,” including 
“each and every person, each and every thing.”  The “autonomy of sovereignty” thus 
becomes the “heteronomy of hospitality”: 
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Hospitality represents a very interesting combination of power and powerlessness.  
I cannot invite the other to your house.  Hospitality means that the host is the 
master of the house, that he or she owns the premises, and that means the host 
has to have some kind of power, but this is a power that makes itself vulnerable to 
the other.  It is power interrupted by the call of the other.217 
In this scenario – as with all kenotic scenarios – nothing is ‘lost’ or ‘sacrificed’.  Self-
identity is retained, possessions are not compelled to be relinquished, and ‘power’ is fully 
preserved.  It is only power’s attributes and exercise that change, as sovereign-ness is 
transformed into hospitality, and hospitality is put into practice as responsibility.  Left only 
at that, however, the situation can appear one-sided, with transformation seeming to 
involve only the host-as-self.  But, just as the host is also other, the guest-as-other is also 
self, with some measure of sovereignty and power, even if only pertaining to self.  
Kenosis is a call to mutual transformation and is only fully instantiated when reciprocal, 
when the guest-as-self is also willing to become open and vulnerable to its other, and 
thereby host the host.  Such is the tension that effects creativity, and, as widely 
demonstrated in theology and philosophy, the ontology of such tension is kenosis. 
 
*   *   * 
 
In what can only be a broad survey, this chapter has located the origins and development 
of concepts – both explicit and implicit – that relate to kenosis.  It has demonstrated the 
relevance of kenosis, not only across the disciplines of theology and philosophy, but also 
across cultures, East and West.  It has introduced many of the major thinkers and 
thinking that arise from those disciplines and cultures.  Subsequent discourse builds on 
the foundations laid here.  It next looks to architecture – an endeavour of human creativity 
at theoretical, aesthetic, and applied levels – for evidence of kenosis, seen not only in 
concretised instantiations but also in missed opportunities.  In so doing, it asks what 
architecture says of kenosis.  With that, the discourse can later turn to ask kenosis what it 
says of architecture; which, stated in other terms, is to ask of architecture how it – and 
human creativity, more generally – might be informed and transformed by its own 
kenosis. 
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3 
Architecture and Essence: 
Modernism 
MODERNISM’S RELIGIOSITY (AND KAHN’S) 
Intended or not, when Modernist architect Louis I. Kahn (1901-1974) famously muses 
that “inspiration is the feeling of beginning at the threshold where Silence and Light 
meet,”1 he aligns his thinking with the Judeo-Christian creation myth, and in so doing 
locates his aesthetic theory – but also, by inference, all human creativity – firmly within 
the concept of kenosis.  Silence and light are frequent metaphors for the divine; less 
frequent, but particularly apt, for the divine at kenotic moments.  In meditative traditions, 
across time and cultures, silence is seen as a fundamental requisite for divine 
communion, and, in the Judeo-Christian tradition, as a fundamental presence and power 
of God.2  As discussed in Chapter 2, profound silence is the implied condition of the God-
alone, pre-cosmic state of Genesis.  It is in such silence that can be found the Kabbalistic 
notion of divine withdrawal or emptying, and the simultaneous onset of ‘power’ that 
results from the silent letting-go of power; that is, the powerfulness of powerlessness.  But 
what is this paradoxical power?  According to the classical account of Genesis, it is “the 
spirit of God.”3  To Kahn it is “inspiration.”  Both interpretations find kenosis at a threshold, 
at a point where things become empowered to begin, at the edge of a domain of 
emptiness in which creation can emerge.  At this threshold, so the biblical narrative 
claims, there is an awakening from silent darkness, and, by God’s utterance – “Let there 
be light” – light is the first creative emergence from original divine emptying and filling.  
Kahn simply says, “Silence and Light meet.”  Subsequent developments in both Judaism 
and Christianity amplify the meaning of light.  Lurianic Kabbalah sees the light of creation 
producing emanations of God, those spiritual attributes of humanity by which God can be 
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known.4  In Christianity, the creation of light by word is conflated with the identification of 
their messiah, Jesus, as the logos, the Word, the personification of divine wisdom. 
Kahn’s threefold theory – silence, light, and inspiration – finds strong analogies in 
both Judaism and Christianity.5  It is, however, by way of Christianity’s incarnational 
dimension that Kahn’s theory is best seen to reflect the modern tension between sacred 
and secular, a tension ever present in his Modernism.  As Vattimo has already been seen 
to argue, it is the notion of incarnation, the becoming of the sacred – the Word, or the 
light – as human flesh, which allows the sacred to be spoken of as part of the secular.6  
Light (and enlightenment) stand with the “shadow, which belongs to Light,”7 as Kahn’s 
secularising counterpart to sacred silence.  Kahn restates much the same when he 
describes silence as “the unmeasurable” (the sacred or numinous), light as “the 
measurable” (the secular or profane), and inspiration as “the sanctuary of art” (the matrix 
of creativity).8  In relatively few words, dismissed by some as “rhapsodic … obfuscatory 
and transcendentalising,”9 Kahn not only presents the foundations of his aesthetic theory 
but broadly outlines the foundational theologies of Western religion. 
It is therefore unsurprising that Kahn describes art as “the language of God” and, 
equally, “the only language of man”10; the two references pointing to the between-ness of 
the divine and human.  It is also unsurprising that Kahn refers to his Modernist practice of 
architecture not as a business, but as “a religion, devotion and dedication, for human 
enjoyment”11; a statement that similarly reinforces his dichotomisation of religious 
sacredness and human secularity.  Yet there is no evidence of Kahn’s allegiance to any 
particular religion, unless humanism is granted religious status.  He was born into the 
Judaic faith; a faith conscious of the divide between sacred and secular, heaven and 
earth, and, despite contrasting messianic views, a faith that shares with Christianity the 
belief that the divine has entered human history.  Kahn neither denied nor observed his 
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inherited faith, but he did acknowledge a more than passing familiarity with Jewish 
mysticism.12  Such familiarity undoubtedly influenced the shaping of his personal values 
and, consequently, his aesthetic theory.  He imagines the origins of the world in almost 
biblical terms, as “an ooze without any shape or direction” animated by a “force of Joy,” 
which is the “essence of creativity.”13  But, whatever Kahn’s actual religious beliefs (to the 
extent any were consciously held), I would suggest that his religiosity is most vividly seen 
in his acts of creativity, through architectural design.  Given the era and context of his 
practice, it is not unreasonable to suggest that Modernism was, for Kahn (and others), a 
kind of religion.  In fact, Michael Benedikt argues: 
Modernism itself was … a religious movement from the start – a Protestant, 
counter Counter-Reformation, this time not so much against the Church and its 
attachment to pomp, hierarchy, convention, iconography, and embellishment, but 
against the class-conscious bourgeoisie’s attachment to the same.14 
Benedikt’s analogy begs further exploration, because major religious movements, not 
least those in Western traditions, reveal an important aspect of kenosis: its dynamism.  
Such movements ricochet between and within traditions, sects, and denominations, each 
addressing perceived changes to their own and the other’s condition, as the following 
sketch demonstrates. 
In antiquity, the fundamental sensibilities of kenosis are already found embedded 
in Judaism (seen in Chapter 2).  Centuries later, a sect within that tradition, which would 
come to be known as Christianity, arises to challenge the tradition’s self-sufficiency and 
plead for a kind of kenosis (without using the term) that would open-up Judaism to 
gentiles.15  By the Middle Ages, a Judaic mystical movement – the Kabbalah – emerges, 
but it is at the cusp of modernity that the Lurianic Kabbalah, with its creation story of 
zimzum, reinforces Judaic connectedness to kenotic thinking.  At about the same time, 
the Protestant Reformation arises to call for the reform of perceived corruptions within 
institutionalised Christianity, as well as for an opening-up of the church to new 
knowledge, to hermeneutics, and, consequently, to re-formed theology.  Arising in 
response, the Counter-Reformation – or Catholic Revival – proves not to be an opening-
up but a containment, largely antithetical to kenosis.  It would seek to affirm foundational 
practices and beliefs – which, in Christianity, necessarily emerge from kenosis – but to do 
so through control, including the prosecution of Judaising and all things Protestant.  The 
call for reform would, as well, inevitably turn back toward Protestantism.  Throughout 
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modernity, it is persistently challenged from within its own emerging sects, or 
denominations, to re-open and re-form in response to new ‘truths’ emanating from 
sectarian hermeneutics; such challenges being met – as kenosis usually is – by both 
acceptance and strong resistance.  But it is in Catholicism that the most significant 
modern movement arises.  Seeing little change since the sixteenth century Counter-
Reformation, a ‘counter Counter-Reformation’ begins to emerge as early as the mid-
nineteenth century.  This ‘Liturgical Movement’ would, yet again, plead for a kenosis in 
the church and see its plea culminate, more than a century later, in the Second Vatican 
Council (1962-65), which finally sanctions liturgical change as part of far more 
widespread renewal.  Justifying the Council’s convocation, Pope John XXIII reportedly 
declares: “I want to throw open the windows of the Church.”16  He calls for aggiornamento 
– a “bringing up to date”17 – and suggests “a new order of human relations.”18  Hence, not 
only does the Second Vatican Council prove to be a kenotic event in Catholicism, it goes 
further, contributing to new interfaith interest and interaction, and thereby effecting at 
least some measure of kenosis amongst many religious traditions in the West and 
beyond.19 
Given the complexities of religious history, this is an incomplete and unjustly brief 
review, but, even as such, there is sufficient detail to see the procession of religious 
‘movements’ as ongoing calls-to-action, all in pursuit of renewal over stagnation and 
excess.  Presented is a kind of whirling kenotic dance, at times graceful, often lurching 
forward and backward, occasionally violent, but generally tending toward self-correction – 
even if incremental and incomplete – because it is a dance that ultimately effects 
humanity’s becoming human, a requisite for, and outcome of, religion’s becoming.  This 
dance is the struggle of becoming, which kenosis animates.20 
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It is not unreasonable, then, to view artistic movements – not least, those of 
architecture – in a similar light.  Such a view renders plausible Benedikt’s argument, that 
Modernism is a religious movement, and allows my extension of that argument to all 
architectural ‘-isms’.21  None is self-sufficient, and each is a challenge to its predecessor, 
even as each will be challenged by its successor.  There is, therefore, a ‘between-ness’ 
about such movements; between the preceding and succeeding, obviously, but also 
between that which is sacralised by the previous movement and that which, in the current 
and following movements, appears to be secularising the formerly sacred.  When the 
relationality of between-ness is maintained – that is, when movements are the progeny of 
their forerunners and the parentage of their progeny – there exists an unfolding, or an 
evolvement of tradition, which is clearly kenotic in its tensility, dynamism, and heightened 
capacity for creativity.  Thus, movements produce movement.  When such relationality is 
disconnected, however, and tension is raised through mere self-interested assertion – 
ignorant of or inattentive to the others and other things of the situation – then kenosis is 
suppressed, and creative movements become vulnerable to the violence of trend, fad, 
and gimmick.  That is the point at which movements produce inertia.  Such is true in 
religion, in architecture, and in creative pursuits of all kinds. 
Modernism, then, is just one movement in a complex, entangled, and multilinear 
continuum of movements, not immune to episodes of inertia and regression.  At its 
beginning, it is a call-to-action, a call to challenge the perceived stagnation and excesses 
of Neo-Classical styles in architecture, but, more importantly, to respond to changed and 
changing cultural, political, and social issues – largely the same issues of secularisation 
that religion faces.  Late modernity – and, with it, emerging Modernism – undergoes 
another cycle of sacred and secular between-ness.  Modernism (in architecture) parallels 
the modern liturgical movement (in Catholicism), with both viewed as ‘counter Counter-
Reformation’ movements, and both significantly influencing religious architecture of the 
West.  In 1906, it is a Protestant denomination that builds one of the first Modern 
churches: the Unity Temple in Oak Park, Illinois.  Designed by Frank Lloyd Wright (a 
significant contributor to emergent Modernism in the US, even if antagonistic toward the 
later International Style), the temple prefigures eighteen modern churches and 
synagogues that he would design in the first six decades of the twentieth century.  And, in 
1923, Modernism makes one of its earliest appearances in the Catholic Church with the 
realisation of Auguste and Gustave Perret’s design for the Église Notre-Dame du Raincy, 
which, although largely traditional in its liturgical configuration, nonetheless challenges 
artistic conservatism and presents a compelling contemporary alternative.22  The 
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momentum of reform movements – in both architecture and religion – increases after 
World War II and finds Christian and Jewish congregations amongst Modernism’s most 
eager clients.23 
By that time, however, Modernism (never a single school of thought or style) has 
come to see one of its more avant-garde strains gain status as an emblem of the ‘new’, 
attain increasingly prominent commercial and institutional commissions, and emerge 
under the banner of the ‘International Style’.  Its proponents, as described by architectural 
historian Vincent Scully, would seek freedom from the “shackles of responsibility”; that is, 
from responsibility to either context or construction.  “Buildings were to have no top, no 
bottom, no side, no up, no down – nothing that would read of construction, but rather of 
composition.”24  While Scully’s assessment may be unfair in its generalisation, it does 
point to the fundamental one-size-fits-all approach of the ‘style’25; an approach for which it 
was named, of which it boasted, and in which lay its demise.  The International Style 
would come to present the paradox of kenosis, but, at last, do so antithetically.  Rather 
than evincing strength in the ‘weakness’ of self-emptying, its narrative would become a 
kind of parable in which fatal weakness stems from the claimed ‘strength’ of self-assertion 
(the assertion of universal responses to all situations).  In the meantime, it presents a 
more radical and abrupt shift than that proposed by the earlier (original) iteration of 
Modernism.  That iteration of Modernism acknowledges a need to open up to the others 
and other things of modernity’s situation, even as it progresses architectural tradition.  As 
such, I would argue that it is Modernism – at its origins – that best fulfils Benedikt’s notion 
of a ‘counter Counter-Reformation’.  Clearly challenging the ‘truths’ of Classical (or Neo-
Classical) precepts, the early iterations of Modernism do so without necessarily 
invalidating classic architectural attributes; those such as symmetry, permanence, and 
beauty, which are neither universal truths nor inherently and inevitably in conflict with any 
particular style or period, including those considered ‘modern’.26  Thus, to the changing 
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situation of twentieth century modernity, initially-emergent Modernism can be seen as a 
kenotic response – self-emptying and opening, without loss of self-identity – especially in 
contrast to the subsequent development of Modernism’s so-called avant-garde, the 
International Style, a response asserting its own universalism. 
Kahn is a product of the transition from Neo-Classicism to Modernism and 
navigates its between-ness.  He is trained in “the order of the Beaux-Arts,” under 
architect and teacher Paul Cret,27 who, notwithstanding Neo-Classical predispositions, is 
a significant figure in the early stages of Modernism.  Kahn works in Cret’s office, a few 
years after graduating, where he engages in the “modern classic” or “stripped modern” 
projects, for which Cret had become known.28  And, almost concurrently, Kahn witnesses 
the emergence of the International Style; an emergence that he cannot ignore – at least 
not initially. 
… Kahn did his best to do this new light architecture, with thin columns and 
weightless walls of glass.  He wasn’t bad at it, but he wasn’t exceptionally good at 
it either.  And, he would not have become the Kahn we know had he continued to 
do it.  He just didn’t feel it.29 
Well known is the fact that Kahn did not continue to do it,30 yet it seems insufficient to 
ground such a drastic shift in mere lack of feeling.  Is there something in Kahn’s ‘religious’ 
approach to creativity that leads to this conversion?  A compelling explanation emerges 
out of a philosophical argument concerning the kenosis of divine incarnation.  In that 
argument, Jesus is said to paradoxically possess “a limitation necessary for revealing that 
which is unlimited”; said limitation being attributed to “his capacity to share human 
suffering … and his capacity to be genuinely tempted.”31  I would argue that these 
attributes – held to reveal divine creation – are also essential to human creation and arise 
out of kenosis.  Human creativity is indeed elevated by a capacity to empathise with and 
attend to every element of a situation; indeed, to every element’s “desire to be, to 
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express.”32  Moreover, it is elevated by a capacity to be genuinely tempted, not least by 
the seductions of style.  Empathy and attentiveness are hallmarks of kenosis, while 
temptability holds the power to recognise temptation for what it is and thereby distinguish 
attentiveness from exploitation – in a process that sees cognition initiate conversion.  
Arguably, such can be seen in the tension between Kahn’s temptation by stylistic 
machinations and his gradual rejection of the same; and therein is also a reflection of the 
modern condition.  But such an argument is not meant to deify or further mystify Kahn.  It 
is to suggest – contrary to any notions of divine inspiration or intervention – that Kahn 
awakens to the deceit of style through the celebration of human ‘limitation’; a form of self-
emptying and something deeper than religiosity, wherein ‘limitation’ must again be seen 
as threshold or starting point.  With that, seemingly ‘unlimited’ creative potential is invited 
to approach and reveal itself; as attentiveness is directed not to trend or fashion but to the 
situation and its ‘desires’. 
By his recognition and rejection of stylistic temptation, Kahn frees himself.  But his 
is not a call for freedom from responsibility, as was that of the avant-garde.  Instead, he 
calls for a resurgence of responsibility, not least with regard to context and construction.  
He turns back to his beginning to find his end.  He returns to the ‘order’ of his Beaux-Arts 
training, but confidently employs his own evolving vocabulary of stripped back, abstracted 
– or modern – forms, without apology for the evident inspiration of historical precedent.  
He stands amidst the tense between-ness of modernity and, in kenotic fashion, struggles 
with it.  Ultimately – especially in his mature work – he can be seen to plead not for 
another new ‘movement’ but for a revival of what had already been begun.  He pleads for 
a transformation toward a more modern, situationally-attentive architecture, which, like all 
transformations, is merely part of what had already always been underway: architecture’s 
ongoing kenosis, a whirling dance in which Kahn takes his steps.  It is in that sense – not 
merely in its protestations against the “class-conscious bourgeoisie”33 – that Modernism, 
particularly Kahn’s Modernism, can be said to be a religious-like movement.  But the 
kenosis at work here is something more profound, something that transcends religion and 
architectural ‘-isms’, and something that can be seen instantiated in Kahn’s work. 
KAHN AT THE SALK INSTITUTE 
Late modernity’s tension between the sacred and the secular is simply another iteration 
of the between-ness that is fundamental to human being.  Heidegger uses the term 
“manifold Between” (vielfältige Zwischen) to describe the world where humanity dwells 
“between earth and sky, between birth and death, between joy and pain, between work 
                                               
32
 This is another of Kahn's descriptions of 'Light'. See Lobell, Between Silence and Light: Spirit in the 
Architecture of Louis I. Kahn: 20. 
33
 See note 14. 
79 
 
and word.”34  Kahn likewise speaks of between-ness when he locates inspiration between 
silence and light, when he places humanity between knowledge and intuition, and when 
he envisages a meeting between the measurable (also light) and the unmeasurable (also 
silence).35  But, for Kahn, it is not only inspiration and humanity that are found in this 
between-ness.  His theory suggests that light is measurable, which, I would argue, is 
meant in the Heideggerian sense, wherein “measure taking” (messen) unconceals or 
makes known.36  Of course, the scientific properties of light can be quantified, but light is 
unconcealed by shadow, the presence of which is made possible by things; things that 
are given their presence by light, and by which light is granted its shadow and, therefore, 
its presence.  Shadow, then, joins humanity and inspiration between silence and light.  
And it is in this shadow that what Kahn calls “Order” can be found, not only the order of 
nature, but also the order of those things made in humanity’s conjunction with inspiration.  
Things humanly created in search of such order, including art and architecture, are 
offered sanctuary in this shadow.  John Lobell frames this juncture as “the Order of the 
Shadow – what lies between idea and reality, between Silence and Light.”37 
I would suggest that kenosis can be seen as that which animates the movement 
between silence and light, between idea and reality.  Where is human creativity to be 
found – particularly architecture – if not in that movement amidst between-ness?  
Architecture, then, can be expected to concretise kenosis.  Just as Goethe calls 
architecture “frozen music,”38 it may equally be said that architecture has the capacity to 
freeze the fluidity of kenosis; to instantiate kenosis in the creation of a building.  
Architecture, being always incomplete, sees change begin almost immediately upon 
completion of construction, and then continue – by virtue of weathering, alterations, and 
additions, if not eventual demolition.  Nonetheless, the record of architectural creating, 
not least the concrete record provided by the building, unconceals evidence of kenosis in 
the movement from idea to reality, despite the reality that kenosis is always continuing.39  
Architecture offers a trove of such evidence, as discussed in this and the following three 
chapters.  The work of Louis Kahn, however, offers perhaps the most efficacious 
                                               
34
 M. Heidegger, "Hebel – Friend of the House," in Contemporary German Philosophy, ed. D.E. Christensen 
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1983), 93; translated from M. Heidegger, Hebel - der 
Hausfreund  (Pfullingen: Günther Meske, 1957), 17.  
35
 Lobell, Between Silence and Light: Spirit in the Architecture of Louis I. Kahn: 69. Kahn consistently uses 
the term 'unmeasurable', rather than the grammatically correct 'immeasurable'. In the tradition of Kahn 
scholarship, I use his term unaltered. 
36
 Heidegger, "'... Poetically Man Dwells ...'," 221. 
37
 Lobell, Between Silence and Light: Spirit in the Architecture of Louis I. Kahn: 70. Lobell's equation of 'idea' 
and 'reality' with ‘Silence’ and ‘Light’, draws on a poem by T.S. Eliot, "The Hollow Men," in which Eliot writes: 
"Between the idea / And the reality / Between the motion / And the Act / Falls the Shadow." 
38
 J.P. Eckermann, Conversations with Goethe in the Last Years of His Life, ed. G. Ripley, trans. S.M. Fuller, 
vol. IV, Specimens of Foreign Standard Literature (Boston: Hilliard, Gray, and Company, 1839), 282. 
39
 The notion of lifecycle transformations in architecture is explored in T.F. Gieryn, "What Buildings Do," 
Theory and Society 31, no. 1 (2002); and in S. Brand, How Buildings Learn: What Happens After They're 
Built, Revised ed. (London: Phoenix Illustrated, 1997). 
80 
 
introduction, for reasons that have already begun to emerge in this chapter.  And, 
amongst Kahn’s oeuvre, there may be no better evidence of kenotic between-ness than 
that revealed by the inception, conception, and construction – the idea, shadow, and 
reality – of the Salk Institute at La Jolla, California. 
Idea 
Viewed kenotically, all architecture – not only Kahn’s – emerges from what Kahn calls 
silence.  More precisely, it emerges from the event in which ‘silence’ undergoes kenosis; 
that is, the event in which silence is emptied to create a domain in which ideas can 
emerge.  Kenosis, in other words, opens-up a situation to which response, or at least the 
idea of responding, is possible (irrespective of need or implementation).  Because the 
situation arises out of an opening-up, the situation mandates ideas for response that are 
open to the situation, that are attuned to situatedness and more than mere reaction.  And, 
because it is ongoing, kenosis goes on opening-up the situation, presenting changed 
boundaries and shifted horizons that mandate openness to the evolvement and re-
attuned ideas for responsiveness.  There are, then, situations in which ideas for attuned 
response include architecture.  In such cases, the idea of architectural response is, in 
itself, reciprocally kenotic toward the kenosis that originates and animates its emergence.  
Most often, however, an idea is only one in a continuous thread of ideas, each idea 
responding to ongoing changes in situatedness.  When Jonas Salk gives voice to the 
specific idea of designing buildings to house a biological research institute and 
constructing them in La Jolla, California, it is a contingent idea that follows many other 
contingent ideas, including the idea of an institute at all.  It is preceded by ideas (all of 
which were eventually rejected or ignored) that include locating the institute in 
Pennsylvania or another part of California, using temporary or existing facilities, and 
ensuring that the institute not be named for any living scientist, particularly its founder.  It 
is followed by ideas that shape, and are shaped by, situational boundaries such as 
finance, administration, and aesthetics, each idea contributing its own situational change 
and thereby requiring a re-attuned response.  Salk (ultimately with Kahn) is required to 
work out – that is, to design – responses to an indeterminate and contingent situation.  
The idea for the Salk Institute, as it eventually manifests in the early 1960s, emerges 
gradually out of Salk’s continued openness to an evolving situation, a kind of kenotic 
vigilance.40 
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At the Salk Institute, as in most other situations, the idea of creating a building 
emanates not from an architect, but rather from one who may become an architect’s 
client.41  Like most clients, Salk’s idea is of place and relationality – more than it is of 
buildings – and is characteristically broad and open.  He imagines a place where “birds 
can migrate and lay their eggs,” where people can “work in peace,” and where the mix of 
people includes not only scientists but also humanists, all of whom share a “deep 
understanding and feeling for the problems of each other, and for the problems of 
humanity.”  He calls it “a shot in the light.”42  Citing what he views as the “key” to Salk’s 
idea, Kahn recalls Salk saying that 
… medical research does not belong entirely to medicine or the physical sciences.  
It belongs to population.  He meant that anyone with a mind in the humanities, in 
science, or in art, could contribute to the mental environment of research, leading 
to discoveries in science.43 
Salk thus demonstrates – and Kahn recognises – a kenotic openness to others and other 
things, as well as to their creative potential; an openness that, ironically, the architectural 
profession is often criticised for overlooking, if not assertively resisting.44  Amplifying this 
openness, Salk famously states that his idea for a research environment necessarily 
includes those attributes that would be able to attract, and extend hospitality to, a visit by 
Picasso.  This is an idea to humanise science and, through its union with art and 
architecture,45 to “merge intuition and reason.”46  In its totality, Salk’s idea is to create a 
place of and for kenosis (though never stated in those terms).  Ultimately, he needs an 
architect with whom he relates and in whom his idea resonates. 
Jonas Salk and Louis Kahn are consistently portrayed as kindred spirits, 
ambitious and open to the openness of their shared humanist principles.47  But they 
approach such principles from their differing perspectives – science and art – and are 
therefore each other’s other; Salk even being described as Kahn’s “alter ego, a 
complementary opposite.”48  Their first encounter can be seen as serendipitous, but is 
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primarily the result of Salk’s openness to meet with an architect only made known to him 
by two friends.  These friends had heard Kahn speak about his design for the University 
of Pennsylvania’s Richards Medical Research Building (then under construction), at an 
event entitled “The Arts and the Artist and Society,” a title already revealing the potential 
for Kahn’s ideas to align with Salk’s.  Salk’s commissioning of Kahn – without considering 
other candidates – is largely owing to Salk’s willingness to look beyond his reservations 
about the Richards Building and remain open, instead, to its underlying idea, as well as to 
Kahn’s apparent understanding of and openness to Salk’s idea.  Kahn’s openness to the 
others of each situation is clearly indicated in his self-described approach to a new 
project:  
“The exhilaration of getting the assignment of course makes you want to talk to 
people.  You can’t just sit back and merely wrap yourself up with yourself … From 
talking to people you get a sense of their radar about this problem and from that a 
sense of beginning for yourself.”49   
It can thus be seen that Kahn’s espoused approach appears as kenotic as Salk’s.  Their 
ensuing relationship evinces volitional self-emptying and filling with the other, mutual 
exchange and influence, and permission to challenge the self-sufficiency of the other.  
Kahn’s architecture tests Salk’s ideas about research, and, in turn, Salk’s philosophy 
tests Kahn’s ideas about architecture, at times robustly.50  The dynamic that develops 
between scientist and architect prefigures exactly that expected at the institute they are 
conceiving.  Indeed, Salk describes their relationship as “more like partners” or “co-
creators … reliant on one another,” and Kahn reciprocates, saying, “Dr Salk is just as 
much the designer as I am.”51  But, true to its kenotic nature, this open exchange – this 
hybridisation of ideas – threatens neither the scientist’s nor the architect’s self-identity. 
The domain of openness that arises in the kinship between Salk and Kahn does, 
however, present at least one threat with manifold ramifications.  Contentment with 
openness can lessen the need for closure.  As a result, Salk and Kahn are happy to 
ideate without the ‘restrictions’ of a program and, initially, without its interdependent 
counterpart, a budget.52  Both already existed – even if in unarticulated form – as two very 
real boundaries of the domain in which ideas were emerging.  It is simply that, for quite 
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some time, neither was attended to; the lack of articulation being the first evidence of 
inattention.  Unattended boundaries breach the open domain, thereby curtailing the 
emergence and outpouring of ideas, especially ideas that are fully-responsive to the 
situation.  Kenotic potential – the potential fluidity of movement between idea, shadow, 
and reality – is thus compromised.  In the case of the Salk Institute, the breaches of 
unattended program and budget see the emergence of no less than three distinct 
planning and design proposals in three years (plus various iterations of their 
development), each full of ideas (many of the most fundamental carried over), but each 
only gradually attending to all of the situation’s boundaries, particularly the two 
boundaries most notably ignored at the beginning.  The same breaches also lead to the 
painful deferral of the residential and meeting house facilities (still unbuilt and likely to 
remain so); to the inability, for decades, to complete the south laboratory building; and to 
the corresponding financial implications, which burden the institute’s formative years and 
remain today.53  Although the need for successive design proposals can be seen to stem 
from the hindrance of kenosis, each proposal demonstrates the incremental rise of 
kenotic effect through ever-heightening attentiveness to situation.  Viewed in its entirety, 
this evolvement of ideas effectively reveals an instantiation of kenosis – indeterminate 
and contingent, like the whirling dance it is. 
Shadow 
Conjoined with Kahn’s hierarchical theory of creativity, kenosis can be seen, not only as 
that which animates the emptying of silence, its filling by inspiration, and the emergence 
of ideas, but also the movement from ideas toward the creation of things; things made 
present by the light that is made present by the shadows of those things.  It is therefore in 
what Kahn calls the “ambience” of shadow – and the light to which shadow belongs – that 
humanity seeks order (including the order that is disorder) in its creation of things.  In that 
ambience, the things of architecture are created and begin to become and, by virtue of 
light’s shadow, begin to reveal their order.  To Kahn, “our work” – human creativity and 
the things created thereby – “is of shadow.”54  Design is thus found in the realm of 
shadow; a realm between the realms of idea and reality, which, as Kahn suggests, are 
only portrayed as separate “for the convenience of argument.”55  The realm of between-
ness offers a worthwhile vantage point from which to see kenosis concretised in design, 
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and the Salk Institute, with its famous central courtyard, seems to embody that realm.  
Like all things, its order is destined to be revealed by the shadows it enables light to cast, 
but the order of this particular thing proves especially accommodating to their interplay – 
their kenotic dance – and therefore also to this discourse.56 
The heart of Salk is an open-ended central courtyard that divides two parallel 
wings, each lined along the inside face by five freestanding towers – the wings 
house laboratories; the towers, arcaded at the base, house private studies.  In 
plan, labs and studies form two serrated bars that straddle the sun-baked 
courtyard.  Standing at the entrance to this serene, open-air nave, ten thousand 
eyes have lifted cameras to cheekbones to record Kahn’s perspective gift.  A 
narrow ribbon of water pulls each lens due west along the courtyard’s centreline, 
launching the viewer into a distant belt of ocean that joins the surface of the court 
to infinite space.57 
There may be no better evidence of kenosis frozen in architecture than that 
offered by the Salk Institute’s central courtyard.  True to kenotic paradox, however, it is 
not the building masses that manifest kenosis but the space between: the void, the 
emptiness, the chora that is a dance floor.  There, in the between-ness of “Salk’s 
extramundane space,”58 this thing – this built environment – empties itself, simultaneously 
receives its others, and responds to the entirety of its situation.  In Heideggerian terms, it 
gathers the fourfold of earth, sky, divinities, and mortals.  Though worthy in their own 
right, the buildings in this courtyard are cast in a supporting role, yet, like shadow, remain 
essential to the unconcealment that results.  It is similarly paradoxical, and evidential of 
kenosis, that this result owes more to Mexican architect Luis Barragán than it does to 
Kahn.59  Long before the current courtyard is designed, Kahn and Salk consistently 
envisage a courtyard at the institute and conceive it as a garden cloister – a nostalgic 
reference to the monastic cloister at Assisi.60  But it is Barragán, out of his own 
opening-up to the unique situation presented by these buildings, at this location, and in 
this time, who tells Kahn, “Don’t put one leaf, nor plant, not one flower, nor dirt” in this 
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courtyard.61  Of course, it is Kahn who invites such advice by opening-up to and inviting 
Barragán’s collaboration.  It is Kahn and Salk who open-up and recognise that a stone 
courtyard floor actually becomes another of the project’s “façades,” one that “rises to the 
sky and unites the two.”62  And it is Kahn and Salk who ultimately empty themselves of 
pre-conceptions, reject suggestions for “softening,”63 and open-up to the other that lies in 
Barragán’s idea.  Thus, a garden transforms into an “oratory.”64  That the courtyard finally 
embodies kenosis is owing to an unfolding of kenotic events that give it presence; events 
that see light enable its shadows (see fig. 3.1). 
 
 
FIGURE 3.1 
The Salk Institute central courtyard, viewing west over the site’s ravine to the Pacific Ocean.   
 
 
Barragán’s idea also awakens Kahn to an alternative view of the design’s 
formality, not as two buildings and a courtyard, but as one larger totality whose centre is 
“hollowed out.”65  Such a view places greater emphasis on the thingness of the 
architecture – the boundedness of the thing’s defining surfaces – and renders the whole 
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thing a receptacle, capable of receiving and therefore of pouring-out.66  Foremost, it is a 
receptacle of light, as evidenced by its cyclical filling with, and emptying of, shadow.  In its 
reception, light – both solar and lunar – is registered as it marks “the passage of time, via 
constantly moving shadows cast by the angled side walls onto the travertine floor.”67  
And, by virtue of those angled walls, light is reflected back and forth between them, in a 
manner akin to the light of Kabbalistic zimzum, ricocheting across the empty, pre-creation 
matrix of divine withdrawal,68 or kenosis.  Hence, even as Kahn’s hollowed-out courtyard 
receives, registers, and reflects light – all kenotic attributes – light reciprocates, as it 
receives, registers, and reflects the courtyard in shadow.  This courtyard is made to 
receive light, and is made by casting shadows.  Light and the courtyard enjoy a kenotic 
relationship, each bettered by the other. 
Proving the relationship kenotic is the fact that both light and courtyard are able to 
challenge the self-sufficiency of the other.  At the most fundamental level, light challenges 
the courtyard (and the forms that define it) to make itself present without casting 
shadows, which it cannot do, especially in the absence of light.  Light then challenges the 
courtyard to deal with light’s intensity, which threatens to shatter and break the order of 
this receptacle, much as it did in the Kabbalistic portrayal of the “Breaking of the Vessels” 
(see Chapter 2).  Kahn’s design for the courtyard welcomes light but returns the 
challenge, putting “the sun on trial.”69  In his famous paraphrase of Wallace Stevens, 
Kahn notes that “the sun never knew how great it was until it struck the side of a 
building.”70  In essence, he challenges the sufficiency of the sun to prove its greatness 
without things to illuminate, and things to produce its shadow; things such as architecture.  
The Salk Institute and its courtyard generously grant sunlight – as well as moonlight and 
starlight – the knowledge of its greatness, even as they also preclude its triumphalism.  
Kahn goes on to challenge sunlight’s siblings – glare and heat – which emanate from the 
intentionally un-landscaped courtyard and threaten to infiltrate the buildings.  He does so 
by wrapping walls around transparent portions of the laboratories, and by employing 
bespoke architectural louvres at other openings, effectively prosecuting “the law of 
light.”71  Thus, just as light is made known by shadow, it is Kahn’s design intent to see the 
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desirable glimmer and warmth of the courtyard made known by the subjugation of glare 
and heat in the laboratories.72 
It might be said that the courtyard and light are engaged in ‘dialogue’, but the term 
understates kenotic relationality.  Kenosis may include dialogue, but it is not mere 
dialogue, and this courtyard is responsible for more.  As seen, it relates to light in various 
and mutual ways, but such engagement is not limited to light.  In fact, this receptacle 
courtyard is the connection and confluence of all relationality at the Salk Institute, binding 
architecture with situation, and sometimes placing the two in tension.  It is the latter that 
holds the project’s intrigue.  In addition to light, the courtyard receives the ‘others’ of its 
situation, including earth, ocean, sky, and the built forms that define its receptivity.  
Through its relationship with the earth, the courtyard gathers-in the site’s deep ravine 
(with which it aligns), and, it is by way of that particular contraction or self-emptying of the 
earth that the courtyard enjoys an unearthly view – figuratively and literally.  Gathering-in 
the hollowness of the natural ravine, the courtyard unconceals and pours out the 
emptiness of its own hollowness, granting the natural topography a mimetic and 
empathetic architectural extension.  Not everything, however, is kenotically relational 
between this architecture and the earth that bears it.  Extensive excavation and 
earthworks were required to accommodate the design, which – purportedly in the name 
of satisfying local height limitations – places the courtyard at natural grade level, while 
depressing each flanking laboratory building one level into the ground.  The expansive 
rectangle of earth beneath the courtyard therefore had to be isolated and maintained – in 
a most unnatural way, using twenty-foot-high retaining walls – as substantial portions of 
earth all around it were removed.  James Steele’s account of the project attributes this to 
the “close relationship between building and ground,”73 but it actually results from the 
opposite: a building design that wilfully resists the topography on which it rests and 
thereby exhibits less than complete responsiveness to the entirety of its situation.  
Nonetheless, there is a sense in which even such incongruity offers evidence of kenosis, 
insofar as it confirms the imperfect, incomplete, and contingent nature of kenotic events. 
As a consequence of the relationship between courtyard and ravine, the courtyard 
comes into a unique relationship with the ocean, as if the earth relinquishes its right to the 
ocean’s horizon and gifts it to the courtyard, alone.  Galvanising this relationship is the 
courtyard’s central channel of water, an extraordinarily narrow axis that nonetheless 
unites the courtyard with the vastness and seeming infinity of the ocean.  Heinrich 
Hermann notes that this “‘River of Life’ … seems to feed the ocean.”74  His observation is 
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correct, but it is equally or more important that the ocean also seems to feed the channel 
and its surrounds.  Ocean and channel appear to simultaneously empty into, and be filled 
by, the other.  By way of this channel, the relationship between courtyard and ocean 
transcends mere view, mere gazing at the ocean – an activity facilitated at innumerable 
sites – and, instead, establishes mutuality and hybridisation.  Neither the courtyard nor 
the ocean, however, suffers any loss of identity.  Ocean remains vast and cosmic, while 
courtyard remains defined and human.  It is, of course, an illusion.  The bodies of water 
are not connected, but their visual relationship is a powerful symbol of the kenosis that is 
actually at work.   
The courtyard’s opening toward the ocean seamlessly joins its largest opening, 
that which opens toward the sky, and they become a single orifice.  In like fashion, the 
ocean and sky often appear to join and be received, as one, by the one opening.  The 
courtyard gathers-in all that the sky offers – sun, moon, stars, and ever-changing 
atmospheres – as well as that which the ocean reflects and enhances, or the horizon 
delimits; the latter marking the ocean’s relationship with the sky.  Such gathering-in 
opens-up a Heideggerian world between courtyard and sky, and offers a place where 
mortals can receive or contemplate the divine (regardless of how ‘the divine’ is 
interpreted).  But, just as with earth, light, and ocean, the courtyard’s relationship with sky 
goes beyond receptivity to include exchange.  The opening that empties and gathers-in 
also pours-out.  It is this opening that presents the courtyard’s horizontal façade back to 
the sky and its shadows back to the sun and moon.  And, it is this opening that presents 
the courtyard’s human activity back to the sky.  The floor of the courtyard becomes a kind 
of mirror in which mortals and ‘divinities’ reflect the presence of the other, and in which 
earth and sky do likewise.75  Thus, the courtyard is a place designed to foster looking 
“within” and “without,” for connecting the human to the cosmic.76   
Finally, the courtyard establishes the relationality of human activity in this place, 
not only the creative activity that formed the place, but also that for which the place was 
formed.  Such human activity first creates and places, in a very particular relationship with 
the situation, the two architectural components by which the courtyard is given form, and 
by which the void and mass conjoin as one, thingly, hollowed-out receptacle.  It is in this 
work of shadow – undertaken by Salk, Kahn, and all of their collaborators – that the 
architecture is enabled to appear, to enter into relationship, and, as a consequence of 
both, to become a place for becoming – essential to the always-incomplete and always-
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becoming nature of science.  In turn, the architecture places into relationship the scientific 
activities to be engaged therein – also the work of shadow.  The resulting dynamic 
supports a view of buildings being at once “made and capable of making.”77  From its 
centre – outward in the direction of the two buildings that define it – the courtyard 
establishes the relationality amongst places of interaction (courtyard), contemplation 
(private studies), and collaboration (laboratories), and thereby embodies Salk’s monastic 
model for scientific research.  In so doing, the courtyard also reveals the kenotic 
relationship that exists between the hollow receptacle and its containing surrounds. 
Despite dramatically different ontologies, the courtyard (human and social) and 
the laboratories (material and technical) open up to one another, even while 
demonstrating that neither is self-sufficient.  And both share the same dynamic with the 
private studies (individual and isolationist).  The three, together, form the institute’s plan, 
wherein “rooms relate to one another to strengthen their own unique nature” and thereby 
become what Kahn calls “a society of rooms.”78  Beyond their societal interdependence, 
however, Heinrich Hermann describes the “interchangeability of what is ‘auditorium’ and 
what is ‘stage’” at this place.79  He notes that when viewing from a lab into the courtyard, 
the lab is auditorium, and the courtyard is a stage for social performance; but, when 
viewing from the courtyard into a lab, the courtyard becomes auditorium, and the lab is a 
stage for technical performance (see figs. 3.2 and 3.3).  Although insightful to that point, 
his analogy fails to include the elements that stand between the courtyard and the 
laboratories: the private study towers (see fig. 3.4).  They are no less interchangeable.  In 
effect, they are the auditorium’s box seats – in a “deliberately elitist” scientific forum80 – 
from which to view, open-up to, and become immersed in, not only the courtyard’s human 
performances, but also those of the ocean and sky beyond; those seemingly unrelated 
things from which may emerge the highly pertinent.  Conversely, when viewed from the 
courtyard, as elements of the stage set, the private studies signal the importance of 
solitary and unobserved performances, as well as the potentiality and actuality of the 
contributions those performances make.  Such interchangeability is not necessarily of 
practical use since the “beholding and being beheld”81 are constantly ongoing, never 
fixed, and seldom consciously observed.  Nonetheless, it characterises the nature of the 
society created by this institution’s plan.  Interchangeability exemplifies mutual exchange 
and influence, an ability to partially become the other, and hybridisation – all evidence of 
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kenosis.  Indeed, if the Salk’s courtyard is an architectural manifestation of what poet 
Wallace Stevens sees as “the dumbfounding abyss between ourselves and the object, or 
between ourselves and the other selves,”82 then it is the project’s kenosis that fills the 
abyss and animates the buoyant movement in its between-ness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3.2 
Above, the courtyard as ‘stage’, with laboratories and 
study towers as ‘auditorium’. 
 
 
FIGURE 3.3 
Above right, the laboratories as ‘stage’ (despite the 
onset of unintended subdivisions and clutter), with the 
courtyard as ‘auditorium’. 
 
 
FIGURE 3.4 
Right, the private study towers as ‘props’ on the 
courtyard-stage but ‘box seats’ in the courtyard-
auditorium. 
 
 
 
 
 
It would, however, be an injustice to kenosis – as well as to Kahn’s design – to 
suggest that any project manifesting kenosis is, or could be, as idyllic as the Salk Institute 
is often portrayed to be, and as this discourse, without the following moderation, might be 
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seen to support.  The indeterminacy and contingency of kenosis is such that things 
created kenotically – even if approaching the “unmeasurable” of Kahn’s aspirations – can 
only be incomplete and imperfect.  Despite the deliberateness and virtuosity of its 
architectural orchestration, the Salk’s design represents one working-out of the situation 
(actually, the third or more of such workings-out), and is not perfect.  The intended 
relationality, which is so carefully designed into the architecture, remains susceptible to 
the unpredictability and uncertainty of human experience and reaction.  For example, 
observations by scientist Suzanne Bourgeois, a researcher at the institute for more than 
fifty years, describe an experience of and reaction to the courtyard.  She cites a particular 
contingency – that of the weather – as a primary source of the institute staff’s “love-hate 
relationship with Louis Kahn.”   
On rainy and windy days … the courtyard is slippery, and the wind can blow you 
away … Yet when the sunshine returns and dries up the marble, much is forgiven.  
Our iconic courtyard … is a nice site to visit and take pictures, but it is not a 
comfortable place for scientists to meet, sit, and talk.  The glare, the hot afternoon 
sun, and the hard marble benches are not friendly.  In fact, the courtyard stands 
empty most of the time … Nonetheless, we love our courtyard and enjoy the 
shows that it offers.  Kahn provided a dramatic stage for watching natural 
happenings – spectacular sunsets [and] the sun setting in line with the courtyard’s 
central canal twice a year on the equinoxes.83 
Her comments are largely corroborated by science historian Stuart Leslie, who 
goes on to describe other experiential imperfections of the design: 
An architectural plan intended to encourage communication and contemplation 
could just as easily foster insulation and isolation … Active fellows often turned 
their studies over to their postdocs … preferring small offices in their laboratories 
that were closer to the action.84 
It must also be noted that the transparent laboratories, which Kahn and Salk intended as 
a symbol of openness and a practical enabler of inward and outward viewing, are now 
rendered virtually opaque by the subdivision of their perimeters as smaller labs, offices, 
and meeting rooms (see fig. 3.4).  With such subdivisions come the consequent 
placement of bookcases (often full height), desks, and other furnishings against the glass 
envelope, as well as the attachment of posters, charts, and notices thereto.85  There is 
virtually no remaining position from which Kahn’s vision of open lab space can any longer 
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be seen.86  Yet all such clutter and dishevelledness is completely reversible.  The 
openness in fact remains, even if temporarily impeded, and that is testimony to the 
design’s kenotic capacity. 
Notwithstanding imperfections, Bourgeois concludes that “our building gives us 
our identity”; the substance of its design “gives confidence that our research is equally 
substantial” and “attracts outstanding faculty and generous donors.”  She contends that 
the founders’ endurance of design and construction hardships “paid off,” since it is exactly 
that design and construction that provides the institute’s “most valuable advantage 
today.”87  Importantly, Leslie adds that the institute has “survived and thrived … by 
becoming a conventional academic laboratory in an unconventional building,” the 
“inward-directed gaze of Kahn and Salk’s monastic cloister” being replaced by “outreach 
and collaboration.”88  (However, the notion of one ‘replacing’ the other misses the point, 
already seen, that the institute is designed to be a place of looking both within and 
without.89)  Collectively, these observations convey an ambivalence – it might even be 
said, an ebullient ambivalence – that points to the ongoing indeterminacy and 
contingency affecting perception, use, and experience of the building, regardless of 
design intent.  Rather than diminishing the argument for the Salk Institute’s instantiation 
and concretisation of kenosis, the evidence of such imperfection and incompleteness only 
amplifies it.  These are not design imperfections that result in failure, only in not-quite-
complete success, because the architecture’s performance is still unfolding.  More 
importantly, these are not contrived imperfections, intentionally designed to represent and 
assert ‘incompleteness’ (which needs no assertion since it is already and always 
present).  These are honest imperfections, arising out of creative human efforts that strive 
for perfection, even in the face of imperfection’s inescapability.  I would suggest that 
when Kahn situates design in ‘shadow’, he recognises precisely such inescapability.  
Shadow is never fully light, but it is inextricably the product of light, light that is always 
becoming.  And it is light’s becoming – light’s kenosis – that moves it toward reality. 
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Reality 
As light, or idea, emerges from silence in the work of shadow – the work by which those 
things that cast light’s shadow are created – Kahn envisages “a wild dance of flame that 
settles and spends itself into material.”90  Idea thus becomes reality.  In fact, he sees all 
the matter of reality – mountains, streams, atmosphere, and humankind – as “spent 
light,”91 and all human creation (that which enables appearance, and which Kahn refers to 
as art) as the “making of a life,” where making is synonymous with “design.”92  Extending 
the analogy, it follows that architecture is threefold spent light: first in its materiality, 
second in its creators, who materialise it, and, third, in those others and other things that 
are receiving and being received by its materialisation.  The term ‘spent’, however, is not 
to be interpreted as exhaustion or consumption but, rather, as evidence of always-
underway becoming, which might also be described as being kenotically.  Kahn’s light 
becomes material, but it is a temporal condition – a frozenness – not one of finality or 
demise.  By means of cosmic, evolutionary, and human creation, light goes on becoming 
material reality, even its spent form ultimately becoming light again, and again becoming 
spent.  The act of designing, or the making of art – ‘the making of a life’ – is the same.  It 
is always underway and never finished, just like the situations to which such designing 
responds.  Design and situation empty themselves, each to the other, hybridising and 
partially becoming the other, even as that precipitates a changing of the situation’s 
boundaries and horizons, and a consequent need for further designing. 
In another view of light (or idea) and reality, Kahn sees the reality of structure as 
“the giver of light,”93 but Kahn is no structuralist.  Structuring is the ordering of the thing, 
which will order the light that gives the thing its presence.  The design of the structure and 
its materiality (the thing) will determine the shadow it casts and, therefore, the light that 
will be presenced by it.94  An interdependent and kenotic relationship exists between light 
and structure, and the designed structuring of the Salk Institute reflects exactly that.  
Kahn’s choices of structural elements and materiality are made for the sake of light, which 
is to say, for the sake of realising the idea.  From the beginning, that idea anticipated the 
realisation of a building that could become, even as would the science conducted therein; 
a building that could seamlessly relate the art and science of architecture, just as Salk 
intended the institute to relate science with the arts and humanities.  In its reality, the 
Salk’s architecture sees structure, materials, and construction systems incorporated into 
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the relationality already established by its idea, an incorporation that expands the 
building’s capacity to become; that is, to be kenotic. 
Aside from its ever-changing, always-becoming courtyard, two features of the 
institute’s structuring and materiality are – in reality – most responsible for its capacity to 
become.  They are inseparably related to the institute’s idea and to each other.  They 
arise out of a kenotic approach to research and result in a kenotic approach to 
architecture.  Salk envisages a research program opened-up to the startling nature of 
discovering the others and other things that might disturb, disrupt, discontinue, or 
otherwise alter existing and planned pursuits.  This, coupled with his interdisciplinary 
aspirations, demonstrates not just an openness toward but also a craving for such 
discoveries.  Kahn responds with the idea of expansive, column-free laboratories that 
provide an unconventionally high degree of practical, spatial flexibility.  But spatial 
flexibility is not enough.  To be effective, it must be accompanied by equal flexibility in the 
delivery of services to what is conceived to be an always-changeable laboratory 
configuration.  In consultation with structural engineer, August Komendant, Kahn 
achieves the desired flexibility in space configuration and service delivery by spanning 
each of three laboratory levels, in both buildings, with Vierendeel trusses of reinforced 
concrete.95  The desired clear span necessitates trusses that are approximately nine feet 
deep (2.7 metres) – essentially a full storey – which provides unusually generous 
interstitial space, not only for services, but also for the movement of personnel as 
services are altered and delivered to new entry points in the laboratories’ ceilings.  Thus, 
while three floors of laboratories effectively require six floors of building, the scheme 
offers utmost flexibility, which, in turn, enables an extraordinary capacity to open-up to the 
others and other things that research presents.96 
The scheme also realises, in vivid form, Kahn’s long-explored concept of “served” 
and “servant” spaces,97 his full storey over each lab being the ultimate servant space, in 
this case laid horizontally.  Kahn, the architect, simply states that “one serves the body, 
and one is the body itself.”  But, being the scientist, Salk finds a biological analogy for the 
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interstitial space, calling it the “mesenchyme,”98 and describes the relationship between 
served and servant spaces in physiological terms, with “the laboratories and studies 
carrying the cerebral function; the service spaces carrying arteries, veins, and nervous 
system; the mechanical [spaces] acting as the respiratory system, etc., each integral.”99  
Accordingly, each laboratory is “like a living organism … capable of differentiation in 
response to evolving needs.”100  Salk’s physiological conclusion reveals an important 
instantiation of kenosis, not only in the idea and design of the institute, but in its reality.  It 
is a building so receptive to an evolving or changing situation that it can transform its 
body and systems accordingly.  This ability to transform is a proven and ongoing 
actuality, allowing “the in-house building crew [to] reconfigure labs almost at will, while 
causing only minor disruption,” but at the same time making reconfiguration so easy that 
“construction never stops.”101  While it is true that most buildings are “unendingly 
renovated into something they were not originally,”102 it is the reality of the Salk Institute 
that structure and systems provide the architecture with an ability to preserve its self-
identity, even amidst significant change and transformation. 
It is not, however, structural or mechanical systems that attract Kahn’s attention.  
It is the structuring of the design and the realisation of the idea that motivate him.  In fact, 
he makes very clear the place of mechanical systems in that structuring and realisation: 
I do not like ducts; I do not like pipes.  I hate them really thoroughly, but because I 
hate them so thoroughly, I feel they have to be given their place.  If I just hated 
them and took no care, I think they would invade the building and completely 
destroy it.103 
Kahn’s approach to this matter reveals another kenotic instantiation.  Ducts and pipes are 
the other, or other things, when it comes to his architecture.  At the Salk, he and his 
building design are obviously open to them.  He empties himself to the realities of 
mechanical and structural engineering, and, in turn, his building empties itself to receive 
the requisite ducts and pipes, even to the point of employing unique and costly structural 
engineering solutions to do so.  Importantly, however, both he and the building do their 
emptying with a healthy sense of caution and reluctance.  The receptivity of kenosis is not 
necessarily based on an a priori love for the other.  In fact, kenosis may require the 
overcoming of a perceived sense of indifference or hatred, in the recognition that 
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heightened attentiveness toward the other may reveal what a given situation calls for, and 
may be what fosters the other’s reciprocal response.  Without using the language of 
kenosis, Kahn nonetheless demonstrates an appreciation for its underlying principle; 
namely, that to be attentive to the other is to self-empty but also to self-strengthen, and to 
ignore or resist the other, or to merely feign attention thereto, is to self-destruct – even 
when the other is nothing more than a pipe or duct. 
The other might also be something as humble, utilitarian, and – to some eyes – 
undesirable as concrete.  At the Salk Institute, concrete ‘freezes’ kenosis in two 
significant ways, first as the project’s materiality.  When ‘light settles’ in this project, it 
spends itself into the materiality of cast-in-place concrete.  Perhaps Kahn or Salk, or both, 
might have preferred marble or stone, given the inspiration they derived from the 
monastery at Assisi.  (Kahn would eventually choose travertine for the floor of the 
courtyard, when slate was ruled out due to higher cost.104)  But, when the situation 
presents its complex boundaries – including those of structure, mechanical systems, time, 
and budget – both architect and scientist open themselves to what can be seen as the 
situation’s calling for concrete.  Kahn and Salk open up to the material, but not without 
challenging it and one another.  For Salk’s part, he insists that Kahn achieve a finish that 
looks “warm and alive,” something like “man-made marble.”105  For Kahn’s part, concrete 
is nothing new in structural terms, but he recognises a need to reacquaint himself with the 
material that, here, would also be the project’s most visible finish.  Kahn is famously 
known for his conversation with brick: “I asked the brick what it liked, and the brick said, ‘I 
like an arch.’”106  In that fabulation, Kahn is effectively emptying himself to brick, and 
when he does likewise to concrete, he concludes that “concrete really wants to be 
granite.”107  He therefore approaches concrete with the respect that might otherwise be 
reserved for granite, paying extraordinary attention to the mix, the forms, and the joints, 
all of which record the very nature of the material and its use.  Salk joins Kahn in 
honouring this unexpected ‘other’ material, fastidiously inspecting and often rejecting test 
panels, not to impugn the concrete, but to say that there is more of the material’s full 
potential to be unconcealed.   
It is in its nature and potential that concrete reveals a second instantiation of 
kenosis.  Concrete, in a sense, is kenotic.  It transcends the standard attribute of most 
building materials; that is, their capacities to be harvested, fabricated, and assembled.  In 
its initial plasticity, concrete is open to be transformed.  It is able to partially become the 
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other and other things that its situation calls for, manifested most obviously in the 
formwork that defines its shape and shadows.  Its expression requires the emptying and 
filling of those containers that grant its formal identity.  And, when rigidity replaces 
plasticity, those containers pour-out the emergent thing.  Throughout its existence, that 
thing reflects an image of its parental containers, which in the case of the Salk Institute, is 
a reflection of the formwork that Kahn eventually specified: “exterior plywood, filled and 
sanded, and finished with coats of catalysed polyurethane resin.”108  All of those materials 
– the concrete’s others – become physically absent with removal of the formwork, yet are 
still and always present in the concrete.  The emergent thing also reflects an image of its 
creators, and the degree of openness and attentiveness with which they approach its 
creation.  Concrete pleads for attunement to its between-ness, that which happens 
between forms (tie rods and their residual holes), between pours (control joints), and 
between panels (construction joints).  At the Salk, it is said that “Kahn’s seams ‘polish’ the 
wall.”109  Clearly, if concrete really wants to be granite (or be deployed as worthily), its 
becoming of that is dependent on the transformation occurring through mutual exchange 
and influence with all of its others.  Yet, despite such transformation, and an inextricable 
relationship with its forms and forming, concrete retains its self-identity and goes on 
challenging its perceivers to remain open – receptive – to the qualities of its character.  
Thus, in response to a kenotic approach to its creation, concrete responds reciprocally.  
Then it asks the same of those to whom it becomes the other.  And, true to its kenotic 
attributes, it spans the between-ness of the secular and the sacred.  It is a secular 
material (not synthetic, but nonetheless a human manufacture), which, according to 
Kahn, wants to become something sacred – and, when approached with reverence, does 
(see figs. 3.5 and 3.6).   
At the Salk Institute, concrete – formed by containers – takes form as a container; 
that is, as a receptacle that receives and grants presence to others and other things.  It 
does so by becoming the containing elements of the courtyard, studies, and laboratories.  
Its transformation to rigid form seemingly suggests permanence and a new-found 
unwillingness to transform further.  Yet, even though the columns, trusses, and walls of 
concrete are necessarily stable and require major construction to alter, they remain open 
to the other things to which they are related, including especially space and services.  
These strong, fixed concrete elements are central to the institute’s relationality, and prove 
to be the enablers of the institute’s always-becoming – its high degree of physical 
changeability in response to changing research.  The institute’s capacity for openness, to 
science and interdisciplinary collaboration, is made possible by this realisation of design 
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in concrete.  Inherently kenotic concrete, approached kenotically by its shapers, is key to 
the kenotic nature of the architecture it defines and, thereby, to the kenotic nature of the 
institution’s reality.  Arguably, that is why it may be said that concrete – a specific and 
particular ordering of concrete – is what the situation of the Salk Institute seems to have 
called for, and what now equips it to respond to shifting boundaries and horizons.  Such 
ability to respond has “ensured longevity in an endeavour increasingly fraught with the 
risk of renovation or demolition.”110  The spent light that is concrete – its humble and 
‘measurable’ nature nonetheless able to conjure the ‘unmeasurable’ – has proven to 
embody the project’s complex relationality and instantiate its kenosis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3.5 
The Salk Institute’s ‘cloister’ juxtaposes the 
courtyard’s travertine floor and Kahn’s concrete 
structure. 
 FIGURE 3.6 
Detail of the concrete exterior showing finish and 
expressed methods of construction. 
 
KAHN ASCRIBED 
Owing to what is often seen as cryptic language and the supposed mystery it creates, 
Louis Kahn’s espousals and oeuvre – both separately and together – have been 
exhaustively analysed, each analysis seeming to search for another label to ascribe to 
the architect or his ‘style’.  Various analysts label Kahn as a mystic, romantic idealist, 
essentialist, and social or political activist.  His ‘mature’ work is variously located in the 
stylistic categories of Modernism, Late Modernism, High Modernism, Heroic Modernism – 
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even emergent Post-Modernism – and, more recently, Situated Modernism.111  
Embedded in each analysis are astute and accurate observations, but, as I attempt to 
argue, none are sufficient.  Somewhat more satisfying, architect Steven Holl manages to 
avoid labels by describing Kahn’s work as transcending time, spanning between “archaic 
and modern times,” and therefore able to “cut through the problem of styles.”112  Holl 
echoes Kahn’s own espousal of a ‘timeless’ architecture, meaning an architecture free 
from the temporal trappings of style.113  The futility of labelling and categorising is made 
obvious by the proliferation and impermanence of the labels and categories ascribed, and 
that tends to render Holl’s observation the most perceptive.  But, like the labels and 
categories he avoids, Holl’s view falls short of explaining how, or by what, Kahn’s work is 
made transcendent and immune to stylistic labelling.  Absent such explanation, ascribed 
immunity is deficient.  Hence, while additional labels and categories are unwarranted, the 
pursuit of an explanation for the superfluousness of existing ones is essential.  An 
examination of the major attributes ascribed to Kahn strips them of their contradictions 
and instead reveals their commonality. 
Mystic 
According to D.S. Friedman, Kahn was “an architect, not a mystic,” ultimately more 
interested in building architecture than espousing its mystical qualities, though he enjoyed 
both.114  Yet, mysticism and mystical qualities are amongst the most frequent ascriptions 
made to Kahn’s approach and work.  As seen in the first section of this chapter, there is a 
case to be made for the religiosity – the zeal and, perhaps, mystery – of Modernism, not 
least Kahn’s Modernism.  Augmenting that case, Michael Benedikt observes that “Kahn 
was an architect happy to stand at the gates of Mystery,” whose “humanism was 
religious, not secular.”  According to Benedikt, it is Kahn’s work in India that sees him 
influenced by the Hindu god – or, rather, an aspect of such god – called Shiva, whose 
dance animates the Universe, whose depiction “gives equal weight to both creation and 
destruction as necessary for purification,” and who Benedikt likens to Dionysus, the God 
of Creative Ecstasy.115  More specific alignment with mysticism, however, is seen as 
Benedikt joins Joseph Burton to unravel Kahn’s familiarity with Jewish mysticism, 
including the Kabbalah (discussed earlier in this chapter and, more fully, in Chapter 2).116  
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It is through this familiarity that Kahn would have been acquainted with the concept of 
zimzum.  Kahn, himself, told colleague William Huff a story of his mystical background, 
explaining that  
… his maternal grandfather, Abraham Mendelssohn, was a ‘famous,’ well-beloved 
Jewish mystic and spiritual healer in Riga.  Kahn reported that the entire city of 
Riga, Christian and Jew alike, had expressed their esteem for his mystic 
grandfather … He also told Huff, as well as Anne Griswold Tyng,117 that in 
Philadelphia, his mother was considered the neighborhood counselor and ‘wise 
woman.’ …Kahn said his mother had received a ‘healing secret’ from her father 
[Mendelssohn] at his deathbed, which was to be revealed to Kahn on her own 
deathbed.  Unfortunately, Kahn arrived in California from the East Coast one hour 
after his mother’s passing in 1958, never learning this promised secret.118 
Mysticism is also seen in Kahn’s projects.  Architect Alexander Gorlin points to direct 
Kabbalistic references in Kahn’s plan for the Mikveh Israel synagogue, as well as various 
other indirect references in his designs for the Hurva Synagogue in Jerusalem and the 
Holocaust Memorial for New York.119  Certainly, such evidence may be ascribed as 
mysticism, but such would only name a possible signifier of Kahn’s capacity to transcend 
style, not identify its cause or source.  Kahn’s mysticism (to whatever extent it existed) 
and his ability to avoid stylistic labels are separate attributes, and neither is prima-facie 
evidence of the other.  Of interest, then, is that which links Kahn’s mystical proclivities to 
his creativity and creative outcomes. 
Unconvinced of Kahn’s mysticism is architectural historian Sarah Goldhagen, 
who, like Friedman, dismisses the notion that Kahn was a “mystical thinker.”  She sees 
that as a creation of Kahn’s own making, a particular “vision of his agenda” that he 
“retroactively” encouraged “toward the end of his life, when under the influence of 
spiritually minded architects, mostly from the Indian subcontinent.”  She argues that Kahn 
intentionally “laid this imaginative, otherworldly language on top of a ‘this-worldly’ 
architectural vocabulary that had decidedly non-transcendental origins and intentions.”120  
Hers appears as a surprising, if not pathetic, portrait: a declining man, easily affected, 
conniving to shape his legacy.  As in the case of arguments for Kahn’s mysticism, 
Goldhagen’s arguments against may be correct, even while also being insufficient.  
Although his espousals may appear to become more mystical as Kahn ages, perhaps 
even by conscious intent, it is clear that the influence of mysticism and mystical thinking 
originated in his childhood and appeared in events well before his work in India – and well 
before the end of his life.  Moreover, while Kahn’s architectural vocabulary may have had 
                                               
117
 Tyng began as an employee at Kahn’s office, but went on to become a partner. In 1954, she and Kahn 
had a daughter, Alexandra Tyng. 
118
 Burton, "Notes from Volume Zero: Louis Kahn and the Language of God," 70.  
119
 Gorlin, "Kabbalah and Architecture," under heading, 'The Tsim-tsum and the Ray of Light'. (All of the 
mentioned projects are unbuilt.) 
120
 Goldhagen, Louis Kahn's Situated Modernism: 2. 
101 
 
non-transcendental origins and intentions, that does not unavoidably exclude the 
possibility of so-called otherworldly inspiration playing a part in the development of a 
design vocabulary that proves to be prudent and practical – indeed, even political – in this 
world.  The very notion of the transcendental is embedded in the non-transcendental, the 
two being as interdependent as Kahn’s own light and shadow.  Of greater concern is the 
nature of the embeddedness. 
Romantic Idealist 
Closely related to Kahn’s purported mysticism is the ascription of romantic idealism.  In 
fact, Burton conjoins the two as “romantic mysticism,” crediting the origins of Kahn’s 
philosophical and aesthetic thought to Kahn’s mother, Bertha Kahn (née Mendelssohn), 
who serves as her son’s “tutor and guide into a Romantic world view, based largely upon 
German literary sources.”  Such a narrative is strengthened, not only by Bertha’s relation 
to German Romantic composer Felix Mendelssohn (1809-1847) and his grandfather 
Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786), a Jewish philosopher of the German Enlightenment, 
but also by Bertha’s literary interest in authors including Schiller, Nietzsche, and 
especially Goethe.  Kahn’s wife, Esther, describes Bertha as “an expert on Goethe,” and 
Kahn, himself, acknowledges that his mother “raised him on Goethe.”  Accordingly, Kahn 
is seen to have become acquainted with, and influenced by, the Neo-Platonic thought 
and philosophical principles that formed the idealistic and mystical visions of German 
Romanticism.121  Such influence presents little conflict with Kahn’s eventual Beaux-Arts 
education and its emphasis on “clear order.”  It is that training which Kahn is said to have 
lost (or denied) as he flirted with avant-garde Modernism, but which reawakens in his 
early 1950s travels to Italy, Greece, and Egypt.122  And in the romantic idealist view of 
Kahn’s story, his transcendent ‘style’ – or, more accurately, his style-defiant approach to 
creativity – is seen to emerge from that reawakening. 
Amongst those who espouse a romantic idealist view (including aspects of 
mysticism) is architectural historian Vincent Scully, not only a colleague of Kahn’s at Yale 
University, but also an admitted admirer.  Scully emphatically rejects attempts by Neo-
Modernists to distort the romantic idealist view into a portrayal of Kahn as “hero architect, 
once more shaping the world anew,” because, according to Scully, that was “not the way 
it went.”123  Even while insisting on Kahn’s attraction to Modernist abstraction and his 
determination to avoid the literal quotation of historic forms, he unequivocally describes 
Kahn as “an idealist and, indeed, a Romantic Classic architect.”  He contends that Kahn 
tries “to revive architecture by going back and starting with the ruins of Rome,” searching 
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for “fundamentally sublime effects” that deal with “the awesome and the unfinished, the 
primitive and the frightening,” as featured in Piranesi’s prints of the Roman ruins.124  He 
points to Kahn’s early 1950s drawings of Italian towns, in which he locates the 
emergence of Kahn’s approach, an approach that defies style.  In particular, he refers to 
a pastel of the Piazza del Campo in Siena: 
[Kahn] makes it curiously timeless by taking out all the elements – windows, 
doors, people – that tell you scale or time or use.  Everything is dissolved in one 
great bath of red shadow, which then floods down over the Campo.  This is 
exactly what he’ll later come to build – an architecture where all time and scale 
elements are eliminated.125  
Scully’s is a compelling interpretation by an eyewitness to the events, yet even it falls 
short of explaining how, or by what, Kahn might have come to this weakening dissolution 
that produces such creative strength – or how one could possibly result in the other.  Nor 
does Goldhagen’s dismissal of Scully’s view offer such insight.  She points to Kahn’s 
exploration of abstraction as evidence that there was no reawakening of Classical 
sensibilities.126  However, as the Scully view demonstrates, the two are not mutually 
exclusive.  Indeed, the openness of Scully’s argument reveals the closedness of 
Goldhagen’s.  She argues that the development of Kahn’s vocabulary is complex, but, in 
dismissing the role and influence of romantic idealism – incorrectly equating it to 
heroicism, despite Scully’s explicit assertions to the contrary – she dismisses a significant 
and abstract dimension of complexity, and forfeits the opportunity to explore its nature. 
Essentialist 
Taking up another view of Kahn’s approach is architectural theorist Christian Norberg-
Schulz, who uses the philosophy of Martin Heidegger – characterised by some as 
romantic, mystic, and nostalgic127 – to extrapolate or extend Kahn’s fragmentary, but not 
incoherent, aesthetic theories.  According to Norberg-Schulz, “Kahn’s famous question, 
‘What does the building want to be?’ … suggests that buildings possess an essence 
which determines the solution” to their design, or more precisely, “an order which 
precedes design.”128  The notion of pre-existing essence appears underscored in Kahn’s 
musings about the definition of art: “What is has always been.  What was has always 
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been.  What will be has always been.”129  However, reading Kahn in this way – and 
proposing a correlation of that reading with Heidegger – seems to deny the modernity of 
both men and their instinct to look forward.  It relies on the view that their respective 
philosophies are nostalgic.  According to such a view, if an essence already exists, it is to 
be found retrospectively, by looking back amongst all that has already come into 
existence; and, based on the already extant essence, the solution is not just determinable 
but already essentially determined.  The Norberg-Schulz reading is additionally 
problematic in its use of singular nouns – an essence, an order, the solution – which 
seemingly excludes the potential for a plurality of essential qualities and, therefore, a 
plurality of interpretations and solutions.  As already seen, Kahn produces three different 
solutions for the Salk Institute.  Although each follows an essentially similar approach to 
siting (which nonetheless cannot be claimed to be exclusively apposite), each reveals 
fundamental differences in interpretation and solution.  The first is ‘urban’ in its approach 
– essentially a re-interpretation of the Richards Medical Research Building –– thereby 
making it inattentive to the essence of an expansive coastal site, but presumably 
responsive to something else that Kahn initially senses to be essence.  The second 
responds to a presumably enlightened and convincing interpretation of essence, since it 
progresses to the point of signed contracts for its construction.  And, the third – a solution 
now revered as Kahn’s ‘masterpiece’ – urgently follows abandonment of the second; a 
response to the appearance and interpretation of new essentials (or, at least, factors 
affecting the project’s essence), most notably those of project finances.  The Salk thus 
offers little evidence of either determinacy or singularity in its design, while also drawing 
attention to a weakness in the Norberg-Schulz reading of Kahn. 
A closer reading reveals that Kahn, like Heidegger, embraces the indeterminacy 
and contingency of existence, as well as the potential for its plural interpretation.130  Such 
can be seen, for example, in Kahn’s admonition to designers: “It is not what you want, it is 
what you sense in the order of things which tells you what to design.”  While his first 
phrase calls for self-contraction (an appeal to some other or other things), the second is a 
charge to interpret and be attentive to the boundaries and consequent domain of the 
entire situation.  Absent is any suggestion that the situation and its potential for 
interpretation are either fixed or necessarily singular.  Further evidence is found in Kahn’s 
discussion of ‘Form’ (the realm of nature, the nature and order of things) and ‘Design’ (the 
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realm of human creation): “You turn to nature to make [Form] actually present.  Form 
precedes Design.  Form is impersonal; Design belongs to the designer.”131  According to 
Norberg-Schulz, Kahn is talking about “man’s basic forms of being-in-the-world, to use 
Heidegger’s terminology,” wherein “life is not arbitrary, but has a structure which 
comprises man and nature,” and wherein humanity has the task of “uncovering [that] 
structure”; an interpretation that can be seen to reinforce the notion of pre-existing 
essence, or determinacy.  I would argue, however, that it is not a conclusion that Kahn 
necessarily intended. 
Although Kahn makes a distinction between unchanging natural law (governing 
form) and ever-changing human rules (governing design),132 which might appear to 
support the notion that form (the order preceding design) is fixed, Kahn’s distinction 
actually only acknowledges the fixed-ness of nature’s laws.  It does not suggest that 
nature itself is fixed.  In fact, it is precisely by such unchanging natural laws that nature, 
and the nature of things, so constantly emerges changed.  Such change is not arbitrary, 
but it is indeterminate.  The ‘structure’ comprising humanity and nature is actually that of 
complex, entangled relationality, which is also constantly emerging and changing.  
Sociologist Émile Durkheim suggests that “structure itself is encountered in becoming, 
and one cannot illustrate it except by pursuing this process of becoming.”133  Hence, the 
task of uncovering this structure is not one of discovering a single, already existing 
relationship (an essence) but one of constantly working-out the current, shifting, and 
entangled boundaries that create relationality in a particular situation.  It is then to be 
attentive thereto and respond accordingly.  What has “always been” has always been 
unfolding and becoming, and has always been amenable – though not without resistance 
and challenge – to its working-out.  Again, that raises the question as to how, and by 
what, Kahn approaches this working-out. 
Social and Political Activist 
Notwithstanding already noted problematics in some of her arguments, Sarah Goldhagen 
offers a view of Kahn that does indeed see him ‘working out’ a complex and evolving 
situation.  Her view, however, is carefully distanced from others.  She writes: 
Kahn was not a lone genius … he was a lively social animal, a creature of the 
culture that he inhabited.  He was not an apolitical mystic, but a highly self-
conscious social activist who, based on an understanding of the evolving needs of 
his and other societies, worked out a complex agenda to fuse the personal 
experience of self-revelation with the social experience of strengthening one’s 
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bonds to the community – experiences that are normally perceived as antithetical, 
but which Kahn saw as complementary.134 
This is a view that associates Kahn with the call-to-action, the political and social 
agendas, and the religious zeal of early Modernism.  It sees Kahn intentionally develop 
an agenda to “situate” people “socially, geographically, within their communities, and 
inside and outside themselves,” all pursuant to a better world.  It is an agenda-focused 
view, with architecture portrayed, first, as a vehicle for the agenda’s fulfilment, and, 
second, as a vehicle for satisfying Kahn’s attraction to “monumentality and authenticity”; 
the second ultimately a servant to the first.  In this view, Kahn eventually embraces 
historical precedents from the “legacy of monumental architecture,” because, once 
architecturally abstracted (apparently the apologetic that makes their modern use 
acceptable), they allow his buildings to “become receptacles for communal identification, 
partly by provoking viewers’ associate memories – embodied history, internalised as 
second nature and so forgotten as history.”  Viewers thereby appropriate Kahn’s 
architecture “as a modern continuation of a pre-existing communal nature.”  When 
employed in his political and religious buildings, Goldhagen suggests that this strategy 
“monumentalises democracy” by inducing in the users a sense of responsibility for self, 
as both community member and human being.135  Such a reading allows Kahn to be seen 
as faithful to his modern agenda – even if disloyal to some of its developing architectural 
vocabulary – but it does not establish that such faithfulness requires Kahn’s infidelity 
toward the influences of mysticism and romanticism in childhood, or toward the influences 
of Classicism in his education and early training. 
Goldhagen’s arguments – despite adding considerably to the compendium of 
Kahn scholarship – thus grow additionally problematic.  First, it is of course true that 
Kahn’s work can be seen as a “modern continuation,” but not necessarily the continuation 
of a “pre-existing communal nature.”  Such a notion invokes determinacy, and I have 
already argued against determinacy in Kahn’s theories.  While it might be said that 
humanity is ontologically relational, the communal entities arising from such relationality 
have been manifold and constantly evolving.  The meaning and import – indeed, the 
nature – of community that may have existed at the time of an historical architectural 
precedent is apt to be substantially different to that at the time of its modern abstraction.  
Moreover, the abstraction of an architectural precedent may also abstract, and thereby 
disconnect it from, its original connotations of community.  I would argue that Kahn’s 
‘continuation’ is that of an evolving architectural tradition, which, at its best, embraces 
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both precedent and innovation.136  In fact, as discussed earlier in this chapter, such is 
Kahn’s Modernism: a call for the renewal or opening-up of architecture to changing 
situations, but not for the abandonment of all that came before – particularly not the 
spiritual or inspirational therein.  In 1953, referring to his Beaux-Arts education at the 
University of Pennsylvania, Kahn declares, “Although I can still feel the spiritual aspects 
of that training, I have spent all my time since graduation unlearning what I learned.”137  
Faced with changing situations, he frees himself from or simply changes those rules of 
Neo-Classicism that are restrictive or outmoded – just as he eventually also frees himself 
from similarly restrictive stylistic rules in Modernism – but he concurrently acknowledges 
something in the Classical that is spiritual and worthy of retention.  He confirms the same 
when he cautions that a “nostalgic yearning for the ways of the past will find but few 
ineffectual supporters,” and then admits to a realisation that “the architecture of Italy will 
remain as the inspirational source of the works of the future.”138  I would suggest that 
there are no contradictions in these statements, only evidence of Kahn’s understanding 
that architecture is an evolving tradition with evolving connotations and meanings, all of 
which require constant working-out; or, in other words, that architecture is a kenotic 
unfolding. 
Of concern, secondly, is Goldhagen’s distancing of Kahn from spirituality.  In 
sharp contrast to Benedikt and Burton, she affords little attention to Kahn’s childhood – its 
mystical and romantic connections – and almost completely disconnects him from 
religiosity, simply by virtue of his non-observance of Judaism and his family’s willingness 
to find commonality, rather than difference, amongst their friends of other faith traditions 
(neither particularly uncommon in the American ‘melting pot’).  In place of spirituality, she 
contends that Kahn finds “an explicitly non-transcendental religious ideal.”139  Such an 
interpretation might reasonably be construed, for example, from Kahn’s view of 
architectural practice – something quite capable of being non-transcendental – as his 
‘religion’.  At the same time, however, that interpretation is betrayed by the fact that Kahn 
views architecture in highly transcendental terms.  As seen, he goes to great lengths to 
describe creativity, art, and architectural practice in terms that even Goldhagen calls 
“transcendentalising”.  In his espousals there is little account of a calculatedly 
non-transcendental social and political agenda, except that which might be extrapolated 
from his intentionally transcendental view of architecture.  To the extent that Kahn is 
agenda-focused, his is an architectural agenda undergirded by Modernism’s aspirations 
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and zeal, but primarily one that anticipates the realisation of integrity through architectural 
form and design.  Rather than seeing Kahn as a social and political crusader, I would 
suggest a view of Kahn in which he constantly – even zealously – addresses the 
architectural challenges presented to him, attends to their situatedness, and thereby sees 
his consciousness elevated.  Each situation includes amongst its myriad boundaries 
those of social, cultural, and political dimensions.  Kahn sets about to work-out and 
respond to all boundaries (or as many as he can), and he does so with both aesthetic and 
ethical impulse,140 seen to climax in his ‘mature’ work.  Despite some of her own 
seemingly contradictory portrayals, Goldhagen finally arrives at much the same 
assessment when she states that “at each step in Kahn’s architectural trajectory … he 
took in a new set of ideas and formulated his own response to them.”141  In other words, 
Kahn can be seen opening-up to indeterminate and contingent situations, attentively 
working-out each situation’s ‘desire to be’, and respectfully responding.  That people still 
respectfully respond to his work is owing not to so-called timelessness (his work is 
actually very time-full) but, rather, to an openness and incompleteness – both his and that 
of his architecture – which grants ongoing relevance and transcends categorisation. 
 
Each, All, and None 
To some extent, Louis Kahn is each of his critics’ ascriptions, and, to some extent, he is 
all of them, which only reveals that he is entirely and convincingly none of them.  Since 
each is incomplete, their mere collection does not produce a whole.  The labels reveal 
their own deficiencies and superfluousness.  Each label proposes traits of Kahn’s being, 
without asking after the grounding of such traits, and each suggests that such traits 
constitute a particular kind of being, without venturing into how, or by what, such being 
might be animated.  Moreover, the plurality of labels suggests a plurality of beings, which 
tends to foster a competitive dynamic – the correctness of one suggesting the fallacy of 
another.  Such a dynamic, however, merely masks the fact that the traits ascribed to 
Kahn share a common ontology.  Indeed, a closer look reveals that the ascriptions are 
part of a creative matrix out of which each is able to arise, but that none can fully 
describe.  It is that view in which Kahn and his work are opened-up and extended beyond 
the narrowness of categorisation. 
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KAHN EXTENDED 
If Kahn is not precisely any of that ascribed to him, then what is it that animates his 
creativity – his being?  Although not before stated in such terms, I argue in this chapter 
that there is much of kenosis to be seen in Kahn.  Indeed, I would further suggest that it is 
due to the instantiations of kenosis in Kahn’s work – appearing in his approach, designs, 
and realisations – that he is assessed, critiqued, and categorised so prolifically and 
diversely.  It is a particularly personal instantiation of kenosis by which Kahn invites 
exactly such analysis – such ‘extending’: 
I don’t know how to extend things, because I don’t have any historical knowledge, 
nor any research tendencies.  I can’t look up and find other literature, I just can’t 
do it.  And so it’s left, in a way, in a very undeveloped state, as though it were just 
an offering for someone else, you know, to extend.142 
And so, Kahn is once again extended, here, but not this time in an attempt to merely 
extend the proliferation of labelling.  Instead, this ‘extension’ invites the appearance of 
what underpins all such labelling, and paradoxically appears in the labels themselves – 
as seen in many examples.   
Modernism – not least, Kahn’s brand of it – can be seen as somehow religious or 
with characteristics resembling a religious movement, but that is not due to any 
connection with a particular religion; rather, it is because creativity (not only architecture, 
and not only modern) and religion are ontologically kenotic.  Kahn’s so-called happiness 
at the gates of mystery can be seen to derive from a willingness to self-empty and be 
filled with the unknown other.  To the extent that his work reflects Shiva’s dance, such is 
due to the fact that Kahn engages in the whirling phenomenon of kenosis; moving 
between the sacred and the secular, the transcendental and the immanent, the 
constructive and destructive.  If Kahn, the romantic idealist, looks back to the classical, it 
is only to find his place in the modern, and he does so by way of kenosis.  Insofar as he is 
able to dissolve scale and time in order to find abstract simplicity, such ability lies in a 
kenotic approach that accommodates complex relationality.  His charge to designers can 
be seen as a call to self-empty, to heighten attentiveness to the other and other things of 
the situation, and to respond as the situation requests, recognising that the order of 
things is neither pre-existent nor singular, but indeterminate, contingent, and plural – 
requiring constant working-out.  And his openness to such working-out can be seen in his 
activism.  Kenosis is a call to action, a call to strive for betterment, despite the 
impossibility of absolute achievement.  If Kahn’s architecture ‘situates’ people, if it is 
socially, culturally, and politically responsible, and if it is immune to style, then, I contend, 
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that is because his approach to each situation is kenotic: emptying, receptive, and 
responsive. 
Of course, it might be argued that kenosis, particularly in its adjectival form – 
kenotic – is merely another label to trump and replace those already ascribed.  But 
kenosis is not the name of, or definition for, a particular way of being, as differentiated 
from other ways of being.  It is being.  It is constantly happening, and humanity can either 
engage with it or self-assertively ignore and resist it for a time, though such ignorance 
and resistance paradoxically come to be a part of the kenotic unfolding.  Kahn seems to 
recognise as much in an exchange with one of his students, who asks “Why 
architecture?”  The teacher, Kahn, replies, “If you were to define it, you would destroy it.”  
But then he turns the question back to the student, in what he calls a “Hebraic way,” 
suggesting that the better question would be, “Why anything?”  To that, the student 
answers, “Because it is,” and Kahn affirms the reply.  “Yes.  Exactly.  Because it is.”143  At 
a more fundamental – perhaps even spiritual – level, Kahn reveals the kenosis of his 
approach and understanding: 
I tried to find what Order is.  I was excited about it, and I wrote many, many words 
of what Order is.  Every time I wrote something, I felt it wasn’t quite enough.  If I 
had covered, say, two thousand pages with just words of what Order is, I would 
not be satisfied with this statement.  And then I stopped by not saying what it is, 
just saying, “Order is.”  And somehow I wasn’t sure it was complete until I asked 
somebody, and the person I asked said, “You must stop right there.  It’s 
marvellous; just stop there, saying, ‘Order is.’”144 
Rather than rushing to label Kahn and his work, I suggest that it is sufficient to witness 
the kenosis in his approach and in his buildings.  To do so – including with discursive text 
such as this – is to extend Kahn, and also to open-up and engage kenosis.  It is also to 
see the name ‘Kahn’ as open and self-emptying.  It is to see that Kahn’s being (and that 
of all humanity) is between and therefore becoming.  Thus it might simply be said – in 
present tense, to reflect the continued becoming of both the architect and his architecture 
– “Kahn is.” 
Thomas Gieryn notes that “in buildings, and through them, sociologists can find 
social structures in the process of becoming.”  He laments the fact that the becoming is 
often “solidified first in floor plans, then in walls and doors,” such that “retrofitting begins 
almost immediately … and every once in a while, somebody is forced to reconsider (and 
justify) how the building came to be this way.”  Portrayed is a kind of material and 
semiotic deconstruction, amidst which “meanings and stories are sometimes more pliable 
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than the walls and floors they depict.”145  Kahn’s buildings continue to undergo abundant 
reconsideration and deconstruction of that sort, but they prove highly resilient.  Kenotic 
instantiations at the Salk demonstrate – in the most literal and physical sense – that walls 
and floors can be as pliable as meanings and stories.  And almost all of Kahn’s ‘mature’ 
buildings demonstrate that the kenosis of their design and realisation is that which 
animates their becoming, as well as the becoming of the social structures they host.  That 
pliability – the paradoxical strength of self-contraction, the monumentality of 
understatement – has seen almost no retrofitting, other than that intended as part of the 
design concept, and has required relatively little justification.  If it can be said that “Order 
is” and “Kahn is,” then the same can also be said of Kahn’s architecture.  It is. 
                                               
145
 Gieryn, "What Buildings Do," 35. 
 111 
 
4 
Architecture and Empathy:  
Postmodern Historicism, Environmentalism, and Regionalism  
As Kahn is at the height of his career (and nearly its end), Modernism begins to yield to 
its successors.  The transition to Post-Modernism – sometimes seen as more of a schism 
– is famously confirmed and sanctioned by Robert Venturi, in 1966, with his Complexity 
and Contradiction in Architecture.1  Venturi pleads for an architecture that better 
empathises with the growing complexity of a pluralistic and secularised world; a world 
rejecting the notion of universal truths, particularly that espoused by Modernism’s so-
called International Style.  Modernism’s initial successor, Postmodern Historicism (or 
Neo-Historicism), could hardly have been more different – or so it seemed.  But it would 
not be the only response to Venturi’s call.  Emblematic of Venturi’s complexity and the 
fallibility of universalism, the oil crises of the 1970s highlight the finitude of natural 
resources and lend momentum to growing environmental awareness.  In architecture, 
that prompts the first urgent discussions about energy-conscious design, elicits 
audacious proposals such as Paolo Soleri’s “arcology,”2 and foreshadows the crescendo 
of Environmentalism – a plea for sustained ecological empathy – that would emerge in 
the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.  Meanwhile, architectural critic Kenneth 
Frampton argues against Modernism’s notion of universality (though not its social and 
political aims) and Postmodern Historicism’s reliance on caricaturisation, but in favour of 
heightened awareness of environmental circumstances (albeit not primarily resource- or 
ecology-focused).  In a famous 1983 manifesto, he pleads for an architecture that better 
empathises with its regionality, but it is not romantic or nostalgic regionalism that he 
promotes.  He advocates an "architecture of resistance," or what he calls “Critical 
Regionalism” (a subject to which I return later in this chapter and in Chapter 7).3  Each of 
these postmodern themes warrants exploration in the light of kenosis.  However, rather 
than analysing the architectural movements, in themselves – abundantly done elsewhere 
– this chapter identifies and discusses the instantiations of kenosis evidenced in three 
buildings that arise out of these movements and, particularly, out of each movement’s call 
for some aspect of greater empathy. 
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2
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Becoming Spirit: The Arcology of Paolo Soleri  (Garden City, NY: Anchor Press/Doubleday 1973). A more 
complete compendium of Soleri’s design philosophy is found in P. Soleri, What If?: Collected Writings 1986-
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3
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In the distinctly European context of The Hague, architect Michael Graves – a 
champion of Postmodern Historicism in America – reprises his trademark exaggeration of 
historical quotations in a government office building known as Castalia.  Despite 
seemingly extreme divergence from Modernism, such quotations present what can be 
seen as a plea for the kenosis of widely-accepted architectural principles; a plea that 
echoes precisely the original plea of Modernism.  Designed and constructed during 
almost the same period, a Norman Foster project – the Commerzbank in Frankfurt – 
makes claims that are substantially kenotic; such as those which see it as a pioneer of 
high-rise environmental friendliness, and as exceptionally attentive to the needs of its 
district and that district’s other occupants (its ‘situation’).  And it is not without some irony 
that the uncovering of kenosis in the architecture of postmodernity is rewardingly 
advanced by exploring the work of Modernist architect, I.M. Pei; most notably his 
Museum of Islamic Art at Doha, where the call to regional awareness and empathy is 
both unique and strong.  All three projects contribute to the discourse relating kenosis 
and architecture, though not with equal significance.  They contribute in a manner that 
recalls the well-known musing attributed to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr: “I would not give a 
fig for the simplicity this side of complexity, but I would give my life for the simplicity on 
the other side of complexity.”4  The project by Graves finds simplicity well before 
complexity.  The project by Foster pushes beyond simplicity to deal with complexity.  But, 
of these three, it is the project by Pei that achieves simplicity on the other side of 
complexity and thereby demonstrates, most vividly, its kenotic provenance.  Although, for 
that reason, Pei’s project is the primary focus of this chapter, the works by both Graves 
and Foster provide a no less valuable backdrop. 
 
GRAVES AT CASTALIA 
Venturi echoes Holmes, but in architectural language: “The recognition of complexity in 
architecture does not negate what Louis Kahn has called ‘the desire for simplicity.’  But 
aesthetic simplicity which is a satisfaction to the mind, derives, when valid and profound, 
from inner complexity.”  In a simpler restatement, he observes that “forced simplicity 
results in oversimplification.”5  Venturi’s critique of Modernism, and what he calls 
“Orthodox Modern architects,” has proven to be a legitimate and well-earned response to 
the excesses of Modernism’s orthodoxy, especially as epitomised by one of its 
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oversimplified truths: the Miesian mantra “less is more.”  It is a critique grounded in more 
multifaceted assessments, such as those of August Heckscher, who notes that  
the movement from a view of life as essentially simple and orderly, to a view of life 
as complex and ironic, is what every individual passes through in becoming 
mature … A feeling for paradox allows seemingly dissimilar things to exist side by 
side, their very incongruity suggesting a kind of truth.6   
From that, however, it might be construed that a simple truth is merely to be replaced by 
a more complex truth, when, in fact, even a complex truth is subject to oversimplification.  
Indeed, that is exactly what the ensuing anti-Modernists or Post-Modernists do, at least in 
their initial Historicism.  They oversimplify their movement’s ‘new’ truths – complexity and 
contradiction – which even Venturi reduces to two simplistic mantras: “more is not less” 
and “less is a bore.”7  They overemphasise irony and paradox at the expense of validity 
and profundity.  In fact, according to Venturi, they do precisely that which Orthodox 
Modernists had done; that which eventually effected Modernism’s demise.  “In their 
attempt to break with tradition and start all over again, they idealised the primitive and 
elementary at the expense of the diverse and the sophisticated.”8  Post-Modernism, then, 
can be seen as always already embedded in Modernism, just as other movements had 
been embedded in their predecessors. 
It must be said that Venturi does not specifically call for the Postmodern 
Historicism that initially responded against Modernism.  Not unlike the modern plea 
against Neo-Classicism, Venturi’s is a ‘postmodern’ plea for a kenosis of Modernism 
(though without using that phrase).  It does not invoke a ‘style’, but calls for the emptying 
of superfluous restriction and an opening up to new others – social, cultural, and political 
– such that architecture might “evoke many levels of meaning and combinations of 
focus,” with spaces and elements that “become readable and workable in several ways at 
once.”9  In the early stages of Post-Modernism, many architects find what they saw as 
new meanings and foci by turning to pre-Modern precedents,10 much as Kahn had 
already done (hence the occasional association of Kahn with emergent Post-Modernism).  
Notably, Michael Graves (1934-2015) and architects of similar leanings replace Kahn’s 
abstraction of historical precedent with caricaturisation, attempting to eschew the 
supposed seriousness of Modernism through the deployment of irony, paradox, and wit.  
Such deployment provides the opening for a plethora of new architectural trends, fads, 
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and gimmicks.11  In fact, it is Graves who produces one of the best known and most 
controversial icons of the movement: The Portland Building, in Portland, Oregon (USA).12  
It is, however, his project at The Hague, Netherlands – a project known as Castalia 
(1998) – that contributes more to this discourse (see figs. 4.1 and 4.2).  Not only does it 
see the American architect responding in his particularly Historicist style, it also sees him 
doing so in a particularly historic and European context, one in which empathy could be 
reasonably expected. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4.1 
Castalia, situated adjacent to the historic precinct of 
The Hague. 
 FIGURE 4.2 
The ‘twin towers’ of Castalia, viewed from its entry 
plaza. 
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At the time of its realisation, Castalia dominated The Hague’s skyline as a 
disruptive other,13 but, in only fifteen years, it is now dwarfed and obscured by the 
increased density and one-upmanship of taller, newer, and showier neighbours (see fig. 
4.3).  From most vantage points, today, the tops of its twin, twenty-five storey towers are 
framed by an array of competing monoliths.14  At first impression, Castalia’s towers 
appear as two aging yuppies at a crowded party of young hipsters – enduring the event 
but absent relationality, other than that afforded by chance proximity.  There appears little 
openness to one another and, therefore, little exchange or influence.  A closer reading, 
however, reveals something more.  Castalia’s architecture grants it a unique and 
memorable – though not necessarily likeable – identity that its counterparts are unable to 
equal.  The differentiation of its historicism can even be seen as having become a kind of 
lynch pin for relationality between the city’s old and new precincts.  Amidst such complex 
interdependence, which can initially be overlooked or dismissed, Castalia reveals a 
sometimes ambiguous and imperfect – but nonetheless instantiated – kenotic grounding. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4.3 
Castalia, viewed in the context of its position between the old and new sectors of the city. 
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Castalia would merely be another high-rise office building were it not for two 
distinguishing architectural motifs.  According to the architect, this project “recalls Dutch 
roof forms” and features “façades [that] reflect fenestration patterns typical of the area, 
where window and wall have equivalent areas and are read as a rich but planar 
surface.”15  Indeed, most striking are the building’s two extremely steep, parapeted gable 
roofs, credited to Dutch derivation.  However, in the absence of characteristic stair-
stepping, or curvilinear shapes and culminating pediment, the gables fail to meet the 
definition of either a stepped gable (sometimes associated with Dutch architecture, and 
widely used there, but originating in many parts of Northern Europe) or a Dutch/Flemish 
gable (more correctly associated with the Low Countries).  The simplified expression – as 
merely steep gables – might be seen as an ‘abstraction’.  However, when placed atop a 
high-rise office building and intimately juxtaposed with historic buildings on which stepped 
and Dutch gables are indigenous, this motif can only be described as an exaggeration – 
the caricature of a Dutch gable – such exaggeration being a hallmark of Postmodern 
Historicism.16  Likewise, the over-scaled window configurations, which are applied to the 
brick façades in the elementary manner of a child’s drawing, evidence the exaggeration 
of another historical reference, original examples of which permeate Castalia’s immediate 
context.  A ‘deceit’ occurs in the use of what would traditionally be single-storey windows, 
here presented as colossal six-paned openings.  In fact, the windows span two storeys, 
their top two panes in one storey, their bottom two panes in another, and their middle 
panes actually an opaque spandrel that covers the interstitial space between floors.  
Neither the roof nor window motif is a literal translation.  Neither is a faithful paraphrase.  
Both are witty and ironic, if not trivialising, parodies.  As a result, Castalia’s Post-
Modernism stands guilty of precisely those charges that Venturi levels against the 
Modernists and Modernism: forced simplicity, oversimplification, idealisation of the 
primitive and elementary, and missed opportunity for diversity and sophistication.17 
There is ample cause to criticise the incongruities of Castalia’s aesthetics, to see 
its design as ignoring or resisting the whole of the situation’s kenotic potential.  But 
Graves claims that Castalia attempts to show “respect for local context,” which is also the 
stated goal of the development within which his project is located.18  His portrayal of 
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empathy toward the historic setting could therefore be seen as a kenotic gesture of 
receptivity, an opening-up to the building’s antecedent others, by which the others’ 
reciprocity might be elicited.  But, once opened-up, precisely how, and to what extent, 
can a twenty-five-storey building be expected to attend to its largely three- to six-storey 
others?  Its building mass, alone, is self-assertive, regardless of how the facades are 
manipulated.  So, if the building fails to fully respond to its situation, the responsibility for 
such failure may not rest as much with those who shaped the current architectural 
response, as it does with those who – by their own earlier responses – found themselves 
shaping the situation to which architecture was then called to respond.  After all, the 
boundaries and horizons of the situation become significantly changed when decisions 
are made to introduce a precinct of high-rise buildings into an historic context of already 
strong and opposite character.  With such decisions, incongruity becomes much more 
likely, if not unavoidable.  Indeed, it becomes at least a part of the situation’s kenotic 
potential; that is, a part of what the situation needs.  Incongruity – though not necessarily 
caricature – might well be seen as appropriate and kenotic responses to such a situation; 
as embodiments of Heckscher’s “feeling for paradox,” which enables the proximate 
placement of dissimilar things. 
Incongruity, however, is not found only in the relationship between Castalia and its 
historic context.  It is can also be seen in the relationship between Castalia and its 
contemporary context.  Excepting the dome-topped Zurich Tower (1999), designed by 
Cesar Pelli,19 the newer and taller neighbouring towers are comparatively generic, 
decorated shafts, seemingly transportable to or from any modern, metropolitan skyline.  
The sameness of their height and façadal manipulations leads to their un-impressiveness 
and ultimate un-memorableness.  They are now the disruptive others in Castalia’s 
situation.  Their size diminishes Castalia, and their honest expressions of floor height only 
highlight the trickery of scale that marks Castalia’s façade.  They challenge Castalia’s 
high-rise credentials, asking after its true identity, because Castalia is also a decorated 
shaft and an intrusion to its context, yet it curiously appears to have a foot in both the 
modern and historic camps.  Ironically, it is its empathy – notwithstanding exaggeration 
and trickery – that now sets Castalia apart and positions it to challenge its larger 
neighbours’ ostentatious assertions, asking after their attentiveness to the entirety of their 
situations.  Thus, the relationship between Castalia and its contemporary others is also 
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one of incongruity.  They are of the same typology but not the same philosophy, and their 
respective architecture concretises the differences.  There may be no apparent influence 
or hybridisation, but there is exchange.  Each is bettered by the other’s presence.  
Castalia, the one-time intruder to its historic context, is now made to appear relatively 
assimilated by virtue of the newer, anonymous, and foreign towers.  And those towers – 
now the intruders – are made to appear less intrusive by the presence of their relatively 
modest and assimilated older neighbour.   
Castalia has, in a sense, finally become the kind of bridge between The Hague’s 
old and new districts that its developers espoused.20  It not only enjoys a relationship with 
each district but now defines the relationship between those districts.  Were it not for 
Castalia, that relationship would be something quite different.  Paradoxically, the 
incongruity that exists between Castalia and its old neighbours, as well as that between 
Castalia and its new neighbours, is that which serves to mitigate the even greater 
incongruity that exists between those old and new neighbours.  Castalia is not historic, 
but it references history.  It is modern, but appears not to be so.  It is curiously unlike its 
fellow high-rises, but is nonetheless one of them.  Literally and figuratively, Castalia is 
between.  Situated at the threshold of both old and new, it marks the beginning of each, 
and does so in unexpected manner.  Since its development, Castalia has become, and is 
becoming.  To the historic context that it once confronted (arguably, that it mocked), and 
to the more contemporary skyscrapers that now confront it (arguably, that mock it), 
Castalia is an enabler, not of harmony, but of happy incongruity.  Insofar as there is ‘truth’ 
in such incongruity, I would suggest that it lies in the reality of ongoing kenosis, the 
opening-up and always becoming of the situation, even when a response to the situation 
has ignored or resisted such kenosis.  Despite what initially appears as Castalia’s self-
assertiveness, it is becoming more fully empathetic to its situation, ironically by 
moderating the self-assertiveness of its newest others.  Castalia thus finds itself 
somewhat transformed, no longer resisting but facilitating its situation’s kenosis. 
 
FOSTER AT THE COMMERZBANK 
Completed one year before Castalia, and constructed less than five hundred kilometres 
away, in another historic precinct of Europe – the Bankenviertel, Frankfurt’s traditional 
banking district in the Westend – the Commerzbank Headquarters (1997) eschews 
notions of the “decorated shed” (a building with “a rhetorical front and conventional 
behind”), and presents itself as a new and improved reprisal of the Modernist “duck” 
(wherein exterior and interior are an integrated whole, and where both reflect the 
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building’s purpose).21  Although these two contemporaneous buildings share high-rise 
typology, neither is quite as ruthless as the prolific towers that assert their spectacularity 
in metropolises the world over and, more often than not, achieve only the anonymity of 
sameness.  Castalia and the Commerzbank are similar in that they each evidence less of 
that sameness.  But, at a more fundamental level, their dissimilarities are striking.  As a 
“decorated shed,” Castalia’s empathy toward its situation is applied, symbolised 
superficially by cladding or decoration.  As a “duck,” the Commerzbank’s situational 
empathy is purportedly in-built, the whole of the building intended to be a symbol.  With 
mixed results and to varying degrees, the Commerzbank does symbolise an empathy 
toward the architectural, social, and ecological aspects of its situation.  In each aspect, 
instantiations of kenosis can be seen, but the ecological aspect is most revealing, 
because it is that aspect which effects the other instantiations.  Indeed, the 
Commerzbank’s architectural and social achievements, to the extent they occur, are by-
products of its being the “world’s first ecological office tower,”22 and its being attentive to 
some of the complexities of that distinction. 
Nonetheless, before it is an ecological office tower – the topic of subsequent 
discussion – the Commerzbank is first an office tower, freighted with all of that typology’s 
associated symbolism, including the excesses of capitalism and American-style 
urbanisation.  The story of its contentious prehistory, as well as its controversial and 
prolonged naissance, is well-documented by Steven Moore and Ralf Brand.23  Of 
importance, here, is to note that much of what appears to be empathy is actually part of a 
forced, and enforced, political solution.  For example, project designer Norman Foster 
(1935-) and his firm, Foster + Partners, indicate that empathy with the district’s existing 
architectural fabric is reflected in “the restoration and sensitive rebuilding of the perimeter 
structures to reinforce the original scale of the block.”24  That feature of the project, 
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however, is primarily necessitated by the inherently dissimilar scale that a 300 metre, 
forty-five storey tower presents to a five- and six-storey neighbourhood (see fig. 4.4). 
 
 
FIGURE 4.4 
The forty-five storey Commerzbank and its low-rise perimeter surround. 
Furthermore, the notion of a low-scale perimeter arises not foremost as a 
proactive and progressive architectural proposal but as a result of “intense, detailed 
negotiations between the Commerzbank and the city,” well before Foster’s 
commissioning.  From those prolonged negotiations emerged the mandate for housing as 
part of the complex.25  The inclusion of apartments, ultimately located in the project’s low-
rise perimeter buildings, addresses a vital social need in the district.  But, since residential 
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use comprises only slightly more than three percent of the project’s floor area, and less 
than half of the floor area devoted to car parking,26 its presence appears to speak more of 
acquiescence than empathy.27  Indeed, the settlement that produced these results was 
characterised, by citizen activists, as offering “no reason to rejoice but a compromise we 
can live with.”28  None of this is to say that such a solution is necessarily made less 
empathetic by its provenance.  Rather, it is to say that these gestures of apparent 
empathy are more indicative of tolerance than kenosis.  Kenosis is engaged volitionally, 
even if reluctantly.  In this case, opening-up comes as a requisite condition of the 
project’s realisation, and therefore must be tolerated.  While tolerance is not unrelated to 
kenosis, it is absent the essential self-emptying that arises out of attentiveness to the 
other; the ‘emptying’, here, having to be mandated by some of those very others to whom 
attention might otherwise be volitionally directed.  It is therefore also absent the full 
potential for gathering-in and pouring-out that kenosis entails. 
Of similar concern is any notion that some twenty years of negotiations – which 
merely move the situation from one that is competitive and conflicted, to one that is 
tolerable – portray an entirely virtuous and paradigmatic process of conflict resolution, or 
any corollary notion that mere conflict resolution exemplifies kenosis.  Describing the 
project’s emergence and its manifestation as architecture, Moore and Brand reveal the 
reasons for such concern: 
One cannot help but be impressed by the degree of conflict resolution achieved in 
the process of developing Frankfurt’s banking landscape.  Although the 
articulation of differences in 1980 – the height of the housing conflict – was distinct 
and powerful, by 2001 respondents from each interest group voiced only minor 
dissatisfactions.  This may well be a sign that most interests were satisfied and 
that no principal interest was vanquished.  It may also be a sign that weaker 
interests were suppressed.  Of course, there were many less visible interests, 
such as Jews, bank employees, and dislocated renters that were never invited to 
participate in the discussion in the first place.29 
Notwithstanding aspects of success, this process of conflict resolution is embedded with 
the potential for wearing down or overcoming certain interests and, equally, excluding 
some.  Moreover, one interest holds the trump.  In its enshrinement of the concept of 
‘weighing up’ (Abwägung), German law grants to planning officials the ability to determine 
which interests hold sway.30  That, of course, might be used to favour more weakly 
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represented interests, but it can equally be used in the opposite manner, taking 
advantage of such weakness to favour dominant or what appear to be ‘majority’ voices, 
often those who hold financial power.   
The ‘process’ that Moore and Brand describe is not kenotic.  While conflict 
resolution may include kenotic effect, kenosis is not mere conflict resolution, especially 
not by way of so-called compromise.  The value of kenosis lies not in its capacity to 
resolve conflict but, rather, to obviate it, even while making room for reticence and 
challenge.  Such is effected through a kind of hybridisation: the mutual transforming of 
selves, others, and other things in a given situation, without their loss of respective 
identities.  This hybridisation is not simply the finding of compromise.  More precisely, it is 
not the nominal changing of a situation’s other things, by dominating and largely 
unchanged selves, in order that the situation comes to be seen as tolerable by its others 
– those who have also been changed by a process that produces fatigue and encourages 
acquiescence.  Furthermore, kenosis cannot exclude any of the others and other things 
that comprise a situation.  And, since kenosis is a complex and entangled procession of 
events, it is not and cannot be made into a determinate process that leads to if-then 
outcomes.  (These aspects of kenosis, which cut across entrenched hierarchies and 
determinist views, are discussed more fully in Chapter 7.)  As the Commerzbank project 
demonstrates, the mere implementation of widespread public talk does not, in itself, 
convincingly evidence kenosis or the situational empathy that kenosis can foster. 
More convincing is the project’s empathy toward ecological concerns, and the 
kenosis that instantiates.  From the time of the project’s inception, energy efficiency and 
environmental friendliness were amongst the aspirations of both city and bank.  Such 
notions required no imposition by authorities.  For the bank, they were also a part of 
corporate policy,31 presenting both direct and indirect commercial value.  Not surprisingly, 
the Commerzbank has come to be seen as a symbolic milestone in the environmental 
movement of the late twentieth century, a movement that continues even stronger today.  
Yet it is an ambiguous, if not contradictory, symbol.  Some observers see the notion of a 
sustainable skyscraper, particularly one that headquarters a financial institution, as 
oxymoronic; effectively ‘green-washing’ corporate hegemony.32  There are, however, 
those who view the project’s technology-based energy efficiencies as at least more 
environmentally conscious than that of equivalent structures, and therefore they applaud 
its achievements.  Of course, the latter stance requires resignation to the inevitability of 
high-rise buildings, a resignation that not all accept.  Such contradiction can be extended 
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to almost all architecture.  Self-evidently, building effects environmental change, whether 
directly or indirectly, whether at micro or macro scales; and due to its inherent 
consumptiveness, building effects change that includes deleterious dimensions, often of 
significant consequence.  Hence, in design, realisation, and utilisation, architecture can 
only be made relatively more ‘friendly’ toward the environment by virtue of its being made 
less consumptive of resources, or more worthy of the consumption it effects.  In other 
words, architecture can only be made increasingly empathetic to the others and other 
things that make up the complex environmental situation.  The Commerzbank takes steps 
toward such goals, and not without some success.  Whether it – or any architecture – 
does enough to mitigate and warrant its environmental cost is a subject worthy of debate, 
but one beyond the scope of this discourse.  Despite all of the inherent self-assertiveness 
of its high-rise typology, the Commerzbank’s environmental attitude effects an opening-
up; that is, a rising attentiveness to at least some dimensions of the environment, which is 
as unprecedented as it is incomplete and insufficient.  It also spawns the expansion of 
such opening-up and attentiveness by a new generation of architecture’s creators, out of 
which might emerge the kind of thinking that sees high-rise architecture become 
superfluous, salvational, or transformed into something as yet unimagined. 
Commerzbank’s eventual commissioning of Norman Foster mirrors its 
environmental commitment.  Foster’s firm is well known to champion high-tech 
architecture and superior environmental performance.  While such performance can be 
seen as having a kenotic dimension – an opening-up to certain environmental others – 
that is not of primary interest, here, since there is ample analysis and documentation of 
the Commerzbank’s energy efficiencies available elsewhere.33  Of greater interest is the 
manner in which the building’s design and realisation has yielded or contracted – that is, 
self-emptied – in order to make room for heightened environmental attentiveness (at least 
on selected fronts).  Its self-emptying must be seen relative to more typical examples of 
high-rise typology.  In that light, what the Commerzbank empties itself of is a significant 
measure of developer voraciousness.  It is to some lesser extent that this building 
exploits its typology’s dogged determination to maximise those things that maximise 
financial performance.  Of course, even the maximisation of energy-efficient technologies 
can be seen as arising out of exactly such determination, since, in the long term, 
operating expenses are thereby reduced.  But sophisticated technology also effects high 
capital costs, which can dull investor attraction.  It is not through such technologies, 
however, that the project relinquishes some of its typology’s grip on maximising 
efficiencies.  Instead, it is owing to uncommon attitudes toward the relationality of space, 
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humanity, and nature that the project begins to ‘let go’ and become something that most 
of its siblings are not. 
Unlike more formulaic skyscrapers, the Commerzbank does away with the 
customary central service core; a feature known for organising all forms of vertical 
distribution with maximum efficiency, and thereby contributing to the greatest possible 
ratio of net to gross floor area.  In its place is a 160-metre high atrium, which offers light 
and ventilation to improve the spatial quality of inside spaces,34 even as it also increases 
the sense of relationality that occupants have with other occupants across the atrium.  
There are, however, associated ‘inefficiencies’ in planning, construction, and cost.  
Splitting vertical services into three smaller cores and relocating them to the triangular 
building’s three corners, the design denies this high-rise its expected corner spaces, 
prized for dual aspect views, coveted for private offices, and typically seen as privileged 
and prime-value real estate.35  Thus, a more egalitarian configuration begins to 
breakdown entrenched hierarchical elements (even while creating new ones).  But none 
of the building’s yieldingness is as significant as that which grants the building its nine 
‘sky gardens’.  Each four stories in height, the enclosed but ventilated gardens are 
staggered up the exterior, three on each of three sides.  As a result, only two-thirds of any 
given floor plate is available for office use.  The balance is ‘sacrificed’, either as the 
garden floor at one level or, at the other three levels, as part of the void creating the 
garden’s height and volume.  Occupants at every office level are thereby offered views 
and natural ventilation by one of the gardens, and no occupant is more than three floors 
away from accessing a garden for informal meetings and breaks.  Not only are these 
gardens part of the environmental scheme – providing natural light and ventilation to 
offices and atrium alike – they also create openness and spatial volume of a kind that is 
highly uncommon in typical high-rise structures.  And, like the central atrium, the gardens 
enhance the relationality of both occupants and spaces. 
With its atrium and sky gardens, the Commerzbank yields to many of the others 
and other things that comprise its situation.  It is emptied of substantial portions of its 
primary functional potential: the efficient provision of office space.  But, as a result, its 
potential as a healthy work environment – promising greater human productivity – is 
paradoxically enhanced, such that there is at least partial justification for what some 
would otherwise see as an investment in inefficiencies.  It is in the spaces emptied of 
expected office usages – the inefficient spaces that are something only because of their 
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relative nothingness – that the Commerzbank best instantiates kenosis.  Such 
‘weakening’ can be seen as a strengthening of this building.  It can also be seen to 
contribute to a strengthening of the high-rise typology, though that contribution risks 
overstatement.  In the modern urgency to find the ‘new’ and label it accordingly, the 
Commerzbank has been described as “a significant new building type,”36 and “the 
reinvention of the skyscraper as a building type.”37  But, it is neither.  Although 
demonstrably innovative in various respects, it remains an evolvement of the architectural 
tradition begun by William LeBaron Jenney in Chicago, with the first iron and steel framed 
high-rise, itself an evolvement of an even older tradition of high-rise construction.38  As 
such, it can lay claim to high-rise orthodoxy – that verticality and density moderate 
suburbanisation, and that centralisation reduces transport demands – but the facts 
remain that its gestures toward mixed-use are relatively modest, and that it continues to 
be a part of a still automobile-dependent urban environment.   
Certainly, the project does not achieve anything as radical as Paolo Soleri’s 
“arcology,” which advocates “the expulsion of those elements that go for the chastising of 
the urban landscape and the punishment of its dwellers.”39  Nor could such achievement 
be expected of any one project.  Yet the Commerzbank does take incremental and 
evolving steps – for some, glacial and insufficient – in Soleri’s direction.  In its attempts at 
operational frugality, it reduces energy consumption, waste, and pollutants.  And, in its 
attempts to foster relationality – human to human, and human to nature, even in an 
un-natural environment – it at least begins to acknowledge Soleri’s plea for “something 
healthier,” something to “supplant [the] decaying organism” embodied by many other 
urban constructs.40  The Commerzbank does not offer a wholly new way of sustainably 
being, and many would argue that it merely assuages the guilt of continuing to 
unsustainably be in the same way we have been.  Nonetheless, it presents instantiations 
of kenosis, and they reveal the becoming of this building and its typology.  It recognises 
and signals the need for empathy and heightened attentiveness toward the complexities 
of the environment in every situation, even as it also recognises its own inability to fully 
address such need.  The Commerzbank is an incomplete and contradictory exemplar, 
but, relative to its counterparts, it speaks worthily of kenosis in architecture. 
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PEI AT THE MUSEUM OF ISLAMIC ART 
The architecture of Ieoh Ming Pei (1917-) is not self-evidently a product of Post-
Modernism, yet his career spans well beyond the period of Modernism, and his work is 
unbound by Modernist orthodoxy.  Moreover, Pei’s oeuvre is not that of Postmodern 
Historicism, yet Pei is reliant on history – especially in his later works – as a source of 
conceptual inspiration and formal direction.  His work does not overtly espouse 
Environmentalism, yet he is keenly interested in appropriate responses to climatic forces 
and the achievement of environmental ‘fit’.  Pei’s name is absent from the customary lists 
of architects who supposedly practise Critical Regionalism,41 but his highly disciplined 
empathy and responsiveness to a project’s situation demonstrates a critically regional 
approach of high order.  As seen to be the case with Louis Kahn, attempts to categorise 
Pei are similarly problematic.  All of the foregoing ‘-isms’ apply, yet none does, because 
Pei and his work – like Kahn and his – eschew easily labelled self-assertions.  Instead, 
architect and architecture reveal significant instantiations of kenosis; vitally being, and 
thereby becoming, but not in a particular way or style.  Unlike Kahn, however, whose 
work was produced within the period of Modernism (to the cusp of Post-Modernism), 
Pei’s longevity sees his work transcend Modernism and all of the ‘-isms’ it spawned.  
Accordingly, Pei and what is likely his career-culminating project merit closer scrutiny. 
Container and Contained 
Contained and presented in the monumental, twenty-first century container-of-culture 
known as the Museum of Islamic Art, in Doha, Qatar, is a modest, sixteenth century 
container called a kashkúl, which, by way of kenotic provenance, presents back to the 
museum a metaphor for its own being.  The kashkul opens-up an understanding of the 
extent to which the museum understands itself as kenotic.  Originating as a pre- and 
early-Islamic ‘drinking bowl’ for wine, the kashkul eventually took on mystical significance 
– its vinous contents heralded as a source of spiritual illumination.  But the kashkul also 
came to be used by the humble Dervishes as a “begging bowl.”42  On display in the 
museum, the kashkul appears to be little more than an object to be observed, but, like 
Heidegger’s ‘jug’,43 it is actually a thing made thingly by the experience of its everyday 
engagement and, therefore, its relationality with human beings (see fig. 4.5).  With 
reference to the jug – but equally true of the kashkul – Heidegger notes that science 
would see such a vessel as never actually ‘empty’, always containing at least air.  The 
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Dervishes, however, would be able to testify to the everyday experience of the kashkul’s 
‘emptiness’ and the consequent human ramifications.  They would also know that in its 
emptiness is the capacity to be filled; in that filling is the potential for pouring; and in that 
pouring is the “gift of the outpouring,” which is its fundamental character.44  Thus, the 
kashkul’s essence is emptiness and fullness, poverty and plenitude, incompleteness and 
completeness; each trait already embedded in the other. 
 
 
FIGURE 4.5 
A sixteenth century Dervish kashkul, or ‘begging bowl’. 
 
In Dervish hands, the kashkul is no ordinary beggar’s bowl, because Dervishes – 
having chosen a life of extreme poverty and austerity – do not assertively beg.  Instead, 
they engage in public praise of the divine and passively receive, from volitional donors, 
the alms and scraps of food that are placed in their kashkul.45  This Dervish passivity is 
actually active.  In an intentional act of humility, the kashkul is carried as an empty 
receptacle to be filled by the carrier’s other with signs of empathy and concern.  Although 
demonstrating compassion on the part of the donor, that, in itself, fails to reveal kenosis, 
since there would seem to be no reciprocal response from the receiver.  Indeed, it would 
seem that the Dervishes are being served, rather than being of service; whereas exactly 
the opposite is ordinarily expected from an acetic religious order.  Receiver response, 
however, is forthcoming.  First, the Dervishes “call down the blessing of Allah at the doors 
                                               
44
 This assessment of the character of the kashkul is occasioned by Heidegger's discussion of 'the jug' in ibid. 
45
 Y. Afroukhteh, Memories of Nine Years in ‘Akká, trans. R. Masrour (Oxford: George Ronald, 2003), 193; 
and S.M. Zwemer, Across the World of Islam: Studies in Aspects of the Mohammedan Faith and in the 
Present Awakening of the Moslem Multitudes  (New York, Chicago, London, Edinburgh: Fleming H. Revell 
Company, 1929), 7. 
 128 
 
where they have filled his kashkul,”46 and, then, they give any monetary collections to 
those who involuntarily find themselves in a state of poverty like that which the Dervishes 
choose.  Hence, the kashkul proves not to be a container for taking and keeping but for 
outpouring.  The Dervish, already set apart as an ‘other’ in society, makes empty and 
open his kashkul – a sign of self-emptying.  With that, he presents an opportunity for his 
‘others’ to self-empty and open-up to him, so that he, in turn, can empty and open-up to 
still others, who, in turn, can expand and reprise the entire cycle.  In this, which might be 
seen figuratively as a kind of continuous ‘whirling dance’ of kenosis, the image of another 
Dervish tradition is evoked: their literally whirling – and seemingly endless – dance, 
deployed to pursue religious ecstasy (ex-stasis) in an out-of-self, or self-emptied, 
‘otherness’. 
The kashkul not only embodies the humility, self-emptying, and opening-up to the 
other that is kenosis but also the absence of ‘grasping’ and ‘clinging’ to power (the latter 
discussed in Chapter 2 as a prerequisite to kenosis in its Christian formula).  Persian poet 
Sa’di (ca. 1213-1291), who travelled as a Dervish, extols this eschewal of power and 
glory, seeing it as a kind of releasement or letting-go, and a call to serve.  In The Gulistan 
he writes: 
One of the pious dreamed of a king in paradise and a hermit in hell. ‘What caused 
the one to be so high and the other so low?’, he asked. ‘It is contrary to what 
people would have thought.’ A cry came, saying, ‘This king is in paradise because 
of his devotion to dervishes, and the hermit is in hell because of his attachment to 
kings.’ 
Of what use is all your dervish paraphernalia?  
Free yourself of blameworthy deeds. 
There is no need for you to have a sheepskin cap. 
Be dervish-like, and wear a Tatar hat.47 
 
As in the Christian formula, exploiting, grasping, or seeking attachment to a higher power 
– in Christ’s case, divinity, and in the case of this religious devotee, nobility – is 
deprecated in favour of devotion.  Here, that term is used as it is by Levinas, when he 
refers to devotion, or “being dedicated” even to “the other not worthy of desire,” as a 
central kenotic characteristic.48  In the king’s case, devotion is an opening-up to the 
humble Dervishes and a recognition of mutual otherness.  It is precisely such relationality 
that is absent as the supposedly humble hermit futilely grasps-at and clings-to 
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supposedly powerful kings – whose power is paradoxically found in Dervish 
powerlessness. 
Beyond the story’s illustrative and moral value, the matter of its translation raises 
a question as to how we, in modernity, come to understand and interpret this Dervish 
lore.  In fact, the question is particularly pertinent to an examination of the Museum of 
Islamic Art, where the kashkul is housed as a representation of such lore, and where the 
museum’s edifice is meant to embody the modern relevance of the kashkul’s wider 
Islamic culture and context.  The excerpt, above, is from one of many versions of The 
Gulistan, all of which attempt to translate medieval Islamic thought – written as Persian 
prose and poetry – into the language of another day and culture; in this case, early 
twenty-first century English.49  The proliferation of translations makes it self-evident that 
not all are the same or likely to be equal or necessarily faithful, a concern noted by 
Heidegger.  “One can no more translate thought than one can translate a poem.  At best, 
one can paraphrase it.  As soon as one attempts a literal translation, everything is 
transformed.”50  Indeed, a translator of Heidegger’s works goes further, describing all 
translation as “already an interpretation” and “risky business, ever bordering on the 
possibility of betrayal.”51  Equally applicable and important to architecture – not least, this 
museum – it is suggested that a faithful paraphrase is to be prioritised over what may be 
literally accurate but interpretively errant.  Translation, then, can be seen as requiring 
kenotic devotion: a self-emptying in order to open-up to and partially become the other, in 
thought, culture, and the nuances of each.  And like kenosis, translation entails the risks 
of transformation, whether such translation involves the language of word or architecture. 
It is a faithful paraphrase that I.M. Pei seeks in the design of the Museum of 
Islamic Art.  Cast as the translator – intrinsically an ‘other’ – he immerses himself in the 
otherness of an ancient and unfamiliar cultural language, and he accepts the risks of 
translating it into the language of contemporary architecture.  The context of Middle 
Eastern modernity presents risks to which many architects have succumbed: the allure of 
spectacle, the temptations of trend and fashion, and the promise of glory.  Pei’s response 
to that context runs counter to many of the Middle East’s modern architectural projects.  
In an attempt to be attentive the entire situation, he looks back to find the contemporary 
and relevant, the innovative and novel.  He uncovers commonality in difference, 
otherness in sameness.  The State of Qatar sees this museum as an enduring ‘container’ 
that speaks of an enduring culture, a culture recognised for enduring contributions to 
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society.  It therefore must be a container able to pour out those contributions to a world 
that sometimes sees Islam – and is sometimes seen by Islam – as ‘the other not worthy 
of desire’.  The events that mark the museum’s creation – cultural translation, situational 
response, and realisation – reveal the museum’s kenotic self-understanding, just as 
metaphorically prefigured by the humble container it contains: the kashkul. 
Cultural Translation 
The Call  
There can be little doubt that, in commissioning the Museum of Islamic Art, the Emir of 
Qatar sought to see his culture translated and presented to the world at large.  Sheikha 
al-Mayassa bint Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, chairperson of the Qatar Museums 
Authority, describes the state’s aspiration for “a modern institution that will engage with 
the world, bridging the gap between tradition and modernity, highlighting the power of 
culture to transcend differences and cross artificial barriers.”  She portrays the museum 
as one of many “platforms” where “people from around the world can unite,” platforms 
that “share a common language.”  This museum, then, is nothing less than “the artistic 
expression of Islamic heritage.”52  Notwithstanding lofty language and questions of 
achievability, this ‘brief’ includes a clear and ambitious cultural goal, extending far beyond 
the display of artefacts and the demographics of those who visit.  In the Middle East – of 
late, engaged in what has been called a “cultural arms race”53 – the response to such a 
brief “presents the constant danger that [the outcome] will morph into a world of Ali Baba 
kitsch,”54 or simply revert to another attention-seeking edifice, perhaps aesthetically 
seductive but not fully related to the entirety of its situation.  Pei’s charge, then, is not 
merely to satisfy the situation’s obvious and tangible needs – those of a state-of-the-art 
museum.  He must also attend to its intangible and hidden needs, those satisfied only by 
the building’s ability to self-empty, to open-up its culture to the other that is the world, and 
to thereby be filled by that world of which it is always already a part.  Like the kashkul, the 
museum is grounded in the interdependence of emptiness and fullness.  It calls for 
faithful translation, radical contextualisation, heightened situational awareness – and that 
is a kenotic undertaking. 
It can be argued that architects are almost always ‘translators’, at minimum 
translating their clients’ quantitative needs into built form – but normally with an 
expectation of something more.  Translations take place in the context of manifold 
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bounds, emerging within those bounds, but often not without testing their limits; the latter 
recognising that bounds are changeable, changing, and sometimes kaleidoscopic.  
Betrayal and faithfulness sit side by side amidst such an indeterminate domain.  There is, 
however, some measure of stability to be found in the kenotic-ness of the translator’s 
attitude and approach; that is, the extent to which the translator is open, alert, and aware.  
Is the translator readied to translate?  Is the translator’s attitude and approach empty 
enough – vulnerable enough – to be filled by the entirety of the situation, even to the point 
of discerning and discriminating that which is contrary to preconceived notions and 
presumed ‘knowledge’?  It is through the translator’s vulnerable readiness that the 
situation – the bounded creative domain – is opened-up, and the situation’s emergent 
potential may reveal itself.  Such is the ‘risky’ topographical matrix in which the 
architectural translator is found, not least in the instance presented by the Museum of 
Islamic Art.55  It is a matrix that kenosis permeates, animates, sustains (and complicates), 
but paradoxically also makes more navigable. 
Rejection and Acceptance 
In the museum’s design narrative,56 there is considerable evidence to suggest that Pei’s 
approach is substantially, if not entirely, a kenotic one.  The first such evidence appears 
when Pei effectively rejects the project by choosing not to participate in the 1997 design 
competition that was to have determined its designer.  As a matter of policy (and 
mirroring the Dervish aversion to assertive begging), Pei does not participate in design 
competitions.57  Such a policy can be seen to demonstrate kenotic inclinations, because 
design competitions can be seen as largely antithetical to kenosis.  Their propensities 
toward exploitation, grasping, and clinging are embedded in the very word ‘competition’.  
Despite the noble purposes and good intentions that can characterise well-administered 
design competitions, the dynamic of a competition is ultimately competitive.  The client, 
wittingly or not, exploits the competitors for the often under-compensated services 
required, in many cases with the hope of attaching themselves and their project to an 
architect of some fame; in more sensational instances, a ‘starchitect’.  In similar fashion, 
the competitors grasp at the glory of a preeminent client or project, seeing therein 
significant prestige and further marketing potential, especially if selected as the 
competition ‘winner’.  But for each winner there is typically a long trail of non-winners, and 
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an inestimable quantity of intellectual resources offering little residual value – to client or 
competitor – other than the mere experience of the competition; the benefit of which may 
have been derived to the same or greater extent from more productive pursuits.  In this 
dynamic, even winners can be losers, as in the case of the museum competition.  After 
the winning entry was announced and publicised internationally, both the competition and 
its winner were abandoned for largely unexplained reasons.  Architectural observers, 
including respected critic Paul Goldberger, have speculated that the winning entrant, 
Jordanian architect Rasem Badran, “despite his distinguished reputation within the 
region, did not have the degree of international stature the nation sought.”58  It would 
appear that Qatar was grasping for more, and eventually they found it, but not amongst 
the next-in-line non-winners, instead, in an architect who refused to compete. 
It is improbable that Pei’s stance against design competitions stems from their 
commercial culpabilities, alone, since his firm(s) would be as financially capable of 
participation as most – if grasping for such prizes were central to his organisations’ ethos.  
I would suggest that, in addition or perhaps instead, what Pei rejects in competitions are 
those aspects most antithetical to kenosis.  Design competitions intentionally distance a 
project’s most important ‘others’ – the clients and users – those with whom designers 
must develop relationality if approaching the project kenotically.  The absence of clients 
and users is typically mediated by little more than the program or project brief.  A design 
competitor can engage with the words of that document and access a project 
spokesperson for the purpose of answering questions – provided that both questions and 
answers are disseminated to all competitors without difference or bias – but such 
substitutions can be largely unsatisfying.  In Germany, where design competitions are 
common, one architect describes the deficiency: “You have no partners in the first stages 
of the project; you must be a detective.”59  Of course, it is true that investigation is integral 
to design, and that the ‘other things’ of a project, including site and surroundings, remain 
accessible in design competitions.  But the lament, here, concerns an absence of the 
essential other, an absence that undermines both the client’s and the architect’s potential 
for emptying and opening-up.  Such absence is not simply due to the difficulties of 
establishing and developing relations between what may be numerous clients and 
competitors.  It is, instead, owing to the fact that relationality cannot exist without some 
degree of difference, and that would be almost certain to bias the competition, either 
toward or against those competitors with whom relations prove most different.  In a 
legalistic sense, client detachment may seem fair and objective, but in other, arguably 
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more important senses, it proves wholly unfair to the project.  The competition’s outcomes 
are denied a substantial and critical component of their potential human-ness, and are 
actually products of curtailed relationality.  Hence it is unlikely, if not impossible, for such 
outcomes to be attentive to the entirety of the situation since such relationality is a 
defining part of the situation to which all parties are meant to be attentive.  By declining to 
participate in the museum design competition (and all such competitions), Pei signals his 
desire to be attentive to the project’s entire situatedness, and, in that, he signals a kenotic 
approach.60 
Kenosis is likewise to be seen in the client’s eventual invitation, to Pei, to 
undertake the museum project, and in Pei’s considered acceptance.  The nature of 
invitation and acceptance initiates relationality, precisely that which the abandoned 
design competition inherently lacked.  To abandon such a public and publicised event 
requires a significant element of humility, and to offer the commission to an ‘other’ 
requires an opening-up to that other.  The other’s acceptance is a recognition of the 
opening-up that the invitation presents and a reciprocal response.  Thus, the acts of 
opening-up mirror one another.  With such rapprochement, a kenotic event is germinated 
– though not assured.  It is Pei’s view that “a good client makes good architecture.”61  And 
by his accounts, the Qatar clients were ‘good’, opening-up a relationship that not only 
offers access to the Emir and Sheikha and museum officials but also fosters mutual 
exchange and influence.62  Such relationality allows Pei to open-up to the cultural ‘text’ he 
is meant to translate.  It is his entrée to months of preparation for emergent creative 
events; preparation that includes engagements with self, others, and other things – the 
situation’s bounds – and thereby invites the opening-up of a domain in which translation 
can happen. 
Readying and Waiting 
Arguably, it is Pei’s willing engagement with self that prefigures his 1990 retirement from 
Pei, Cobb, Freed & Partners and sees the establishment of a small practice; one bearing 
only his name and accepting only projects outside the USA.  Of this intentionally boutique 
practice, Pei says, “I selected places to work where I did not know the cultures,” and that 
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made each “a learning process.”63  Indeed, Qatar was just such a place.  “I knew the East 
because I was born there, the West because I was educated there, but the Middle East I 
didn’t know”; a matter amplified by the fact that his professional education had “never 
revealed … Islamic architecture as a major architectural invention.”64  And, in addition to 
architecture, the Islamic religion presents another area of unfamiliarity to Pei.  Although 
Christianity and Buddhism are part of Pei’s life, he knows almost nothing about Islam, a 
religion inseparable from Islamic culture and, therefore, its architecture.  Thus, even as he 
accepts the role of translating and expressing Islam through architecture, Pei 
acknowledges his ignorance and willingly accepts the consequent risks.  His is not, 
however, the risk-taking customarily associated with architecture.  As a seasoned 
practitioner and nonagenarian, Pei’s risk is not that of a fledgling architect or architectural 
firm, strategically eager to take almost any project for the sake of experience and 
continued livelihood (a risk that includes an element of grasping).  Moreover, there is 
nothing to suggest that the museum project requires Pei to take any unusual financial 
risk.  Nor is Pei’s risk one of potentially failing to garner the approval of a twenty-first 
century audience – professional and public – seeking to be ‘wowed’ by the so-called 
unconventional.  Indeed, the latter is no risk at all, as recognised a century earlier by 
playwright and author Somerset Maugham: 
It is not difficult to be unconventional in the eyes of the world when your 
unconventionality is but the convention of your set.  It affords you then an 
inordinate amount of self-esteem.  You have the self-satisfaction of courage 
without the inconvenience of danger.65 
The inconvenient danger of Pei’s risk-taking is of greater consequence.  It is the 
risk of interpretive betrayal, of failing to be attentive to the project’s entire situatedness.  
Left unattended, elements of a situation – whether regarded as agreeable to the situation 
or not – merely go on attempting to establish their relatedness, and such attempts only 
highlight the state of un-relatedness.66  Ironically, it is precisely such un-relatedness that 
is often overlooked or dismissed by some, even as others offer praise for its 
unconventionality and its ability to deliver the popularly sought ‘wow-factors’.  Pei’s 
approach shows little concern for the ‘wow’ of fashion or trend,67 and, according to one 
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observer, “runs counter to the ever-accelerating pace of the global age, not to mention 
our obsession with novelty.”68  It unassumingly reflects what Levinas refers to as “sublime 
kenosis” and, with that, the courage and “greatness” of those “who risk being taken for 
failures.”69  Pei’s ignorance of Islam – and disinterest in fashion – puts him at exactly such 
risk, but, in that vulnerability, he is liberated from its restrictions.  Such risk-taking is 
neither strategy nor mere humility.  It is an aspect of kenosis.  It evidences the 
“denucleation of the subject,” whereby “the consciousness releases its self-ness, so that 
it becomes ‘selfless’, and no longer clings to itself or hardens itself.”70  Emptiness and 
openness originate in denucleation, standing in sharp contrast to the already fullness of 
self-assertion. 
Self-emptying or denucleation, however, is only one side of the kenotic coin.  As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the other side is skenosis, the revelation, filling, and indwelling – 
even overflowing – made possible by emptying.  But, how are these effects of skenosis 
effected?  For Levinas, filling is enabled by the approach of the Infinite,71 or what 
Heidegger calls “the appearance of a god.”72  Each description stops short of direct 
contact between the Infinite and the finite.  And although both philosophers use language 
that can be regarded as numinous, neither is referring to a deity, but to a phenomenon.  It 
is the phenomenon that can be seen occurring in Michelangelo’s Creation of Adam 
(particularly if its theological and anthropomorphic expressions are put aside).  Therein, 
the Infinite approaches, appears, and even extends itself toward the finite, but, despite 
the finite’s reciprocal response, physical contact remains incomplete – held in 
suspension.  Less ambiguously, there are contemporary Christian theologians who turn 
from notions of God as entity – especially anthropomorphic entity – and authoritatively 
posit God as phenomenon, not least as the phenomenon of “serendipitous creativity,” 
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whether cosmic, evolutionary, or human.73  If the notions of God, a god, and the Infinite 
are taken broadly to mean ‘creativity’, then self-emptying is that which readies for – that 
which enables the awaiting of – creative emergence and the filling it can effect.  The 
“readying of this readiness” is fostered by “thinking and poetising,” which Heidegger 
proposes as “the standard measure of [human] activity,”74 and which he cautions can only 
be conjoined because of their difference and distinctness.75  Poetising differs from and 
complements thinking, in that it is “measuring” (messen), but not in scientific or 
mathematical terms.  Instead, it is a measure-taking that unconceals the self-concealed, 
not by assertive extraction, but by respecting the concealment.  It is thus 
[a] strange measure for ordinary and in particular also for all merely scientific 
ideas, certainly not a palpable stick or rod but in truth simpler to handle than they, 
provided our hands do not abruptly grasp but are guided by gestures befitting the 
measure here to be taken.  This is done by a taking which at no time clutches at 
the standard but rather takes it in a concentrated perception, a gathered taking-in, 
that remains a listening.76 
This activity that complements thinking – this poetic measuring – is a passive 
activity that is actually a kind of listening, though not limited to the audial.  Levinas paints 
a similar notion with a different brush, seeing it as a change in the very nature of thinking, 
wherein thinking ceases as activity and becomes passivity, or what he calls affectivity: “an 
irreversible affection of the finite by the infinite; [a] passivity and patience …”77  Affectivity 
is therefore an active passivity, a form of receptivity like Heidegger’s listening, which 
readies or heightens attentiveness to the approach, or the appearance-through-
unconcealment, of that which is unknown and remains not-fully-knowable.  There is no 
evidence to suggest, and no argument here, that Pei’s readying for the museum project is 
the conscious pursuit of such philosophical concepts.  But in his ways of readying, such 
concepts are nonetheless manifested, and the argument that such readying is kenotic 
becomes stronger. 
Pei’s initial self-emptying – including his recognition of ignorance and acceptance 
of consequent risk – readies him to await the approach of what he calls the “essence,”78 
or what might also be understood as the infinite unknown of Islamic architecture.  He 
further readies his readiness by opening-up to the others who shaped and are shaping 
the things of Islamic culture, as well as to those things by which the others were shaped 
                                               
73
 G.D. Kaufman, "A Christian View of Creativity: Creativity as God," Dao 6, no. 2 (2007): 106-107. Professor 
Kaufman (1925-2011) was an influential liberal theologian, and member of the Faculty of Divinity at Harvard 
Divinity School, since 1963. 
74
 Heidegger, "'Only a God Can Save Us': The Spiegel Interview (1966)," 56-7. 
75
 Heidegger, "'... Poetically Man Dwells ...'," 216. 
76
 Ibid., 221. 
77
 van Riessen, "Hermeneutics of Kenosis: The Road of Dispossession," 189. 
78
 Jodidio and Lammerhuber, Museum of Islamic Art, Doha, Qatar: 44. 
 137 
 
and are being shaped, not least architecture.  Initially, Pei opens himself to the mysteries 
of the Islamic religion and the mind of its prophet, and follows that with extensive travel, 
submitting himself to ‘concentrated perception’ and a ‘gathered taking-in’ of the people 
and places of Islamic significance, from Spain to India.  By thinking and poetising, Pei 
makes himself a receptacle – a kashkul – to Islam and its architecture, inviting (but not 
begging) its unknowable essence to approach.  Like the Dervishes, his passive 
receptivity is not inactivity.  Through a kind of devotion to the other and other things of 
Islam, he pays close attention to their essential diversity and nuance. 
The Approach 
Unlike architects who, when faced with unfamiliar project demands, find themselves 
consciously or subconsciously grasping at precedents with mimetic potential, Pei does 
not search for features to copy.  As translator, he seeks a faithful paraphrase, not the 
literalness that risks betrayal.  He awaits the unconcealment of Islamic architecture’s 
being by respecting its concealment.  The wait frequently yields only that which is readily 
revealed: excessive Spanish influence at Cordoba, excessive Indian influence at 
Fatehpur Sikri, and the contaminating reverberations of Roman and Christian history at 
Damascus.79  But, in Tunisia, the ribat (fort) at Sousse (821 CE) bares something that Pei 
believes is “coming closer to the essence of Islamic architecture, where sunlight brings to 
life powerful volumes, and geometry plays a central role.”80  Noteworthy is that his 
description is not of forms but of the essence that exists in the relationality of forms and 
light.81  Indeed, that essence is amplified by the central courtyard and ablutions fountain 
at Cairo’s mosque of Ahmad Ibn Tulun (876-879 CE), where he not only notes 
fundamental geometric progression but is specific about their square and octagonal 
shapes.  In that, Pei is ‘thinking’.  But when he attempts to name that which unconceals 
itself in this place, he is wholly unspecific, using the term “severe” and finding that 
severity not in architectonics but “sun … shadows, and shades of colour.”82  In that, Pei is 
‘poetising’.  These are essences that thrive on their self-concealedness in a desert 
region, and are unconcealed – contingently, never fully – in direct proportion to the 
perceiver’s respect for and attentiveness to the concealment.  Just as, for Heidegger, “the 
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unknown god appears as the unknown by way of the sky’s manifestness,”83 the unknown-
ness of Islamic architecture appears as the never-fully-known in the manifestness of an 
ablutions fountain.  As this infinite spirit, or inspiration, of Islamic architecture approaches 
and appears, it is, in Levinasian terms, Pei’s affectivity – his patient and actively passive 
openness – that readies him to recognise and receive it (though never fully). 
When Pei substitutes the word ‘inspiration’ for essence, as he does in declaring 
various Islamic locations to be places where “I did not find my inspiration,”84 there is an 
unsettling temptation to think of inspiration – and by association, essence – as it is 
sometimes viewed in so-called creative industries (not exclusive of architecture).  There, 
inspiration can be seen as something to be searched-for or chosen, an exemplar or 
prototype requiring only clever adaptations to suit a new time and use, and thereby a 
saviour from the real dangers of creating.  Pei’s attitude and actions, however, 
demonstrate an understanding of inspiration in a more original sense, meaning to be 
breathed into or upon, as by the ‘spirit’; or to take-in, as with the inhalation of air.  As 
such, inspiration is not optional.  It is neither searched-for, nor chosen; and although it 
can be invited, it remains contingent.  “The inspirational thus exerts a power that derives 
both from the nature of that which is taken in, and from the nature of the lives … into 
which it flows.”85  Every setting, not least those Islamic settings that Pei visits, is imbued 
with the inspirational, though not necessarily the spectacular.  Inspiration is no less real 
or important when it approaches from out of the ordinary, the everyday, and even the 
undesirable.  To some extent, every perceiver breathes-in the inspiration on offer, and 
that is one dimension of the filling that accompanies self-emptying.86  But the power of the 
connection – between that which is taken in and that into which it flows – is never 
assured and never the same.  Self-emptying is itself contingent, and, although the taking 
in is reflexive, the potential for synergy depends on the nature of the perceiver’s 
engagement and relationality with self, others, and other things; in other words, with the 
world.  The concentrative perceiver, who is also the attentive listener and affective 
receiver, is made more open to the approach of each situation’s infiniteness – and 
potential inspiration – than is the perceiver who already ‘knows’, is already full, and is 
unwilling to empty.  Worthy of further examination is the response to kenotic experience – 
the expiration, or breathing out, that accompanies inspiration – especially as seen by 
examining Pei’s response to the inspiration of Islam and its architecture.  In that 
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examination, the question arises: Does readying, awaiting, and resultant filling with 
inspiration actually advantage a more attentive response? 
Situational Response 
“Architecture is form, space, light, movement, all of that.  But more important is the place 
where you build.”87  In so declaring, Pei nominates place as that aspect of this project – 
indeed, of all architecture – demanding the greatest attentiveness.  Hence, it is also that 
aspect by which the Museum of Islamic Art must first be seen and assessed.  So, what is 
the placedness of this building?  It is placed in the world, as a building with which to 
bridge world cultures, just as it is also the “crown” in a program designed to establish 
Doha as “a cultural capital for the region.”88  It is equally placed in the greater city of Doha 
and in the immediate environs that surround and define the museum site.  The project’s 
placedness, then, includes each and all measures of proximity.  Although the same is 
true of virtually all architectural projects, even if to modest extent or affect, architecture 
can often be seen to prioritise the ‘selfness’ of the immediate context over the ‘otherness’ 
of more distant surroundings.  Indeed, there are abundant examples, not least in 
contemporary architecture, of the narrowest self-priority, that of assertively, if not 
defiantly, ignoring context – including aspects of the building’s own site – and thereby 
producing the kind of un-relatedness that might be unseen, ignored, forgiven, or even 
valorised for its ‘different-ness’.  Such distinction, however, frequently only serves to 
make a building the same as so many other ‘different’ buildings.  By contrast, Pei 
recognises that the bounds and horizons of place can open-up a surprisingly broad 
domain, and be constantly changing.89  Although risky and demanding of attentiveness, 
place is creatively charged. 
When Pei is offered a variety of sites along Doha’s prime waterfront, known as 
The Corniche, he rejects all and – with the approval and support of the Emir – instead 
thrusts a new peninsula into the Persian Gulf.  So doing, he creates a new semi-circular 
bay, in which he constructs a new island, on which he builds the new museum, and, 
ironically, by which he physically isolates the museum site from its proximate built 
environs and its host city.  He cites his concern for “what will come after” the museum; 
that is, its potential to be “overshadowed” or “destroyed by something else.”90  Sounding 
self-assertive and scarcely kenotic, Pei proclaims, “I didn’t choose the location; I made 
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it.”91  Although he admits to what many might think – that “this was very selfish”92 – his 
admission belies an outcome noteworthy for its kenotic sensibilities.  His bold and 
deliberately separated siting finds the museum apart from its surroundings, yet 
simultaneously and inseparably a part of all that comprises its place.  The island museum 
develops an “insistent relation of distance,”93 wherein the water between mainland and 
island creates an interval, much like those that separate but also intimately relate notes of 
music.  By emptying itself of contiguous connection to the mainland, the island opens-up 
to an even stronger connection with that from which it is separated.  Such relationality 
can be seen to create dynamic tensions and heightened potentiality. 
According to a well-known quip by architect Hugh Jacobsen, “Good architecture, 
like a well-mannered lady, never shouts at the neighbours.”94  Employing that standard, 
the manners of Doha’s contemporary architecture are a legitimate subject of scrutiny.  
Though not yet on a par with Dubai, the buildings that comprise Doha’s “look-at-me 
skyline” have been described as products of “the same developer greed, the same 
architectural autism, in which buildings ascend as if alone, not on speaking terms with 
their neighbours,”95 a lament applicable to many skylines of the world (see figs. 4.6 – 4.8).  
Pei shares similar sentiments, especially toward architecture that fails to prioritise 
relationality with its contexts.  In Doha, Pei finds “real life” and “real context” only at the 
old marketplace – the Souq Waqif – a context to which most of modern Doha fails to 
empathise (see fig. 4.9).96  Assessing notable projects and architects in the Gulf Region, 
Pei reveals sly modesty.  “They are trying to do something novel.  I think that what they 
are interested in is the ‘shock of the new’.  I do not go along with that, because I am not 
competent to do it that way.”97  Fearing that such novelty or shock will one day dominate 
The Corniche, he conceives of his man-made peninsula, bay, and island (see figs. 4.10 
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and 4.11).  With that, the museum is gifted with a ‘difference’ that prevents its dissolution 
into the ‘sameness’ of other Doha buildings, those trying so desperately and vainly to be 
different.  Such buildings ascend as if alone and fail to be in relationship, despite their 
proximity.  The Museum of Islamic Art is alone and at a comfortable distance.  In that, it 
shares an intimate relationship with its environs and city neighbours.  It converses with 
them, and never has need to shout.  Thus, as one Islamic critic observes, rather than 
following other contemporary examples in the region, where “architecture [is] naively 
used to express artificially the Islamic identity,” Pei’s museum addresses “Doha’s 
contemporary aspirations without neglecting the value of its contextual heritage,” a 
heritage that uniquely arises from its “belonging to the Arab and Islamic world.”98 
 
 
FIGURE 4.6 
The skyline of Doha’s new business district, at the northern side of The Corniche. 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4.7 
New high-rise buildings compete for attention. 
 FIGURE 4.8 
Islamic motifs applied to modern buildings.  
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4.9 
Doha’s historic market district, the Souq Waqif; according to Pei, Doha’s only “real” life and context. 
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FIGURE 4.10 
Pei’s new peninsula, bay, and island-museum, as related to The 
Corniche, the city of Doha, and the Persian Gulf.  
 FIGURE 4.11 
Detail of the museum as island. 
 
 
 
 
At another scale, the museum’s island siting also makes a significant contribution 
to its relationality with region and world.  It would be an overstatement to suggest that 
such relationality could only exist by virtue of this siting solution, but it is nonetheless true 
that this siting solution manifests that relationality in ways difficult to effect by other 
solutions.  Of course, Pei’s project is not the first to occupy re-claimed land.  Various 
airports around the world, for example, have created previously non-existent sites far 
more ambitiously and extensively, primarily to overcome localised land shortages.  But 
the museum island does not exist because of insufficient available land; quite the 
contrary.  Nor does it exist as an easy or obvious solution.  In fact, it is problematic, not 
least to the fundamental functionality of a museum, which dares not have either exhibits 
or storage below the water table.  The island’s existence, then, appears to be primarily a 
matter of place-making being given priority over functionality.99  By virtue of that 
prioritisation, a small fragment of disconnected terrestrial world is created, never before 
existing in that form.  Though separated from the mainland by only 60 metres, it is 
                                               
99
 As Pei explains it, he elevates the building on its island platform – to a greater height than initially 
envisaged – so as to maintain sub-exhibit level storage spaces above the water line. The approach to the 
public entrance is thus ramped, culminating in a bridge to the island. See Landin and van Wagenen, 
"Learning from Light: The Vision of I.M. Pei." 
Museum of Islamic Art 
(as island) 
Bridge 
Palm 
Colonnades 
New peninsula 
and bay 
Museum of 
Islamic Art 
(see detail) 
Souq Waqif 
New Business District 
Old Business District 
Persian Gulf 
N 
 143 
 
nonetheless physically excised from Doha; as if not in the exclusive grasp of either city or 
state; as if cast off to float toward the world beyond Doha and Qatar.  Having emptied 
itself of attachment to Doha (even without losing its identity as a part of Doha), it is 
opened-up to the region and world.  Although there is no ambiguity about ownership and 
sovereignty – Qatar is clearly the host and the museum is undeniably political – the 
museum’s siting speaks of the potential for transforming sovereignty into hospitality and 
responsibility,100 not only to benefit local constituents, but also all of the others for whom 
the island museum designedly exists.  In such transformation – kenotic transformation – 
lies the capacity to bridge world cultures and thereby fulfil Qatar’s vision of “a modern 
institution that will engage with the world.”101 
It is in fact a bridge – physical, but also metaphorical – that connects the island 
museum to Doha, the region, and the world.  And, in so doing, it establishes the 
museum’s placedness.  It is a bridge not unlike that described by Simmel, in “Bridge and 
Door,”102 and subsequently by Heidegger, in “Building Dwelling Thinking.”  From the 
latter: 
[The bridge] does not just connect banks that are already there.  The banks 
emerge as banks only as the bridge crosses the stream.  The bridge designedly 
causes them to lie across from each other.  One side is set off against the other 
by the bridge … With the banks, the bridge brings to the stream the one and the 
other expanse of the landscape lying behind them.  It brings stream and bank and 
land into each other’s neighborhood.  The bridge gathers the earth as landscape 
around the stream.103 
The bridge at the Museum of Islamic Art does indeed set off the island and the mainland 
against one another, even as it gathers the landscape lying behind each toward the 
interval of water.  The landscape lying behind the mainland’s bank is that of Doha and the 
Qatar desert, beyond.  The landscape behind the island’s bank is the Persian Gulf and 
the world to which it and related waterways are connected.  Without the bridge, there 
would be island and mainland, related by proximity but not in relationship; there would be 
island and world, with respective positions but little mutual exchange and influence.  
Without the bridge, the island would be one of what Heidegger calls “many spots” in the 
water, rather than a “location” or place.  The place of the island museum “comes into 
existence only by virtue of the bridge.”104  For Heidegger, the bridge is a place that 
establishes relationality as it “gathers the fourfold” of earth and sky, divinities and mortals.  
All places are constantly engaged in such gathering, yet not all places are equally placed.  
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Kenosis, which is already gathered into this gathering, sees those places of heightened 
relationality – those most instantiative of kenosis – become, like Heidegger’s bridge, very 
special, if not sacred or ‘holy’.105 
Pei’s bridge is such a place.  Not only does it gather the landscape of the earth, 
from behind its two banks, but it also gathers – or assembles and presents – the other 
elements of Heidegger’s fourfold.  It gathers the sky by receiving the sky’s sun and 
thereby creating shadow and reflection in the water it crosses.  It likewise receives the 
sky’s storms and sees the rain-turned-sea flow under it.  It gathers people (mortals) and 
presents their crossing-over to the sky and world, while also presenting sky and world 
back to those who cross-over.  And in the event of crossing-over, the bridge presents an 
opportunity for people to contemplate the ‘power’ of all that the bridge presents: self, 
others (who share in the crossing-over), and the worlds at each of its ends.  Perhaps 
most importantly, as that which enables the crossing of threshold or boundary, the bridge 
is “that from which something begins its presencing.”106  In the case of this project, it is 
the museum that begins its presencing at one end of the bridge, while the city and region 
and world are seen to emerge at the other end.  The bridge grants the museum 
placedness, not only by connecting it to existing places, but also by revealing the 
museum as a place for and of people – a place of human experience and relationship.  
Hence, even as the bridge is itself always already kenotic – opening-up to and gathering-
in the fourfold – it is additionally a conduit of kenosis, facilitating the ongoing exchange 
and influence of museum to world, and world to museum. 
Furthering its kenotic conduction, the bridge is partnered by a triple allée, formed 
by four colonnades of palm trees.  Marking an axial approach from the mainland, the 
centre allée accommodates vehicles, while those flanking it serve pedestrians.  Although 
palms of proper scale and durability proved difficult to procure, and their use attracted the 
Emir’s misgivings, Pei defends the scheme for its ‘ceremonial’ value, an attribution that 
warrants further exploration.107  The colonnades actually extend the effect of the 
museum’s bridge and perform in like manner to the bridges of Heidegger and Simmel.  In 
fact, a colonnade shares similarities with all of Simmel’s archetypal elements – road, 
bridge, window, pillars, and door – each of which says something of kenosis, something 
of the connecting or opening-up of a world.108  Like the road and bridge, the colonnade 
connects the destinations at each of its terminuses.  Like the window, the colonnade 
frames the outside world – in a multiplicity of views – and thereby evokes the potential for 
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freedom beyond the frame.  Like the pillars, the colonnade provides the directionality of 
perspective, and, in this case, four parallel rows of palms offer both axial and lateral 
perspective, directing attention in four directions.  Like the door, the colonnade separates 
‘inside’ and ‘outside’ by means of defined threshold – here, tree trunks and canopies – 
yet makes them always apparent and apparent to one another.  The colonnade, then, 
connects and directs.  At the Museum of Islamic Art, the four colonnades join the bridge, 
to serve as prelude in one direction, and postlude in the other, placing the museum in the 
world and opening each up to the other.  Indeed, there is ‘ceremony’ in all of this, but not 
merely that of special occasions.  In their connecting, framing, directing, and defining, 
these colonnades celebrate the on-going ceremony of human creativity.  It is such 
creativity to which the museum is dedicated, and through which humankind and the world 
engage, kenotically.  The experience of the colonnades sees this ordinary – yet also 
extraordinary – ceremony celebrated every day. 
 
Materialisation 
The bridge (conjoined with its palm tree colonnades) grants the museum building its 
placedness, a place in its own right.  The building, too, gathers the fourfold, much like 
another of Heidegger’s built examples, the temple, which he presents in “The Origin of 
the Work of Art.”109  Heidegger’s thinking about the temple provides a useful framework 
through which to examine the self-understanding of Pei’s museum – materialised in built 
form.  Something of the nature of the museum as ‘container’ can be assessed by way of 
the building’s exterior, and something of its nature as ‘containment’ by way of its interior.  
However, those aspects deal with little more than architectonics unless they reveal the 
building’s essential self-understanding; that is “the original determinations of the 
thingness of the mere thing.”110  The building’s architectonics must be seen against those 
(already discussed) determinations in which the building originated.  Such inquiry goes 
beyond mere exterior and interior appearance, instead probing the thingness of the 
thing’s exteriority and interiority.  It asks to what extent each contributes to a ‘faithful 
paraphrase’ of traditional culture, and to what extent their sum manifests, anew, the 
essence of Islamic architecture. 
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Exteriority 
Although Pei’s encounter with the ‘essence’ of Islamic architecture occurs at an 
architectural site,111 he describes that which is encountered as austerity and severity, 
manifested by sun, shadows, and shades of colour.  None of what he describes is 
inherently architectural or even portrayable by architecture, but it can all be gathered in 
architectural places.  There, it can be discernible to listening, concentrative perceivers.  
For Pei, the essence that manifests in a Cairo ablutions fountain does not appear in the 
architecture of that fountain as much as it does in what that architecture gathers – 
although it is that particular architecture in which that particular gathering is able to occur, 
and it is in that gathering that the architecture emerges.112  Hence, the architecture and 
what it gathers share an inextricable but delicate relationship.  Such can be seen in 
Heidegger’s description of the temple: 
A building, a Greek temple, portrays nothing.  It simply stands there … 
Standing there … the lustre and gleam of the stone, though itself apparently 
glowing only by the grace of the sun, yet first brings to light the light of the day, the 
breadth of the sky, the darkness of the night.  The temple’s firm towering makes 
visible the invisible space of air.  The steadfastness of the work contrasts with the 
surge of the surf, and its own repose brings out the raging of the sea … The 
Greeks early called this emerging and rising in itself, and in all things, phusis.113 
Pei confirms his understanding of the relationship between architecture and that which it 
gathers – as well as the priority implicitly granted to the latter – when he observes: “It is 
the light of the desert that transforms the architecture into a play of light and shadow.”114  
In its relationship with light, the Museum of Islamic Art emerges (see fig. 4.12).  It does so 
through its capacity to receive and gather the light granted by the desert sun (and moon), 
even as it offers that light back to the fourfold by means not available to light alone.115  
Light’s reliance on the building and the building’s reliance on light may not be equal, but 
such asymmetry can be seen to produce dynamism and power, without hierarchical 
inequity.116  Moreover, the relationship is interdependent, much like that of the sun and 
moon, themselves.117 
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FIGURE 4.12 
Museum of Islamic Art, as seen from the south-eastern end of The Corniche. 
 
 
The essence of Islamic architecture that Pei encounters in Cairo proves to be both 
limiter and enabler.  It limits his formal vocabulary, but only in the sense that such limits, 
or bounds, open-up a creative domain in which essence can emerge anew, responding to 
a new situation.  In that domain, there emerges a particular vocabulary of form and 
materiality – one approvingly described as “almost primitive”118 – that can maintain the 
tenuous relationship with light; that can empty itself to light, radically contextualise light, 
and partially become light, in a way that not only maintains but strengthens architectural 
identity.  That identity is partially grounded in Pei’s ‘thinking’ view of Islamic essence, 
wherein he sees powerful volumes and geometry.  But Pei concludes that “when you 
have the sun, architecture does not need anything; all you need is the faceting …”119  
And, when the volumes and geometry are reduced to their facets, they come to express 
the essence of Islamic architecture that he ‘poetises’ – severity, austerity, and simplicity.  
(Knowingly or not, his description of Islamic essence echoes the standard of ‘severe 
simplicity’ set down by the Prophet Mohammed as Islam was born.120)  Thus, beyond 
mere volumes and geometry, it is the severe simplicity of complex faceting that, in 
concert with light, enables the appearance of the building’s constantly-changing forms 
and colours (see fig. 4.13). 
It can be argued that the museum’s assembly of faceted, stone-clad forms – 
appearing to one observer to possess the innocence of “a compulsively precise child, 
playing with chalky geometric blocks”121 – is merely a result of the geometric obsession 
shared by both Islamic culture and its architectural translator in this case.  If true, that 
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would not bode well for faithful translation, since such obsession could be seen to cloud 
objectivity.  And it is precisely such clouded objectivity that Goldberger sees evidenced by 
Pei’s avoidance of the decorative detail seen in so many examples of Islamic 
architecture, and by his embrace, instead, of only those elements that appeal to his 
Modernist sensibilities.122  Although prejudice is inevitable in all human endeavour, Pei 
persuasively counters by explaining that, in Islamic architecture, the shift from austerity to 
decoration had often been effected by the non-Arab geographies, cultures, and climates 
into which Islamic architecture was transposed; and, in some locales, by the affluence 
into which Islam grew, contrary to its original standard of severe simplicity.123  Hence, 
rather than avoiding any essential aspect of Islamic architecture, I would argue that Pei is 
marking an important distinction between ‘essence’ and its ‘embellishment’, between the 
‘essential’ and the ‘non-essential’.  In so doing, he confirms a kenotic outlook.  By his 
emptying and opening-up to Islamic architecture, Pei invites a reciprocal response: an 
emptying and opening-up of Islamic architecture that reveals its essence. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4.13 
Museum of Islamic Art, as seen from the new peninsula that forms the island’s bay setting. 
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Goldberger goes on to conclude that the museum is a “meaningful success,” but 
he attributes that to Pei’s ability to synthesise the “many architectural elements that 
Islamic and Western architecture have in common.”124  Pei’s kenotic-ness, however, 
suggests that such a conclusion understates what is actually at work.  Merely searching 
for architectural forms that Islam and the West coincidentally and conveniently share, and 
then combining those forms into an architectural composition, does not demonstrate 
attentiveness to situation or necessarily result in placedness.  In fact, such a pursuit is 
antithetical to kenosis, and likely to find only the lowest common denominator.  Rather 
than synthesis, or the finding of common ground, I would suggest that Pei’s museum is 
more the product of kenotic hybridisation.  Rather than being the result of combining co-
original forms into a complex whole, it is a product of cross-fertilising and breeding whole 
formal expressions that are relevant and specific to the entirety of the museum’s unique 
situation, even if not entirely or strictly ‘new’.  Consequently – and notwithstanding critical 
aesthetic assessments125 – the building rests comfortably, convincingly, and uniquely in 
its situation; not readily transposable to other Islamic contexts, and not readily 
transportable between Islamic and Western contexts.  While such a test of placedness is 
neither definitive nor infallible, it is also not unreasonable, particularly in connection with 
an architecture of kenosis.  Its apparent simplicity and obviousness masks what is 
actually a difficult and complex test to pass.  Most other contemporary buildings in Doha 
and the Gulf Region – and many worldwide – fall well short of the expectations it 
proposes.126 
 
A closer examination of just one of the museum’s exterior formal expressions 
further reveals the kenotic grounding of the whole project.127  Pei was not obliged to 
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sentimental and pastiche. Scrupulously and even skilfully re-presenting traditional Islamic architectural motifs, 
their actual modernity is rendered undiscernible and contradictory. Of note, however, is Musheireb, a new city 
centre and public forum development in Doha, “whose surrounding buildings become subsumed into the 
space” so as to produce “an architecture of deference … contemporary and specific to the city’s fierce 
climate,” which makes it, “in its quiet way, the most radical thing in the Gulf.” This project is examined in 
Heathcote, "Bridge in the Gulf: There is no shortage of self-conscious architecture in Doha but a new city 
centre promises something different." 
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culminate his architectural composition with a dome.  Only one of the six finalists in the 
original design competition included a dome, and that not as a culminating element.  
Pursuant to Goldberger’s analysis, Pei could be seen to consider a domical top because 
of the dome’s obvious commonality to both Islamic and Western architecture, and 
because of its potential to challenge and satisfy Pei’s geometric predilections.  If that 
were the case, Pei would have been well within architectural norms to re-present, in some 
manner, the dome atop the Cairo ablutions fountains, at which he claims to have 
encountered Islamic essence.  Modernist interpretations of that dome might have 
manifested as something akin to the new steel and glass dome atop Berlin’s renovated 
Reichstag (a project discussed more fully in Chapter 6), or merely as a direct but stylised 
reference to the original form, executed with contemporary means and materials.  
Although such interpretations might be seen to take steps toward abstraction, they would 
forever remain neither original nor new.  Pei’s eschewal of such interpretations, and his 
pursuit of another, reveals that Goldberger’s premise is too simplistic. 
Instead of selecting the dome from a smorgasbord of common architectural forms 
and employing it for easy stylistic result, Pei engages the dome, kenotically.  He 
attentively ‘listens’ to it.  Indeed, he ‘struggles’ with it.  For Pei, the dome is excessively 
referential to Renaissance and religious architecture.128  Yet it is ubiquitous in Islam and 
of Islamic essence.  Such essence can be traced to the dome’s ancient and primitive 
beginnings, as domestic shelters of crudely-circular shape and corresponding curved 
roof.  Remembered and revered over generations, the dome’s ancestral connection and 
protective power eventually transcended domestic use, becoming a cosmic symbol, place 
of ritual, sacred shelter, royal tent, mortuary, and, in virtually all iterations, a manifestation 
of the divine.  Thus, amongst pre-Islamic Arabs and many other cultures, the domical 
shape gave way to domical ideology, commencing a gradual process that led to the 
dome’s monumental use.  Mohammed’s early-seventh century call for severe simplicity 
was also a condemnation of Christians and Jews for their use of domed tombs as places 
of worship, but, by that century’s end, the Prophet’s followers had “begun to make the 
kubba (domical hut or tent) an architectural symbol of their religion.”  The dome’s 
development was not at all independent or exclusive to a particular civilisation.  “The 
formation of domical architecture – in the Roman Empire, India, the Christian and 
Sassanian East, and [later] the Islamic Empire – was the result of an intricate fusion of 
various domical traditions and a multilateral dispersion of structural methods …”129  In the 
West, the dome’s origination as a concept of ‘house’ led to its use not only at important 
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houses of worship but also at many sorts of secular ‘houses’, those dedicated to culture, 
politics, and, more recently, sports and entertainment.  In Islam, the dome remains most 
closely associated with places of worship (mosques) and royalty (palaces). 
Clearly, then, the domical shape is shared by Islam and the West, but the 
development of its ideology is diverse and entangled across time and cultures.  Pei’s 
apprehensiveness toward the form is well founded.  He sees the dome as an important 
expression of Islamic essence, and therefore as an essential component of the museum, 
but he is wary of unintended and inconsistent ideological connotations that any of its 
traditional shapes might convey to either Islamic or Western observers.  Rather than 
attempt to resolve the questions of shape and ideology with one dome, at one project, Pei 
is content to leave such questions open.  He reverts again to essence; that is, to the 
dome’s essential capacity to manifest the divine – or, at least, to hold mystery.  Since 
such capacity depends more on ideology than shape, Pei does not see the dome’s 
essence aligned strictly with traditional form.  That shift makes room for the emergence of 
a unique formal expression.  Pei’s ‘dome’ conceals a traditional domical interior shell 
within a decidedly non-traditional cubic exterior shell; the cubic exterior serving to 
augment the museum’s essential faceted-ness, as a traditional dome could not (see fig. 
4.14).  Goldberger notes that doctrinal Modernism would find this configuration “false,” a 
denial of “the structural reality of the dome,” and an “architectural cover-up … 
characteristic of historicist architecture.”130  But such charges are contestable.  There is, 
for example, a long tradition of double-shell domes with differing interior and exterior 
profiles,131 a tradition maintained by Pei’s dome, albeit in radicalised form.  Moreover, if 
there is a ‘cover-up’, it is a porous one and anything but historicist.  Piercing all four sides 
of the exterior cube are openings – wide in breadth, narrow in height – taking the shape 
of circular segments and resembling flat-bottomed crescents or lunes.  These openings 
offer unexpected and curious glimpses of the outer surface of the concealed interior 
dome, which prefigures, but leaves ambiguous, the dome’s actual shape and the awaiting 
experience of its interior expression.  Sheikha al-Mayassa speaks of comments, made to 
her, suggesting that these restricted and mysterious openings conjure images of a veiled 
woman wearing the niqab.  Although Pei denies any such analogous intent, he accepts it 
as a compliment, recognising that “a mysterious quality is very difficult to attain in 
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architecture.”132  To the extent that the analogy applies, it is both apt and paradoxical.  
Severe as it may seem to some, the niqab nevertheless reveals its wearer’s eyes, and 
therewith it reveals itself as a very liberal revealer.  By virtue of its dome, Pei’s museum 
does likewise. 
 
 
FIGURE 4.14 
The faceted forms of the museum culminate in Pei’s particular expression of ‘dome’. 
 
 
Through hybridisation, not synthesis, the museum’s dome achieves both honesty 
and intrigue.  It is neither Islamic nor Western, but is designedly both, specifically 
responding to the museum’s entire situation and holding the tensions thereof.  It is at 
once traditional and non-traditional, but, being the latter, it is ultimately modern.  In the 
tradition of the dome at the ablutions fountain of Ibn Tulun, to which Pei presented 
himself as a receptive ‘listener’, this dome also invites ‘listening’, and, to the attentive 
perceiver, it lets something of its full existence be known.  This dome empties itself, even 
of expected domical traits, but without loss of identity.  In so doing, it reflects a kenotic 
understanding of itself, its designer, and its placedness.  And because dome and building 
are one – the dome not acting as an added ‘crown’ – the attributes of the dome are also 
those of the building as a whole.  The dome is a microcosm of the museum, a building 
like Heidegger’s temple, which although it just stands there, is much more than an object 
for gazing. 
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Interiority 
Pei’s museum and Heidegger’s temple are things to be engaged and experienced by 
humanity.  Both are worthy containers, which, in concert with their interior containment – 
already foretold by the exterior – offer humanity a view of the world.  Once again, 
Heidegger’s temple provides a means of probing the museum’s self-understanding, this 
time by way of its interiority: 
The [temple] encloses the figure of the god, and in this concealment lets it stand 
out into the holy precinct through the open portico.  By means of the temple, the 
god is present in the temple.  This presence of the god is in itself the extension 
and delimitation of the precinct as a holy precinct.  The temple and its precinct, 
however, do not fade away into the indefinite.  It is the temple-work that first fits 
together and at the same time gathers around itself the unity of those paths and 
relations in which birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, 
endurance and decline acquire the shape of destiny for human being.  The all-
governing expanse of this open relational context is the world of this historical 
people.  Only from and in this expanse does the nation first return to itself for the 
fulfilment of its vocation.133 
Strictly speaking, a museum is not a temple, at least not in the religious sense 
(although even that is ambiguous in an Islamic context).  So, can there be ‘a god’ 
presenced by it?  Noting the potential for exaggeration, Goldberger posits that “the 
museum has come to occupy a position in contemporary international culture not unlike 
the position once held by the cathedral,” a claim supported by largely coincidental 
similarities.134  It is a commonly invoked analogy – applicable to many of the cathedral’s 
modern-day substitutions – which, at a superficial level, merely recognises that as the 
roles and cultural importance of various institutions change, the architectural 
manifestation of those institutions usually adjusts likewise.135  At another level, however, 
the analogy points to the widely-observed march of modern secularisation, and the 
perception that religion must therefore be in decline.  Yet, as discussed in Chapter 2, it is 
this secularisation that Gianni Vattimo sees as evidence of on-going kenosis, leading not 
to religion’s demise but to its fulfilment.  No longer locked up in one construct – as might 
be represented by the ‘cathedral’ – religion can open-up to manifold legitimate 
interpretations not only within Christianity but, importantly, beyond it.  If an interpretation 
is seen as a way of viewing the world, then, in Heideggerian terms, it is also ‘a god’.  The 
temple encloses and reveals ‘a god’, not merely because it contains a god-figure, but 
because the temple and its containment fit together, and thereby open-up, a world view of 
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the people who shape the temple and are shaped by it.  Thus a god – or the divine or the 
infinite – is ongoingly revealed in humanity’s being; in humanity’s becoming human.  
Such is what Heidegger is describing when he says that “the world worlds.”136  The 
temple is not the world, but it sets up a world, and is a work arising out of the world’s 
worlding.  The world’s worlding is animated by its self-emptying, its ongoing kenosis. 
As a work itself, and in its containment of works, the Museum of Islamic Art 
presents an interpretation, a view of the world that transcends being-there.  By virtue of 
that, ‘a god’ is indeed presenced.  (By extension, it can be said that ‘a god’ is presenced 
in every work – architectural and otherwise – but what each work reveals, and the extent 
to which revealment occurs and manifests ‘a god’, remains contingent and 
indeterminate.)  Such presence is amplified at the museum, because the works it 
contains are grounded in a world view that conjoins life and faith.  Persian philosopher 
Hossein Nasr writes: “Traditional Islamic civilisation is marked by its emphasis upon 
beauty being wedded to every aspect of human life … [and] as a complement of the 
Truth.”137  Hence, in traditional Islam (absent modernist and fundamentalist influence) 
every creative event – including the ordinary, everyday, and mundane – is “a sacred act 
contributing to the overall spirituality of the individual and community … each based upon 
a science of nature, concerned not with the outer appearance of things, but with their 
inner reality.”  Islamic works of art inspire “the remembrance and contemplation of 
God,”138 and, in their ‘thingness’, are seen as presencing ‘a god’.  Through such works, 
human creativity is celebrated for its whole- and holy-ness, for its holding of the divine or 
mysterious.  The museum and its collection – much of which comprises the ordinary, 
everyday, and mundane – can therefore be likened to the temple and the god-figure it 
encloses.  A god is not present merely by virtue of the museum and the items it contains, 
but as a result of the wider relationality established and presented by the works, 
importantly including that between those who created the works and those who now 
experience them.  As in the account of the Dervish kashkul, such relationality is complex.  
The works of art – the museum and its collection – empty themselves to be filled by each 
other.  They also empty themselves to be filled by their perceivers, those who come self-
emptied, readied to engage and be filled by the works that they also fill.  Thus, emptying 
is always already enabled by the emptying of the other.  The museum, the collection, and 
their perceivers engage kenotically – almost cyclonically – to invite the unconcealment of 
‘a god’, a world view set amidst a world always worlding. 
 
                                               
136
 Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," 43; additionally, Heidegger's notion of 'worlding' is explored 
and further developed in Malpas, Heidegger's Topology: 227-228. 
137
 S.H. Nasr, Traditional Islam in the Modern World  (London: K. Paul International, 1990), 20. 
138
 Alraouf, "The Role of Museum's Architecture in Islamic Community: Museum of Islamic Art, Doha," 61. 
 155 
 
Of concern to some Islamic observers is the potential for a museum such as this – 
a container and its containment – to ‘freeze’ the contributions of Islam primarily in its past, 
rather than recognise the culture’s longevity, continuity, and contemporary influence on 
the world and world views.  This concern is exacerbated when fear, misconceptions, and 
mistrust – often invoked, bilaterally, by Islam and the West – have the effect of masking 
Islam’s intrinsic identification with beauty.139  The extent to which specific museum 
exhibits can overcome such concerns is largely a matter of curatorship, and therefore a 
subject better left to other discourse, because Pei is neither the designer nor the curator 
of the exhibit spaces.140  But, as designer of the museum and its major interior space, Pei 
is afforded an opportunity to create and contribute a major work of Islamic art that 
evidences continuing cultural relevance.  It is a task to which his philosophical and 
historical perspective seems well matched.  “You have to be modern as well.  You cannot 
just go back to history.  There is the past, but also everything that has happened 
since.”141  Although the architecture of the museum is not Islamic by authorship (Pei not 
being Muslim), it is certainly Islamic in its commissioning, and can be equally so in its 
essence as a work of art, regardless of authorship.  In fact, to the extent that a “Western 
architect” (Pei’s self-description)142 is able to transcend Western-ness – including its 
hegemonic propensities – and effect such a contribution, it could be argued that the 
outcome does more to foster intended cultural bridging than would a product of ‘pure’ 
Islamic provenance.  I have already posited that the museum’s exteriority is a faithful 
reflection of Islam’s aesthetic essence.  Additionally, I have endeavoured to demonstrate 
that the museum as container, together with its contents – the latter a major element of 
interiority – presences a world view embedded in Islamic art and culture.  There is, 
however, another major element of the museum’s interiority, unsurprisingly found at its 
core: the central and first-to-be-experienced interior space (see fig. 4.15).  Remaining to 
be explored is the question as to whether and how this element of the museum’s 
interiority fits together with its exteriority to advance the museum as a cohesive work of 
contemporary Islamic art. 
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FIGURE 4.15 
The museum’s central hall, with main entrance to the left and culminating dome overhead. 
 
 
The museum’s central interior space is a five-storey hall, which, at each level, is 
surrounded on three sides by exhibition galleries and other functional spaces.  It is this 
space that culminates in Pei’s unique dome.  To label the space an ‘atrium’ would unfairly 
connect it with the proliferation of atria in the world’s contemporary hotels and other 
commercial developments; a proliferation that trivialises the term and the space it 
describes.  One critic makes exactly that connection, suggesting that the museum’s 
atrium is “one part grand mosque to two parts Hyatt Regency.”143  Such a description, 
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however, is less than one part correct.  Because the museum is a place of Islamic art and 
is itself such art, and, because Islamic art is so closely connected with spirituality, the 
central hall can be seen to evoke mosque-like qualities.  But it is clearly not a mosque.  It 
is also not a hotel.  And the central hall eschews both possibilities.  Such a space cannot 
be disparaged simply because the enduring concept of an atrium is, at a particular point 
in time, seen to be appropriated by commercial interests.  As if to extend the indictment, 
the same critic claims that the central hall “has nothing whatsoever to do with the 
business of looking at art”144 – a claim that misses the point entirely.  The central hall has 
everything to do with looking at art.  It gathers around itself – it makes room for, 
assembles, and presents – all of the exhibition galleries and their collections.  It makes 
room for perceivers and offers them a place to prepare for their encounter with the art, to 
ready their readiness for an experience that transcends gazing.  More than merely the 
inner surface of the container-museum, it is actually one of the museum’s exhibits.  
Indeed, it is arguably the museum’s most important exhibit, in that it prefigures all of the 
other exhibits and the world view they hold.  The central hall is an exhibition that exhibits 
art, not least the work of art that is itself. 
As a contemporary work of Islamic art, the central hall works to preclude the 
cultural frozenness about which some worry.  Unlike its essentially severe and austere 
container, the central hall presents an opposing aspect of Islamic architecture – that of 
decoration – which Pei has already been seen to reject as inessential, at least in 
connection with exterior expression.  Pei characterises the contradiction as a subjective 
indulgence, but it more accurately appears to be a response to the self-contradiction and 
contingency of Islamic essence.  Notwithstanding austere origins, Pei recognises that 
“Islamic architecture often comes to life in an explosion of decorative elements.”145  Even 
within severe exteriors, there are interiors that present “a riot of forms.”146  Accordingly, 
the central hall makes room for decoration, albeit neither explosively nor riotously, and 
never overshadowing the project’s essential simplicity (see fig. 4.16).  The decoration is 
almost entirely reductive or integrated, and muted in colour: inlaid geometric floor 
patterns, coffered ceiling planes, sculpted stairways, and expressed structural elements.  
The hall’s giant ‘chandelier’ is one of the few additive features, which, despite a great 
difference in scale, is added in the manner of its Byzantine antecedent: the suspended oil 
lamp.  At the zenith of the space, the inner surface of the dome’s interior shell is revealed, 
the outer surface of which is first glimpsed at the building’s exterior.  It is discovered that 
the dome’s cubic exterior gives way to an interior shell of traditional domical shape.  
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Decidedly untraditional, however, is the shell’s execution in distinctly modern stainless 
steel; the surface of which presents a three-dimensional “geometric matrix [that] 
transforms the dome’s descent from circle, to octagon, to square …”147  An oculus admits 
natural light to play against and reveal the dome’s exuberant multi-facetedness, though 
not all of it.  Consequent shade and shadow create an Escherian effect – an element of 
mystery – and see the dome fulfil its domical ideology, manifesting something of the 
divine (see fig. 4.17). 
 
 
FIGURE 4.16 
Right, decoration integrated into architectural and 
structural elements. 
 
FIGURE 4.17 
Below, the interior’s traditional domical form, 
expressed in faceted stainless steel. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Directly, and more abundantly, light is also admitted by way of the museum’s only 
major window.  It is this window that gathers, and brings to the interior, the desert sun 
and its play of light and shadow; that which Pei considers so essential to Islamic 
architecture (see figs. 4.18 – 4.19).  The term ‘window’, however, understates its forty-five 
metre height, its axial location opposing the central hall’s main entry and monumental 
staircase, and its role in framing a view of the landscape beyond the museum; primarily 
the new business district’s skyline, but also the Persian Gulf (region) and all to which the 
gulf leads (world).  This great window, like the window described by Simmel, is “a link 
between internal space and the outside world,” one in which “the teleological direction is 
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almost exclusively from the inside to the outside.”148  As such, it is another exhibit – a 
vertical mural of the Islam that stands outside the museum, there to be viewed in the 
context of the image of Islam presented inside.  Compared to a door, Simmel sees the 
window’s restrictiveness, citing “the fact that it can only be traversed by the gaze.”  But 
that attribution may be this window’s most important asset, in that it offers a kind of 
protection or guard against that aspect of modernity that demands the surrender of 
cultural identity.  Since such a demand is antithetical to kenosis, this window is actually 
kenotic – more liberating than restrictive.  It can therefore be seen as an exhibit of that 
from which it frees the visitor.  It can also be seen in its own right, as a modern artwork of 
metal and glass.  The simple grid-like pattern of mullions serves to reinforce the concept 
of protection, but, overlaid with a more intricate solar and acoustical screen, this window 
adds another element of geometry to the decorativeness of the central hall. 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4.18 
The ‘window’ of the central hall, framing a view of the new business district.  
   FIGURE 4.19 
The ‘window’ as screen. 
 
 
 
What might be seen as an inconsistent departure into decorative expression is, in 
fact, further evidence of the kenosis in Pei’s approach.  It demonstrates Pei’s willingness 
to empty himself, even of his commitment to essential austerity and his suspicions toward 
ornament and decoration.  True to kenosis, he is content to be suspicious of his own 
suspicions and thereby open himself, and the museum’s central space, to both the 
essence and the enigma of Islamic architecture.  Reflecting on the personal challenge of 
this unexpected foray, Pei confesses: “I would have created more decorative patterns if I 
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had had more courage.”149  His restraint, however, is arguably due less to trepidation than 
to attunement.  Pei understands that his paraphrase of Islamic architecture risks vastly 
different reactions in the West and the Middle East, and therefore necessitates 
heightened recognition of, and attentiveness to, situational bounds.150 
Fidelity 
Insofar as the museum is a faithful paraphrase of Islamic architecture – in modern terms 
and bearing – I would suggest that such is largely owing to Pei’s kenotic posture.151  Even 
if not consciously assumed, it is that posture which allows Pei to avoid the incongruities – 
and spectacles of incongruity – that can arise when contemporary Islamic architecture is 
defined in terms of Western modernity, or when it resorts to various forms or 
combinations of imitation, alteration, and restatement.152  By eschewing all such 
machinations, Pei’s museum achieves something extraordinary; yet, as one critic 
observes, “there’s nothing revolutionary about the building.”153  Therein lies kenotic 
paradox.  When compared to other buildings – those in the Middle East, and elsewhere, 
so intent on being ‘revolutionary’ – it is the un-revolutionary nature of the Museum of 
Islamic Art that transcends the others’ extraordinary ordinariness.  Making that possible is 
Pei’s fidelity to the task of translation; his awareness that neither literal translation nor 
controversial interpretation assures faithful paraphrase. 
Pei commits himself to the purpose of learning about a culture previously 
unknown to him.  He empties, opens-up, and is filled by a culture quite un-Western and 
un-Modernist, especially in the inseparability of faith from life and therefore from art.  He 
comes to understand that, in Islam, all architecture (and urban design) is fundamentally 
an expression of faith.  That is significant, because such a cultural precept can be difficult 
to reconcile with Modern architecture.  According to Ali Alraouf, professor of architecture 
at Qatar University, Islam’s mid-twentieth century introduction to secular modernity – and 
with it Modernism – seemed to demand a disconnection of faith and architecture.  It 
presented Islam with a conundrum: how to discuss modern architecture with faith 
removed from the conversation.  Yet the architecture of Western modernity – in its 
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various expressions – came to be embraced in much of the Middle East as a means of 
securing ‘modern’ credentials; in some sense, as an act of conformance to an 
increasingly hegemonic world view.154  Its embrace and proliferation, however, did not 
mask its contradictions with Islamic culture.  Thus, for the Museum of Islamic Art to be a 
faithful paraphrase of the culture to which it was dedicated, its design could not resort to 
Modernist orthodoxy, alone.   
Nor could it turn toward anything historically imitative.  Traditional Islam would see 
Postmodern Historicism and any form of romantic or nostalgic regionalism to be as 
unsuitable as Modernism.  Alraouf observes that, in Islam, all of those who engage in 
innovation and creativity have a duty to worthily represent culture and faith – and their 
oneness.  Hence, “copying or reshuffling old architectural vocabularies, from past eras,” 
could legitimately be seen as a violation of that duty.155  “Contemporary Muslims,” 
declares Alraouf, “need to use art, architecture and creativity … to vigorously emphasize 
that their presence on earth is a sacred mission, characterized by a compelling desire, 
faith, and commitment towards enhancing mankind.”156  Indeed, such a call-to-action was, 
in part, answered by the advent of Critical Regionalism – neither imitative nor sentimental.  
Credited with sparking alternative and noteworthy architectural responses to the Islamic 
context from a number of indigenous architects,157 the movement’s nuanced shift away 
from Modernist precepts allowed the re-opening of a dialogue between architecture and a 
faith-driven culture; a dialogue with the potential to see Islam’s creative duty restored.  In 
that potential, those who placed great import on the relationship of art to Islam saw an 
opportunity, not only to express cultural identity, contribution, and relevance, but also to 
heal the damage done by the rush to Western modernity.  In other words, they saw the 
potential for faithfulness in their architectural identity. 
When faced with the situation at Doha, Pei sees the same potential, but, 
importantly, he owes no allegiance to any style or movement or ‘-ism’, including 
Modernism, Historicism, and Critical Regionalism.  It is true that his museum building 
meets some of the tests of the latter label; for example, in its placedness, self-identity, 
rejection of imitation, and undeniably modern grounding.  But its kenotic self-
understanding prevents the project from being convincingly characterised as either “an 
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architecture of resistance” or “a self-conscious synthesis.”158  In some ways, it is quite the 
opposite and, in others, significantly more.  The museum is critically regional, but it 
transcends Critical Regionalism.  Despite its monumental scale, it is not architecture with 
a rebellious cause or contention.  It just stands there.  Rather than overt resistance, there 
is relinquishment and opening-up.  Rather than the self-consciousness of overstatement, 
there is the self-contraction and self-withdrawal of understatement.  Rather than 
synthesis, or mere combination, there is hybridisation and the establishment of mutual 
exchange and influence amongst situational elements.  And, as is always the case with 
kenosis, there is paradox, because, in all of this, there is a quiet and humble resistance – 
to assertive resistance.  Another description of the museum building has it attempting “to 
reconcile regional tradition with modernity.”159  Limited to mere aesthetics, the description 
perhaps has merit, but reconciliation is not what the building represents.  More 
accurately, the building explores the compatibility of Islamic tradition and modern 
expression, but makes no attempt to cover up the associated unresolvedness.  The 
building establishes relationality between itself, city, region and world – its placedness – 
even as it acknowledges and celebrates inherent tensions; some of which may never be 
resolved or need resolution; and some of which may actually serve and preserve 
relationality.  It opens up to its others and partially becomes them, without jeopardising its 
self-identity.  In so doing, the museum accurately reflects its kenotic self-understanding 
and invites a kenotic understanding of the world.  It thereby likens itself, yet again, to 
Heidegger’s temple: “The temple, in its standing there, first gives to things their look and 
to men their outlook on themselves.”160  
Dervish-ness as Kingly-ness 
From its inception, the Museum of Islamic Art can be seen as a vital revelation of the 
world of Islam to the world at large.  And the acts of conceiving and realising the museum 
are as much a revelation of Islam’s artistic and cultural contributions as are those objects 
and exhibits that the museum contains.  The container is what it is capable of containing, 
and therefore what it can potentially pour out: a creative work of humanity, fitting-together 
and revealing a particular world view.  I.M. Pei demonstrates his commitment to faithfully 
translate and represent that world view with an approach to the project that is arguably 
kenotic.  His receptivity and heightened attentiveness prefigure a building of like 
character: withdrawing to connect, drawing close to detach, celebrating inherent tensions, 
and thereby establishing dynamic relationality.  By virtue of its own kenosis, the museum 
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makes-room for, gathers-in, and pours-out the essence of a culture, for world-viewing, 
world-shaping, and, in turn, the shaping of the culture being viewed.  The ‘whirling’ nature 
of this kenosis mirrors that of the Dervishes and their distinguishing kashkul, with which 
this discourse began. 
Pei’s museum is described as being “sober rather than sumptuous, more a 
receptacle than a showpiece.”161  Also an insightful description of kenotic character, it 
applies not only to the museum-container but, equally, to the kashkul contained therein 
and to the creators of both.  Each is sober and receptive.  In so being, each is also a 
sumptuous showpiece of sobriety and receptivity.  In the earlier-cited medieval writings of 
Sa’di, the sobriety and receptivity of the Dervishes is set against the presumed 
sumptuousness and showiness of the king.  While the latter attracts the devotion of the 
hermit and sends him to hell, the former attracts the devotion of the king and sends him 
to paradise.  Thus, in The Gulistan, Sa’di poetises the paradox of kenosis: kingly-ness is 
ultimately found in Dervish-ness, much as the cosmopolitan is ultimately found in the 
fundamental.  In the Museum of Islamic Art, I.M. Pei concretises the paradox and, so, 
enables its appearance, even while respecting its concealment and the mystery thereof.  
His is a cosmopolitan museum grounded in Islamic essence.  The convergence, in Doha, 
of this designer, this design, and those who commissioned and realised this design 
presents a particularly intriguing view of Islam and modernity engaged.  More importantly, 
it reveals the always ongoing and never complete nature of kenosis: the present in the 
past and the future in the present. 
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5 
Architecture and Nothingness: 
Neo-Modernism 
Having considered, in the preceding two chapters, various manifestations of kenosis in 
secular architecture, attention now turns to the happenings that can be seen to occur in a 
situation wherein kenosis and its religious foundations intersect with a building of sacred 
purposes.  The building in question, however, is no ‘ordinary’ example.  It transcends yet 
revives Modernism, in what has been labelled Neo-Modernism, but notions of ‘style’ or 
‘movement’ are only one aspect of the building’s kenotic-ness.  Indeed, it is the encounter 
of architectural and religious ideologies that, in this case, most affects the instantiation of 
kenosis.  Although the building represents only one faith tradition, it is said to be strongly 
influenced by two others.  Such influence arises naturally from the situation itself, but its 
promotion comes most significantly from the architect.  Moreover, although each tradition 
– whether influenced or influencing – is kenotically grounded, each incorporates and 
expresses kenosis with vital differences.  The architecture emerging from that dynamic 
can be considered not only for its own manifestations of kenosis but also for its ability to 
enable and empower the kenosis of theology and liturgy; precisely that for which the 
architecture has presumably been conceived.  In such an exploration, the thinking about 
kenosis through architecture is importantly expanded. 
 
ANDO AT THE CHURCH OF THE LIGHT 
Criticising Perfection 
Attending a wintertime worship service at the Church of the Light – the famously ‘empty’ 
edifice by Neo-Modernist architect Tadao Ando (1941-), at Ibaraki (Osaka), Japan – I was 
struck by thoughts of Modernist architect Richard Neutra (1892-1970).1  In particular, I 
recalled one of Neutra’s clients retelling a possibly mythical but nonetheless pertinent 
anecdote: 
[Neutra] studied architecture at the [Vienna University of Technology], and the 
senior students always visited St Stephen’s Cathedral.  Neutra’s class went and 
came back.  The professor said, ‘What did you think?”  And, Neutra said, “It was 
beautiful, but there are three things wrong with it.”  No one had ever before found 
fault with St Stephen’s.  The professor said, “Oh?  What is possibly wrong with St 
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Stephen’s?”  And, the young student said, “Well, it was so dark, I couldn’t see.  
The acoustics were so bad, I couldn’t hear.  It was so stuffy, I couldn’t breathe!”2 
Myth or not, the story presents the spectre of criticising the seemingly un-criticisable – the 
‘perfect’.  The young Neutra’s critique does not dismiss the ascription of beauty generally 
accorded to the historical edifice.  Instead, it honestly calls attention to deficiencies that 
may go unnoticed or unnamed in connection with legendary architectural ‘greatness’.  In 
essence, the critique suggests that the architectural grandeur of St Stephen’s does not 
come without certain – and significant – experiential costs. 
It is tempting, also, to see perfection in the Church of the Light, particularly in what 
appears to be architectural purity.  But, like St Stephen’s, it too can be critiqued – even 
while appreciating its widely-revered status – because Church architecture must be 
assessed not only on the basis of espoused and ascribed aesthetic theories but also on 
the basis of a building’s capacity to fulfil its commission; to respond fully to its situation.  
Ando describes his Church of the Light as “a space of nothingness” and as “spatial 
emptiness,”3 phrases readily adopted by professional and lay observers in expressions of 
both praise and disapproval.4  Prominent amongst professional observers is Jin Baek, 
who, in his analyses of the church building and Ando’s theories about it, offers generous 
and deserved praise for the architecture, while also advancing a commonly discussed link 
between the Japanese religio-philosophical tradition of “nothingness” and Christian 
kenosis.5  In that light, it is reasonable and worthwhile to critically consider (1) the 
situation’s potentiality to instantiate kenosis; (2) the building’s receptivity – its kenotic 
openness – to the church’s kenotic purposes; and (3) the creativity with which the 
architecture’s conception is approached, and the extent of kenosis evidenced therein.  
Insofar as such consideration reveals imperfections and irregularities – as would be 
expected in all creations – a further and final question is raised as to whether and how 
imperfection influences valorisation. 
To effect the proposed assessment is to search for the building’s character – not 
in its myth, but in its maturation.  Philosopher Walter Benjamin suggests that “historical 
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‘understanding’ is to be viewed primarily as an afterlife of that which has been 
understood; and so what came to be recognized about works through the analysis of their 
‘afterlife’, their ‘fame’, should be considered the foundation of history itself.”6  Or, as 
Graeme Gilloch interprets Benjamin: “the modern reveals itself as ruin” and truth only 
appears through gradual demise, a “destruction of deceptive appearance” that “facilitates 
a process of reconstruction.”7  This interdependence amongst apparent contradictions is 
analogous to that of kenosis and skenosis, and the paradox of weakness producing 
strength (discussed in Chapter 2).  It may seem premature to speak of the Church of the 
Light in terms of ‘ruination’ or ‘demise’, but, like all finite creation, it has begun its march 
in that direction.  With more than a quarter-century of ‘fame’, it is better positioned to be 
more self-revealing – more self-emptying, or kenotic – and to submit to fresh critical 
analysis that benefits from the intimacy of greater distance. 
Potentiality 
The kenotic potentiality of a situation rests, first, in its very nature and, second, in that 
which is brought to the situation by those who are already part of it and will respond to it – 
particularly, in this case, the church congregation and their chosen architect.  Each 
aspect warrants exploration.  The nature of this situation can be seen in its genealogy.  At 
a global scale, the mere notion of a Christian church on Japanese soil – where Buddhism 
and Shintoism are predominant – holds inherent kenotic potential.  In fact, the proposition 
fundamentally relies on at least some measure of mutual opening-up.  Then, as 
mentioned, the Japanese tradition of nothingness – grounded in Buddhism and revived in 
the twentieth century by Kitarō Nishida and his Kyoto Philosophical School – establishes 
a connection between Buddhism and Christianity, notably by way of kenosis.  Such can 
be seen not only in Nishida’s writings but also in a considerable volume of subsequent 
and continuing discourse that posits kenosis as an important, if imperfect, model for 
interfaith relations.8  Influenced by such tradition and philosophy, Ando uses the 
Japanese terms mu (nothingness) and ma (interval or in-between) to discuss his 
aesthetic theories,9 and he expresses an unequivocal intention to further the interfaith 
connection.  It is his hope that the deployment of an architecture “that seeks to embody 
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the spiritual realm, explained by the religious and philosophical notion of nothingness, will 
bridge Buddhism and Christianity.”10   
Accordingly, Baek can adopt Nishida’s philosophy as an interpretive framework 
for the Church of the Light,11 and that allows him to posit: 
The molding of the church is a creative linguistic event of interpretation, arising 
from the common ground between nothingness, on which Ando stood, and the 
God of Christianity, as re-introduced to East Asia with the inception of 
modernization during the second third of the nineteenth century.12   
By his own comments and through his participation in Baek’s project, Ando at least tacitly 
accepts this portrayal.  He also strengthens the link with kenosis, stating that his interest 
in spatial emptiness goes beyond the perceptual and is meant to convey the concept of 
sharing,13 which is an aspect of kenosis.  Going further, Baek specifically correlates 
Nishida’s theory of self-negation with Christian kenosis, and associates both with Ando’s 
religious architecture.14  Although the genealogy may appear somewhat circuitous, the 
relationship between kenosis and the situation that produces the Church of the Light is 
clearly established as one of potentiality. 
Presented is nothing less than the potential for East-West exchange – between 
Buddhism-via-Nishida and Christianity – with Ando as chief envoy.  Notionally, the 
exchange relies on similarities in the Buddhist concept of sunyata – central to Nishidan 
philosophy – and the Christian concept of kenosis.  The potential of the exchange is 
made richer and more entangled by Ando’s acknowledgement that he is also influenced 
by Shintoism; not so much a religion, but a polytheist spirituality, which, unlike Buddhism 
and Christianity, is indigenous to Japan.  Such a confluence of traditions only reinforces 
Ando’s observation that the “co-existence of religions is a very important part of Japanese 
spirituality.”15  So, it would seem that – at least in theory – the situation of the Church of 
the Light holds the potential to concretise an avenue of interfaith dialogue.  However, two 
important questions arise, asking, first, whether such dialogue is kenosis and, second, 
whether kenosis can be seen as an aspiration of those who commissioned the project.  
Regarding the first question, it is important to appreciate that although dialogue can be 
kenotic, kenosis is not mere dialogue; nor is it simply the discovery of comforting but 
possibly naive analogies, or ‘common ground’.  Open-ended, kenotic dialogue requires 
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“entering into relationships that go on raising questions about the adequacy or otherwise 
of the terms [the conversers] use,” relationships that are allowed to “challenge any sense 
of self-sufficiency” and “confront the edges and boundaries of the known.”16  Hence, the 
extent to which this situation’s potential can be actualised is held in the second question; 
one contingent upon the willingness of the project’s commissioners to open-up and give 
the building over to that end, to challenge and be challenged, and to risk the possibility of 
partially becoming the other.  Exploration of that question requires some understanding of 
the commissioning Christian denomination, as well as the potentiality of its relationship 
with the traditions at the other end of Ando’s ‘bridge’, particularly Buddhism. 
The Church of the Light is the worship centre of a local congregation of the 
Kyodan, the United Church of Christ in Japan (UCCJ).  The UCCJ was formed in 1940-41 
as an evangelical union of all formerly independent or denominational Protestant 
churches – more than thirty at the time.17  While the union created an ecumenical and 
globally-engaged organisation, the UCCJ Constitution is unambiguous about the authority 
it finds in the God of Christianity: 
God, summoning from every land and people those whom, in Christ, it pleases 
Him to call, consecrates these people and reveals to them His grace and truth, 
bestowing upon them the fellowship of the Holy Spirit.  This, then, is the holy 
catholic Church.18 
The Constitution and its companion documents, the Confession of Faith and Guidelines 
for Christian Living, are silent on the subject of interfaith dialogue, but the language in 
each is unwaveringly self-sufficient; a fact that may not jeopardise religious co-existence 
but, if taken seriously, could stand in the way of more meaningful exchange.  Indeed, 
such doctrine can be read to suggest that the embrace of religious pluralism and interfaith 
dialogue would necessarily rely on some form of “sameness universalism,” whereby the 
in-principle equality of other faiths is recognised, but without the obligation to open-up to 
their possible influence – particularly influence seen as challenging to existing doctrine.19  
One might speculate that, in practice, the UCCJ is less rigid than its doctrine, and that 
congregational latitude is likely and tolerated.  However, a 2008 disciplinary case, in 
which the UCCJ – prevailing over lay and clerical pleas for greater charity – admonished 
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and eventually dismissed a local minister for administering the sacrament of communion 
to unbaptised worshippers, provides evidence that doctrinal exclusivity is real, and 
enforcement is strong.20  In the confident espousal of represented, metaphysical ‘truth’, to 
the exclusion of other interpretations, there is, arguably, a sense of clinging or grasping 
that is antithetical to both Buddhist sunyata and Christian kenosis.  Found therein are 
barriers to the metaphor of church building as interfaith bridge. 
It is not only the client, however, presenting such barriers.  In certain ways, Ando 
does as well.  Indeed, there is a part of Ando’s thinking that seems to impact the 
situation’s kenotic potentiality, well before the conception of a building.  Acknowledging 
that “religion is a very difficult issue for me,”21 Ando’s self-described approach to religion 
reveals what I consider to be two noteworthy biases.  Although perhaps predictable, 
understandable, and benign, they are nonetheless barriers to kenosis.  They manifest in 
Ando’s inclination toward Buddhist-inspired thought,22 and in his disinclination toward 
liturgy.  The latter is discussed in the next section of this chapter, but the former I discuss 
here, beginning with Ando’s view of nature, God, and where God supposedly exists: 
God (kamisama), to the Japanese, exists in nature.  I do not know whether this 
would be an acceptable view in Christianity or not.  Many people think that god 
exists outside the self.  But, a god who exists in nature is also in one’s mind 
(kokoro).  In this sense, my intention in church architecture is to lead one to the 
awakening of the mind as the locus of god.  God does not exist in the church 
itself, but the architecture rekindles the callous mind from the everyday life into the 
locus of god.23 
Additional insight comes as Ando compares his churches to those of Rudolf 
Schwarz and Sigurd Lewerentz.  “I believe that God exists inside one’s self and my 
churches reflect this, while I think Schwarz and Lewerentz each intended to create a 
church as the domus of God.”24  Marking a similar distinction, Ando sees Kenzo Tange’s 
well-known St Mary’s Cathedral, in Tokyo, as being “Western,” insofar as it “expresses 
the moment of moving toward heaven, symbolising heaven as the locus of God.”25  
Perhaps Ando’s assessments stem from his basic view of nature, which is, according to 
Kenneth Frampton, “oriented towards an ineffable manifestation, bordering on the 
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animistic.”  Or perhaps they are grounded in what Frampton describes as Ando’s “basic 
concept of creating introspective microcosms to stand against the urban chaos of the late 
modern world.”26  Indeed, Ando seems to confirm the latter suggestion, saying, “In our 
contemporary culture, where all of us are subjected to intense exterior stimulation, 
especially by the electronic environment, the role of architectural space as a spiritual 
shelter is crucial.”27  Notwithstanding their sincerity and merit, Ando’s views find him 
aligned with two aspects of Buddhist thought that most separate it from Christianity.  First, 
his view of nature sits comfortably alongside the absence, in Buddhism, of theism and all 
centricisms, especially anthropocentrism; an absence that allows the suchness of 
everything to be realised.  But this is in contrast to a theocentric, christocentric, and 
historically anthropocentric Christianity, which, even while acknowledging the immanence 
of God in nature, first sees nature as evidence of God’s exclusive power to create it – 
originally from somewhere outside itself – and to cause its ongoing existence.  Second, 
Ando’s view of God is in accord with Buddhism’s rejection of “the notions of a 
transcendent ruler of the universe or of a savior outside one’s self,” but it is in sharp 
contrast to Christianity’s emphatic embrace of precisely those notions.28  (In separate 
comments, Ando curiously seems to deny this fundamental difference, saying that 
Christianity and Buddhism “are similar in that Sakyamuni [Buddha] and Jesus are each 
presented as the paradigmatic representative of humanity and as savior.”29  But that 
paints only part of the picture.  In Buddhism, Sakyamuni is actually quite unlike the 
human-but-divine Jesus, since Sakyamuni is presented as “none other than a person 
who awakens to the … truth,” and the salvation he presents is not purported to derive 
from any supernatural existence.30) 
Another of Ando’s interpretations is similarly askew with Christianity, that being his 
view of where God is to be ‘found’.  As seen, he does not consider God existing in the 
church itself, by which he could mean in the worship space, in the people who comprise 
the church (skenosis), or in the architectural fabric of the building.  Regardless of which 
meaning is intended, his premise is difficult to reconcile with the Christian belief that 
arises from the well-known words attributed to Christ: “For where two or three are 
gathered in my name, I am there among them” (Matt 18:20, NRSV).  Christianity posits 
that the second hypostasis of a triune God is ‘present’ (albeit not in a single, identifiable 
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body) whenever two or more Christians gather; meaning, amongst other possibilities, that 
when Christians gather together for worship, God is present in their midst and, therefore, 
in the church’s worship space.  Furthermore, the apostle Paul adds, “Now you are the 
body of Christ and individually members of it” (1 Cor 12:27, NRSV).  Although usually 
interpreted as referring to a mystical body, Paul nonetheless names a presence of Christ 
in the people who constitute the church, and, by extension, also in the places they 
occupy.  Presence in a building’s architectural fabric, however, is only implied – by virtue 
of a church building’s consecration, or dedication, for use by the people in whom Christ is 
said to be present. 
For Ando, the church building is where “one goes … to search for god,”31 and, 
since he also believes that the locus of God is in one’s mind, the church is a place for 
introspection, a place at which to search for God within one’s self – a search perhaps 
nurtured by architecture.  While Christianity recognises each individual ‘self’ as a part of 
the body of Christ, it is in communal celebration, when the parts are joined together, that 
the body is made whole.  While Christianity proclaims Christ’s presence in and amongst 
the people of the church, such presence occurs when an individual is gathered with at 
least one other.  And while Christianity includes acts of individual piety, such acts are 
seen as an extension of communal worship, not in lieu of or in isolation.  Hence, while 
Christianity certainly includes self-examination, such is more an assessment of one’s 
faithfulness than it is a search for God within (notwithstanding the striving for godliness 
that faith demands).  Indeed, the interpretation of Christianity espoused by the UCCJ 
finds that “God chooses us by His grace,” and that “the Holy Bible is the Word of God, 
which gives us full knowledge of God and salvation, and is the unerring standard of faith 
and life.”32  So, contrary to Ando’s vision of humankind in search of God, his client 
portrays God in search of humankind – or as already having found those “it pleases Him 
to call” – with any need for the converse made superfluous by the definitive information 
already available in the biblical texts. 
 
Ando’s desire to build an architectural bridge between Buddhism and Christianity 
– a significant aspect of this situation’s potentiality – is neither unfounded nor 
unfathomable, since many of the requisite theological and cultural bridges have been and 
continue to be built.  His views of religion and philosophy, however, from which he effects 
such a construct, are often quite dissimilar to those espoused by his client.  It is difficult to 
conclude that, in commissioning the Church of the Light, the UCCJ aspired to the level of 
religio-philosophical influence that is suggested by its positioning within Nishida’s legacy, 
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 "Confession of Faith,"  (The United Church of Christ in Japan, 1954). 
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or to the level of interfaith ‘bridging’ to which Ando is committed.  Nevertheless, it is 
apparent that those with design approval authority were, at the time, accepting of Ando’s 
proposals.  Ironically, that acceptance has proven to evangelise the project’s architecture 
and architect to a far greater extent than it has their own evangelism.33  Although 
contemporary Christianity sees church primarily as people, and only secondarily as 
buildings, the wholeness (if not the holiness) of church comes in the hybridisation of the 
two – the opening-up of one to the other.  Ando’s church building, however, says much 
about its own character but little about the character and practices of those for whom it 
was created.  The building’s reductive modernity, simplicity, and emptiness could 
reasonably be expected to herald progressive Christian teaching; teaching that perhaps 
makes-room for interfaith sensibilities and other world views.  But such appears not to be 
the case.  Faithfulness to denominational doctrine constricts the building’s spatial 
emptiness as a means to fully open-up and gather-in what the others of the world might 
open-up and pour-out in mutual exchange.  Looking beyond architectural ascriptions and 
the irony of Japanese Christianity’s missionary origins – effected only by the willingness 
of Japan (and other countries) to make-room for Christianity – the kenosis and therefore 
the cosmopolitanism of the situation of the Church of the Light is largely a latent promise; 
perhaps never being more than Ando’s hope, unrealised in the actuality of the church’s 
whole.34 
Receptivity 
Accepting that the situation of the Church of the Light has, at the global scale, inherent 
kenotic potential – albeit compromised in various ways by client and architect – it is then 
necessarily important to shift to the local scale and explore the extent to which the church 
building instantiates kenosis through the experience it affords.  In question is the 
building’s openness and hospitality – its receptivity – not so much to users, but to the use 
for which it is intended; the latter being the ultimate expression of hospitality that can be 
extended to users.  What is the building’s capacity to receive, accommodate, and amplify 
the kenosis occasioned in Christian worship – that is, in liturgy?35  It is often suggested 
that liturgy can take place in almost any setting because liturgy is primarily action; that 
liturgy can overcome unsympathetic architectural conditions.  Indeed, a building can host 
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 Owing primarily to the large numbers of people wishing to see the architecture, the church has been forced 
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worship activities without necessarily being especially kenotic or receptive to kenotic 
events.  But in the case of a building dedicated solely to the action of liturgy, much more 
can be reasonably expected.  Indeed, such a building might be expected to be 
particularly attentive to what happens in Christian worship; in the symbology and practice 
of liturgy.  Because liturgy’s purpose is to celebrate the mystery of kenosis, attentiveness 
to liturgy is attentiveness to kenosis, and such attentiveness is manifestly important to 
‘church’ – seen both as people and building. 
Church and Liturgy 
In his analysis, Baek refers to Ando’s worship space, interchangeably, as ‘church’ or 
‘chapel’, perhaps tempted to deploy the latter term because of the building’s relatively 
modest scale and seating capacity.  The terms are not, however, synonymous; the 
distinction is not merely a matter of size; and the practical consequences are not 
insignificant, especially as related to liturgy.  Manifested in built form, a church is “an 
edifice for public Christian worship,” whereas a chapel is “a private or subordinate place 
of prayer or worship.”36  The worship space at the Church of the Light is neither private 
nor subordinate to another space.  Its primary purpose, then – regardless of size or 
seating capacity – is liturgy, defined as “a form of public worship; a ritual.”37  As a church 
building, it has specific liturgical duties; the foremost to accommodate public worship with 
architecture that can functionally and aesthetically sustain – and ideally enhance – events 
of prescribed liturgy.  The same expectations would not apply if were it a chapel, thus 
intended primarily for private (and often spontaneous) prayer or meditation by individuals 
and small groups.  This is not to say that a church might not be used for private prayer 
and meditation, and accommodate those activities well.  Nor is it to say that a chapel 
might not be used for small liturgies.  It is merely to say that liturgy is not the primary 
purpose at a chapel in the same way that it is at a church.  Hence, church and chapel 
present different criteria by which their architecture is to be assessed, and the Church of 
the Light must be judged on the basis of its primary purpose; namely, as a church in 
which to conduct the liturgies of public Christian worship, particularly those of the UCCJ.   
It is in this regard that a second of Ando’s biases is revealed (the first having been 
discussed in the previous section of this chapter).  In addition to his inclination toward 
Buddhist-inspired thought, Ando betrays a disinclination toward liturgy.  The joining of the 
latter with the former importantly prefigures his design for the Church of the Light and the 
reception it offers to liturgy.  In Ando’s view: 
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Both Christianity and Buddhism put emphasis on ritual and liturgy.  But, I doubt 
whether they are still spiritually powerful.  What we need at this point is not 
repetition of ritual and liturgy, but a place of spirituality.  Once we have this place, 
we might have a qualitatively different experience in performing ritual.38   
Ando’s aspiration for a worthy place of spirituality, and for the enhancement of the 
experience that might accrue in such a place, is commendable and likely to be shared by 
most ecclesiastical clients (even accounting for widely-varying interpretations of 
‘spirituality’).  Of concern here – in light of Ando’s charge to design a place for Christian 
liturgy – are his misgivings toward liturgy, the potency of liturgy’s contemporary spiritual 
power, and the essentiality of liturgy’s repetition.  Given various indications of decline in 
mainstream Christian churches (often citing attendance), a case could be made for 
liturgy’s diminishing influence.  But the measure of its full power would have to include 
humanity’s instinctive attraction to liturgy and para-liturgy, whether or not of the religious 
kind.  Such attraction is seen on many occasions of great import – whether tragic or 
festive, organised or spontaneous – including the milestones of life, natural and humanly-
caused disasters, and the openings and closings of major events.  In many parts of the 
world, there is surprising interest in the liturgies of Christmas and Easter amongst non-
Christian populations.  Hence, while the contemporary power of liturgy may sometimes 
appear dormant, it would be premature to suggest or predict its demise.   
Regardless of its adjudged power, repeated liturgy is the essential activity of the 
church.  Indeed, the UCCJ “understands its true purpose to be the carrying out of the 
functions of the catholic Church … the accomplishment of which is the mission for which 
it exists,” and it defines those functions to be the conduct of public worship on every 
Sunday – including proclamation of the gospel through hymns, scripture readings, 
sermon and prayers – and the administration of the sacraments, comprising baptism and 
communion.39  Ando’s client sees its very identity in the repetition of liturgy.  Ando, 
however, suggests that such repetition is unnecessary or at least subordinate to the 
promise of architecture.  In Ando’s view, architecture can rescue liturgy from what he 
sees as its ineffectualness.  Thus he proposes a relational union predicated on one 
changing the other; that is, architecture changing liturgy so as to effect a liturgical 
experience presumed superior by virtue of the architectural environment.  It is anything 
but a kenotic proposal.  Certainly, architecture and the experience of its perception can 
prompt a perceiver’s fascination or awe, but not with any guarantee of profundity or 
longevity.  Spiritual power germinates in what happens at a place – often in what 
happens repeatedly – and gestates in the memories of those happenings.  (This is true 
not only in religious places but across a wide range of human institutions.)  When a 
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building offers open and receptive hospitality to the happenings and their 
memorialisation, it becomes the placed materiality of memory.40  When those who hold 
the memories are reciprocally open and receptive to the hospitable building, aspects of 
spirituality may be achieved.  The ‘spiritual’ approaches contingently in the repetition of 
liturgies, in the memories thereof, in architecture’s hospitality to both, and in the 
relationality thereby established.  When architecture empties and opens-up to the 
otherness of liturgy, and liturgy does likewise to the otherness of architecture, it is 
possible to see realised that which Ando calls a “qualitatively different experience of 
liturgy.” 
Christian liturgy – not limited to but most frequently found in Sunday public 
worship – is a celebration of reciprocal kenosis; the divine and human in relational union.  
Such celebration is intended to mark the self-offering of the Father in the incarnation and 
the self-offering response of the Son in his passion.  But it also calls, through the Spirit, 
for the faithful to respond with their own self-offering, so as to join an extension of divine 
perichoresis.  The latter is seen not “as something that we do, but as something that 
happens to us, that lifts us out of ourselves and transports us, however fleetingly, to a 
place of supreme fulfilment …”41  As such, liturgy is intended neither as personal piety nor 
individual meditation (though both, conducted on other occasions, can be nurturing to 
liturgy), but as a self-transcendent, relational, and communal celebration of kenosis.  
Clearly then, Christian liturgy presents something quite different to introspection, even 
though elements of introspection may be part of liturgy.  That difference points to a further 
difficulty in syncretising Christianity and Buddhism, particularly if intending to do so by 
deploying Christian liturgical architecture. 
The philosophy of the Kyoto School relates kenosis to sunyata by way of defining 
the latter as ‘selflessness’ or ‘non-ego’ (anātman).  Christian scholars, including Balthasar 
and modern mystic Thomas Merton (1915-1968), acknowledge the importance and 
applicability of that definition in Christian meditation and contemplation.  But they also 
point to the “vital difference between a kenotic buddhology that is based on an act of self-
negation in the locus of nothingness, and a kenotic christology centred on the 
sacramental life of the church community,”42 as observed in liturgy.  In Christianity, the 
event of the cross is the mystery of kenosis, liturgised in the sacrament of communion 
and seen as Christ’s ongoing kenosis.43  Such historical and eschatological dimensions of 
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kenosis are not found in Buddhism.44  Although Baek recognises this difference, he is 
less interested in “whether this notion of self-emptying by Nishida conforms to 
Christianity” than he is in the “hermeneutic openings it has brought to [Nishida’s] 
understanding of Christianity.”45  Notwithstanding the value of the latter pursuit, the 
degree of correspondence in Nishidan philosophy and Christianity is critically important 
when evaluating architecture for Christian liturgy that is purported to be significantly 
influenced by that philosophy.  As discussed, such architecture can reasonably be 
expected to honour, foremost, its identity as a Christian church.  Then – if the 
commissioning church body assumes a kenotic posture – the exploration of hermeneutic 
openings may well hold the potential for mutual exchange between Christianity and its 
others, including that which architecture might aid.  But architecture alone, no matter what 
philosophy is embraced by its architect or with which it is imbued, cannot effect the 
hermeneutics necessary to change entrenched doctrines and practices.  Ironically, in the 
case of a church, such change – such kenosis – is more likely to be effected by quality 
liturgy, which architecture can be designed to effect. 
Liturgy, Symbology, and Architecture 
At the Church of the Light, Ando’s ‘reduction’ initially appears successful in architecturally 
syncretising Buddhism and Christianity: a space of nothingness evoking sunyata, and, 
central on its front wall, the symbol of the cross, deployed as a monumental incision 
admitting natural light (see fig. 5.1).  Attributing the stark simplicity to “Ando’s anti-
semiotic attitude” toward Christian architecture,46 Baek describes the survival of the cross 
in an otherwise thorough ridding of things religious: 
The fact that this cross, along with the displaced altar, is left in the church first 
indicates that the cross must survive the process of emptying the space, even as 
other icons, figures, and images are purged.  This characterizes … the 
fundamental difference between the cross as the universal Christian symbol and 
other figurative icons or images.47 
Although the symbol of the cross far predates Christianity and arose only gradually in its 
early celebrations, the cross and Christianity are now categorically linked, with the cross 
seen as “the primordial emblem shaping the [Christian] community.”48  But primordiality, 
universality, and centrality, do not establish the cross as a complete symbol, or as the 
only essential symbol in Christian liturgy. 
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FIGURE 5.1 
View toward chancel, unoccupied (2006) 
(Photo: Naoya Fujii) 
 
Primal Symbols 
In the full conveyance of the event of the cross – the mystery of kenosis – Christianity 
relies on a collection of primal symbols.  According to Baek, the symbols, icons, figures, 
and images that Ando purges are those that link to antecedent ‘prototypes’ and therefore 
become figurative re-presentations.  Certainly, such a distinction pertains to secondary 
symbols, for example, the chalice and paten re-presenting their prototype cup and dish 
from the Last Supper.  It also pertains to elements such as icons, paintings, and statues, 
which usually re-present some prototypical image of an important religious figure.  But it 
is not a distinction that can be applied to Christianity’s primal symbols.  Light, bread and 
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wine, word (or wisdom), water, oil, and assembly (or community) do not depict 
prototypes, and it is exactly that attribute which marks their power to evoke manifold 
layers of meaning and transcend figuration – to be symbols.  They are, in concert with the 
cross, the primal symbols of Christian liturgy, used to celebrate kenosis.  Ironically, 
amongst these primal symbols, it is only the cross that has a prototype – an ancient 
instrument of execution – and therefore the potential to be made figurative.  Left at that, 
the cross has little meaning, but seen as part of the event of the cross, in which it 
becomes intrinsically connected to the other primal symbols, it transcends its prototype 
and is thus able to be a symbol. 
Ando’s almost exclusive attention to the cross may seem prudent insofar as it can 
be said that the other primal symbols are already embedded in the cross.  But, equally 
important – and challenging to that prudence – such embeddedness does not equate to 
subordination, because the cross is likewise embedded in each of the other primal 
symbols.  Water, for example, is used in baptism to symbolise not only mystical cleansing 
but a ‘sharing’ of the event of the cross.49  Just as Christianity is defined by the cross, 
Christians are defined by the water of baptism and their willingness, as the baptised, to 
receive and open-up to their own ‘crosses’.  The symbol of water points to the cross and 
already holds it (a relationship Ando deftly manifests at the Church on the Water, where a 
monumental steel cross rises out of a large reflecting pool).  Indeed, the cross and all of 
the other primal symbols are similarly interdependent.  None can replace or be replaced 
by the cross.  Furthermore, the primal Christian symbols – notably excepting the cross – 
transcend Christianity and have meaning for all of humanity, regardless of religious views 
or affiliations.  It is therefore not the cross but the other primal symbols that offer the 
greatest potential to bridge Buddhism and Christianity, as Ando aspires to do.  In their 
embodiment of kenosis, they present the potential of relational union and, in so doing, 
transcend faith traditions and perhaps all categories of opposition.  They point toward 
what has been called Christianity’s “nonreligious destiny.”50  Yet, at the Church of the 
Light, these other symbols are largely neglected. 
Liturgical Places 
Christian liturgy invites architecture to join it in a kenotic relationship of respect, 
challenge, and mutual influence.  Important to the architect and architecture, such a 
relationship requires more than the creation of an ambiguous liturgical setting in which 
selected symbols are treated as props on a stage.  It requires heightened attentiveness to 
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liturgy’s potential and the consequent provision of liturgical places to honour each of the 
primal symbols; places that accommodate their respective furnishings and actions, and 
facilitate participant movement from one to another.  Important to the liturgist and liturgy, 
the relationship requires heightened attentiveness to architecture’s capacity for liturgical 
enhancement and a willingness to let-go of practices evolving from expediency and habit 
so as to focus, instead, on the potentiality of the rites conducted at each place.  In short, 
the relationship demands mutual awareness of the hermeneutic openings in each 
discipline that might strengthen understanding, spatial realisation, and practice – and, as 
a result, invite the approach of spirituality.  It is a relationship left significantly unfulfilled at 
the Church of the Light.  Ando’s space of nothingness contains only two major liturgical 
places: that of the assembly, and that of the chancel.  The latter prioritises only one of 
Christianity’s primal symbols and collaborates in Ando’s diminishment of the others.  
Although liturgy ‘saves’ the other primal symbols – insisting on their survival in some form 
– the architecture’s minimalism nonetheless succeeds in overpowering all that might 
compete with the architecture of space and cross.  Unnecessarily, there is more of 
contest than relationality.51 
The separation of liturgy into performance and observation (or, chancel and 
assembly, stage and audience) grows out of an historic and still evolving dynamic in 
which it is not uncommon to find the ministers (ordained or lay) thought of as those who 
perform the rituals, and the congregation as those who observe and receive the 
supposed benefits of the performance (but who actually comprise a primal symbol).  That 
Ando did not undertake to challenge this enduring subject-object relationship – and 
include its manifestations in his purge – marks a significant missed opportunity to 
concretise the kenotic relationship of liturgy and architecture.  Perhaps it can be 
explained, however, by the UCCJ’s prescriptive and hierarchical culture,52 wherein 
consideration of a more egalitarian liturgical setting may not have been ponderable.  
Baek alludes to such tension, noting that Ando’s focus on “the sense of emptiness as the 
paramount leitmotif of the church” was accompanied by his “grappling with the demands 
and forces of particularization.”53  Yet, in terms that name few particularities, Ando is 
portrayed as merely taking the archetypal space of emptiness (already employed in his 
design for the Azuma house) and then “installing the cross, the pews, the altar, and the 
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pulpit, and bestowing importance upon the front wall as the backdrop for the performance 
of the codified Protestant liturgy of the [UCCJ].”54  Such a description suggests that the 
architectural needs of liturgy amount to little more than one symbol and a few items of 
furniture.  It reinforces the notion of liturgy as performance, and thereby implies that the 
metaphor of stage and audience is appropriate.  And it sees the front wall as a vestige of 
the reredos – the screen or wall behind and above an eastward altar – made largely 
obsolete, though not extinct, by free-standing altar-tables and celebrants in westward 
posture,55 both longstanding Protestant norms.56  The bifurcation of space and 
participants, the self-important backdrop, and the marginalisation of other primal symbols 
can thus be seen to evidence a tension between architecture and liturgy, one that is 
neither creative nor kenotic. 
At the Church of the Light, it is the chancel on which almost all liturgical action is 
staged – congregational responsories being the obvious exception.  In addition to seats 
for the liturgists, the chancel includes: (1) a reading-table (pulpit, lectern, or ambo) that 
holds the symbol of word, (2) an altar-table that presents the symbols of bread and wine 
for the sacrament of communion, and water for the sacrament of baptism, and (3) behind 
the chancel, the incised and glazed cruciform that simultaneously presents the symbols 
of cross and light.  Amongst these, only the cross is given permanence of place.  
Although the positioning of the other two furnishings – and, with them, the primal symbols 
they hold – is of Ando’s determination, they are ultimately susceptible to relocation, 
interchange, and replacement by future liturgists.  Such is the case because, although 
they are placed on the chancel, a place is not made for them that convincingly defines 
their identity and the liturgical action they facilitate.  Yet, in their marking of the mystery of 
kenosis, the cross and other primal symbols are equally essential and permanent.  Each 
deserves closer examination. 
Place of the Cross 
Ando’s zeal for the cross not only results in its exclusive pride of place but also in 
its magnification to monumental scale.  Monumentality, however, is not an originating 
characteristic of the cross as a symbol.  Although other primal symbols were used in the 
rituals of the early and largely domestic Roman churches,57 the cross emerged slowly 
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and tentatively.  It appeared for processional use – small and portable – in the fourth 
century,58 “leading the community into their gathering place” and then “prominently 
positioned for the rest of the ritual action.”59  The cross was thus given a place of honour 
but as a means to focus attention on the action taking place before it.  In the Middle Ages, 
with ritual action becoming the purview of the clergy, and processions of the assembly 
becoming infrequent, the processional cross came to be replaced by a larger and fixed 
cross or crucifix, positioned alternatively on the altar, above the celebrant’s head, or at 
the centre of the reredos.  The most monumental symbols of the cross were spawned by 
the Catholic Counter Reformation.60  In some churches of that time, the cross came to be 
“enormous, dwarfing the very altar it was meant to embellish.”61  Ando’s cross can be 
seen in the modern lineage of that development and, arguably, in the same relationship 
with its companion altar-table. 
Since the cross spans the full height and width of the church’s front wall, its leg 
extends to, or emanates from, the lowest elevation, which is the floor of the chancel.  It 
can therefore be said that the cross “anchors its body at the low end of the chapel” and 
“actualizes humility.”62  But it is not to remain in a humbled state. 
The cross becomes increasingly towering and prominent as one descends into 
the cavernous space that engulfs all other material and superficial signs.  One’s 
descending is thus his or her humbling, and, when the journey is done, the cross 
that symbolized the modesty of the Word God by standing at the lowest point of 
the church has already been transformed into that of the highest loftiness.63 
So it is that the cross is cast as a dynamic embodiment of kenosis.  It takes an initially 
humble position in order to reflect the posture of the incarnated God, but, then, by virtue 
of a perceiver’s descending “journey” through the stepped seating, the added perspective 
of a third vanishing point is meant to increase its verticality and prominence.  It is, 
however, a phenomenon difficult to appreciate, because the entire height of the cross is 
seen from the moment of entry and during any part of the descent that one might 
experience.  The potential for this transformation of the cross – from humility to glory – is 
largely reliant on a modest vertical change in the perceiver’s viewing position, and that 
change is effected only to the extent that one actually descends (either to find a seat or to 
participate in a ritual at the chancel).  In fact, the cross is little changed regardless of 
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viewing position.  The kenotic allegory, if intended as described, could be achieved with 
greater effect by deploying other expressions of design.  For example, this cross of light 
could – instead of taking the most prominent position – take the church’s most ‘humble’ 
position, opposite the chancel, on the back wall.  There, it would figure prominently on 
arrival and entry – invoking the original role of the cross to gather-in the assembly.  By 
virtue of this withdrawn position, it would yield to the other primal symbols during worship, 
but finally return to prominence during the recessional; becoming the last symbol seen by 
the assembly as it leaves and takes up the (kenotic) call to serve others.  Thus, in a 
journey that the entire assembly takes on every occasion, an even more dynamic 
transformation of the cross could be experienced; one that more fully marks the absence 
and presence – the emptying and filling – of kenosis. 
Putting aside issues of scale, another major attribute of the cross is the brightness 
and intensity of the natural light it admits.  In almost evangelistic terms, Baek equates its 
admission of light with “the love of Jesus Christ filling the hearts of the believers,” and 
describes an almost aggressive effect, whereby “one is penetrated by the phenomenal 
light” and “the penetrating light crushes our ego self.”64  Notwithstanding the possibility of 
such effect for some perceivers on some occasions, and not discounting its 
spectacularity, this phenomenal light has another effect, one that significantly influences 
the liturgical experience at this church.  Intense light, introduced through a narrow incision 
into an otherwise intentionally dark space, results in pupillary constriction and heightened 
contrast.  In turn, the dark timber chancel furnishings – placed on an equally dark timber 
floor and set against only marginally lighter concrete walls – are almost fully obscured on 
entry to the space.  Indeed, they remain silhouetted throughout a service, even after 
gradual but never sufficient pupillary dilation (see fig. 5.2).  While it may be that the cross 
of light operates at many levels of encounter and dramatic effect, and “gives existence to 
the spatial emptiness,”65 it does so at significant cost to the other essential and primal 
symbols of Christianity – those on which liturgy equally relies. 
Places of Bread and Wine, Word  
Most affected by the intensity of light emanating from the cross are the chancel’s 
two tables, the primal symbols they present, and the liturgical action associated with 
each.  Not only are the tables and their small symbolic objects obscured in darkness, so 
are the gestures and facial expressions of the liturgists.  The visibility of such gestures 
and expressions are central to the sacrament of communion and the proclamation of 
word, and those rites are central to UCCJ liturgy, the accommodation of which is a 
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mandatory ‘particularisation’ of the project.  Indeed, the monumental cross and spatial 
emptiness are co-conspirators against the successful particularisation of the liturgy’s full 
and multi-layered celebration of kenosis.  Citing an idea of Christian theologian and 
philosopher Paul Tillich (1886-1965) that emptiness is a “condition for the return of God” 
and therefore an essential identity of church, Baek observes that Ando’s bold cross “is 
not just placed within the church as an additional installation to offer a religious identity to 
an otherwise unidentifiable space of emptiness; it constitutes itself as the other essential 
element of the church, displacing the altar-table to the side.”66  Thus, any ‘competition’ 
between the symbol of the cross and those of communion (bread and wine on altar-table) 
is clearly resolved in favour of the cross.  And, when cross is conjoined with emptiness, 
the two supposedly represent all that is required to define the essence of church. 
 
 
FIGURE 5.2  
View toward chancel, occupied. 
(Photo: Tadao Ando Architect & Associates) 
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However, as discussed earlier, there is no competition between the cross and 
other primal symbols and, hence, no need for competitive resolution.  Indeed, the very 
notion of subordinating the altar-table and its symbols contradicts both the concept of 
Christian kenosis and the Buddhist rejection of dominant-subordinate relationships.67  But 
if subordination of the altar-table was Ando’s goal, it is better achieved by obscuration in 
darkness than by displacement.  In fact, the positioning of the altar-table, on the left side 
of the centre aisle and centreline of the cross, mirrors the position of the reading-table 
(with symbol of word), on the right side.  The two tables are thus twinned in a symmetrical 
arrangement about the church’s longitudinal axis.  Together, they occupy the same 
central position in front of the cross, where, in some traditions, the altar-table might be 
found alone.  In this case, horizontal displacement – off of centre, but very centre-related 
– merely results in the counterbalancing of word and communion, a notion that is not at 
all unusual in Protestant (and many other Christian) worship spaces.  Displacement, 
however, is not limited to the horizontal.  It also occurs vertically, by way of a stepped 
assembly floor that culminates with the chancel at the lowest elevation.  From Ando’s 
point of view, any prominent placement of altar-table and reading-table is associated with 
Western church architecture, and that is something to be avoided at a church intent on 
bridging East and West traditions.68  Yet, at the Church of the Light, such prominence is 
actually not avoided, since the chancel and its two symmetrically placed tables are at the 
natural focal point of the stepped arrangement.  Furthermore, such a configuration is 
common in Western church architecture – particularly for Protestant denominations – its 
antecedents found in facilities such as theatres, concert halls, and lecture venues.  It is a 
particularly suitable arrangement for Protestant liturgies, wherein the focus – often for 
long periods of time – is on preaching and teaching, which demands effective lines of 
sight and sound. 
Ando describes his use of the stepped configuration as a means to acknowledge 
the “humbleness of God” and to “equalize the eye levels of the believer and the pastor,” 
because the “Supreme Being is with us, not only with the pastor.”69  Such intent is 
problematic, however, because in most applications, the stepped configuration is used 
not to diminish but to elevate the importance and authority – even superiority – of those 
who occupy the lowest elevation: the actors, performers, lecturers, ministers, liturgists, 
and other presenters, who have something to offer to those who have come to witness 
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their presentation.  Nonetheless, Ando defends his schema, saying, “I wish to stress the 
dimension of sharing, not the authoritative aspect of the church as institution.”70  But that 
defence is also problematic, in that the altar-table he seeks to subdue is not a symbol of 
church authority.  To the contrary, it is the embodiment of communal sharing.  Although 
the altar was historically the domain of the priest, and could therefore have been seen as 
a symbol of ecclesial authority, modern theological development and liturgical reforms – 
both in Protestantism, since the Reformation, and in Catholicism, since Vatican Council II 
– see the altar-table marking the place where, if not physically then at least symbolically, 
the whole ‘community’ gathers-around to share bread and wine in communion (albeit a 
members-only community in many traditions, including the UCCJ).  Although the ritual 
may be presided over by a minister, the activity is seen to be corporate71; one of mutual 
sharing rather than one characterised by a server-served, dominant-subordinate 
relationship.  Hence, Ando’s striving to diminish the altar-table – intentionally by 
displacement and depression, perhaps unintentionally by obscuration – only serves to 
diminish the notion of sharing that he wishes to elevate.  Arguably, it thereby weakens the 
very bridge he seeks to build between Buddhism and Christianity; a bridge whose 
promise rests in the shared embrace of kenotic thinking. 
Places of Water, Oil 
Essential to the Christian’s full celebration of kenosis is the primal symbol of 
water.  At the Church of the Light, the symbol of water is placed at the chancel.  Actually, 
the chancel does not provide a place for water, but a vestige of the symbol in the form of 
its container72 – a relatively small and shallow glass bowl, sitting atop the altar-table (see 
fig. 5.3).  On the occasion of worship that I attended, the bowl remained empty and dry, 
presumably to be filled when the sacrament of baptism is being observed.  Without water, 
the bowl is merely the sign of a transient symbol.  The church is thereby denied any 
ongoing reminder of baptism’s essential role in Christian initiation.  Even filled with water, 
the size and scale of the bowl is such that it is of little relative significance, especially 
juxtaposed against the cross.  Furthermore, its placement on the altar-table confuses its 
unique meaning and diminishes its importance.  In that location, the water of baptism is 
presented alongside the symbols of an entirely different rite – the bread and wine of 
communion – suggesting that the altar-table must therefore be some sort of multi-
purpose fitting.  And, like the communion symbols, the water falls into the same darkness 
as that to which the entire altar-table, and anything atop it, is inevitably relegated. 
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FIGURE 5.3 
View toward assembly (2013). 
 
Water, like the other primal symbols, cannot be purged from liturgy or liturgical 
space, and will survive any architectural attempt at reduction because it must.  It warrants 
the same architectural hospitality as that extended to the cross.  Particularly curious is 
that Ando clearly understands the significance of water’s abstraction – in its “strange 
power to stimulate the imagination and to make us aware of life’s possibilities,” and in 
“the profound relationship between water and human spirit.”73  Yet, here, in a Christian 
context that celebrates exactly that abstraction, the symbol of water is not granted an 
identifiable place.  It therefore languishes in the ambiguity of inconsistent presence, 
minimal scale, residual space, and the obscurity of darkness.  Not only obscure but 
absent from view is the symbol of oil (chrism).  As another symbol of initiation, oil is often 
a companion to water, used at confirmation and baptism but also reserved for anointing 
(as in ordinations) and rituals of healing.  In Roman Catholicism and some Protestant 
denominations, oil is gaining a more visible presence as a symbol of the church’s 
preparedness to welcome new members.  But, in more evangelical settings, it tends to 
remain an occasional and discreet liturgical guest, if used at all.  Its apparent absence at 
the Church of the Light is, therefore, neither surprising nor necessarily subject to 
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criticism.74  Nonetheless, oil merits mention for its place in the mystery of kenosis and, 
consequently, its potential when placed in liturgy and liturgical environments. 
Place of the Assembly 
In its marking of Christian initiation and the oneness of the baptised, water points 
toward another essential liturgical symbol: the church assembled and seen as the ‘body 
of Christ’.  The assembly is an oft-forgotten symbol of Christianity, but liturgy and its 
celebration of reciprocal kenosis cannot occur without it.75  Although a relationship with 
the divine can be expressed privately and individually, an individual’s reciprocal response 
to divine kenosis is demonstrated through self-emptying and openness to other human 
beings – and that requires an assembly of at least two (as does the promise of Christ’s 
presence).  Since the assembly is comprised of liturgy’s essential participants, it is not 
merely an audience for clergy-enacted rituals at the chancel.  Hence, its placement, 
configuration, and relationship to the other co-originating symbols are critically important.  
Liturgy and the liturgical environment offer many opportunities to dismantle the clergy-
assembly divide, foremost by placing the primal symbols at their most effective location 
and avoiding their concentration at a place (such as the chancel) that appears to ‘belong’ 
to the clergy.  For example, the symbol of water can be given its place at the threshold of 
the assembly space or in its midst or nearer to the chancel, but, in any case, it is more 
effectively associated with the baptised, rather than the baptiser.  Similarly, the altar-
table, where communion is to be shared, can be placed in such a way that the assembly 
– at least in sufficient part – is actually seen to ‘gather around’ it, so as to blur any lines of 
territorial demarcation between it and the clergy.  But it is the configuration of the 
gathered assembly, itself, that holds the greatest opportunity to express liturgy’s 
communal nature.  Ando senses that nature but ironically misses the opportunity that it 
presents for his bridge-building – for kenosis.  He relates the Japanese tea room to the 
Church of the Light, observing that both are spaces of nothingness and suggesting they 
have largely similar purposes.  According to Ando, the tea room is a place for “man to 
man” contact.  “It is the space of ma (nothingness) for the encounter between the two 
participants,” in which they think about “matters related to the mind” and are thereby 
afforded an opportunity for “cultivation of the self.”76  He sees the Church of the Light 
similarly: 
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A simple box, into which multifarious manifestations of light are drawn, is adopted 
as the space of encounter.  People come to the church to encounter God and 
fellow believers, or other participants who might be non-believers.  The 
architectural performance of the church is, in this sense, the same as the 
Japanese tea room.  There is nothing there except for the deep awakenings of the 
self, in the minds of the participants.77 
For Ando, the tea room and the church are places at which to encounter the 
‘other’, but the outcome is an experience of ‘self’.  Participants are related by proximity 
and common pursuit; namely, personal introspection.  That relatedness, however, is little 
different to what exists, for example, at theatre performances, at lectures, and on public 
transportation, where participants are related but not necessarily in relationship; certainly 
not in a kenotic relationship that calls one to partially become the other and enter into the 
Christian community.  Ando’s seating arrangement at the Church of the Light exemplifies 
the distinction.  The assembly is seated together but not gathered.  Individuals are 
proximate, but there is little semblance of engagement.  Despite the intimacy of his 
simple box, and its potential for interpersonal relationship, Ando deploys the most 
anonymous of seating arrangements, wherein awareness of one another is limited to the 
profile of those immediately aside and the backs of those immediately in front.  Although 
of longstanding precedence in Christian churches, the arrangement is derived from 
church-appropriated basilicas, and responds to a clergy-focused liturgy.  It is not a 
reflection of progressive Christian thinking.78 
Other aspects of Ando’s treatment of the assembly reveal not symbolic but 
practical inhospitableness to liturgy.  The stepped configuration is, at best, unfriendly and, 
at worst, inaccessible to those with physical limitations.  Although disabled visitors can be 
accommodated in a limited fashion, behind the back row of pews and before the steps 
begin, access to liturgical participation at the chancel – to read the scriptures, to 
contribute musically, to be baptised, or even to make an announcement – is fully 
impeded.  Only extraordinary measures could overcome the barriers; measures that 
would likely call greater attention to the disability.79  But the configuration is problematic 
beyond issues of accessibility.  The omission of side aisles hinders the realisation of full 
seating capacity, restricts liturgical movement, and is unfriendly to visitors who may be 
reticent to disrupt strangers in order to gain seats.  Instead of emptiness, the resulting 
wall-to-wall furniture evokes a sense of fullness (seen earlier in fig. 5.3).  Heightening that 
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sense is an array of ad hoc post-occupancy additions – lights, speakers, and heaters, all 
portable and floor-standing – compensating for the insufficiency of original 
infrastructure.80  Such appurtenances clutter the space and challenge its ‘nothingness’ 
(see fig. 5.4).  And, in another practical injustice, the architectural device meant to 
prevent direct sunlight from entering the side window – and reaching worshippers’ faces – 
fails in its task.  On Sundays in late January, and presumably all other days of similar 
solar trajectory, those seated near the side window are subjected to direct sunlight 
throughout the service and forced to use worship bulletins as eye shades.  Although 
Ando is praised for avoiding “the minimalistic conundrum where the practical matters of 
life are set aside,”81 many aspects of the Church of the Light point to the contrary. 
 
 
FIGURE 5.4 
View toward chancel (2013) 
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Architecture and Church 
The emptiness of Ando’s church building is found to be filled with many self-
contradictions.  His architectural confrontation with Christian symbology, in which he 
attempts to purge all but the cross in the name of emptiness, proves to be a contest with 
liturgy itself, the central and essential purpose of this and any building purporting to be a 
church.  Although Ando is able to purge the church of icons and statues – an act not at all 
new to Protestantism – the primal symbols of liturgy survive, despite diminishment, to 
demonstrate that Christian liturgy is irreducible to one symbol; that the cross symbolises 
an event, which is the mystery of kenosis; and that liturgy, being the celebration of that 
mystery, is multi-layered and demanding of multiple symbols for its full conveyance and 
experience.  Thus, Ando succeeds only in having his cross dominate its companion 
symbols, an outcome that fails his intention to actualise humility.  Indeed, this cross can 
be seen to assume the very posture that Christian kenosis and Buddhist sunyata 
denounce: “the vertical posture in which one would confront, in an overbearing manner, 
the opposite party.”  And, in that posture, the church risks embodying the “haughty, 
dominant and arrogant uprightness”82 that Ando intends to negate. 
The potential for this architecture to evoke spirituality is largely reliant on the cross 
of light in its space of nothingness, a reliance restricted to the realm of the visual (and 
therefore inaccessible to those without sight).  Minimised is the architectural 
accommodation and punctuation of those other primal symbols that, together, invite more 
expansive engagement and offer additional paths to meaning and understanding.  
Liturgy, expressed through all of its primal symbols, is an aesthetic and kenotic 
happening, an “event of the beautiful” that can “both invite and enable” a kenotic 
response.83  At the Church of the Light, an extraordinary awareness of the cross offers 
aesthetic spectacle, but otherwise leaves the fullness of liturgy to emerge from its small 
and obscured co-original symbols.  Fullness of participant response is thereby made 
even more contingent.  The synchronous emptying and filling of kenosis may be 
experienced, but requires the overcoming of missed architectural opportunities.  Here, it 
is not so much that this architecture subverts liturgy; indeed, liturgy of some form occurs 
in the church every week.  Rather, it is that this architecture is inhospitable – unreceptive 
– to the fullness of liturgy’s kenotic experience, and the liturgy that does occur is required 
to overcome or adapt to that inhospitality.  Although it cannot be said that Ando’s empty 
space fails to be ‘numinous’, it is fair to say that, in its indifference toward all but one of 
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the primal symbols of Christian liturgy, its numinousness is not fully manifested.84  That 
failing ironically brings the building precariously close to the kind of architecture against 
which Tilloch warns, and from which Ando seeks distance: “An empty room filled only 
with benches and a desk for the preacher is like a classroom for religious instruction, far 
removed from the spiritual function which a church building must have.”85  Insofar as it 
approaches Tilloch’s description, Ando’s empty space points to the essentiality of a 
kenotic relationship – opened-up and receptive – between church architecture and the 
church (its people and their liturgy). 
Creativity 
There is no reason to think that either Ando or his client has – or necessarily should have 
– considered the extent to which kenosis permeated the conception of the Church of the 
Light.  But I would suggest that, if viewed through a kenotic lens, the ascribed and self-
described theories, intentions, and experiences that surround the building’s design – as 
well as the built result – yield valuable insights.  Of interest is the extent to which this 
building’s conceptualisation emerges from a kenotic approach to creativity, and whether 
and how that may have affected the creating of it.  These issues reach to the 
underpinnings of creativity – not only Ando’s but also that of others who influenced the 
creation. 
Conversations with Self and Others 
A creative event emerging from kenosis is one in which participants are called to what 
Eckhart and Heidegger term “releasement,” and what Guignon defines as “heightened 
sensitivity” to situation (as discussed in Chapter 2).  A similar call is evidenced in 
Nishida’s philosophy, particularly as he adopts and incorporates the Japanese notion of 
shintai (body): “the sensational capacity to be filled by the world of things,” or “the 
corporeal agency through which one empties selfhood to accept the other into his or her 
own self.”86  In effect, shintai nudges the philosophy of nothingness further toward 
kenosis.  But, it is Ufan Lee (1936-) and those of his modern movement, called The 
School of Things, who interpret Nishida – and seem to prefigure Guignon – with an 
emphasis on awakening to the “situated-ness (jōtai-sei)” of subject and thing.  Such an 
awakening involves a divestment of self, of presumed sufficient knowledge, and of 
domination goals.  One so awakened assumes the posture of a “situated actor” rather 
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than an “authoritative master of creation.”87  Such a posture would seem appropriate in 
situations like Ando’s, where a non-Christian architect is asked to design a Christian 
church.  The pertinent issue, however, is not the architect’s religion.  Ando declares, “I do 
not think that it should matter whether the architect is a Christian or Buddhist,”88 and, at 
least in principle, he is correct.  Indeed, the irrelevant criteria should include all faiths and 
no faith at all.  But, I would argue that, in practice, Ando’s observation remains operative 
only when the architect assumes a kenotic posture, volitionally emptying self (including 
whatever faith that may or may not comprise) to effect a heightened awareness of what 
the situation comprises and calls for – and thereby to eschew personal predilections. 
Ando seems to reflect the sensational and situational aspects of the 
kenotic/shintai call in his admonition to other designers: “You must be closely aware of 
where you stand ...”  But then, with words that seem to cast ‘self’ as benefactor and 
‘other’ as beneficiary, he adds, “… and be thinking everyday about what you can do for 
society, and about what you can communicate”.89  Notwithstanding the merits of 
contributing to society, the latter comments include echoes of classic architectural 
Modernism, wherein architecture is portrayed as a saviour of society.  They also seem to 
uphold Ando’s view, discussed earlier, of architecture as a saviour of liturgy, in little need 
of mutual exchange or influence.  Such a uni-directional, subject-object view also arises 
in suggestions that, at the Church of the Light, Ando “saved” the cross “from the grip of 
debased perception” and effected “the cross’ retrieval of its efficacy.”90  Such indicators of 
architecture’s potential for conceit are not limited to or uniquely evidenced by Ando and 
his work, but they do open-up a question as to whether Ando’s creative approach moves 
beyond a conversation with self, so as to challenge self-sufficiency and ask: To what 
extent am I open to the others of this situation? 
Ando’s views of creativity and spirituality appear correlated, wherein the 
significance of nothingness lies “in the discovery of self and the procedure by which one 
is led to the discovery.”91  But in nothingness and its relation to shintai, the encounter with 
the other is pivotal to the procedure of self-discovery and found in the dualistic aspect of 
the body: the simultaneity of ‘I’ (me/subject) and ‘other’ (world).  Hence, entering into a 
creative event with heightened attunement to the entire situation (the world), shintai – like 
kenosis – “effectuates the reciprocal matrix of actions from the world to the subject, and 
from the subject to the world.”92  Accordingly, it is not unreasonable to expect that, in the 
                                               
87
 Ibid., 47-51. 
88
 Ibid., 183. 
89
 S. Morikawa, "Tadao Ando – An Interview with," The GROUND (2012), 
http://www.thegroundmag.com/tadao-ando-an-interview-with/. (Italics are my emphasis.) 
90
 Baek, Nothingness: Tadao Ando's Christian Sacred Space: 59, 142. 
91
 Ibid., 182. 
92
 Ibid., 68-9. 
 194 
 
conception of the Church of the Light, challenging encounters or conversations might 
have occurred amongst Ando (self/subject and his world), his client (the other), and their 
Christian theology and liturgy (their world) so as to foster mutual exchange and influence.  
However, Ando’s engagement with the world of his client is seen to be largely limited by 
his desire to express a distinctively architectonic symbol of the cross, almost to the 
exclusion of Christianity’s other primal symbols.  Even his displacement of the altar-table 
– a kind of engagement – is said to be “evidence of Ando’s desire to make the cross the 
central and essential element.”93  But did that desire emanate from mutual exchange with 
the others in this particular situation?  Or, did it originate in Ando’s personal views of 
Christianity and his architectural preferences?  Baek’s narrative begins to answer to such 
questions when he describes Ando’s creation of the cross as a “self-imposed task” 
fulfilling his “two-fold wish … to differentiate it from the conventionalised emblems of the 
post-war spectacle and … allow it to be read as a cross”; and when he states that “the 
molding of the cross … comes from Ando’s conception of sacred space.”94  Although the 
client accepts the manifestation of Ando’s desires and wishes, such acceptance does not 
necessarily evidence kenosis in the creative event.  Indeed, it might even be said that 
Ando’s celebrated anti-semiotic attitude actually shows itself to be antithetical to kenosis, 
particularly when exercised in the context of Christianity and its kenotic grounding. 
Certainly, client-architect conversations occurred, and it may be that such 
conversations were creatively productive.  Speaking of the project’s beginnings, Ando 
recalls discussions with his client about “limited funds” and the anticipation of “many 
difficulties.”  He also evokes some notion of exchange when he cites “the church people’s 
passion and eagerness” as a source of his “hope.”95  For its part, the client recalls asking 
for a church “open to anybody,” one of “dignity and beauty.”  Their brief called for “a 
simple building with sacred space which realises Jesus Christ’s words: ‘Where two or 
three come together in my name, I am there with them.’”96  Not surprisingly, each of these 
client requests invokes something of Christian kenosis.  On the one hand, their requests 
are open to many sorts of architectural response, but, on the other, they posit a specific 
view of God’s presence, which is seen to misalign with Ando’s personal view.  Indeed, it 
is the clients’ latter request to which the design seems least attentive, instead manifesting 
Ando’s preference for introspection over communal liturgy.  At the church’s dedication, 
Ando refers to the building as one which his office and the builder “have brought up under 
our enduring care, and will hand over to the church people today.”  He admits to having 
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been “concerned about whether the church people would use this building well,” but 
suggests that such concern is assuaged by the “faces” of those at the ceremony.97  
Notwithstanding the latter assurance, Ando’s words portray a giver-receiver relationship, 
one in which the architect presents the client with a worthy gift and, then, is left only to 
hope that the client proves worthy of it.  In this case, there is little doubt about the 
worthiness of the architect’s gift.  But reasonable doubts do arise concerning Ando’s 
attentiveness to this project’s entire situation and the scope of mutual exchange and 
influence that occurred.  Clearly, the influence of architect and architecture on the local 
congregation is realised, on-going, and longstanding – in the form of a fame-filled 
building.  But the influence of the congregation (and its doctrinal traditions) on the 
architect and architecture – especially during conception, when such influence would 
most matter – is much less evident.  Ando’s architecture clearly demonstrates a bond 
between self and the creation – a significant out-pouring of the creator (self) in the act of 
creating – and may initially appear to meet Nishida’s characterisation of the work of art as 
“the pure body (junsui shintai) of the artist.”  But, as Baek elucidates, it is through the 
agency of shintai (and, one might also say, kenosis) that a work of art is “the very 
expansion of the bodily self”; that the emptied self comes to be filled and overflowing with 
the world (the entirety of the situation).  And it is that very notion that calls into question 
the extent to which Ando’s creativity exposes or overturns the “limited capacity of the 
self,”98 so as to be filled with all that comprises the situation of the Church of the Light. 
Conversations with Other Things 
Sensational and situational awareness requires not only conversations with self and 
others but also with other things.  Such conversations can result in what Nishida sees as 
a transformation of will, whereby “we totally immerse the self into the thing … and we feel 
the action of the thing to be the activity of our own will.”99  Nishida’s view aligns with the 
kenotic notions of radical contextualisation, hybridisation, and partially becoming the 
other (concepts introduced in Chapter 2).  Indeed, Ando demonstrates an understanding 
of such concepts and alludes to the sort of conversation by which they can be effected: 
The shintai (body) is a sentient being that responds to the world.  When one 
stands on an empty site, one can sometimes hear the land voice a need for a 
building.  The old, anthropomorphic idea of the genius loci was a recognition of 
the phenomenon.  The point is that what this voice is saying is actually 
‘understandable’ only to the shintai.100   
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But, in light of questions about the extent of kenotic-ness in his approach, Ando’s 
openness to hear the ‘voice’ of the site stands in contrast to what I have characterised as 
the appearance of inattentiveness – even intentional inattentiveness – to many things of 
liturgy that call to be engaged and heard in the situation of a Christian church building.  
Such contrast opens-up additional questions about Ando’s approach to still other ‘things’.  
In his engagement with an empty site, there is an echo of Louis Kahn’s ‘conversation’ 
with brick – a conversation that I have suggested is kenotically based (see Chapter 3).  
Does Ando also converse with potential building materials?  And, if so, are such 
conversations similarly kenotic? 
Surveying Ando’s largely concrete projects, it is easy to imagine him paraphrasing 
Kahn, saying, “I asked the concrete what it liked, and the concrete said, ‘I like a wall.’”  
Indeed, Frampton writes that Ando’s basic syntax, arising in his early residential projects, 
comprises an “habitual use of fair-faced in-situ concrete, inside and out, either as a 
bounding wall or as a free-standing frame.”101  Clearly, Ando’s architectural vocabulary 
extends beyond concrete walls, but he has used the idiom often enough, masterfully 
enough, and in sufficiently diverse situations, so as to establish the bond between himself 
and the material.  In what would appear to be a mutual and, perhaps, kenotic relationship, 
concrete is open to Ando’s intentions and Ando is open to the material’s nature.  
However, the ubiquitousness and subjectiveness of Ando’s deployment of concrete calls 
into question whether its selection as a building material – prior to considerations of its 
manner of use – is in fact the product of kenosis (or shintai).  Acute attentiveness to each 
project’s entire situation would seem unlikely to produce such similar determinations of 
materiality in so many dissimilar situations.  Self-emptying, and its consequent openness 
to each situation’s world of things, point to a high likelihood of unique and varied 
responses – amongst them, those of materiality – unless the responses are primarily the 
product of whim or preference or self-assertion.  The latter sorts of responses are not 
uncommon or discouraged in architecture (beginning in architectural education), but 
neither are they kenotic. 
Material selection and use are closely related and, according to Ando, the 
connection can be seen in traditional Japanese houses.  Figuratively speaking, he claims 
that, in such houses, “the wall does not actually exist.”  Clarifying the claim, he explains 
that in “an aesthetic devoid of actuality and attributes … it is the wall, made as light and 
thin as possible, that permits – or perhaps more accurately evokes – space.”102  In other 
words, the materials of a Japanese house are selected for their capacity to create the 
lightest and thinnest of walls, and then used in such a way as to be self-withdrawing, so 
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as to realise not walls but space.  The imagery, however, is difficult to reconcile with 
Ando’s work and his self-described architectural pursuit: “I create enclosed spaces by 
means of thick concrete walls.”103  Recognising the dilemma, and the apologetics in which 
Ando engages, Baek elucidates Ando’s theory.  He cites the “subtlety and smoothness” 
of his concrete – opposed to the textural roughness of béton brut – as that which 
“removes materialistic sensuousness” and creates “a self-effacing surface” below which 
concrete’s inherent strength is concealed.  From that self-effacement, “thinness … 
lightness … and delicacy” are meant to emerge in a paradox that reconciles Ando’s thick, 
heavy, and strong concrete walls with the insubstantial walls of wood, paper, earth, and 
straw – as found in Japanese houses and tea rooms.104  Without debating the validity of 
the paradox, and notwithstanding its convenience, I would suggest that reconciliation 
remains problematic.  Materialistic sensuousness has not been removed from the 
concrete at the Church of the Light, because smoothness is as much a texture as 
roughness, and it is not only sensuous but, arguably, more so.  Thus, the ascribed self-
effacement and its attributes are not realised.  Furthermore, concrete’s thickness is in its 
structural nature – strong in compression, weak in tension – and its heaviness is 
consequential.  In this situation, not only is its thickness (and strength) not concealed, it is 
vividly revealed by the (structurally heroic) cruciform incision through the front wall, which 
commands focus and presents the wall’s full thickness for perceptual or actual 
measurement. 
Ando’s selection and use of concrete, particularly at the Church of the Light, 
presents three additional ironies.  The first arises from concrete’s requisite twofold 
construction.  Ando’s contained emptiness is created by initially constructing an empty 
container around it, one which is extraordinarily thin compared to that of the space it 
defines.  Then, the emptiness and thinness of the surrounding container are displaced by 
the fullness of concrete and steel reinforcing, ultimately producing walls that appear thick.  
The second irony finds the initial surrounding container, or form, comprised of two thin 
‘walls’, often made or lined with wood.  And it is these walls – stripped away after their 
filling – that would seem to share a stronger relationship to the walls of a traditional 
Japanese house than do the thick concrete walls they parent.  A third irony can be seen 
in Ando’s bond with the material.  Notwithstanding his appreciation of concrete, he 
primarily engages only those properties needed to produce his trademark rectilinear and 
occasionally (in other situations) curvilinear slabs.  Notably passed over is the potential of 
concrete’s plasticity, as explored and deployed by many designers including Oscar 
Niemeyer, Félix Candela Outeriño, Pier Luigi Nervi, and Japan’s Kenzo Tange.  Therein 
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lies concrete’s capacity to be shaped in ways that actually achieve the relative thinness, 
lightness, and delicacy to which Ando purportedly aspires.   
Ando opens up to concrete’s nature as a means of mastering it and, then, uses 
that mastery to control his architecture.  Concrete is at Ando’s service, but to what extent 
is the reverse true?  In many ways – though certainly not all – Ando deploys concrete at 
the Church of the Light (and at many other projects) as Kahn does at the Salk Institute.  
But the two situations are dramatically different.  At a particular place on a particular 
Californian coastline, Kahn heard the situation calling for concrete, and the concrete 
asking to be granite.  At a suburb of Osaka, did a particularly different situation also call 
for concrete?  And, if so, what did the concrete want to be, there, that it did not want to be 
in California?  If, as Ando suggests, it wanted to be like the walls of traditional Japanese 
houses – and ‘not exist’ – is such a request honoured by a response largely similar to 
situations where concrete’s existence is so plainly evident?  Does Ando approach 
concrete’s inherent kenotic-ness with his own kenosis, as Kahn seems to have done?  
For Kahn, concrete never becomes the trademark that it does for Ando.  Kahn responds 
with concrete at the Salk Institute, where the situation seems to calls for it.  In other 
situations, he responds with whatever else seems to be called for.  Ando, however, 
responds to most situations with concrete.  The difference, I suggest, is the extent of 
kenotic-ness in the two creators’ approaches to creating; that is, in their creativity. 
 
Certainly, there is evidence that Ando’s approach recognises self-insufficiencies 
and embraces aspects of kenosis (specifically via Eastern thought).  The creative event 
appears to be a significant spiritual experience for Ando.  And, in the case of the Church 
of the Light, it is clear that Ando converses not only with self but also with certain others 
and other things.  But, as seen, some of those conversations appear to lack the 
vulnerability, heightened sensitivity, and mutuality that mark instantiations of kenosis.  In 
his conversations with self, there is more to be seen of self as a benefactor to 
architecture and architecture’s beneficiaries than there is of self as a situated actor, 
attentive to his situation.  In his conversations with others and other things, there is 
evidence of selective attentiveness and intentional inattentiveness.  Such observations 
are not condemnatory and, to greater or lesser degrees, can be widely ascribed to 
architects and their approaches to design – both contemporary and historic.  They 
emerge from the measure-taking of a particular situation.  As such, they hold open the 
question of Ando’s alignment with Nishida’s “new phase of shintai,” wherein “the created 
figure is neither a representation of subjective intentions, nor an element in the 
iconographical system to be manipulated by the heroic and hegemonic instrumental 
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subjectivity.”105  In fact, many aspects of Ando’s approach point to subjective intentions 
and reflect traits of heroism and hegemony toward the outcome.  Consequently, it proves 
difficult to view the Church of the Light as emerging from kenosis.  To the extent that 
kenosis is evidenced, it appears inchoate, primarily in the domain of the architect and part 
of the architect’s search for self.  In a sense, that portrays kenosis as something self-
controlled, which, of course, is oxymoronic, since kenosis is a call for self to lose control. 
Valorising Imperfection 
No creator is obligated to assume a kenotic attitude toward creating.  However, when 
Ando is called to join in creating a Christian church building, the project brief can only be 
for a building in which the mystery of kenosis is to be celebrated – communally and 
repeatedly.  Hence, kenosis is an inescapable aspect of the product, if not the process, 
and, at a minimum, accommodation of the kenotic celebration is a reasonable 
expectation.  Furthermore, when the church building is to be situated in Japan, and Ando 
therefore invokes a particular Japanese philosophy of nothingness – with meaningful 
links to Christianity’s kenosis – he invites the project to be scrutinised in light of kenotic 
thinking.  Such scrutiny reveals that the situation of the Church of the Light holds inherent 
kenotic potential, much of which is unrealised.  Although that result may be primarily 
owing to religious doctrine rather than architecture, it nonetheless indicates some 
misalignment of client and architect views.  Then, in the realisation of the architecture, 
significant opportunities for liturgical place-making are foregone; opportunities that hold 
not only the capacity to accommodate the church’s kenotic celebration but also to elevate 
the potential of the worship experience, and thereby elicit the community’s kenotic 
response.  The building’s performance is a reflection of its conception.  Ando’s approach 
offers limited evidence of kenosis, instead revealing the characteristics of a more 
conventional, architect-centred event, paradoxically controlled by an architect whose 
adopted philosophy espouses self-loss and self-withdrawal.  Like all creations, this work 
of architecture – both process and product – is imperfect.  Yet, in its architectonics, it is 
also remarkable, noteworthy and, in some ways, spectacular. 
Ironically, it is the building’s most spectacular feature – its cross of light – that 
presents its most significant imperfections.  Ando attempts to de-objectify the cross (even 
though the same symbol is objectified elsewhere at this and other Ando projects) in order 
to ensure, as Baek describes it, that this cross of light “is not the cross that the reductive 
procedure would take as the object of riddance.”106  Ando’s intent, however, is “‘to break 
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light down to individual particles’ so that it may become almost touchable.”107  In that 
palpability, the cross of light virtually returns to an objectified state.  Furthermore, this light 
fails to find what Heidegger describes as a “clearing” (using the German word, Lichtung, 
itself a reference to light): 
The forest clearing is experienced in contrast to dense forest … To open 
something means: To make something light, free and open, e.g., to make the 
forest free of trees at one place.  The openness thus originating is the clearing … 
But light never first creates openness.  Rather, light presupposes openness.108 
Not only does the cross of light not create openness, it is denied the presupposition of it.  
In fact, it is the cross of light that makes the space of emptiness more like a dark and 
dense forest than a light, free, and open clearing.  Although the cross gives the empty 
space ‘existence’, it does so by joining with the concrete walls to enclose the emptiness, 
compound the darkness, and make the space shrine-like.  But Ando’s building is not a 
shrine, nor is it primarily a space for individual contemplation.  It is foremost an 
evangelical church, existing to accommodate free and open communal celebrations 
(albeit subject to doctrine) in the ‘light’ that Christianity ascribes to their Christ.  That light 
presupposes a clearing for it, in the Christian community.  It is therefore an opening – a 
kind of Heideggerian clearing – that is essential to Christian liturgy.  The Church of the 
Light, however, manifests enclosure.  In so doing, it is faithful to Ando’s desire for closed 
and introspective spaces, and may be perfectly suitable for retreat, meditation, and self-
reflection.  But it fails to manifest the open domain in which communal liturgy can happen 
to its fullest extent.  This central imperfection is largely disregarded by visitors and critics 
whose attention becomes almost overwhelmed – exactly as Ando intends – by the 
dramatic play of light and dark; an abstraction and magnification of the effect created by 
candles in a darkened shrine.  Numinousness – in things spiritual as well as architectural 
– is often more easily effected by a superficial presentation of spectacle and drama, 
rather than by the more painstaking process of attentively responding to a situation’s 
entirety (which may, paradoxically, call for another, more profound sort of spectacle and 
drama).  Neither public nor critical valorisation of architecture is necessarily conditioned 
on the latter. 
All creating involves situational awareness, even when the creation is an 
intentional rejection of, or rebellion against, the situation.  Variable is the degree of 
awareness and attention.  In his critique of Modernism, Robert Venturi cites Modernist 
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Paul Rudolph, who, while recognising that perfect attentiveness is beyond reach, makes 
a crucial point: 
It is characteristic of the twentieth century that architects are highly selective in 
determining which problems they want to solve.  Mies [van der Rohe], for 
instance, makes wonderful buildings only because he ignores many aspects of a 
building.  If he solved more problems, his buildings would be far less potent.109 
Rudolph’s observation, coupled with those in this chapter, opens to speculation what the 
Ibaraki church might be like had Ando’s architectural prowess – even genius – been 
applied with greater attentiveness to its entire situation.  The concept of kenosis – 
particularly in the unique situatedness of a Christian church on Japanese soil, designed 
by a non-Christian architect – suggests that opportunities exist beyond those explored 
(even in light of known budget constraints and, perhaps, because of them).  It suggests 
that Ando’s architectural objective, that of “instilling fascination into visitors,”110 is 
paradoxically better accomplished through the emptying of such objectives.  Thus 
emptied, room is made for the fascination – even spirituality – that accrues when situation 
and response come into relational unity (without compromising individuality and 
respective complexities).  Notwithstanding Rudolph’s prophecy, the concept of kenosis 
suggests that heightened attentiveness need not produce impotency, but exactly the 
opposite.  Still, the responses emerging from such attunement can only be imperfect (or 
there would be no need for ongoing kenosis).  Such imperfection, however, is not that 
produced by ignoring or rejecting any of the situation or its kenosis.  Precisely because of 
that, it is the sort of imperfection worth valorising. 
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6 
Architecture and Memory: 
Critical- and Non-Modernism 
Eyewitness to the advent of Modernism, and later amongst its disciples, Larry Perkins 
describes an exchange between his father, Dwight Perkins (1867-1941) – one of the 
architects whose work in the so-called Prairie and Chicago Schools prefigured 
Modernism – and Jens Jensen (1860-1951),1 a noted pioneer of modern landscape 
architecture: 
Dad and Mr Jensen were looking at [one of dad’s school building designs], and Mr 
Jensen, a magnificent big old Dane, with white handle-bar whiskers and a very 
gruff, hearty manner, said, ‘Yes, Dwight, it is fine.  It is direct.  It is strong.  But, is it 
kind?’2 
Given the context of the question, immersed as it was in the naissance of Modernism and 
that movement’s founding concern for social responsibility (certainly an aspect of kind-
ness), the question could be read … is it Modern?   But Jensen’s question is more 
startling in its use of a very simple and ordinary term, kind.  Kind-ness is a rare criterion to 
be applied to architecture – especially Modernist architecture, eventually accused of the 
opposite – yet Jensen uses the term with pointed intention, surely beyond its usual 
reference to mere benevolence, cordiality, or helpfulness.  Amongst customary 
definitions, ‘indulgence’ may be nearest to Jensen’s intent, yet even that remains 
insufficient.3  Toward whom or what might a building be expected to be indulgent?  Would 
such a one-way relationship – if demonstrable – be enough to answer Jensen’s question 
in the affirmative?  In the context and sense of Jensen’s usage, I would argue that the 
term kind invokes nothing less than a profound and multi-dimensional view of kenosis.  
As a result, the question can also be read … is it kenotic?4  Read as such, Jensen’s 
question opens-up another avenue for taking the measure of kenotic influence in 
architecture.  It proves especially pertinent in considering three contemporary projects in 
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Berlin, each founded in what Jean-Luc Marion describes as a “saturated phenomenon,”5 
a most extreme and exploitative act of assertion, authenticity,6 and unkind-ness: the 
Holocaust, or Shoah.7 
The Jewish Museum Berlin, the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, and 
the Reichstag (renovated as part of the Bundestag complex) – all initiatives of German 
governmental bodies – emerge from and respond to the memory of an atrocity rooted in 
fanatical notions of self-sufficiency and singularity; the antithesis of kenosis.  
Notwithstanding the significant programmatic differences in these projects, their 
fundamental grounding raises a question as to the role that kenosis plays – or could have 
played – in each project’s response to, and ongoing relationship with, the profoundly un-
kenotic Shoah.  Because the relationship is inherently one of opposition, a kenotic 
response – perhaps even a profoundly kenotic response – could be seen as particularly 
appropriate, even if counterintuitive.  Indeed, it is the extremity of unkind-ness, to which 
these projects respond, that makes it reasonable to ask of each project’s kind-ness.  The 
question is neither simple nor superficial.  It must be asked in the fullness of Jensen’s 
original critique, which, I suggest, is to be read as including the Levinasian view of 
kenosis as ethical responsibility, the Derridan view of kenosis as hospitality, and the 
Vattimian view of kenosis as charity-in-friendship over metaphysical truth (such views 
introduced in Chapter 2).8  Affirmative answers, however, are not necessarily privileged, 
since such privilege would only see kenosis portrayed as exactly the kind of metaphysical 
truth that kenosis contests.  As I have posited in previous chapters, no creator, creative 
act, or created thing has a duty to instantiate kenotic traits – and not all will – but the 
unfolding of all creative events is nonetheless a consequence of ongoing kenosis.  
Kenosis is always and everywhere at work – at the cosmic, evolutionary, and human 
levels – and is therefore already bound into creation.  Uncertain and variable is the extent 
to which human response will attend to the kenotic unfolding, or, conversely, will 
overlook, ignore, and resist it.  Thus it is that, paradoxically, every response to a situation 
evidences kenosis in some way.  But kind-ness – as Jensen proposes it, and I interpret it 
– is more than a mark of an inevitable process.  It is first a measure of kenotic attunement 
in a creator’s approach to that process, then a measure of kenotic influence in the 
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creating, and finally a measure of kenotic manifestation in the created thing.  And it is 
such measuring that continues to be of interest in this chapter. 
In their connection to the Shoah, the three Berlin projects are also linked to the 
milieu of early twentieth century Europe in which both the Shoah and architectural 
Modernism arose.  Insofar as these projects respond against the Shoah, it follows that 
they might also respond against Modernism.  Indeed, writer and architectural critic 
Charles Jencks connects all three projects to what he calls “Critical Modernism,” a 
post-Post-Modern view not unlike what others have called “Nonmodern.”9  About Berlin, 
Jencks writes: “Except for Hiroshima, [it] is the city that suffered the most under 
modernity, so it is no surprise that it has some of the best works of Critical Modernism.”10  
As examples, he cites Daniel Libeskind’s museum and Peter Eisenman’s memorial, as 
well as aspects of Norman Foster’s parliament building, although, in the latter’s “living 
across time,” he also sees traits of Postmodern Historicism.11  Jencks proposes that his 
concept of Critical Modernism reveals a “deeper truth,” which is “that the critical and the 
modern have formed a dynamic hybrid where the scepticism of the former and 
transcendence of the latter make a potent cocktail – the creative tradition that lasts.”12  
Although his claim to a truth (especially one that lasts) sounds unsettlingly metaphysical – 
and is, ironically, a claim of the same sort that Jencks and many others have criticised 
Modernism for espousing – I would argue that his lengthy description, like Jensen’s single 
word, emerges from kenosis.  For if the modern is marked by a striving for 
transcendence, and the critical is marked by a striving for scepticism, and, furthermore, if 
their union forms a dynamic hybrid, then both the modern and the critical are derivatives 
of kenosis, because, as discussed in previous chapters, kenosis is nothing less than 
dynamic hybridisation, impelled by scepticism and capable of transcendent result.  Thus, 
in the Critical Modernism of these Berlin projects – each distinct, but with shared 
bloodlines – there are valuable opportunities to measure the kenosis instantiated by their 
creation. 
Introducing an early publication of “Between the Lines” – Libeskind’s written 
statement about the then-proposed design for what would become the Jewish Museum 
Berlin – Stanley Allen refers to various newspaper accounts about the ‘fall’ of the Berlin 
Wall, on 9 November, 1989.  In particular, he notes those with headlines announcing a 
realised toppling (for example, “Berlin Wall comes tumblin’ down,” in the New York Daily 
News), but with juxtaposed photos showing the wall still very much intact.  Of the 
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contradiction, Allen says, “illustrations and their captions are often at odds.”  Observing 
that it was not the architecture of the wall that had changed but its performance, he posits 
that the wall’s demise only came when its value as architecture was exceeded by the 
value of the spectacle produced by its fall.  This, Allen suggests, is the fissured context 
for Libeskind’s museum proposal: “a web of actual physicality and programmed 
spectacle,” the relationality of architecture and event.13  Arguably, it is also the context for 
Eisenman’s memorial and Foster’s parliament building.  More than that, Allen’s 
observation ironically proves to be a description of each project’s realisation.  Indeed, the 
architecture of each – seen as manifested ‘illustrations’ – is often at odds with its 
ascriptions; that is, with the ‘captions’ assigned to it by philosophers, theorists, designers 
and others.  Much has been written in scholarly and popular publications about these 
Berlin projects, with analyses from both architectural and philosophical points of view.  
Though not without exception, the attention has been largely favourable – at times, 
acclamatory – particularly in philosophical circles.  Of concern in this discourse is less 
what has been written and more what has not.  In developing and reaching certain 
philosophical claims about these projects, it would appear that many architectural 
considerations must be, and have been, overlooked.  Through a kenotic lens, the efficacy 
and sufficiency of such claims can be examined, even as other philosophical principles 
can be shown to be at work. 
 
LIBESKIND AT THE JEWISH MUSEUM BERLIN 
Libeskind’s Jewish Museum Berlin and Pei’s Museum of Islamic Art in Doha (the latter a 
focus of Chapter 4) have little in common, regardless of what is compared – approach, 
design response, or realisation.  Libeskind’s project is his first to be constructed,14 while 
Pei’s is regarded as amongst his last.  Libeskind is selected by international competition, 
while Pei is commissioned directly.  Of his museum, Libeskind says, “You shouldn’t worry 
about superficial issues such as form; it is enough that it is different from the existing.”15  
But Pei sees built form as architecture’s foundational and enduring mode of expression, 
and he searches Islam for ‘essences’ that might inspire form’s shaping.  And, while 
Libeskind’s museum prioritises its own identity over curatorial concerns, Pei’s exhibition 
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 D. Libeskind, S. Allen, and D.F. Krell, "Between the Lines: Extension to the Berlin Museum, with the Jewish 
Museum," Assemblage, no. 12 (1990): 20-21. 
14
 A. Cobbers, Daniel Libeskind, Second ed., vol. 1, Architects & Master Builders in Berlin (Berlin: Jaron 
Verlag, 2006), 9. The Jewish Museum is the first project of Libeskind's to commence construction. Another, 
the Felix-Nussbaum-Haus, commenced construction after the Jewish Museum but was completed in 1998, 
the year before the museum.  
15
 Ibid., 17. 
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spaces yield to their exhibitions, even while establishing a strong self-identity.16  Direct 
comparison is not necessarily productive, since Libeskind’s project is extoled for 
attributes intentionally opposed to those of most other contemporary museums, including 
Pei’s.17  About the Jewish Museum Berlin, Australian art historian and critic Terry Smith 
writes: “Functionality, legibility, a spectacular external gestalt, deference to the higher 
arts, contextualism – all are rejected, emphatically.”18  With regard to the rejection of 
functionality, it is tempting to strike a comparison with Ando’s Church of the Light (the 
focus of Chapter 5), where, as I argue, Ando prioritises personal architectural preferences 
over the accommodation of his client’s liturgical practices and requirements.  But such a 
comparison also yields mostly differences, because the functionality of museums is much 
less prescribed (though not without certain expectations), and Ando’s church is nothing if 
not legible and of considerable gestalt.  Indeed, rather than comparing it to other 
buildings, the Jewish Museum Berlin is more effectively examined vis-à-vis the key terms 
by which its claimed singularity has been defined: uncanniness, hope, and laughter.  It is 
through these ‘captions’ that the museum’s kenotic reckoning emerges. 
According to Daniel Libeskind (1946-), the task of designing what came to be 
called the Jewish Museum Berlin did not require that “I … go to the library to research, 
and look into the archives and find out about the history of Berlin, because I’m a part of its 
history.”19  The precise factuality of that claim notwithstanding,20 Libeskind projects an air 
of self-sufficiency that opens-up the question of kenotic-ness in his creative approach.21  
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 As noted in Chapter 4, Pei was not responsible for the interior design of the exhibition spaces, but he did 
determine their size, shape, and ordering. 
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 In fact, museums by both architects can be examined within Berlin, itself, since Pei has also contributed to 
the city’s assemblage of museum facilities with his Exhibitions Building of the German Historical Museum, 
located not far from the Jewish Museum. Such examination is worthwhile because the two projects are, more 
or less, contemporaries. Pei was commissioned in 1996, seven years after Libeskind’s design for the Jewish 
Museum had been selected by competition. The Exhibitions Building opened in 2003, four years after 
construction of the then-still-empty Jewish Museum had been completed and made available for public 
viewing, but only two years after the latter’s exhibits had been installed and the museum fully opened. Like 
Libeskind’s museum ‘extension’, Pei’s is sited in close relation to historic structures, in this case 
Neo-Classical buildings by Karl Schinkel. More about the Pei museum can be found in U. Kretzschmar, ed. 
I.M. Pei: The Exhibitions Building of the German Historical Museum Berlin (Munich, Berlin, London, New 
York: Prestel Verlag, 2003); and A. Cobbers, Ieoh Ming Pei, vol. 6, Architects & Master Builders in Berlin 
(Berlin: Jaron Verlag, 2004). 
18
 T. Smith, "Daniel Among the Philosophers: The Jewish Museum, Berlin, and Architecture after Auschwitz," 
Architectural Theory Review 10, no. 1 (2005): 117. 
19
 M. Blackwood, "Berlin's Jewish Museum: A Personal Tour with Daniel Libeskind," (USA: Michael 
Blackwood Productions, 2001). 
20
 D. Libeskind, Breaking Ground: Adventures in Life and Architecture  (New York: Riverhead Books, 2004). 
Here, autobiographical details indicate that Libeskind was born and raised in Lodz, Poland (some 500 km 
from Berlin), until his family emigrated to the US, in 1959, when he was 13. He and his wife, Nina, established 
their professional practice at Berlin, in 1990, after winning the international design competition for an 
extension to the Berlin Museum. (The firm’s website indicates the firm’s founding to have been in 1989.) 
21
 Some might ask if it is possible for any architect (any creator) to avoid biographical statements that connote 
‘self-sufficiency’. I would argue that the answer to such a question is ‘yes’. As seen in Chapters 3 and 4, Kahn 
and Pei, for example, are able to challenge their self-sufficiency and do so without compromising self-identity 
or self-confidence.  The latter traits are quite different to the former, and, viewed kenotically, the latter traits 
are strengthened by the challenges to the former (challenges emanating from both self and others). This topic 
is introduced in Chapter 2, and I explore it more fully in Chapter 7. 
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Granting that his experiences in post-war Poland, and those of his parents (Shoah 
survivors) prior to and during the war, were largely determined by events in or emanating 
from Berlin, and likewise granting that his very being is imbued with Jewish history and 
culture (including that inseparable from Berlin’s), Libeskind’s attitude toward this project’s 
situation – that is, how he addresses and thinks about it – nonetheless appears to initiate 
in a form of certitude.  His words, though perhaps glib, suggest a less than open attitude 
to that which, in and in relation to Berlin’s history, might be unattended in whatever 
already comprises his knowledge.  They also echo the solidarity expressed in John F. 
Kennedy’s famous “Ich bin ein Berliner”22; solidarity that Libeskind amplifies.  “After the 
tragic and disastrous consequences of the Holocaust and its impact on Modernity, 
everyone is also a survivor.”23  Such solidarity, however, is neither preclusion nor 
substitution for ongoing openness to that which one inevitably does not know.  In fact, 
when viewed kenotically, solidarity is that which might be expected to dilate openness 
and encourage proactive attentiveness. 
Uncanniness 
Amongst the traits frequently ascribed to the Jewish Museum Berlin is that of 
uncanniness.  Those ascribing it have amply explained various nuances of meaning, only 
a sketch of which I include, here, for purposes of initiating this discourse.24  Standard 
dictionary definitions of uncanny include “unnaturally strange” and “superstitious 
uneasiness.”25  In philosophy, the term is often presented as an English translation of the 
German term unheimlich (explored by Heidegger and others before and after him), a 
more literal translation being unhomely.26  Uncanniness, then, describes the condition of 
being not at home, not at ease, amidst the unknown and unfamiliar and strange; or of 
estrangement and being a stranger.  And, within Heideggerian thought, uncanny can be 
extended to mean “that which lies outside of our knowledge,” where knowledge is seen 
as “that ‘locality’ in which we are at home.”27  Hence, the uncanny can be understood as 
the risk-fraught and possibly overwhelming condition of not knowing.  But already 
embedded in the un-canny is the canny, that relatively safe locality of homeliness and 
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 J.F. Kennedy, "Ich bin ein Berliner," (Speech given at the Rathaus Schöneberg, Berlin, West Germany 26 
June,1963). 
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 D. Libeskind, "Between the Lines: The Jewish Museum, Berlin," Research in Phenomenology 22, no. 1 
(1992): 83. 
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 J.E. Young, "Daniel Libeskind's Jewish Museum in Berlin: The Uncanny Arts of Memorial Architecture," 
Jewish Social Studies 6, no. 2 (2000): 1-2. Here, as an example, Anthony Vidler's notion of the 'architectural 
uncanny' is pursued in an analysis of Libeskind's museum as 'uncanny memorial architecture'.  
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 Macquarie Dictionary: s.v. "uncanny". 
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 Preference is given to the English term 'strange' (with uncanny a synonym) as the translation of 
'unheimlich' in M. Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. R. Manheim (Garden City, NY: Anchor 
Books, 1959), 161; more contemporarily, however, in M. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. G. 
Fried and R. Polt (New Haven: Yale University Press, (1953) 2000), 127, the translation as 'uncanny' is 
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27
 Malpas, Heidegger's Topology: 374n101. 
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stability: our knowledge, sagaciousness, even astuteness.28  I would suggest that the 
connection is more than lexical; that it is kenotic, and that kenosis is the instantaneous 
and direct, yet unending and non-linear, transport between the two ‘localities’.  It is the 
awakening from, or opening-up of, the safety and presumed certitude of knowing, so as 
to become more attuned to the risk-laden uncertainty of what is not yet known but may 
appear.  The two localities empty, fill, and empty back into themselves, such that they 
reveal each other.   
In connection with a Jewish museum for Berlin, uncanniness can be seen in the 
traumatic experience of Jewish Berliners, made strangers in their ‘home’ country – to the 
point of annihilation – or estranged through exile.  From that, it follows that uncanniness 
may well be the apposite condition to be embodied by such a museum.29  But how might 
that embodiment be manifested in architecture?  One possibility lies in what might be 
perceived as a risky and perhaps spectacular assemblage of ‘strange’, ‘unfamiliar’, and 
‘destabilising’ forms and spaces; that is, in architecture that asserts its uncanniness, 
strives to appear uncanny, and thereby offers a particular strange experience to the 
perceiver, which may be little more than a fabricated sensation.  Architecture of this sort 
seems to presuppose that the challenge of architecturally configuring trauma is best met 
with a traumatic configuration of architecture.  It also prioritises the contrivance and 
control of experiences – particularly those that shock or wow.  Another possibility, 
however, sees the uncanny strangely manifesting in forms and spaces that are not 
necessarily of strange or unfamiliar traits, but which establish a kind of relationality – 
amongst themselves and their perceivers – that opens-up to the trauma and its full range 
of questions, responses, and experiences, all without re-presentation.  Architecture of 
that sort prioritises the attending of complex relationships, those amidst which contingent 
and indeterminate experiences can happen.  More elusive and more difficult to ‘know’, it 
is that sort of architecture that can actually be uncanny. 
Conceptualisation and Production 
The embodiment of uncanniness seems a perfectly appropriate and worthy aspiration for 
a Jewish museum in Berlin.  The extent to which it is an aspiration fulfilled by the Jewish 
Museum Berlin is an appropriate and worthy question.  Viewed superficially, Libeskind’s 
museum appears to achieve the uncanniness of the peculiar.  It can certainly be read as 
strange, risky, and avant-garde, but soon it is seen that such traits derive primarily from 
the known and intended (the canny), rather than the unknown and unintended (the 
uncanny).  It becomes clear that Libeskind conceptualises the museum from a locality of 
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 Young, "Daniel Libeskind's Jewish Museum in Berlin: The Uncanny Arts of Memorial Architecture," 1. 
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homeliness, from well within his body of knowledge.  Not only the themes but also many 
of the formal expressions that would evolve into those of the museum were already 
familiar to Libeskind as a result of explorations and developments undertaken years 
before the museum project.  Substantial aspects of the museum’s conception can be 
seen to emerge from two of Libeskind’s seminal theoretical projects.30  First, in the spatial 
universe of Micromegas, from 1978 – a decade before the museum competition – 
Libeskind juxtaposes “fragmentation and explosion” against presupposed “objects and 
continuity,”31 and reveals a “preoccupation with absences, voids, and silences.”32  Later, 
in a 1983 project, Chamber Works, he displays a vivid fascination with lines and acute 
angular geometries, both of considerable complexity.  And then, in 1989, many of these 
previously drawn theories appear to congeal in response to the international competition 
for the “Extension of the Berlin Museum with the Jewish Museum Department,” which 
Libeskind describes in his original submission, entitled “Between the Lines”. 
All of this amounts to two broken lines: one straight but fragmented; the other 
tortuous but continuing into infinity.  As the lines develop … they also fall apart – 
become disengaged – and reveal themselves as separate, so that the void that 
runs centrally through what is continuous materializes outside as something that 
has been ruined … a voided void.  Fragmentation and splintering mark the 
coherence of the ensemble …33 
At this point, it might be argued that during his years of developing architectural theory, 
Libeskind uncannily foresees the museum’s situatedness long before its inception, and 
begins responding to it – at least in theory.  That, however, also suggests that he 
foresees a situation that no one else could see, not even those who would eventually 
define the situation for the international competitors asked to respond to it.  And, as it 
transpires, Libeskind’s submission does not respond to the situation described.  More 
plausibly, the museum competition provides Libeskind with a platform for the application 
of theoretical musings and ongoing investigations,34 which were not only already known 
to him but were a part of him.  Viewing himself as a part of Berlin’s history, it follows that 
he could view his theories likewise.  Such an approach – operating within and drawing 
inspiration from what is known or familiar – is neither uncommon nor illegitimate in 
creative pursuits, least of all architecture.  It does not suggest that Libeskind’s proposal is 
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 The conceptual complexity of these projects is widely-recognised, though not elucidated in this necessarily 
brief mention. However, key aspects of these projects are discussed, throughout this chapter, as they are 
seen to manifests in the museum project under consideration. 
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 Young, "Daniel Libeskind's Jewish Museum in Berlin: The Uncanny Arts of Memorial Architecture," 11. 
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"building"; a view emerging after many years of inquiry that had primarily comprised a "rigorous investigation 
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merely regurgitative.  But, rather than uncanny, his approach shows itself to be canny.  
Although it might appear to be a kind of ‘self-emptying’, its carefulness and astuteness – 
indeed, its canniness – belie such characterisation.  It is not an approach that opens-up 
to, or engages and fills with, those unfamiliar others and other things that reveal a 
particular situation’s call.  Nor does it enable attentiveness to that call.  Rather than 
kenotic, Libeskind’s approach is assertive, a canny assertion of familiar knowledge 
(including any predilections and preconceptions that might reside therein); in effect a self-
assertion.  If there were a kenotic moment in the conception of the Jewish Museum, it 
would seem to have occurred as Libeskind initially explored his theoretical concepts in 
relation to the imagined situations he was then responding to; not years later, when, as it 
would appear, the knowledge of those earlier explorations was revisited and made to be 
assertable as a proposal in the museum competition. 
It is important to remember that, in 1988-89, Libeskind and his fellow competitors 
responded to a brief that would see the existing Berlin Museum expanded, with only one-
third of that expansion earmarked for the museum’s “Jewish Department.”  Libeskind’s 
“Between the Lines” was submitted as a solution to that ‘situation’, a situation that largely 
called for what Libeskind did not offer.  Indeed, as James Young describes it, Libeskind’s 
proposal was less a solution than an “architectural articulation” of the conundrum 
presented by the situation.35  Through its narrative, both explicit and implicit, as well as its 
formal expression, his solution had the effect of asserting an entirely different proposition.  
It declared the need for a Jewish Museum (if not a Jewish memorial), one that 
transgressed the competition brief in all of its terms – philosophical, aesthetic, functional 
– and one which eventually prevailed.  Following extensive deliberation and debate, the 
jury concluded that “the true dilemma at the heart of their project was not apparent … 
until revealed in Libeskind’s design.”36  Thus, an arguably canny proposal elicited an 
extraordinarily uncanny response.  A proposal that largely failed to be attentive to its 
situation at the time – not only as limited by context and brief but also by history, politics, 
and socio-cultural issues – saw the situation become attentive to the proposal; or, at 
least, saw the commissioners become more attentive to the situation as a result of the 
proposal.  The designer’s approach, though revealing little instantiation of kenosis, was 
met with a highly kenotic response from the commissioners.  They became suspicious of 
their own knowledge – their own canniness – and that enabled their opening up to the 
situation’s others and other things, which, until then, had remained concealed, ignored, or 
resisted.  Ironically, then, it is the commissioner’s approach – and the kenosis therein – 
that reveals a greater degree of uncanniness.  The startling nature of Libeskind’s 
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participation in the competition might therefore be seen as fortuitous in sparking a kenotic 
occurrence that the situation was calling for.  But that, in itself, does not make his 
proposed architectural solution either responsive to that shifting situation or uncanny. 
Further evidence of the proposed solution’s canniness is revealed in its near 
immutability.  Following the jury’s kenotic moment, a chain of significant events affects the 
project’s situatedness.  There occurs a kind of situational kenosis, even as the project’s 
design is being advanced.  The Berlin Wall falls, Germany reunifies, and the Berlin 
Museum is excised from the project; the latter a contentious political development that 
finally sees the entire project become the autonomous Jewish Museum Berlin (effectively 
by 1997, and officially in 1999).37  For the museum, important symbolic and functional 
ramifications arise from these developments, yet in the face of such vital changes, 
Libeskind proposes virtually no conceptual design changes in response.38  Only the 
designer’s conceptual narrative changes with the times.  As events unfold, Libeskind 
expands his project description by referring to other sources of inspiration, or what he 
calls other “dimensions of the project,”39 which were either not included or referenced 
tangentially in the original description.  Like many of the original concepts, these further 
named influences derive from Libeskind’s locality of knowledge.  An architectonic 
dimension comes from the hexangular geometries of the Star of David, distorted as a 
“nexus of lines connecting invisibles”40; a musical dimension from a long held fascination 
with the unfinished Schönberg opera, Moses und Aron; and a textual dimension from the 
Gedenkbuch, literally a ‘memorial book’ in two volumes, listing the names of Germans 
persecuted under the National Socialist regime, as well as their birth dates, deportation 
dates, and places of extermination.41  In later versions of this second narrative, Libeskind 
includes reference to a fourth and also textual influence: the writings of Walter Benjamin, 
particularly in One-Way Street, which are well known to the architect.42  Finally, by 1995, 
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with the museum becoming entrenched as a symbol for its own autonomy, Libeskind 
introduces yet another explanation for what he freely comes to call “the Jewish Museum.” 
In this third narrative, he focuses on “three basic ideas”: the intrinsic link between Berlin’s 
history and Jewish contribution, the integration of the Shoah into Berlin’s consciousness 
and memory, and the recognition of erasure and void to ensure the “human future” of 
Berlin’s and Europe’s history.43  Like earlier iterations, this is a distillation of the known or 
expected, the sagaciousness of the canny.  Taken together, these highly mutable 
narratives come to defend the immutability of the design concept and its formal 
expression, even in the face of situational transformation. 
Amidst the transformation, and as Libeskind is positing his second design 
narrative, Jacques Derrida responds to that narrative (a response to which I will later 
return).  Naming only two of the major shifts in Berlin’s boundaries and horizons, Derrida 
rhetorically asks Libeskind about the relationship between design and situational change.  
“During the process of the elaboration of plans of your project, as everybody knows, the 
Wall came down.  My question would be to what extent this event affected your project.  
Then there is the matter of reunification.”44  Derrida’s question opens up a broader issue.  
If the design proposal is conceptually responsive to the original situation, it follows that it 
could not go unchanged and remain equally responsive to a substantially altered 
situation.  Conversely, if, as already seen, Libeskind’s proposal is not responsive to the 
original situation, then it would have to be that the situation just happens to evolve in such 
a way that it becomes perfectly matched to the original proposal.  If the latter were the 
case, uncanniness – at least of the situation – appears undeniably established.  But, if 
that seems unlikely, there are at least three other scenarios to consider.  First, it could be 
that Libeskind’s solution is so universally ‘true’ as to transcend situation.  With its 
Modernist ring, such a notion is antithetical to Libeskind’s deconstructivist anti-
Modernism.45  After all, Modernism (particularly its universally true International Style) is 
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an assertion that disproved its own purported uncanniness.  Second, the proposal is so 
chameleonic as to succeed in adapting to the evolved situations.  Although such a 
scenario would present potential uncanniness, Libeskind’s proposal underwent no 
responsive adaptations to the evolving situations, and showed no proclivity for doing so.  
Third, the proposal is so self-assertive – and canny – as to simply overpower all 
situational forces.  This, I would suggest, is the more plausible scenario, but it is really a 
matter of little import, since all three scenarios suggest an indifference to situation.  None 
sees the project respond reciprocally to the kenosis of the situation, and, therefore, none 
convincingly reveals uncanniness in the project’s conception or production.46 
 
 
FIGURE 6.1 
Aerial view of the Jewish Museum Berlin, showing the zinc-clad, extruded zigzag form of Libeskind’s design.  
The fragmented concrete ‘void’ is evidenced only by a straight dual row of skylights on the new building’s roof 
(beginning top middle, extending to bottom left), which is interrupted as the solid form interacts with it.  To the 
right of the new museum ‘extension’ is its ‘host’, the Kollegienhaus, an historic Baroque building that serves 
as the public entrance to the entire complex and provides amenities.  To the new museum’s left is the only 
‘void’ externally expressed as concrete, the Holocaust Tower (top), and, behind it (middle), the Garden of 
Exile.  (Photo: Günter Schneider) 
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Formality and Spatiality 
But is it the case that canny conception and production is nonetheless capable of 
realising an architecture of uncanniness?  The realisation of Libeskind’s formal 
expression relies heavily on his own set of values – those of estrangement and 
unfamiliarity, disorientation and disintegration, fragmentation and void – as a vocabulary 
with which to express the uncanniness of Jewish history.  As seen, those values privilege 
acute angles and jagged geometry.  In fact, according to Libeskind, he began formal 
explorations with a geometric preconception: “I started by trying to plot a hexagonal 
figure; I don’t know why.  In a way it sounds very kitschy, the star of David; it is such a 
cliché.”  His explorations go on to see him draw connections, on a map, between the 
addresses of famous Jewish Berliners, from which emerges additional geometry.  “I 
ended up with a kind of distorted hexagonal set of lines.  It was a framework: I did not 
want to begin with a grid, or with a square or a module, but I had to start somewhere in 
the nowhere.”47  In these exercises, Libeskind can be seen to indulge in the very sort of 
geometric fixation for which Modernism is roundly criticised; an indulgence that is not 
uncanny. 
Emerging from this “rather irrational set of lines” is a zigzag floor plan, comprising 
space for most of the museum’s programmatic brief.  The lightning-bolt-like form, 
however, is only perceptible in plan; that is, from bird’s-eye view (see fig. 6.1).  It is 
virtually constant in cross-section, thereby producing a uniform extrusion of the zigzag.48  
As a result, the full impact of the form’s unusualness – potentially that which might 
contribute to a sense of estrangement and uncanniness – is absent for the visitor.  
Instead, from eye-level, there appears a relatively opaque and monolithic building mass, 
punctuated by occasional, angular slashes of glass that present Libeskind’s theme of 
randomly connected Berlin street addresses, but without any perceptible relation to the 
spaces through which they slash (see fig. 6.2).  As a counterpoint to the ‘solid’ zigzag 
form, a linear ‘void’ – also of constant width, but rising the full height of the building – 
pierces through the zigzag, manifesting wherever void intersects solid.  The result is 
actually a series of individual ‘voids’, but Libeskind envisages them as the fragmentation 
of one ongoing void (a notion that can only be perceived and understood by examining a 
floor plan).  This collection of voids (six within the zigzag, plus one in the museum’s 
original Baroque building and one detached as the ‘Holocaust Tower’) can, in some ways, 
be seen to represent the Jewish absence in Berlin – a “self-inflicted void at [the city’s] 
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 Libeskind, "Between the Lines: The Jewish Museum, Berlin," 83. 
48
 The plan’s ubiquitous use as the museum logo, combined with aerial photos in the museum guide, offer 
visitors the only visual reference to the jagged and disintegrated configuration they traverse. Its manifestation 
as a chrome-plated paperweight, on sale in the gift shop, provides the most tangible evidence of the form’s 
extruded three-dimensional reality. 
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centre.”49  Such a view, however, depends primarily on the perceivers’ attunement to and 
empathy with the project’s grounding – perhaps developed long before entering the 
building, and experienced at any number of places within it – rather than on the intrinsic 
character of these particular voids.  Indeed, these voids prove to be more sign than 
symbol.  The brutality of concrete construction is well suited to the desired notion of void, 
but were the building used for any other purpose, it might simply be said that the spaces 
in this jagged structure are organised around a series of ‘light wells’ – industrial in 
character. 
 
 
FIGURE 6.2 
Street level view of the Jewish Museum Berlin ‘extension’.  At the extreme left is the previous Berlin Museum 
(housed in the historic Kollegienhaus), which is now the public entrance to the entire museum complex. 
(Photo: Mark B. Schlemmer) 
 
 
To be expected from an extrusion, the museum’s interior spaces are as constant 
as the exterior form.  Although the zigzag plan creates a variety of exhibition halls with 
different sized and shaped floor plates – the result of “irregular shapes and odd angles”50 
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 Young, "Daniel Libeskind's Jewish Museum in Berlin: The Uncanny Arts of Memorial Architecture," 20. 
50
 A. Elon, "A German Requiem: Two Millennia of German History, Jewish Museum, Berlin," The New York 
Review of Books 48, no. 18 (2001), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2001/nov/15/a-german-
requiem/?insrc=toc. 
 217 
 
– they are largely of the same width, height, and rectangular cross-section.  They further 
present the same materiality: smooth walls and ceilings of constant light colour, with 
polished concrete floors.  The halls, therefore, tend toward monotony and anonymity.  As 
with the exterior form, punctuation of these spaces comes only by way of random, 
angular slashes of glass, which neither prefigure nor correspond to any cross-sectional 
angularity of space, or to anything other than flat, horizontal movement through the 
halls.51  The ensuing sameness demonstrates little virtuosity in the orchestration of space, 
material, and light.  Where the voids penetrate the halls, they do not reveal their ‘void-
ness’ but, instead, show themselves as objects with opaque walls and only small slits of 
glass through which the void – the hollow interior of the shaft-like object – can be viewed 
(if the narrow and relatively short slits are noticed).  Since the wall surfaces of the void 
are materially indistinguishable from other walls,52 they are presented in a contrasting 
colour: charcoal grey (see fig. 6.3).  Thus it would seem that objectification and colour-
coding are tasked with ensuring that the voids’ intended omnipresence is not overlooked.  
Not surprisingly, that proves ineffective.  What otherwise might be ‘bridges’ of some kind 
– crossing over or through the void, to encourage and amplify its encounter – actually 
manifest as curious and relatively narrow corridors between exhibit halls.  Corroborating 
my observations, an architectural critic and frequent visitor notes that “visitors pay [the 
voids] little heed, notice them only as passageways to be traversed or empty areas to be 
avoided, and not as metaphysical or existential challenges.”53  Indeed, challenges to the 
visitor are more often of the practical kind.  Libeskind’s composition has been so 
successful in achieving the intended visitor disorientation that museum officials have 
deemed it necessary to install permanent directional markers on floors throughout the 
museum54; all in an effort to make more apparent the hidden and confusing pathways to 
successive exhibits, exits, and entrances (see fig. 6.4). 
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 Vertical circulation is provided by several standard stairwells, where diagonal fenestration continues but not 
in any perceptible relation to the stairs or their angularity. (Lifts are provided elsewhere in unexpressed 
shafts). And, at the museum’s major stairway, inherently angular movement is greeted by a rare, nearly-
horizontal window. Although the window offers an arguably important view of the Berlin neighbourhood in 
which the museum is sited – and which was an important part of Jewish-German history – the juxtaposition of 
angular movement and horizontal window renders the view unachievable on all but a few of the stairway’s 
steps (which can also be unsafe). That contradicts the potential importance of the view, and, for many, the 
view goes unnoticed. 
52
 I refer, here, to the walls of the voids that face the exhibition halls. Only the interior surfaces of the voids 
reveal their concrete construction. 
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 P. Chametzky, "Not What We Expected: the Jewish Museum Berlin in Practice," Museum and Society 6, 
no. 3 (2008): 235. 
54
 The intentional confusion and disorientation presented by the museum’s plan might be rationalised as 
analogous to the extraordinarily traumatic confusion and disorientation of Nazi persecution and the Shoah. 
Such rationalisation, however, raises a question as to whether trauma (actually, mere traces of trauma that 
could be seen as tokenistic) needs to be repeated or re-presented in architectural form – and in an entirely 
different context – in order for it to be evoked and remembered. 
 218 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6.3 
View of a typical ‘void fragment’ (as seen looking from one exhibition space 
toward another), manifesting as a solid grey object that separates two 
corridors, each with a narrow slit for viewing into the void’s concrete shaft. 
 FIGURE 6.4 
Typical floor markers, as 
deployed to overcome visitor 
disorientation. 
 
The museum’s interior spaces are not entirely limited to those within the extruded 
zigzag.  In the museum’s basement entrance, Libeskind’s three axes of Jewish history – 
continuity, exile, and Holocaust – take the form of relatively narrow, tunnel-like, black and 
white corridors (see fig. 6.5).  Their skewed floor planes can be disconcerting, and their 
acute crossings, at three different and unprioritised junctures, present to visitors their first 
encounter with disorienting choices of direction.  Then, segregated from the zigzag, there 
are a further two components.  Indoors, but untempered and unlit – other than by the 
daylight from a small, invisible opening at the roof – one of the six voids appears as a 
free-standing, twenty-four metre high concrete shaft, called the Holocaust Tower (see fig. 
6.6), which is intended “to convey the feeling … of hopelessness.”55  Outdoors, The 
Garden of Exile (see fig. 6.7) comprises an ordered grid of forty-nine, closely spaced but 
traversable concrete stelae, each measuring seven metres in height and filled with earth 
that sustains one oleaster tree planted at its top.  Here, the skewing of the ground plane 
is exaggerated well beyond that of the interior axes, and the stelae are set perpendicular 
to the skewed plane such that they lean, pronouncedly.  For a visitor moving amongst the 
stelae, the combination of skewing and leaning creates physical dis-ease.  And that is 
precisely Libeskind’s intent.  “One feels a little bit sick walking through it.  But, it is 
accurate, because that is what perfect order feels like when you leave the history of 
Berlin.”56 
                                               
55
 C. Beeck, Daniel Libeskind and the Jewish Museum  (Berlin: Jaron Verlag, 2011), 49. This description of 
the emotion intended to be evoked – hopelessness – stands in contrast to the museum’s portrayal as an 
‘architecture of hope’, discussed in the next section of this chapter. 
56
 Chametzky, "Not What We Expected: the Jewish Museum Berlin in Practice," 225. This quotation appears 
on the 'wall statement' at the Garden of Exile. 
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FIGURE 6.5 
View of the primary public circulation and orientation spaces – with skewed floor planes – at the basement 
level of the new building.  These are the first spaces to greet visitors, immediately after entering the museum. 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6.6 
View from within the Holocaust Tower, a free-
standing concrete ‘void’, unconnected to the 
museum building except by tunnel. 
 FIGURE 6.7 
View from within the external Garden of Exile, 
showing the intentionally skewed stelae and floor 
planes. 
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In both formal and spatial expression, Libeskind strives for disintegration and, 
thereby, for what Anthony Vidler and James Young refer to as the uncanny.  Vidler 
expresses the intended uncanniness in vivid terms:  
… when confronted with the withdrawn exteriors and disturbing interiors of the 
Jewish Museum … we find ourselves in a phenomenological world in which both 
Heidegger and Sartre would find themselves, if not exactly ‘at home’ (for that was 
not their preferred place), certainly in bodily and mental crisis, with any trite 
classical homologies between the body and the building upset by unstable axes, 
walls and skins torn, ripped and dangerously slashed, rooms empty of content and 
with uncertain or no exits and entrances.57 
He rationalises the upset as “so many tests of our own abilities to endure the vertigo 
experience of the labyrinths that make up our modernity.”58  Vidler is not alone.  In the 
form of an open letter to Libeskind, philosopher David Krell praises the proposed 
building’s uncanniness, saying of what he expects to be its experience, “No one will feel 
at home, whether on the inside or the outside.”  For Krell, Libeskind’s museum is 
“architecture undone and redone,” an effective antidote against submission to a dreaded 
set of values: “beauty, harmony, and totality.”59  The bind, however, is that opposition to 
one set of values is the espousal of another; in this case, that of Krell, Libeskind, and 
others who undo and redo architecture, whether they be called Deconstructivists, Critical-
Modernists, Non-Modernists, or the next label that follows.  A dichotomy of value systems 
is established where there need be none.  In that light, this ‘avant-garde’ genre is 
exposed as mere latter-day Modernists, not any more avant-garde or uncanny than any 
other genre. 
Similarities between Modernism and the genre with which Libeskind is associated 
are seen least in Modernism’s socially-conscious beginnings and only somewhat in its 
rebelliousness (virtually all movements are somehow rebellious).  The most significant 
similarity is found in Modernism’s eventual assertion of an approach and design 
vocabulary so un-relational and unresponsive to situation as to be internationally 
transportable and transposable.  Libeskind’s work, but also that of others who are 
considered or consider themselves to be avant-garde, betrays exactly such 
transportability and transposability, even if not explicitly asserted.  Libeskind undoes and 
redoes architecture – wherever the opportunity arises – with forms and consequent 
spaces that are essentially oblivious to place.  Moreover, they are forms and spaces 
largely beholden to a relatively limited vocabulary of design already ‘familiar’ and ‘known’, 
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 A. Vidler, Warped Space: Art, Architecture, and Anxiety in Modern Culture  (Cambridge, Massachusetts 
and London, England: The MIT Press 2000), 237. 
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 Ibid., 240. 
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 Libeskind, Allen, and Krell, "Between the Lines: Extension to the Berlin Museum, with the Jewish Museum," 
55-56. 
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not only to him and those of like values, but also to the design community at large and, 
increasingly, to the public.60  Even as the Jewish Museum Berlin was being constructed, 
Libeskind was transporting many of its concepts, forms, and mannerisms to Osnabrück, 
at the opposite side of Germany, where they were transposed as a gallery to house the 
collection of Jewish painter Felix Nussbaum, murdered by the Nazis.61  Notwithstanding 
the obviously shared aspects of both projects, it is not unreasonable to argue that other 
significant differences in situation – including project brief, macro- and micro-
geographies, scale, client, and clientele – warrant, and would likely produce, substantially 
different responses and architectural expressions, if preconceptions were not being 
asserted.   
There are other instances that support the same argument.  For example, the 
acute angularity and zigzagging geometries of the Jewish Museum, recurring in much of 
Libeskind’s work, is transported to – and thereby suggested as being equally suitable for 
– an entirely different situation on another continent; namely, in his plan for the Denver 
Art Museum (2006).  Likewise, distinctly recognisable elements of the Jewish Museum’s 
façade are transported to Toronto and transposed in the Royal Ontario Museum (2007), 
although, there, the façade is even more exaggerated, like that which was to have 
originally enveloped the Jewish Museum, had its walls not been straightened.  Such 
international appearances are not all of Libeskind’s authorship, nor are they limited to the 
northern hemisphere.  In Australia, for example, at Melbourne’s Federation Square 
(2002), significant aspects of that project’s angular geometries, forms, and façades bear 
more than coincidental resemblance to the Jewish Museum Berlin (see fig. 6.8 and 6.9).  
Designed by Peter Davidson and Donald Bates, the project (which became their first 
constructed commission, just as the Jewish Museum had become Libeskind’s) was 
selected by international competition and judged by a panel that included Daniel 
Libeskind.  Bates had not only been a student of Libeskind’s at Cranbrook Academy of 
Art but also an employee at Libeskind’s Berlin office, where Bates served as an associate 
architect for the Jewish Museum competition entry.62  That a former student and 
employee might re-explore and re-present his mentor’s themes is neither surprising nor 
necessarily egregious.  The influence and application of architectural precedence is 
commonplace throughout history, absolutely original authorship being difficult to 
establish.  What is extraordinary – if viewed kenotically – is that a particular architectural 
expression, ostensibly conceived in response to a particular situation, could also be the 
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 Beeck, Daniel Libeskind and the Jewish Museum: 23. 
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best and most suitable response to a wholly different situation, particularly different in its 
geography and all that flows therefrom.  Such ready transportability and transposability 
exposes the canniness of these expressions.  It is by their un-fittingness that they are 
asserted to be fit responses to each of their situations.  Intentionally unfitting responses 
are, perhaps, the easiest to create and, certainly, amongst the most canny.  They merely 
conjure the unknown, knowingly.  They knowingly ignore or resist a situation’s kenosis, 
and are unaffected by their diaspora.  Indeed, they are incapable of knowing 
unhomeliness – uncanniness – because they know no home. 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6.8 
Exterior, Jewish Museum Berlin. 
(Photo: Wojtek Gurak) 
 FIGURE 6.9 
Exterior, Federation Square at Melbourne, Victoria, 
Australia. (Photo: Shutterstock) 
 
 
So-called avant-garde designs – particularly those that claim to be such – can 
soon appear familiar, largely because they are distinguished not by the uncanniness of 
unique and situationally-attentive response but simply by degree and manner of formal 
distortion, which is less a response than a preconception.  Although knowingly asserted 
distortion can succeed in inducing particular reactions (usually discomfort of a kind), that 
sort of success fails to prove the uncanniness of either the distorted architecture or the 
induced reaction.  For it must be asked whether, in such distortion, the mystery of the 
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experience can be held in uncanny tension.  Contrary to Libeskind’s claim that the 
museum “poses many questions to visitors,” and that “there is no set way to read [it],”63 I 
would suggest that his forms produce their effect in quite direct, calculated, and therefore 
canny ways.  In the case of the Jewish Museum, this is made almost self-evident by the 
fact that, at all of its major experiential junctures, the architect’s intention for each 
experience is presented as a wall statement.  About this, eminent Israeli journalist and 
author Amos Elon observes: 
On the one hand, Libeskind seems to believe that his architecture achieves 
nothing less than the evocation of sensations akin to those felt by deportees to 
concentration camps.  On the other hand, he seems so unsure that his building 
will reflect his intended message that he feels compelled to tell you, wherever you 
turn, what you are supposed to feel and where and what you must remember or 
reflect.64 
The experiences intended to be evoked at this museum are not unique, nor are 
they necessarily dependent on the distortion of its architecture or its architect’s 
descriptions of the effect such distortion should evoke.  Worldwide, various Shoah sites 
arouse the sickening sensations of the event and its memory.  Other ‘sites of memory’ stir 
a range of bodily and emotional experiences – as do many works of architecture – though 
not necessarily or exclusively by their assemblage of forms and spaces.  Uncanniness 
does not rely on the distortion of form and space.  Only if viewed elementally – in the 
well-known experiences of illusionary constructs such as the maze, the fun-house, the 
hall of mirrors, and the haunted house – is disorientation, disconcertion, dis-ease, and 
sickness reliant on architectural distortion.  And when such effects occur, they are 
anything but inexplicable or uncanny, other than to the most naive perceiver. 
 
Libeskind’s striving for uncanniness betrays canniness, which, in turn, betrays a 
form of ‘grasping’ and ‘exploitation’, the resistance of which is a prerequisite to kenosis.  
Such striving presents as self-assertion – the assertion of what one thinks one already 
knows.  It stands as a barrier to self-emptying and its consequent attunement to the 
fullness of place, or situation.  The realisation of Libeskind’s museum employs forms and 
spaces that assert uncanny credentials, boldly claiming that their assemblage comprises 
“a new Architecture,”65 an architecture supposedly unfamiliar and hitherto unknown.  But 
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the formality and spatiality of the building are soon seen to be quite conventional in their 
square tubularity, while the diagonal fenestration and jagged plan reveal as superficial 
manipulations, pursuant to the geometric preconceptions of the designer.  That revelation 
ironically echoes the same Walter Benjamin whose writing is named as one of the 
influences leading to the museum’s supposedly novel idioms: “The illusion of novelty is 
reflected, like one mirror in another, in the illusion of infinite sameness.”66  It is precisely 
such illusion that sees the canny fashioned as the uncanny, and the Modern fashioned as 
the Non-Modern or the Critical-Modern or the Deconstructed.  Not only does Libeskind’s 
response to this situation fail to react against the canniness of orthodox Modernism, it 
shows itself to be of the same ontology.  In its preconceptions and self-assertiveness, it 
fails to be attentive to the unfoldings of kenosis, the very unfoldings that open up domains 
beyond the reflected illusions of novelty.  The uncanny ultimately appears not as a result 
of grasping at it or exploiting it.  It appears experientially, from the unanswered, the 
unseen, the ineffable, and the unknown, those unintended consequences of created – but 
not contrived – relationships amongst form, space, and perceivers, or what Kahn called 
the ‘unmeasureable’. 
Derrida presents the prospect of illusion to Libeskind in two ways.  In the first 
instance, he refers to Gershom Scholem (a friend of Walter Benjamin) who, in a post-war 
speech marking the completion of a long-awaited Buber-Rosenzweig translation of the 
Bible into German,67 said that this particular translation was (in Derrida’s words) “a gift 
[that] the Jews, as guests (Gastgeschenk), wanted to give back to the Germans, but that 
it was too late; there had never been anything like a German-Jewishness or a Jewish-
Germanness,” and therefore it was a Bible that “nobody in Germany will ever read.”  
Then, viewing Libeskind’s museum as a similar sort of ‘gift’, Derrida asks Libeskind, 
“What do you think of this return of the museum as a gift … a ghostly gift to this 
country?”68  Scholem’s contention suggests that, in the long history of Jews and Germans 
in relation, there is actually an absence of relationship.  Amidst such absence, a ‘gift’ can 
be seen as an assertion and, rather than being met with acceptance, can occasion 
ambivalence or resistance.69  Indeed, Derrida’s question is made even more pertinent by 
the didactic and almost triumphal words with which Libeskind describes his ‘gift’: “Here at 
last [is] a place where Germans might face their history.”70  A gift conceived cannily, and 
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presented (or asserted) in the absence of a kenotic relationship between giver and 
receiver, cannot be uncanny any more than it can be kenotic or, ultimately, kind. 
In a second and related instance, Derrida recalls Walter Benjamin’s friendship, not 
only with Gershom Scholem, an anti-Communist ‘Zionist’ and scholar of Jewish 
mysticism, but also with Scholem’s older brother, Werner, a ‘Marxist’ who sat in the 
Reichstag as a member of the Communist Party (1924-28) but was eventually killed by 
the Nazis at Buchenwald. 
Benjamin was emblematically always divided between the Scholem brothers, 
between Zionism and Marxism.  I do not know what Benjamin – divided as he was 
between these Marxist-Russian and Jewish-Messianic poles – I do not know, but I 
wonder what he would have thought about your project …”71   
Here, seen through a kenotic lens, Derrida’s wondering exposes a dichotomy; that which 
exists between the Messianic, questioning, and always-yet-to-come nature of Zionism, 
and the political, didactic, revealed-truth nature of all ideologies, exemplified by Marxism.  
It is a dichotomy between the kenotic and the assertive; and, therefore, also between the 
uncanny and the canny.  Merely by raising the question and leaving it open, Derrida 
suggests that Benjaminian approval cannot be presumed.  In fact, an examination of the 
museum’s conception, production, and realisation suggests that Benjaminian approval 
can be imagined, confidently, only in a scenario that sees the emblematic divide closed in 
favour of Werner over Gershom.  That is a scenario never realised and one question, 
among many, left open by Benjamin’s suicide in 1940. 
Hope 
Open questions seem appropriate to Libeskind’s museum, insofar as its ability to leave 
“all questions intact, all doubts and difficulties in place” is offered as testimony to its 
uncanniness.  According to James Young, the questions left open are “as daunting as 
they are potentially paralysing” since they centre on the conundrum of linking “a museum 
of civic history with the altogether uncivil treatment of that city’s Jews,” and doing so 
without suggesting “reconciliation and continuity.”72  Philosopher Andrew Benjamin takes 
the position that in addressing such a conundrum, not with attempted answers but by 
holding open – in the present – the questions that surround and transcend it, the museum 
is “the architecture of hope.”73  This ‘hope’, a philosophical concept, is said to be found in 
the building’s relationality, incompleteness, and vigilance, as well as in its rejection of any 
ascribed identity.  It is to be found in its ‘work’ as art, or figure, holding open the 
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fundamental question of Jewish identity and being.  Such notions of hope are aspects of 
kenosis.  Therefore they, and their claimed architectural manifestations in this project, 
warrant further examination in the light of kenosis; an examination that compares 
‘illustration’ with ‘caption’ and assesses the extent to which this project can support the 
weight of the philosophy with which it has been laden. 
In the museum’s work, as figure, Benjamin emphasises the actative over the 
substantive,74 which can be read to suggest that what the building’s design instigates or 
inspires, as action, should perhaps be privileged over what it is, as substance – as 
constructed architecture.  Such privileging would see the action effected by the museum 
– even if effected only by its concept and not concretised beyond discourse – as being of 
greater import than either its built form or the performance of that form in pursuit of 
intended purpose.  Notwithstanding the merits of the actative, this premise effectively 
apologises and grants absolution, in advance, for any failings that might be found in the 
realised building, provided that its theory or concept fosters continued discourse 
concerning either its own claims or those attributed to it.  In fact, since the concept is 
already the dominant and deciding source of value, realisation would seem to be of little 
additional value.  But, if the architecture is realised in the substantive, the premise implies 
that its appearance and prompting of consequent discourse (both effecting a kind of 
kenotic opening-up) are sufficient to fulfil its actative work, whether or not it successfully 
‘works’ (i.e., performs or functions) in the manner expected or required by its 
commissioners and users.  Thus the premise can be seen to suggest that architecture 
has a capacity to achieve sufficient – if not greatest – value in a theoretical or conceptual 
state.  But can it be said that architecture is fully architecture while remaining in such a 
state?  Or, in that state, is it actually only architectur-al?  And, under such a premise, is 
consideration actually given to architecture, as that which is meant to be occupied, used, 
and experienced by human beings?  With those questions held open, for the moment, the 
search for hope in the Jewish Museum Berlin can continue. 
Reconciliation and Continuity 
Libeskind, himself, invokes the notion of hope in the original submission of “Between the 
Lines,” wherein he explains that the museum “must be a place where all citizens, those of 
the past, of the present, and of the future, discover their common heritage and individual 
hope.”75  In a later narrative, he anticipates the larger impact that the museum might have 
for Berlin, saying, “… the idea is to give a new value to the existing context, the historical 
                                               
74
 Ibid., 105. 
75
 Libeskind, Allen, and Krell, "Between the Lines: Extension to the Berlin Museum, with the Jewish Museum," 
48. 
 227 
 
context, by transforming the urban field into an open and hope-oriented matrix.”76  And 
after the museum’s opening, in yet another narrative called “Project Memory,” he states 
that his use of the void reveals the opening of a “hopeful horizon,” and adds that the 
museum as a whole is “an emblem of Hope” (with the word finally capitalised).77  The 
hope that Libeskind ascribes and invites to be ascribed to his museum is clearly not that 
which might be seen as false hope, nor is it the hope for some restorative outcome, 
especially one that leads to forgetting.  His fragments, splinters, and shards were, 
according to him, never “some prior whole” and cannot be “reassembled in some 
hypothetical future.”78  Young makes it clear that Libeskind’s fragmented forms eschew 
any suggestion of “wholeness and mending, salvation or redemption,” and, instead, 
“represent the breach itself, the ongoing need for tikun haolam … and its impossibility.”79  
Invocation of the term tikkun ha-‘olam (as it appears in rabbinic literature), or tikkun olam 
(as evolved in modern parlance),80 opens an important door to kenosis and invites further 
discussion about its manifestation in Libeskind’s museum. 
As seen in Chapter 2, but worthy of brief reprise, tikkun olam is pervasive in 
Judaism, but features centrally in Kabbalah, particularly Lurianic Kabbalah.  The latter 
advances the notion of zimzum, God’s withdrawal to make room for the creation that 
includes humanity and human activity, or, stated more broadly, the paradoxical concept 
of presence through absence.  Humanity is seen as having a duty to respond to ‘broken’ 
creation through tikkun olam: “a person’s theurgic potential to repair the fragmented world 
with the goal of restoring it to its original design.”81  In late modernity, these propositions 
spark renewed interest in, and an expanded view of, the Christian theology of kenosis.  
Therein, the Judaic notion of tikkun olam becomes a call for humanity’s kenotic response 
to divine kenosis; that is, a call for openness and responsiveness to the others and other 
things that comprise the world, society, and universe.  The concepts of tikkun olam and 
kenotic reciprocity, as well as the faith traditions in which they originate – Judaism, 
steeped in messianic waiting, and Christianity, with its anticipation of a ‘kingdom’ yet to 
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come – indisputably sustain a sense of incomplete restoration, even as they promote 
humanity’s responsibility to ceaselessly, constructively, and hopefully contribute to 
restoration’s pursuit.  Neither suggests that the pursuit is futile.  In fact, both call for action 
through substance, or the actative and the substantive. 
How does the Jewish Museum Berlin answer that call?  Echoing Libeskind’s own 
narratives, Young suggests that the call is answered by designing and building a re-
presentation of the un-mended and un-mendable breach, thereby ensuring the 
remembrance of both the breach and humanity’s duty to work toward mending.  That 
reckoning, however, exposes a bind.  By its purposeful striving to avoid any suggestions 
of mending, the Libeskind design is proposed as a symbol for the ongoing need to mend.  
But in that proposal is the suggestion that the museum can symbolise tikkun olam without 
accepting the responsibility that tikkun olam assigns to it; namely, to at least attempt to 
progress mending through its own manifestation.  Even in the face of trauma deemed 
impossible to mend – something as impossibly ‘saturated’ as the Shoah82 – the principle 
of tikkun olam does not exempt humanity from its responsibility to work toward the 
mending of a world overwhelmed by an un-mendable event.  The bind comes as 
Libeskind’s design eschews mending while also purporting to represent the very notion 
that insists mending not be eschewed.  Two aspects of this bind reveal kenotic potential, 
while a third precludes its realisation.  By resisting the portrayal of mending as something 
already complete, the design makes known that kenosis is not reconciliation – though it 
may prove reconciliatory – that it is always incomplete and remains challenging to all 
claims of self-sufficiency.  In its striving to ensure that the need for ongoing mending (of 
the breach) is never forgotten, the design upholds the ongoing relevance of kenosis and 
its hopefulness in the present.  But in forgetting or discounting the opportunity cum 
responsibility to progress mending – if not of the event, then of the world thereby affected 
– the design finally suppresses the kenosis that could advance unending remembrance 
and the efficacy of hope.  To respond to a traumatic event by reifying trauma in 
architecture – with architectural devices deployed for visual and other sensational effect – 
and, at the same time, intentionally suspending any response that might express the 
concept of healing’s pursuit (even if not its achievement), is to place at risk the trauma’s 
remembrance; that which this project sets out to ensure.  It is to reveal not openness, but 
closure; not kenosis, but an assertion that is ever subject to amnestic reaction when 
novelty inevitably wanes.  It is also to invite questions about the architecture’s kind-ness. 
Kenotic opportunity – not least, the opportunity for kind-ness – can be located in 
the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas (introduced in Chapter 2), who looks outside the 
incarnation-centred Christian interpretations of kenosis (largely avoided in Jewish 
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theology83), and beyond Kabbalistic zimzum, to see kenosis as having “full meaning in the 
religious sensibility of Judaism.”84  If divine kenosis is seen as God’s self-contraction, or 
absence, made present not in the Christian messiah but in ‘the other’, and if such 
absence is seen to consequently result in the disruption of religious desire and its 
redirection from the transcendent to the immanent,85 then “human existence should not 
be thought of as ‘self-oriented,’ but as a ‘reception of the other,’”86 even “the other not 
worthy of desire.”87  Such kenotic receptivity is an ethical responsibility (not unlike tikkun 
olam) and not a “free decision of the receiving subject,” especially since Levinas sees the 
other as “an unwelcome intruder: the one who disturbs the peace, the one I do not want, 
the ‘unwanted par excellence.’”88  In that light, it might be tempting to analogously view 
the disintegrated motif of the Jewish Museum Berlin as the intruding unworthy other, 
eliciting hesitant receptivity from those receiving subjects it disturbs (its visitors), and to 
thereby see the relationship as kenotic.  But, such is a perversion of kenosis, particularly 
Levinasian kenosis, because, in this instance, the other (the museum) is intentionally 
distorted – intentionally made to appear unworthy – to attract the attention of the receiver; 
in essence grasping or begging for that attention.  The other is thus not kenotic, but self-
assertive.89 
The kenotic opportunity of this project, much of which I argue is overlooked, lies in 
an architecture that would responsibly – even if reluctantly – receive its ultimately 
intrusive, disturbing, and unwanted other: the fragmented events of Jewish contribution 
and persecution in Berlin, climaxing in the Shoah.  It would do so, not with didactics or 
falsely sentimental notions of reconciliation and uninterrupted continuity, but with 
openness, unresolvedness, and emptiness; a peculiar and paradoxical architecture of 
kind-ness.  Such architecture would be able to hold ineffable tension without resorting to 
the indignity and futility of shouting, instead letting the tension be revealed uncannily, in a 
way “not of this world.”90  It would be able to present that tension humbly, without a need 
to re-present it.  I contend that such architecture would even be able to meet the 
challenge presented by philosopher and sociologist Theodor Adorno (1906-1989).  
Initially declaring that “to write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric,” he later acknowledges 
that suffering has a “right to expression,” and concedes that perhaps some “poems may 
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be written.”  In support of that possibility, he cites playwright Samuel Beckett and, in 
particular, his play Endgame as providing “the only fitting reaction to the situation of the 
concentration camps – a situation he never calls by name, as if it were subject to a strict 
image ban.”91  The sort of architecture that arises out of kenosis – in response to an 
utterly un-kenotic event – is that which would have no need for spectacular identity, in 
name or image.  It would have no need to claim the status of poetry, but would become 
such by receding, poetically.  It would recede to the overwhelm-ment of the event, rather 
than meeting the event with architectural attempts to overwhelm.  And while honouring 
the ineffableness of the event, it would nonetheless give expression to the event’s 
trauma, through “a gentle whisper.”92  Such architecture would vigilantly maintain the 
questions and confirm their unanswerableness, but advocate that in their mystery lies 
hope.   
Questions and Negotiations 
Andrew Benjamin contends that Libeskind’s design for the Jewish Museum Berlin 
exemplifies the unanswered question and the hope therein, while it might appear that I 
suggest the opposite, particularly concerning the design’s realisation.  The difference is 
not, in fact, one of opposition, but, rather, emerges from Benjamin’s emphasis on the 
project’s actative work and my insistence that such emphasis can lead to a discounting of 
architecture’s physical manifestation and experientiality.  In the museum’s conceptual 
narrative – at least in the actative interdisciplinary dialogue produced as a result of that 
narrative – the project may do all that Benjamin describes.  But in its substantive work – 
its unexpurgated performance as architecture – it reveals severe deficiencies.  In no way 
does this impugn the merits of Benjamin’s philosophical exploration of hope or the value 
of its application to architecture.  Indeed, it is stimulating to ponder what the architectural 
outcome of the Jewish museum project might have been, had Benjamin’s ideas formed 
the original brief.  But advancing those concepts, as worthy philosophical aspirations for 
the project, is something quite different to locating their achievement in Libeskind’s built 
solution. 
According to Benjamin, a question can be built and a building – more particularly, 
Libeskind’s museum – can be the manifestation of a question.93  He sees such a 
construct as: 
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… a building that guards the question of representation, refusing it finality and 
thus necessitating its retention as a problem to be investigated, while allowing at 
the same time presentations; a building that questions display while allowing for 
display; a building that in its effectuation as building, holds open the question of 
remembrance as question, enjoining humility while providing – because of the 
question – the necessity for a vigilance that can be identified as present 
remembrance.94 
Absent finality, there is a “structure of hope” – not in the future, but the present – one in 
which answers may be produced, “but not the answers that close off the question.”  In the 
case of Libeskind’s museum, it is its void that assumes the central role of holding open 
the question.  In one iteration of Libeskind’s narrative, the void promises “to be 
experienced by the public … visible, accessible.”  Accepting that promise, Benjamin 
anticipates an “inscribed and insisting void, a void space that is always being 
encountered.”95  But neither the promise nor the anticipated result is fulfilled. 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the void’s visibility and opportunity for 
encounter is something far less than the narrative promises.  While passing from gallery 
to gallery, there is limited and uncelebrated visibility into the void’s various fragments, and 
therefore little experience of them – more often obliviousness.  Accessibility is similarly 
limited, though not completely.  Of the six fragments that comprise the jagged building’s 
central void, only two are accessible.  One is experienced at the Rafael Roth Learning 
Centre, in the museum’s basement.  There, one is offered an upward glimpse from a 
lecture space, whose furnishings and activities compromise the sense of absence that 
the void is intended to evoke.  The second, known as the Memory Void, can also be 
entered, but only if its entrance is discovered at the end of a temporary gallery; a 
discovery easily missed.  The Memory Void is relatively large and presents as a 
potentially significant experience of void.  But its emptiness – an important dimension of 
which is aural – is filled with the harsh and highly reverberant noise of footfall on loose 
steel discs, which cover this void’s floor as an art installation, called Shalechet.96  Two 
other voids – not part of the fragmented central void and segregated from the main 
building – are also accessible.  The first is located in the adjacent Kollegienhaus – a 
Baroque building that originally served as a Prussian courthouse and later became the 
Berlin Museum – and serves as the sole point of ingress and egress to the new 
‘extension’.  As such, it is an unavoidable void and, therefore, the most encountered.  Its 
void-ness, however, is compromised by the constant flow of visitor traffic descending and 
ascending the staircase it envelops; a staircase leading to the primary public circulation 
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and orientation spaces (or dis-orientation spaces, as Libeskind would have it), at the 
basement level (seen earlier in fig. 6.5)  The second is the most popular void – the 
Holocaust Tower (described earlier, and seen in fig. 6.6) – and the void that best fulfils 
the promise of encounter and experience with absence.  Yet, because it is segregated 
and a terminal destination (as it symbolically needs to be), it cannot contribute to the 
experience of a larger void that is always being encountered.  Hence, whether considered 
individually or collectively, the void, as physically manifested and conjoined to the 
function of the museum, is not insisting and pervasive in the experiential way that 
conceptual narratives and philosophical musings suggest. 
However, to say that the void is not in any way insisting and pervasive would be 
incorrect.  Describing the specific manner in which the museum might hold open the 
question and embody present hope, Benjamin sees the void “giving rise to the necessity 
that each exhibition, if not the policy of exhibition itself, will have to negotiate with it”97; the 
premise being that the unending need for such negotiation ensures the question’s 
unresolvedness.  Actually, he sees a twofold negotiation, anticipating the first to take 
place between the museum building and its visitors, with each visitor having to “confront 
the void” while viewing the exhibits.  As already seen, that negotiation proves less 
confronting than imagined and, in key instances, goes unnoticed due to the void’s weak 
manifestation and restricted experientiality.  But the second negotiation is unavoidable: 
“Curators will have to negotiate with the void in constructing and planning exhibitions.”  In 
fact, Benjamin foretells, the curators will have to negotiate with “each aspect of the 
Museum,” because all aspects “will combine in such a way as to hold the question in 
place,” and “their combination will define the ambit of curatorial practice.”98  This concept 
of spatial and material negotiation is intriguing, both philosophically and architecturally, 
but, once again, this ‘caption’ is at odds with the ‘illustration’ it describes.  The museum, 
as built, is simply not designed to negotiate, at least not if the definition of negotiation is 
seen as holding open the questions of give and take, compromise, and equitable 
outcome amongst the negotiating parties. 
As Benjamin predicts, the fragmented void does manifest amidst the exhibition 
galleries as something to be dealt with.  But rather than spaces of emptiness and 
absence, to be experienced as counterpoints or complements to the exhibition galleries, 
they present as a series of objects; essentially opaque shafts (seen earlier in fig. 6.3).  
For visitors, these objects must simply be gotten past while en route to the next gallery.  
Such ‘negotiation’ is merely navigation, not mutual engagement.  For curators, there is no 
alternative but to plan around the object-like fragments of void, wherever they happen to 
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occur and regardless of legitimate exhibition needs.  Such is not negotiation at all but, 
instead, preordained surrender.  Furthermore, like the entire museum, the void was 
conceived, designed, and constructed well before either exhibition needs or curators 
were known.  Forfeited, in that sequence of events, was the opportunity for preliminary 
negotiations – at the conceptual and creative stages – that may have produced a building 
capable of subsequent and ongoing negotiations.  In that forfeiture, the void and other 
aspects of the museum do, as predicted, conjoin to define the ambit of curatorial practice.  
They do so, however, not by encouraging negotiation, but by precluding it. 
Although Libeskind’s original design submission touts “a set of flexible spaces,”99 
the size, shape, and character of the realised exhibition galleries are fixed and invariable, 
not unlike traditional, nineteenth and twentieth century museums.100  Despite the 
conceptual equation of fragmentation with incompletion or unfinishedness, the building, 
as constructed, is anything but incomplete or amenable to ‘finishing’.101  It is, therefore, 
always the prevailing party in any negotiations, a situation that renders the negotiation 
unnegotiable before it commences.  Having no choice but to accept the building’s 
unyielding obstacles, curators are often forced into awkward solutions – making already 
awkward spaces even more so.  Within the galleries, there are added mezzanine 
platforms and staircases (inaccessible to the disabled), subdividing partitions, and 
incongruous exhibit fittings, almost all indifferent to, if not in conflict with, the architecture.  
As a consequence, exhibitions often appear as guests in their own home (see figs. 6.10 - 
6.12).  Equally apparent are curatorial attempts to deal with the random placement of 
diagonal windows – and the sometimes unwanted light they admit – by going so far as to 
cover them over with black film or bespoke architectural devices, such that exhibits and 
exhibit fittings can be configured with less restriction (see fig. 6.13).  Now permanently 
installed, it is obvious that such features were neither anticipated by the architect nor able 
to be accommodated by the architecture.  Curators are coping – sometimes desperately 
– with an architecture of intransigence.  Lamenting what he sees as the galleries’ 
“bewildering maze of crammed nooks and corners,” Amos Elon nonetheless expresses 
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admiration for these curators, saying that others “might have been discouraged from 
trying to fit a museum into such a Procrustean bed as its building.” 102 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6.10 
Typical exhibit spaces, showing curatorial installations, conceived and installed over the 
course of more than two years following the museum’s construction. 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6.11 
A typical exhibit space prior to curatorial installations, 
showing the relationship of angular fenestration to 
the then-empty space – at a time when the ‘museum’ 
served largely as a ‘memorial’. 
(Photo: Stefan Müller) 
 FIGURE 6.12 
The same exhibit space after curatorial installations, 
showing the scale and relationship of angular 
fenestration to later exhibits and exhibition 
furnishings.  
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FIGURE 6.13 
Detail views of typical curatorial attempts to ‘negotiate’ with the fenestration.  Left, a 
permanent baffle covers the window but allows the indirect admission of light.  Right, 
material is used to totally black-out the window and light.  
 
These circumstances do not point to the ongoing negotiation of an open question.  
Instead, they highlight a domineering building, which, by its self-assertion, closes off 
questions, particularly ones of context, curatorship, and use.  Such an outcome was 
neither unpredictable nor unpredicted.  According to James Young, the competition jury 
expressed concern “that in the face of such a stupendously monumental piece of 
architecture … the contents of the museum itself would wither in comparison”; the 
museum’s then-director saying that the building “might seem to make its contents 
subordinate and insignificant.”103  Young obliquely acknowledges the same concern, but 
effectively absolves any eventual curatorial difficulties with the justification that 
Libeskind’s disintegrated design resists “continuous, homogenous history-housing” and 
thereby “never allows memory of this time to congeal into singular, salvational 
meaning.”104  Barely veiled is a presupposition that the exhibition of discontinuous and 
heterogeneous history requires a disintegrated building, and that architectural resistance 
is necessary to avert redemptory presentations; a presupposition that, itself, closes off 
the question of curatorship and rules in favour of architecture.  Final absolution, however, 
comes in an each-way bet, when Young concludes that Libeskind’s design is “partly 
integrationist and partly disintegrationist,” one that “allows for the attempt at integration as 
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an ongoing, if impossible project, even as it formalises disintegration as its architectural 
motif.”105  Young’s contention implies – and reality confirms – that attempts to integrate 
architecture and curatorship are largely futile, essentially unnegotiable by virtue of the 
building’s self-assertion.  In a sense, the ongoing struggle between building and 
exhibitions is a fulfilment of Libeskind’s claim the museum is “a new realisation of the 
relationship between program and architectural space.”106  But the achievement is neither 
constructive nor, in reality, supportive of the underlying merits in Young’s and Benjamin’s 
themes. 
So, what might be an alternative?  An architectural solution instantiating kenosis 
can be envisaged as offering the flexible spaces that Libeskind promised.  Such spaces, 
along with other unfixed features, would enable relationality and genuine negotiations 
amongst the context, visitors, curators, and exhibitions – present and future – with which 
the museum purports to conjoin in a matrix of hope.  Benjamin argues that gestures 
toward the future risk dislocation of the question from the present, and that such gestures 
require “spatial neutrality,” which, at least in concept, the Libeskind design avoids.107  The 
realisation of Libeskind’s design, however, delivers exactly such spatial neutrality and, 
with it, the spatial inertia evidenced by sameness, rigidity, and stringency – especially in 
its galleries.  It follows, then, that a kenotically-derived alternative would be marked by the 
openness necessary to perpetuate the question, by some form of spatial kenosis or 
capacity for spatial self-emptying, and by concurrent receptivity to situational demands.  
In short, it would enjoy a capacity for complex relationality with all that the building is 
meant to engage.108  Countering neutrality and inertia, spatial kenosis offers a dynamism 
that perpetuates the question, in both the present and the future (a future that, according 
to both Benjamin and kenotic thinking, is located already in the present).  Indeed, spatial 
kenosis addresses Benjamin’s contention that the future “will demand another 
thinking.”109  It does so by opening-up, and opening-up to, exactly such thinking(s); by 
accommodating changed boundaries, new domains, and resultant emergences that the 
perpetuated question and interim answers present over the course of the building’s 
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lifetime.  Spatial kenosis does not exclude the particularity of spaces such as a Holocaust 
Tower, or a Garden of Exile, which serve to anchor the boundaries of openness at its 
edges.  Nor does spatial kenosis lead to the banality of multi-use space.  It simply asks of 
space – of architecture – that it be humble enough to respond, perhaps reluctantly but 
always responsibly and hospitably, to the disturbances of open questions, yet strong and 
confident enough (even in spectacular modesty) to do so while maintaining integrity and 
identity.  Such architecture is positioned, over the self-assertive, to sustainably be “an 
architecture of the question.”110 
Identity and Being 
The question of Jewish identity is that which Libeskind’s museum design is said to hold 
open, and, in so doing, invoke present hope.  In the built and curated museum, two 
statues stand side by side, as their kin have done since medieval Christianity.  Both of 
attractive female form, they are replicas of those at the Roman Catholic cathedral of 
Bamberg, Germany, and are similar to those at other such cathedrals (see fig. 6.14).  
Ecclesia, the allegorical figure of the Christian church, stands next to its counterpart, 
Synagoga, personifying the Jewish synagogue.  Although there are many versions and 
variations, Ecclesia is typically portrayed as forward looking and self-sufficient, even 
triumphal, while Synagoga is limp, downcast, and often blindfolded.  It is Synagoga that 
Benjamin uses to explicate one view of the question of Jewish identity – that of being a 
Jew, not of Jewish being – a view that closes off the question.111  A short sketch of his 
narrative, though not fully just, provides a sufficient platform for further analysis.  “The 
blinded Synagogue is linked to the Jew’s blindness and refusal” to accept the Christian 
messiah; the obvious deficiency of Judaism in Christian thinking.  “Their refusal,” 
according to Pascal, writing in the Pensées, “is the foundation of [Christian] belief.”  This 
is a portrayal not of mere blindness but of stubborn blindness, a “sustained lack of in-
sight” despite the alleged clarity of what is available to be seen.  It is a “gift” to the Jews of 
a lesser identity, one described by Sartre as “segregated, untouchable, shamed and 
proscribed”; in essence, “pitiable.”  It is a gift that can be neither simply refused nor 
completely destroyed.  It thereby carries “the intention that Jews, in order to be Jews, 
would then have to live out the expectations and possibilities” that the asserted ascription 
presents, or at least accept them as part of the framework surrounding the question of 
identity.  “Thus the Jew is positioned, by Christian thought, not as the other … but as 
involved in a relation of dependency that holds the Jew outside.”  Such dependency 
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fosters abjection, which, in turn, sanctions thoughts of “expulsion [to] rid Christianity of its 
relation of necessity to the blind Jew” 112; thoughts that have been seen to conjure violent 
perpetrations. 
 
 
FIGURE 6.14 
On display in the museum, replicas of two statues at the cathedral of Bamberg, Germany.  
Left, Ecclesia and, right, Synagoga. 
 
Here, in a depiction offered by two stone figures, the Christian faith – whose myth, 
distinction from Judaism, and claim to relevance are entirely dependent on assertions of 
kenosis – can be seen responding to another faith, of common heritage, in a manner 
wholly antithetical to kenosis.  The response is not self-emptying openness to the other.  
Instead, it is judgement and a dependent identity; such identity ascribed to the other by a 
party that asserts its dominance only out of the authority of its own assertions.  A twofold 
disparity is thus revealed, one deriving from an indemonstrable – though not simply 
rejectable – assertion by Christians toward Jews, and another from a self-evident 
                                               
112
 Benjamin, Present Hope: Philosophy, Architecture, Judaism: 105-109. 
 239 
 
incongruence between Christianity’s assertiveness and its claim to kenosis.  The former 
exploits what Benjamin calls “disequilibrium of power,”113 even as the latter signals an 
hypocrisy that ultimately, and paradoxically, disallows the dominant position being 
grasped at.114  The product of Christianity’s performance – the two statues – attempts to 
answer the question of Jewish identity.  Although much of the question is answered by 
the creation and promulgation of the image of Synagoga, it is only by conjoining it to the 
image of Ecclesia that relationality is established and the question can be seen as closed.  
But two entirely different images can be imagined, emerging not from asserted 
dominance but from a kenotic posture, and necessitating neither disequilibrium nor 
perfect symmetry.  Such transformation is made possible in a celebration of difference – 
an engagement that challenges one another’s self-sufficiency, and sees each partially 
become the other, even while retaining fundamental self-identity.  In that kind of 
celebration, the moulding and ascribing of identity is rendered impossible, because 
identity is grounded in being and being unfolds kenotically – openly and questioningly. 
Although silent on the subject of Ecclesia, Benjamin contrasts the figure of 
Synagoga with the figure of Libeskind’s museum, suggesting that, unlike Synagoga, 
Libeskind’s museum design “allows identity to endure as a question.”  It does so by being 
a museum of “remembrance” and “acts of commemoration.”  Its very “nature” questions 
those aspects of its being, and therefore the building remains a question.  Thus, the 
claim: “What it holds in place is the link between being and questioning.”115  Benjamin 
declares that such “is the only possibility” for a Jewish museum, but stops short of saying 
that Libeskind’s museum is its only possible manifestation, acknowledging instead that 
this “singular possibility … has no single predictable concrete form.”116  I argue similarly, 
up to a point.  Indeed, Benjamin’s singular possibility is a worthy aspiration of, and 
properly belongs to, a Jewish museum in Berlin.  It proposes that such a museum – 
irrespective of Libeskind’s particular manifestation – must remain open to the questioning 
of itself, its work, and, by inference, the relation of itself and its work to the others thereby 
engaged.   In short, the museum must remain open to its being.  Benjamin’s proposal can 
thus be seen as a call for kenotic architectural response.  And a kenotic response to 
events so antithetical to kenosis is, if not the only possible response, at least a response 
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with heightened potential to be situationally attentive, or ‘fitting’, and also uncannily hope-
filled. 
At that important juncture, however, my argument diverges, because Libeskind’s 
museum – if viewed, beyond its narrative, to include conception, realisation, and 
experience – is not such a response.  In fact, in its assertion of self-sufficiency and 
singularity, and in its inability to negotiate with the others and other things that its work 
engages – curators, exhibitions, and users – it works to reveal two paradoxes.  First, by 
its dominant counter-relational performance, it cannot be likened to Synagoga.  Instead, it 
bears semblance to that which it is not meant to be, Ecclesia; in this context a symbol of 
perpetration.  Then, in its fixed and stubborn formalisation, it answers and closes off the 
question of its identity, and thus resembles that which it is meant to oppose, Synagoga; 
blind to the situation, and pitiable.  Libeskind’s museum is intended to be like neither of 
these two figures it contains, but, in its desperate attempt to avoid the connotations of 
each, it becomes both.  As such, it accepts that Ecclesia and Synagoga frame the field in 
which the question of its identity is to be examined.  Instead of being an architecture of 
the question, Libeskind’s building is an assertive statement (like Synagoga); instead of an 
organism that pulsates and responsively reacts to the contingent events of its being, it is 
single-minded and disinterested (like Ecclesia).  Instead of linking its being with 
questioning, the museum responds to its situation much as medieval Christianity did to 
Judaism, with an assertion of power supported only by the certitude of its own assertions.  
Certitude attenuates the need for hope and its promise, while assertiveness proves futile, 
and both are susceptible to pity and laughter. 
Laughter 
A third and final theme in this discussion is that of ‘laughter’.  The source of this theme 
comes from Libeskind’s “paradigm of the irrational,” which he explains by stating that “the 
best works of contemporary spirit come from the irrational, while what prevails in the 
world, what dominates and often kills, does so always in the name of Reason.”117  
Declaring the irrational to have been the museum’s “nonbeginning,” Libeskind seeks a 
clear disassociation with reason and what Stanley Allen terms “the rationality of 
instrumental logic.”  This attempt at disassociation is somewhat ironic since Libeskind’s 
predilections toward unusual and distorted forms depend, almost entirely, on the most 
rational and logical of instruments for their realisation: the computer.  The logic of forms is 
inversely proportional to the logical power required for their determination, and, in that 
sense, Libeskind’s architecture is ultimately the work of logic and rationality.  It is not that 
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irony, however, which prompts the ascription of laughter to Libeskind’s work.  Allen 
describes Libeskind’s practice as a “practice of laughter” and amplifies the theme, saying 
that the work of such a practice – in particular, the Jewish museum – “must erupt in 
hysterical laughter at the absurdity of reason itself.”  One such eruption is purported to 
occur in Libeskind’s design process, which, according to Allen, seeks neither to find 
meaning nor to have meaning found in it.  Instead, it reveals itself as “a fact of the 
making,” a process both “unfinished and undecidable,” employing logic “only to call logic 
into question,” and producing an object that is “always more and less than the record of 
its making.”  These attributes are named as the irrationalities of Libeskind’s process and 
equated to the “contradictory structure of laughter,” the embrace of which is posited as 
the only means to confront the “absence and horror” that underlie the museum project.  
Therefore, “this is a building that must disturb: out of disaster, laughter and ‘convulsive 
beauty.’”118   
In this paradigm of the irrational, set in opposition to the rational, there arises a 
problem inherent in many dichotomies: the criteria by which either trait can be precisely 
established is unclear, except perhaps at the traits’ extremes.  Exactly at what point, and 
by what actions, does a purportedly rational design process become irrational; and at 
precisely what point does an irrational process cease to be so?  Many other corollary 
questions emerge to challenge this logic that claims to question logic.  Can a creative 
process (distinct from mathematic or scientific processes, themselves not absolute) ever 
be completely finished or fully decidable?  Can a process be creative if it fails to be 
suspicious of its own logic?  Can an object produced creatively (extra-engineering) be 
merely a record of its making – no more or less?  Can a creative process be undertaken 
and, of necessity, concluded without there remaining unexplored avenues of further 
promise and hope?  More fundamentally, can creativity really be reduced to a ‘process’, 
or can it only ever be an indeterminate and contingent pursuit of one approach amongst 
many?  Are not all creative acts animated by kenosis, whether its effect is seen or 
unseen, attended to, ignored, or resisted?  Are not all creative acts unfoldings and 
openings-up – at cosmic, evolutionary, and human levels – subject to the contradictory 
structure of laughter? 
The latter three questions again evoke a Levinasian view of kenosis.  Therein an 
utterly irrational “divine comedy” proposes the absurdity of an absent God being made 
present in the other, often intrusively and disturbingly.  With that proposal, it also absurdly 
redirects humanity’s desire for contact with God back to humanity itself, even to those 
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perceived as least god-like.119  This is the kenosis of dispossession, a disruptive emptying 
of power and simultaneous filling with strength.  It is ultimately foolish in its proposition of 
powerlessness, and ultimately irrational in its proposition that such powerlessness has 
power.  So, kenosis is seriously foolish and irrational.  But it cannot be taken with the 
seriousness that renders it strategic.  “When foolishness becomes serious, [it is] no 
longer truly foolish.”120  The mere pretence of irrationality and foolishness – the striving for 
and exploitation of such traits for the sake of establishing power, winning, or out-doing, 
and without a full, foolish, and powerless opening-up – is antithetical to kenosis.  Indeed, 
the work arising from such pretence turns back into the realm of the rational, serious, and 
canny, from which it tries so desperately to flee.  I contend that the Jewish Museum Berlin 
is a casualty of exactly such paradox. 
When Libeskind’s procession of narratives is placed in dialogue with concurrent 
and subsequent philosophical analyses, the result is a compendium of rationale for the 
museum’s design.  Instead of eschewing “reasons and signs”121 – as kenosis would 
suggest, and as Libeskind’s irrationality claims to do – the museum is surrounded and 
filled by them, in a relentless challenge to the claim.  If one looks beyond what appears to 
be an irrational form, the manifestation of Libeskind’s design proves to be rational and 
reasoned.  Its fundamental architectural element is that of square hollow tubes (one 
jagged, one straight but fragmented), in which jaggedness and fragmented-ness present 
more as gimmicks than as consistently compelling spaces or experiences.  There is a 
twist, however.  Amidst Libeskind’s strategic and rational decision to evoke irrationality, 
the only irrationality that actually results is functional.  And such functional irrationality is 
merely the predictable consequence of those originating rational decisions.  In all of this, 
the building reveals an ultimately economic logic: the value of the spectacle of irrationality 
is greater than the value of the museum’s functional and experiential performance.  
Kenosis, on the other hand, has no economic logic, no quid pro quo.  It simply unfolds.  It 
is a challenge to “power and rationality, but not one that substitutes a new concept of 
power and rationality.”122  It is, and remains, a foolish and irrational comedy.  Thus, in 
grasping for irrationality, Libeskind precludes an irrational realisation and shows the 
grasping to be the comedy. 
It follows, then, that a ‘practice of laughter’ is actually one that emanates in 
kenosis, not one whose work must erupt in hysterical laughter, but one that is – absurdly 
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and with great abandon – willing to erupt if the situation calls for that or, equally, to 
subside for the same reason.  It does not strive for irrationality because to do so requires 
rational intent; nor does it strive for rationality, because such striving proves vainly 
irrational.  Instead, it sits comfortably with both, as in the tension and contradictory 
structure of laughter.  In his rationale for a practice of laughter, Allen cites the writing of 
Comte de Lautréamont: 
My reasoning will sometimes jingle the bells of madness and the serious 
appearance of what is, after all, merely grotesque (although according to 
philosophers, it is quite difficult to tell the difference between the clown and the 
melancholic man, life itself being but a comic tragedy or a tragic comedy).123   
Lautréamont invites considerations that perhaps go beyond those Allen intended.  In a 
strategic attempt to achieve irrationality, Libeskind risks creating a serious appearance of 
what is, after all, merely grotesque.  He risks creating an architecture that is both clown-
like and melancholic, with the potential to elicit reactions of laughter (as is suggested to 
be the intention) or, alternatively and just as likely, reactions of pity.  In connection with a 
Jewish museum in Berlin, the risk is elevated by the history of Jewish disparagement and 
persecution, symbolised in the previously-discussed figure of Synagoga.  If a practice of 
laughter is to produce such a museum, it cannot afford to create a pitiable laughing stock 
– the laughter directed to its pitiable-ness indistinguishable from the pity directed to its 
laughable-ness.  It cannot risk the assertion of cheap and contrived comedy or the 
strategic deployment of laughter as a winning end; for “the fool’s laughter is not designed 
… or else the fool would no longer be a fool.”124  Viewed kenotically, a practice of laughter 
must foolishly give up goals of mastery and winning, give up reasons and signs (and their 
inherent logic).  Indeed, it must give up gamesmanship – particularly one-upmanship – 
and leave the “nothingness of kenosis … dangling and disturbing.”125 
Foolishly opening itself up, a practice of laughter makes itself vulnerable.  In the 
consequent emptiness, it attends to all aspects of its situatedness: the disturbing 
bedazzlement of complex relationality presented in the project, its contexts, and those 
others and other things that affect or are affected by it.  Although attentiveness is never 
finished or completed (even though it may necessarily be concluded for a time) it enables 
the emergence of paradox, irony, and therein laughter – even hysterical laughter.  Such 
laughter is not only grounded in the Levinasian divine comedy but can also be seen to 
emerge from Vattimian caritas, as it manifests in the ludicrous abandon of compassion, 
friendship, and love.  This is not merely laughter directed at the absurdity of reason (a 
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form of ridicule), but, more fundamentally and sophisticatedly, it is laughter arising out of 
that which renders reason absurd (a form of critique).  To confront the unkind, or un-
kenotic, acts that generate this project’s underlying absence and horror, a practice of 
laughter need not rely on the disruption of distorted forms and their limited comic effect.  
Instead, the irrationality and hilarity of kenosis can be presented, which hilariously proves 
to be also kind.126  Such is the opportunity discounted or overlooked at the Jewish 
Museum Berlin, not only by the architectural and philosophical narratives – beginning with 
the designer’s own – that ascribe a concept of laughter to Libeskind’s design, but also in 
the performance of the realised design and the experience thereof. 
Spectacularity and Exemplarity 
At the Jewish Museum Berlin, instantiations of kenosis – of self-emptying, filling with the 
other, and pouring-out – are limited by the architecture’s self-fullness and self-
assertiveness, but that is not to suggest that the project is without all kenotic effect.  
Indeed, its conception and realisation can be seen to prompt a significant opening-up of 
interdisciplinary dialogue amongst philosophy, architecture, the arts in general, and 
society more broadly; not least German society.  Although kenosis is not mere dialogue – 
and certainly not mutual admiration – the discourse surrounding this project goes further, 
at times challenging the self-sufficiency of its conversers (such as in Derrida’s response 
to Libeskind).  Thus, in its actative work, it is a figure – and spectacle – whose 
manifestation becomes a worthy subject of intellectual and emotional exchange.  In so 
doing, it instantiates kenosis.  At that point, however, kenotic evidence begins to wane, 
primarily because the actative work is not matched by the substantive reality.  Much of 
what was said about Libeskind’s concept cannot be said about Libeskind’s building.  Or, 
returning to Allen’s analogy, captions may have matched the conceptual illustrations, but 
now that those illustrations can be entered and experienced, the same captions are of 
questionable fit.  Moreover, the comprehensive discourse demanded by this project – this 
situation – is such that it must transcend architecture.  As James Young argues, and 
Andreas Huyssen upholds, “the debates surrounding the design and meaning of 
memorials may be even more important than the finished memorials themselves.”127 
Arguably, the inherent profundity of this project’s situation demands extraordinary 
kenotic attentiveness, including, of course, far-reaching interdisciplinary dialogue and 
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debate, so as to invite the approach and appearance of all aspects of the situation’s 
being.  It is from such attentiveness that kenotic responses – architectural and otherwise 
– can emerge.  But in the case of this memorial, a discontinuity in the debate and 
dialogue may well have affected, if not prefigured, the architectural response.  Although 
the project’s inception is marked by abundant and robust discourse, the subsequent 
design competition temporarily suspends discussion and thereby blocks Libeskind’s (and 
his fellow competitors’) full engagement with the situation during the period when such 
engagement holds its greatest potential; that is, during conception of the architecture that 
is meant to be attentive and responsive to the situation.128  Of course, the discourse 
resumes after conception – in reaction to the concept – and, indeed, the situation 
significantly evolves.  But, as seen, Libeskind’s proposal seems to be its own defence 
against change.  A situation of this complexity is one that stands to benefit most from 
releasement, by all participants, to the situation’s kenotic unfolding.  Through such letting-
go – such receptivity – a response to the situation, in both actative and substantive 
dimensions, holds the potential to instantiate the situation’s kenosis; and an architectural 
response, in particular, is able to be as ‘spectacular’ as the situation calls for – perhaps 
even in modesty. 
By grasping at and exploiting spectacularity, the Jewish Museum Berlin 
compromises its receptivity.  Indeed, if it can be said of I.M. Pei’s museum, at Doha, that 
it is “more a receptacle than a showpiece,”129 then the opposite must be said of 
Libeskind’s museum.  Yet the latter’s centrepiece, both philosophically and 
architecturally, is that of the void and the absence or emptiness it evokes.  Given that 
emphasis and its appropriateness, the notion of receptacle – like that exemplified by 
Heidegger’s jug or the Dervish kashkúl – might arguably be more pertinent to Libeskind’s 
project than to Pei’s.  The Libeskind museum, however, reveals an occupation with itself 
(irrespective of exhibitory content), a self-containment and, therefore, a solidification or 
constrained sort of boundedness that stands as a barrier to emptiness, receptivity, and 
pouring-out.  This problematic aspect of the museum is raised in Derrida’s response to 
Libeskind’s not-yet-built design, particularly in connection with the void.  (And, since the 
void emblemises the entire museum, Derrida’s challenge could be seen so extended.)  
Derrida notes the apparent contradiction between Libeskind’s “determined void” and the 
indeterminacy of the Platonic chora, a “place,” which, despite emptiness and absence, is 
something (even if that something comprises nothing) and, therefore, is not a void. 
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My anxious question would have to do with the relation between this determined 
void of yours, totally invested with history, meaningfulness, and experience, and 
place itself, place as a nonanthropological, nontheological possibility for this void 
to take place.  The logic of the chora, then, is a challenge to the logic of 
exemplarity, the human, theological space in which the void is determined …130 
Libeskind’s void, so full and invested, so evocative of the human and theological, is not 
empty.  It is not the chora – empty, receptive, and outpouring – the place that “receives all 
the Forms, and which gives place to everything that is inscribed in the Forms.”131  Reliant 
on the void for its identity, the museum reveals itself as showpiece; a spectacle of 
fullness and investment. 
It is such fullness and investment that prevents the museum from instantiating the 
responsibility of Levinasian kenosis (and tikkun olam) to openly pursue justice, the caritas 
of Vattimian kenosis to freely and foolishly extend compassion in friendship and love, and 
the hospitality of Derridan kenosis to break through exemplarity and self-sufficiency.  It is 
the same fullness and investment that causes the museum building to assert the already-
known with distorted but familiar motifs that deny it uncanniness; to didactically answer 
and close-off questions of identity, and do so with an ambivalence toward negotiation that 
denies it hope; and to strategically protest rationality and reason in pursuit of laughter, 
which such protestation ultimately denies by exposing itself as rational and reasoned.  It 
is also that fullness and investment which, on the one hand, distances the project from 
the best aspirations of Modernism’s beginnings, while, on the other hand, reveals it to be 
as value-driven and assertive of universal claims as Modernism’s worst.  As with all 
creations, the production of Libeskind’s museum is a part of ongoing kenosis, but the 
building does not find its self-understanding in kenosis.  It therefore stands nervously and 
self-consciously when faced with the sort of observation and interrogation that Jens 
Jensen might present.  It is, in some ways, strong.  But, is it kind? 
 
EISENMAN AT THE MEMORIAL TO THE MURDERED JEWS OF EUROPE 
On a trajectory that chronologically trails but otherwise largely parallels the Jewish 
Museum Berlin, another place of memory – the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe 
– manifests as a ‘field’ of some 2,700 undulating concrete stelae, just steps away from the 
Brandenburg Gate (see figs. 6.15 – 6.17).132  It could be argued that the absence of this 
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memorial, during the decade or more in which the Jewish museum was conceived and 
realised, is responsible for having instigated the original and ongoing conundrum over the 
Jewish museum’s identity and purpose (discussed earlier in this chapter).  Although 
Libeskind’s project was always to be, and function as, a museum, it came to be seen by 
many (arguably, including its designer) as also assuming the role of surrogate memorial, 
and, therewith, as bearing the weight of a memorial’s additional responsibilities.133  
Conversely ironic, Eisenman’s project was always to be and function as a memorial, yet 
came to include – over the designer’s objections – an Information Centre, which, by every 
measure, is a museum.134  Not surprisingly, the “prolonged, complex and difficult 
controversy,”135 which similarly surrounded both projects, is reflected in ambiguities of 
identity.  But, throughout the controversy, and undoubtedly owing to it, the memorial’s jury 
– charged with managing the process and mediating the debate – underwent a kenotic 
experience, an attitudinal kenosis prompting members to challenge their own suspicions 
concerning a memorial’s identity and purpose.136  In so doing, their experience seems to 
have mirrored that of the commissioners for the Jewish museum. 
The contemporaneous and ongoing dialogue surrounding both projects is also 
similar.137  Eisenman, himself, claims the characteristic of uncanniness for his project,138 
echoing the similar ascription to Libeskind’s museum.  Just as Libeskind eschews 
rationality, Eisenman is well-known to view reason and meaning as “fictions,” and to 
advocate the excise of functionality and human values from architectural design (such 
advocacy nonetheless value-laden and leading to a kind of functionality through 
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intentional dysfunction).139  And, like Libeskind, Eisenman unabashedly promotes his 
reputation for creating disturbing and destabilising spatial experiences,140 which, 
according to Andreas Huyssen, unites the two architects with others of their genre as 
“representatives of a prevailing architectural style.”141  Finally, there is the notional 
similarity between Libeskind’s “void” and Eisenman’s “absence in the void” (both of which 
Derrida questions).  Hence, many aspects of Eisenman’s approach and work can be 
aligned with Libeskind’s.142  Importantly, however, there are other aspects of Eisenman’s 
memorial project, which, by kenotic reckoning, differentiate it from Libeskind’s museum. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6.15 
Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, viewed across the field of concrete stelae. 
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FIGURE 6.16 
The memorial and its immediate urban context. 
 FIGURE 6.17 
The memorial, looking toward Tiergarten. 
 
Even in what appears to be another similarity – the claim to extraordinary 
interpretive openness – Eisenman’s memorial is actually distinct.  Unlike the museum, the 
memorial substantially and effectively fulfils the claim.  The memorial has been described 
as a “metaphor machine,” able to “elicit a totally different response from each person who 
encounters it.”  Eisenman supports that description, saying that it was his design intention 
“to deny opticality,” to prioritise the tactile experience over the retinal, and to eschew “the 
metaphysics of presence, that is, iconography, meaning, symbolism … [and] information 
of any sort.”  For him, “there is nothing symbolic in the material and the being.  It just is.  
We were trying to reduce [the memorial] to pure presence.”143  In that regard, a memorial 
is advantaged over a museum, insofar as a memorial enjoys a greater luxury to just be.  
Functionally, it need not be anything other than a place that holds memory and, perhaps, 
invites thinking.  It need not convey information, and it has no duty to overtly display 
particular symbolism (though it is likely to be interpreted symbolically).  Consequently, in 
this memorial’s abstractness and absence of information – not least, the absence of 
information like that at Libeskind’s museum, which attempts to explain each of the 
designer’s experiential intentions – the project presents as being open to the other (the 
visitor), invites the other to respond with reciprocal openness, and accepts the 
indeterminacy and contingency of the relationship that ensues.  These are effective 
instantiations of kenosis in architecture. 
Transformability 
Kenosis promotes and animates the transformability of each and all of the others and 
other things that comprise a given situation.  Although its muscularity and apparent 
permanence suggest immutability, Eisenman’s memorial is nonetheless transformable by 
virtue of the unique relationship it strikes with each visitor and the diverse interpretations 
that consequently result.  Indeed, transformation is mutual when the visitor is “open … to 
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semiotics, readings that transgress ‘logocentrism.’”144  Visitors can be seen engaging the 
memorial in many different ways – its ambiguity even leading to some engagements that 
might be seen as inappropriate to a commemorative place.  Actions include standing and 
climbing, running and walking, conversation and silence, frivolity and contemplation.145  
For some visitors, it appears to be hallowed ground, for others a civic playground, for still 
others merely a tourist destination at which to be photographed; and there are also those 
who appear to be as ambivalent as the memorial itself.  That is as Eisenman intended.  
Observing visitors at the memorial, he remarks: 
They’re moving just for the sake of moving and having that experience.  Usually, 
in experiences [such as this] you expect to find something … but there’s nothing 
to find.  People start out saying, ‘What’s the point?’  The point is: there is no point.  
What’s wonderful is to see so many people being happy, here.  And, I think the 
fact of being happy is something that will open up the Germans to relaxing their 
anxiety about the guilt.  The Germans that I’ve seen, here, don’t seem to feel 
much guilt.  That’s great, because this was not intended to be guilt-inducing.  
People are not being good to this place; they’re just being as they are.146 
Eisenman accurately describes the experientiality of the memorial.  By virtue of its 
hospitality – stark and stern as it may be – the memorial receives the visitor with the 
expectation of relationality and, therefore, the potentiality of transformation.  Similarly, the 
visitor receives the memorial – often as a disturbance and with reluctance – only to find 
that it is open to any relationship that might emerge.  Thus the visitor is subject to 
transformation, even as the memorial transforms to suit the visitor’s relationship with it.  
Such is the hybridising potential of kenosis.  At work, however, is much more than amity 
or mutuality, and much that challenges both. 
Certainly, this memorial challenges its visitors.  In fact, its very presence 
challenges all of Berlin, all of Germany, and all of humanity.  It invites relationship, not by 
comforting, but by opening-up difficult and therefore transformative questions.  
Importantly, however, it is not didactic or threatening, nor is it triumphal.  As Eisenman 
explains, it does not ask Germans to grovel and surrender their identity.  It invites them to 
be “as they are.”  And all of those challenged by the memorial are able to question and 
challenge it, just as they have done since its inception and continue to do – the ongoing 
discourse being another example of kenotic aftermath.  In response, the memorial 
transforms to the manifold interpretations of its visitors, but never at the expense of its 
fundamental identity.  Indeed, defending that identity and its necessary abstraction, 
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Eisenman argues: “In fifty years, [visitors will] ask the question, ‘What is this field, here?’  
And, that’s exactly the question I wanted to provoke.”147  His proposition evidences the 
potential of kenotic exchange, because implicit in the future visitors’ question is the 
memorial’s question to future generations: Who are you, and how will you relate to my 
being?  In this memorial’s instantiation of kenosis – a relatively kenotic response to the 
most un-kenotic of events – it works toward mending a world still affected by the un-
mendable event of the Shoah.  In so doing, it also instantiates tikkun olam,148 even as it 
avoids any suggestions of redemption, reconciliation, or false hope. 
Pointlessness and Arbitrariness 
Whereas Eisenman sees the memorial’s openness embedded in its incompleteness, 
pointlessness, and arbitrariness, I suggest that its openness arises from kenosis, which is 
always incomplete but neither pointless nor arbitrary.  The contrast of views is worth 
exploring.  Eisenman’s claim that there is no point to the memorial is slightly exaggerated, 
if not disingenuous.  To say that the memorial is not “reducible to any single or simple 
notion” is undoubtedly true,149 but, being a commissioned construct, there must be some 
point to its existence, or it would have had neither a brief nor a name, and simply would 
not exist.  Perhaps it could be said that this memorial is so profound that its ‘points’ are 
too numerous to name.  But it is surely not pointless.  Still, it is the case that Eisenman 
goes to great lengths to disassociate himself and the project from any precedents that 
might imply points or meanings, whether they be cultural, architectural, or symbolic.  For 
example, he opposes the trope of a cemetery, even though such imagery is, for many – 
including the original competition jury – an instinctive reaction to the memorial’s point and 
physical manifestation.150  When an obvious comparison is made to the crowded and 
disturbingly unstable semblance of The Old Jewish Cemetery in Prague (see fig. 6.18 
and 6.19), Eisenman defends his originality, saying, “I have never seen that.”151  Perhaps 
not, but to intentionally design nearly five acres of closely-spaced concrete objects, 
whose size and proportions take on the appearance of unadorned caskets or sarcophagi, 
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is to knowingly invite the suggestion that the marking of death – “mass, industrially 
organised death”152 – is at least one of the memorial’s points.153 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6.18 
The Old Jewish Cemetery in Prague. 
 FIGURE 6.19 
The memorial in Berlin. 
 
 
Over his own protestations, it is Eisenman who demonstrates that there are 
intended points and meanings to his memorial.  Discussing its undulating and unstable 
ground plane (see fig. 6.20), Eisenman explains that this feature references the Nazi 
mantra of blut und boden (blood and soil, the latter meaning either ground or homeland) 
and, in particular, its implication that “the Jew was without ground.”  The memorial’s 
ground is meant to “take the ground away,” such that the “stelae sink into a morass” and 
the visitor can “feel the leaning.”154  Groundlessness is thus employed as a symbol, or 
representation, to evoke the malevolent and exclusionary ascription of Jewish identity, 
and “to induce disorientation and claustrophobia” as a kind of “proxy for the trauma of 
living in a concentration camp.”155  Such intent is not pointless.  Nor is it “not design,” yet 
that is how Eisenman portrays the memorial’s conception.  He describes the creative – 
and rational – process by which he and Richard Serra took the site’s natural topography 
(more or less), as given and superimposed the topography they intended for the stelae 
tops, but then he claims that the exercise was “not design.”  According to him, it was 
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simply “connect the dots.”156  Although that may be what it was, only one set of the dots 
was given (even that requiring intervention), and the other set had to be designed (see 
fig. 6.21).  The notions of connecting the dots, and determining the manner in which they 
should be connected, were nothing less than design decisions; only two, I would argue, 
amidst a complex array of others that establish the project’s relationality.  It is from the 
openness – but not pointlessness – of kenosis that relationality can emerge. 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6.20 
View amongst the stelae, showing the 
undulating (groundless) floor plane. 
 FIGURE 6.21 
View of floor plane and stelae tops – two 
connected topographies.  
 
 
Eisenman’s notion of pointlessness is a close companion to his notion of 
arbitrariness, the latter proving to be equally problematic.  Most accounts suggest that the 
number of concrete stelae, at the memorial today, is ‘arbitrary’ and substantially less than 
originally proposed.  Eisenman tells the story of a surprise exchange with then-Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl as the project’s fate was being decided: “Mr Kohl said, ‘Look, you have 
4,400 stones; how many do you need?’  So, I said, ‘How about 2,700?’  And, Kohl 
replied, ‘You’ve got a deal.’”  Underscoring the supposed arbitrariness, Eisenman adds, 
“There’s no magic in the number 2,700.”157  Although the final number of stelae may have 
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been spontaneously determined, it cannot be deemed arbitrary.  First, Eisenman’s 
number is not so much indiscriminate whimsy as calculated strategy – albeit hurried – 
posited in the hope that approximately two-thirds the original number would be seen as a 
compromise sufficient to win the project’s approval.  Second, if the number were 
completely arbitrary – without any importance or significance – then it follows that any 
arbitrary number would be suitable to the project’s realisation.  At upper extremes, the 
number could not be completely arbitrary because it is ultimately limited by the size of the 
site, as well as the size and arrangement of the stelae to be placed on it; that eventually 
influenced by practicality.  Moreover, absolute arbitrariness would mean that the number 
of stelae could suitably be as little as one or, theoretically, none.158  As the lower extreme 
is approached, there comes a point at which even the site and the fundamental concept 
of stelae become untenable.  Beyond the issue of number, the stelae are also not 
arbitrarily placed or shaped or coloured; they are designedly ordered and consciously 
designed.  Claims of arbitrariness are therefore difficult to support since the arbitrary is no 
longer arbitrary if determined.  The truly arbitrary is “not design,” but this memorial is 
worked-out and designed, which shows the notion of arbitrariness to be incongruously 
ascribed.  Certainly, there was latitude in the number and size and arrangement of stelae 
that could fulfil the designers’ conceptual intentions, and each different number would 
require a different design, but it was not the case that absolutely any arbitrary number 
would do.  As the situation unfolded, it had to be worked-out. 
Valuelessness 
In his well-known essay, “The End of the Classical,” Eisenman argues that Modernism is 
merely a continuation of the classical and advocates an “alternative idea of architecture,” 
provisionally titled “the not-classical” or “architecture as is.”159 Aspects of his argument 
parallel my own, in this dissertation.  But Eisenman depends heavily on arbitrariness to 
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end what he sees as the value-laden, classical (and therefore Modernist) notion of a 
beginning (or essential origin).  The same arbitrariness pre-empts strategy and thereby 
also ends the equally value-laden, classical (and Modernist) notion of an end (or idealised 
goal).  His proposal is meant to render architecture “timeless (originless, endless) … non-
representational (objectless) … and artificial (arbitrary, reasonless),” all of which, 
Eisenman admits, are values.160  Thus he effectively substitutes the values of 
timelessness, non-representationalism, and artificiality for those he labels as classical: 
representation, history (timefulness), and reason (which embeds utility), or, in other 
terms, beauty, harmony, and totality.  Despite the boundedness of his substitute values, 
he persists in advocating the freeing of architecture from its boundedness, and pleads for 
extreme boundlessness.  He proposes doing away with “structures of belief” – what he 
names as “origins, transformations, and ends” – in favour of a “‘timeless’ space of 
invention.”  He proposes “maintaining a state of anxiety … which maintains its own 
fictionality rather than proposing a simulation of truth.”161  Instead of seeing his proposals 
as part of a complex and multilinear continuum of evolving tradition,162 he suggests a 
radicalisation that must either deny or overcome human values and, therefore, lie outside 
tradition (notwithstanding the inherent contradiction presented by his substitute values). 
In effect, Eisenman proposes that architecture empty itself – in what I call a 
kenosis of architecture – but he seeks an emptying that cannot occur in his proposed 
state of boundlessness, because emptying is reliant on bounds.  If Heidegger’s jug had 
no bounds, it could not empty or fill or pour out.  The bounds of any situation may be 
constantly changing – some appearing clearly, others vaguely – but they nevertheless 
exist.  In the reality of such boundedness, it is an architecture of kenosis that can be ‘as 
is’.  Boundaries seen kenotically, as thresholds, offer manifold beginnings and endings, 
where none of the former is absolutely privileged, and none of the latter is absolutely 
terminal.  Kenosis thus enables the “timeless space of invention” that Eisenman seeks, 
because, amidst constantly evolving bounds, new domains of creativity are constantly 
unfolding and opening-up.  Since that unfolding is ongoing and never finished, so must be 
the responses to it.  Kenosis has no strategic beginning, and no idealised end, nor any 
sense of structured transformation.  It invites letting go – foolish abandon – as an enabler 
of engagement and response, and that is transformative, but indeterminately so.  It 
requires an always incomplete working-out of changing situations.  It does not offer a set 
of conclusive and immutable truths, only greater attentiveness with which to undertake 
the working-out.  What Eisenman calls the state of anxiety is the kenotic state of 
                                               
160
 Ibid., 172. 
161
 Ibid. 
162
 Pallasmaa, "What Would Utzon Do Now?: The Lessons of Louis Kahn and Jørn Utzon." The term 
“evolving tradition” is drawn from Professor Pallasmaa’s lecture. 
 256 
 
attentiveness.  That attentiveness is human creativity, and one of its products is 
architecture, designed by and, more importantly, for human beings.  Architecture’s 
humanity – and human values – cannot be denied or overcome.163  In the end, 
Eisenman’s end of the classical and, with it, the end of the beginning and end of the end, 
is merely another branch of kenotically evolving tradition. 
 
Eisenman posits that his memorial “just is.”  To the extent that is true, I would 
suggest that it is the memorial’s instantiation of kenosis that makes it so.  Architecture 
can only be a temporal response to a situation as it is, whether that situation is real, 
surreal, perceptible, or imagined.  In its kenotic attunement, architecture can also be alert 
to clues – signs and traces – as to what the situation might become, and thereby at least 
attempt to be hospitable to that becoming.  In so doing, architecture, too, remains 
unfinished and continues to become.  The Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, in 
its openness and relationality and transformability, instantiates kenosis and does so – 
despite the designer’s claims – not arbitrarily or irrationally, but by design. 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6.22 
Foreground, Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe; background, the Reichstag and its distinctive dome. 
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FOSTER AT THE REICHSTAG 
Within sight of the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe stands the historic 
Reichstag, its modern glass dome signalling the building’s extensive renovations (see fig. 
6.22).  Designed by Norman Foster (Foster + Partners) – the same firm that authored the 
Commerzbank in Frankfurt (Chapter 4) – and completed in 1999, the project offers a 
tangible demonstration of Eisenman’s view that Neo-Classicism, Modernism, and Post-
Modernism are all merely descendants of the classical.  Indeed, unlike its neighbouring 
memorial and the not-too-distant museum, the Reichstag does not work through 
distortion or fragmentation.  Nonetheless, it joins those other projects to form a sort of 
Berlin triumvirate, whose respective situations derive from common origins and evoke the 
remembrance of those origins in the present. 
Mutuality 
Compared to the disturbances intended at Eisenman’s memorial and Libeskind’s 
museum, the Reichstag could be described as friendly, approachable, and compliant; 
well within an evolving tradition of architecture,164 but nonetheless innovative and 
certainly not conventional.165  Yet, in a way, it is also disturbing.  Its iconic glass dome – 
that by which one first recognises it – is patently foreign to its historical host, even though 
hospitably received.  That relationship presents a microcosm of the entire project, which, 
according to one admiring observer, “ingeniously integrates the latest in high-tech design 
principles … into the 1894 building’s frame … while transforming the structure’s outdated 
functional core to answer its contemporary practical and symbolic demands.”166  Indeed, 
as renovation began, it is said that Bundestag members viewed the historic building “as 
an invalid, entrusting it to the ‘intensive care unit of high-tech architecture.’”167  The 
building’s very existence thus became dependent on modern and Modernist intervention.  
But the host’s hospitality to such intervention was a prerequisite for its continuing life.  In 
Foster’s final iteration of design, this interdependent relationship is honoured, not only by 
the dome, but also throughout the renovation (see fig. 6.23).  In terms that ring true to 
Modernist (and to some extent Post-Modernist) principles, Foster + Partners describes its 
attitude toward the situation: 
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As we peeled away the layers of history, the bones of the old Reichstag came to 
light, revealing striking imprints of the past … We have preserved these memories 
of the past, allowing the Reichstag to function as a living museum of German 
history.  We have followed a clear ethos of reconciling our new interiors with the 
old.  Junctions between existing and new work are expressed; and where the 
fabric has been repaired, it is articulated, allowing the building’s many historic 
layers to be read clearly.168 
This is an ‘approach’ (albeit articulated after the fact) that is clearly laden with the kind of 
values that Eisenman proposes to overcome in pursuit of the “not-classical.”  And it 
produces a building that stands in sharp contrast to Libeskind’s museum, which adopts a 
domineering posture over its historic host and thereby constrains the host’s receptivity.  
Foster’s approach to the Reichstag is distinct from both of its counterparts.  Certainly, 
kenosis is more than mutuality, but, in the mutuality that the ‘new’ Reichstag enjoys with 
the ‘old’ – as well as that which both enjoy with their situation – something of kenosis is 
instantiated. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
FIGURE 6.23 
Exterior and interior views, showing interdependent relationship of ‘old’ and ‘new’ elements. 
Above, top and bottom, the dome and its historic ‘host’; top right, articulation of new works in historic context; 
and bottom right, the new parliamentary chamber inserted into a former courtyard, with dome overhead. 
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It would be mistaken, however, to suggest that the designer’s approach to this 
project – regardless of what it produced – is entirely kenotic.  Unlike Pei’s approach at the 
museum in Doha, which reveals its kenosis in a more or less linear and progressively 
unfolding design event, the Reichstag project and Foster’s approach to it are marked by a 
more equivocal (and highly politicised) situation, with consequently disjunctive events.  
Though not without resistance, Foster attends to a changing situation with changing 
responses.  Indeed, the mutuality of old and new elements, as seen in the realised 
project, is not found in Foster’s initial responses, and the concept of a new dome is one to 
which he objected.  His first proposal (prepared for the 1992 design competition) 
demonstrates significantly more self-assertion toward the existing architecture, which is 
left on display as a gutted shell – an artefact of history – surrounding a new, glass-
enclosed plenary chamber at the shell’s centre.  Then, a grandly-scaled, umbrella-like, 
glass canopy, supported by a regular grid of slender columns, rises well over the top of 
the domeless Reichstag building and covers both it and a portion of the Platz der 
Republik to the west, even extending partially over the Spree River to the north.169  The 
proposal is meant to convey an embrace and acceptance of the past, even while stepping 
into the present and future.  That conveyance, however, relies on a somewhat prejudicial 
arrangement that sees the ‘old’ placed prominently, but in a nonetheless subordinate 
position relative to the dominant ‘new’.  Neither this proposal, by Foster, nor those of two 
other competition ‘co-winners’ received a mandate, and the entire situation continued to 
evolve. 
New plans emerged for development of the area around the Reichstag, and a 
second phase of the Reichstag design competition was announced, based on a modified 
brief and a Bundestag edict that “the basic appearance of the [Reichstag] would remain,” 
and there would be included some sort of glass dome.170  Although Foster finally received 
the commission in 1993, he did so having to concede to the dome’s replacement, a 
feature that had already been proposed by one of Foster’s ultimately unsuccessful co-
winners in the first phase of competition.171  Thereafter, the dome became the subject of 
myriad alternative designs from Foster and his team.172  In all of this, it can be seen that 
Foster’s initial responses are not fully attentive to the entirety of the situation – not least 
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its politics – but Foster’s willingness to respond to change does demonstrate a kind of 
self-emptying, albeit reluctant.  Although such willingness might be viewed sceptically, as 
mere strategy or political expediency needed to win the commission, it finally required 
that Foster overcome his reluctance,173 give up any notions of mastery, and enter into a 
mutual relationship with the changing situation.  In that mutuality and its exchange, 
Foster’s approach reveals some measure of kenosis; at least enough to enable the 
project’s own kenosis – the fundamental accord it strikes between old and new. 
Governance and Architecture 
Beyond relational grounding, there are at least three other aspects of the Reichstag’s 
realisation that warrant brief exploration in light of their kenotic dimensions: (1) the claim 
of environmental friendliness, (2) the ideology and occupancy of the dome, and (3) the 
metaphor of transparency.  In this project, each is made somewhat more important by its 
connection to the issues of politics and governance. 
Acknowledging the Environment 
According to Foster, one of the project’s primary pillars is “a passionate adherence to the 
low-energy, environment-friendly agenda, which is fundamental to the architecture of the 
future.”174  As discussed in connection with the Commerzbank, this is a frequent, if not 
mandatory, claim in the architecture of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.  
It is especially so in high profile projects, and often crescendos in those from the realm of 
politics and governance.  Indeed, there are times when the claim may be more important 
than the delivery.  Nonetheless, it is self-evident that any heightened responsiveness to 
the ongoing kenosis of the earth’s environment is commendable – and reciprocally 
kenotic.  Environmental friendliness, however, requires a holistic view; one which 
becomes complex and complicated.  Like the Commerzbank, the Reichstag’s 
environmental consciousness – as radical as it might have been, and as effective as it 
may still be – nonetheless rests in its ability to reduce ongoing consumption and 
emissions by technological means.  Notwithstanding the merits of that pursuit, the 
argument can be made – and is – that such savings cannot justify the substantial 
consumption of resources that were required to realise the project and transport the 
Bundestag from relatively new quarters in Bonn to those in Berlin.  A more holistic and 
radical view might look to the development of communications and other technologies for 
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 An example of Foster’s ‘reluctance’ is found in his fundamental resistance to the inclusion of a dome. 
Barnstone writes: “Because at the core Foster was opposed to building a dome of any kind, he and his team 
looked at numerous ways of designing a dome that was not a dome …” See ibid., 202. 
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 N. Foster, Rebuilding the Reichstag  (Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 2000), 12. This and other 
resources document the environmental features and performance of the Reichstag, which are not repeated or 
discussed at any length, here. 
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its potential to render certain types of construction and transport redundant, and thereby 
open-up fundamentally new attitudes toward architecture, governance, and environment.  
For example, does a kenotic and modern view of human relations and governance 
necessarily require the number and forms of assemblies that currently mark geopolitics?  
Does every needed assembly need a unique building in which to assemble?  And does 
assembly always necessitate physically assembling? 
Although the Reichstag’s dome is cited as a centrepiece of its environment-
friendly agenda, it must be said that a dome is not the only formal expression capable of 
achieving similar environmental results.  Indeed, Foster undoubtedly would have 
championed like performance in his initial, domeless proposal.  Today, however, visitors 
to the Reichstag are told that the dome’s primary purposes are to accommodate visitors 
(a subject discussed in the following section) and to effect environmentally-friendly 
ventilation, heat, and natural light.175  As important as the latter purpose is, it could have 
been successfully addressed by many solutions other than this particular domical shape 
(numerous examples of which were explored by Foster + Partners).  And, even strictly 
technological solutions, involving neither a dome nor any visually-expressed form, would 
have held similar potential.  So, the dome cannot be seen as a required environmental 
feature.  It came to be one part of a required technological solution that mitigates 
environmental concerns, only after it first came to be a required component of the 
project’s aesthetics.  And both requirements ultimately emerged from the politics of the 
situation. 
Desacralising the Dome 
Unmistakably, the crowning feature of the Reichstag – whether in historic or 
contemporary contexts – is its dome; a form that is, as discussed in Chapter 4, invested 
with the ideology of majesty and manifestation of divinity.  And such ideology can be seen 
as problematic to both contexts.  In 1894, Paul Wallot’s steel and glass dome, which first 
sat atop the Reichstag, “was meant to relocate symbolic power from the crowned head of 
the state to Germany’s still youthful parliamentary institutions.”176  Yet, despite such 
intention and physical relocation, the power of the form was such that it would continue 
as a reminder of the majesty and manifestation of divinity previously reserved by the 
emperor – and only reluctantly surrendered – at a time when German democracy was 
inherently tentative and vulnerable.  Of course, there is a sense in which this late 
nineteenth century handing-over of power is kenotic; a kind of royal releasement or 
letting-go, and a public opening-up to shared responsibility for one another.  And still 
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 Such was my experience on 7 December, 2013, during a tour with an official government docent. 
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 L. Koepnick, "Redeeming History? Foster's Dome and the Political Aesthetic of the Berlin Republic," 
German Studies Review 24, no. 2 (2001): 306. 
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another sense of kenosis is evoked by the dome’s exposed structure, and its 
transparency.  Simultaneously strong and fragile, the dome can be seen as a symbol of 
democracy’s promise, as well as its openness to critical challenge; symbolism no less 
attributable to the dome’s newly-interpreted steel and glass replacement.  But how is the 
dome’s underlying ideology – always present in its form – to be seen in the late twentieth 
and early twenty-first centuries, particularly in the wake of an intervening dictatorship, 
from which the fully democratic German nation must be seen to be fleeing?  Does the 
ideology of majesty and manifestation of divinity have any place in modern democratic 
governance?  Can such ideology be transformed to remain relevant in a modern context?  
These questions challenge the contemporary propriety of a dome – particularly in the 
architecture of secular governance – and, even if such propriety is established, they 
challenge the dome’s contemporary expression. 
The Reichstag’s new steel and glass dome, still of fundamentally traditional form, 
addresses these questions in a manner quite distinct to its counterpart at the Museum of 
Islamic Art (examined in Chapter 4).  Both domes are well-scaled, exquisitely detailed, 
and appropriately related to their contexts.  Yet, at the Reichstag, the underlying ideology 
of sacred sovereignty remains problematic.  While the original dome symbolised a 
handing-over of sacred power from sovereign to parliament, sacredness nonetheless 
lingered in its form.  In the case of the new dome, however, Foster attempts to fully 
desacralise it (see figs. 6.24 – 6.27).  He seeks to symbolically hand-over power, not only 
to the people’s representatives, but to the people themselves; the secular citizenry of 
Germany.  His dome invites them and their worldwide guests to take a position superior 
to the government – in the base of the dome, at the Reichstag’s rooftop – above and over 
the parliament’s glass-ceilinged plenary chamber, into which the dome’s visitors can 
ostensibly view.  Then, by virtue of the dome’s external transparency and a suspended 
system of double helix ramps, visitors are invited to experience an ascending and 
descending panoramic view of the city and world from which they came, even as that city 
and world views them.  Notwithstanding these attempts to invert the domical experience – 
and thereby overcome its ideology – the result speaks largely of gimmick and spectacle; 
the dome’s sovereignty failing, in many ways, to be transformed into hospitality.  It 
receives visitors (its others) but then imposes its will, offering a prescribed and restricted 
experience.  Dark glass and security constraints preclude any genuine view into the 
parliamentary chamber, and access to the dome is prohibited when parliament is 
sitting.177  The ramps are visually striking but it becomes apparent that their purpose “is 
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 The dome can also be found closed due to weather conditions (wind, ice, etc.), since access requires the 
visitor to traverse an uncovered outdoor walkway from the new elevator towers to the dome entrance, over 
the original building’s roof. 
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entirely tourist … an astonishing ride through space and time,”178 as if the dome is 
intended as some sort of extreme adventure.179  Even a philosophical interpretation of the 
dome, as a place for “present-day flâneurs … to become leisurely walkers … [and] 
behold a transitory capital,”180 is thwarted by its popularity.  The relatively narrow ramps 
quickly become crowded, a condition that impedes promenading and hurries viewing – 
whether of the scenery or fellow flâneurs.  But, crowded or not, the experience is that of a 
one-way conveyance with no deviations or escape, little freedom of movement, and no 
experiential choice; in essence, an undemocratic event.  Further limiting the experience is 
the fact that, after one circumnavigation, the balance of the ascent and all of the descent 
comprises replays of the same views, differing only by virtue of the perceiver’s slightly 
greater or lesser elevation above the Reichstag’s roof – a moot point in this circumstance. 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6.24 
The dome at its base, atop the Reichstag’s 
roof. 
 FIGURE 6.25 
The dome’s interior, with conical ventilation 
and light reflecting device, and, at its base, 
the observation windows into the plenary 
chamber beneath. 
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See Chametzky, "Rebuilding the Nation: Norman Foster's Reichstag Renovation and Daniel Libenskind's 
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FIGURE 6.26 
The dome’s double helix ramp system for ascending 
and descending the dome. 
 FIGURE 6.27 
Typical view from the ramp, varying only slightly at 
the ramps’ different elevations. 
 
 
Foster’s dome struggles against, but ultimately is unable to overcome, the 
inextricable ideology that rests in its form.  Thus the dome can be seen as “appeal[ing] to 
the sacred so as to overcome segregation and remake secular politics in terms of a civil 
religion”181 – going so far as to include a climb to the Mosaic mountaintop of German 
politics.  There are at least two senses, however, in which the dome’s struggle reveals the 
kenotic.  First, it suggests the social and political emptying of a nation, which began at the 
conclusion of World War II.  The Reichstag dome offers a kind of snapshot of this 
emptying at the time of the dome’s completion, but also serves as a symbol of its 
ongoingness.  Second, at a more global level, the attempt to desacralise the dome 
renders it a symbol of secularisation, that aspect of kenosis in which, as Vattimo 
describes it, religious faith is gradually replaced by “faith in progress – both a secularized 
faith and a faith in secularization,” or a “faith in the value of the new.”182  By way of high-
tech structure and bedazzling transparency, the Reichstag dome seeks its credentials in 
newness, and, through the spectacle of its secular ‘adventure ride’, it purports 
progressiveness.  But, just as Vattimo sees modern secularisation dissolving progress 
into routine, this dome routinises its own progressiveness.  In so doing, it paradoxically 
upholds its sacralising ideology, but now it sacralises secularisation.  Although the 
dome’s transparency produces an optical opening-up that might otherwise suggest 
heightened awareness, the nature of its experience privileges phantasmagoria over 
social and political reflection.  And such privileging has the capacity to compromise 
society’s opening-up to those others whose despair, trauma, and near annihilation 
compelled the reinstatement of the secular democracy that the dome now ordains. 
 
                                               
181
 Ibid., 311. 
182
 Vattimo, The End of Modernity: Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Postmodern Culture: 99-101. 
 265 
 
Looking-In and Looking-Out 
In this symbol of democracy, the concept of transparency is a multifaceted and much 
discussed attribute of the Reichstag’s modern realisation, often beginning with the 
equation of transparency and democracy.  Deborah Barnstone, in The Transparent State: 
Architecture and Politics in Postwar Germany, challenges the truism that “he who builds 
transparently, builds democratically.”  She finds it “easily proved false” and effectively 
makes that case, labelling it a myth, which, like all myths, is an “emotional appeal to 
collective desires.”183  At the core of this myth is the suggestion that architectural 
transparency somehow ensures the popular supervision of parliamentary activities – a 
watchful looking-in – as if to effect the Paul Scheerbart epigram: “A house of glass stays 
free of vermin.”184  The naivety of the myth, of course, is revealed in the fact that many 
politicians in many democracies are seen to be content, especially when unchallenged, to 
follow the principle that citizens are better off not seeing how laws and sausages are 
made.  Moreover, some are seen as willing to engage in very opaque episodes of 
corruption and backroom deal-making, evidenced even in Germany’s transparent 
Reichstag.185 
The Reichstag’s transparency not only facilitates inward-looking but also outward.  
In connection with its dome, both aspects have already been discussed.  Less often 
considered – though perhaps most germane to this discourse – is the transparency of the 
plenary chamber’s main floor and balcony.  At both levels, the entire rear expanse of the 
chamber is transparent, addressing the also transparent west entry and the open Platz 
der Republic, beyond.  This transparency presents as another symbol of inward-looking 
public oversight.  More importantly, however, this particular configuration of glass extends 
an invitation for those in the chamber to be outward-looking.  While the dome gathers the 
Heideggerian sky and divinities, it is this horizontal transparency that has the capacity to 
gather mortals and earth.  Although both work to grant the chamber its placedness, it is 
the latter that opens the chamber to the world it serves, affects, and is affected by.  It is 
therefore also the latter that compellingly presents the need for kenotic relationality 
amongst the public servants in this Reichstag and the situations – out there – to which 
they must attend and respond; situations comprised not merely of voters but of 
interrelated others and other things.  Such relationality has the capacity to abate the will 
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for power, the cynicism in oversight, and the accompanying potential for violence.  
Indeed, it can establish the kenotic power of powerlessness.  Although this transparent 
feature, of itself, cannot effect such relationality, it does symbolise and invite the emptying 
and looking-outward that can. 
 
Thus the Reichstag is a contradictory snapshot of unfolding kenosis, a picture of 
kenotic resistance and embrace.  Its modern interventions are clearly distant from their 
historic host, but they are nonetheless integral and relational parts of its totality.  The 
event of its design is equivocal – original intentions pointing toward something entirely 
different to the now realised outcome – but the event’s evolving situations are 
nonetheless attended with evolving openness and responsiveness.  The Reichstag’s 
environmental performance is incremental, and some might argue largely symbolic, but it 
demonstrates the merit of kenotic human response to the environment’s kenosis.  The 
dome’s design and occupancy attempt to transform the ideology of sovereign privilege 
into civic hospitality and responsibility, but they do so with an element of kitsch and the 
enticement of thrill.  In addition to visitor amusement, transparency is deployed to portray 
an openness to scrutiny, but, at times, such transparency can be used to mask 
closedness.  Under-represented in this situation is another, larger dimension of 
transparency – that found in the self-emptying and outward-looking governance of a self-
emptying and outward-looking society.  If not a fully convincing and complete instantiation 
of kenosis, the Reichstag at least presents its kenotic potentiality – and it does that, in no 
small measure, by virtue of its uncertainty and incompleteness. 
 
COLLECTIVE KENOSIS 
Championing the ‘new’ as a new value, all three of the Berlin projects routinise progress 
in their own ways, and thereby evidence the ongoing kenosis that is secularisation.  
Foster routinises the spectacle of urbanism, taming even the flâneur’s observation of it.  
Eisenman routinises monumentality, feeding and exacerbating the insatiable modern 
appetite to be wowed.  Libeskind routinises the dis-ease of distortion and, with it, his 
genre of the avant-garde.  Evidencing kenosis through secularisation, however, is not 
necessarily evidence of a project’s kenotic self-understanding.  In the cases of Foster’s 
parliament building and Eisenman’s memorial, each reveals a degree of kenotic 
grounding by way of its attentiveness to situation and consequent hospitality toward 
context, users, and use.  But, in the case of Libeskind’s museum, much the opposite is 
seen.  Notwithstanding its role in prompting valuable interdisciplinary dialogue, the Jewish 
Museum Berlin is proclaimed to be uncanny in its distortion and disturbance, but realises 
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such effects in the most literal architectural terms – all quite cannily.  In its overt striving to 
achieve avant-garde unusualness, it is seen to grasp.  In the face of the Shoah – an 
utterly aggressive and un-kenotic event – it responds aggressively and un-kenotically, 
with a kind of architectural re-presentation of the event.  And its self-assertiveness resists 
ascriptions of uncanniness, hope, and irrational laughter, because such attributes cannot 
be asserted and are finally seen as emergences of kenosis. 
In the relationality of these three projects – found in their shared originating event, 
geographic proximity, and distinct architectural expressions – they are placed in a unique 
dialogue.  I would argue that this triangulated exchange – transcending any individual 
claims and reckonings – is their most important instantiation of kenosis.  Through it, each 
opens up to the others, though not without reluctance; each challenges the self-
sufficiency of the others and stands transformed in that light; yet each maintains its 
identity.  Eisenman’s project, as memorial, challenges the memorial credentials of 
Libeskind’s museum, while the museum’s disorder challenges the memorial’s claim to 
arbitrariness.  The disturbance and disruption of Libeskind’s museum challenges the 
relative domestication of Foster’s parliament, even as the parliament’s rational 
sophistication challenges Libeskind’s execution of irrationality.  And, the seriousness of 
Foster’s parliament challenges the frivolity sanctioned by Eisenman’s memorial, just as 
Eisenman’s project, viewed as counter-memorial and civic playground, challenges the 
amusement credentials of Foster’s parliamentary dome-climb.  Each project is 
transformed by its relationship with the others.  In many ways, each has partially become 
its others.  Together, more effectively than in their individuation, they come to terms with 
the event at their origins; they hold the tensions thereof, and leave its questions 
unanswered.  Thus, it is not any one project but, rather, the relationality of all three that 
reveals the uncanniness, hope, and laughter, which can humbly attempt to address 
horror and absence. 
The projects can also be seen as part of a creative unfolding, though not a simple 
or unilinear one.  Despite protestations to the contrary, each is a descendent of the 
‘classical’ that Eisenman seeks to end, and each can be located in one or more 
contemporary ‘-isms’, whether Modernism, Post-Modernism, Deconstructivism, or any of 
their derivations and successors, including Critical-Modernism, Non-Modernism, and 
Post-Critical architecture.186  Such movements or theories typically rely on either the 
condemnation or overcoming of values – human values – espoused or seen to have been 
espoused by previous movements, or those contemporaneously seen to be in opposition.  
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They are susceptible to politicisation and self-consciousness.  However, even the most 
radical and militant theories ultimately propose some value, or values, to replace those 
being contested.  For example, Eisenman’s advocacy of the ‘non-representational’ and 
‘reasonless’ is little other than a case of negated values masquerading as valuelessness.  
Such advocacy overlooks the fact that architecture and its practitioners are called to 
respond to situations always bounded by human values, situations that consequently 
demand the creative interpretation and application of manifold human values, not merely 
those privileged by current theory.  Architecture is an evolving tradition, subject to the 
paradox identified by Eugenio d’Ors: “Everything that lies outside tradition is 
plagiarism.”187  Thus, notwithstanding various degrees of resistance and d’Orsian 
plagiarism, the three Berlin projects – particularly important for their valuing of memory – 
are parts of architecture’s evolving tradition. 
It might be said, then, that these particular Berlin projects are nothing ‘special’, 
nothing especially avant-garde, at least not individually.  Each is found in the complex 
and entangled continuum of architecture, and also that of Berlin.  In challenging the 
avant-gardeness of Libeskind’s museum – its claimed singularity and exemplarity – 
Derrida uses the city of Berlin to make his point, a point that relies on a twist, and is 
therefore worth quoting at some length: 
… Berlin as a city is not simply one among others – it is an exemplary city, and 
because of this, you [Libeskind] can articulate both the singularity of everything 
you have done and the universality of the meaning of your project.  Why is Berlin 
exemplary?  It is a city … because of its split, which symbolises all the division of 
the world, all the divided cities of the world – think of Jerusalem, for instance – 
and because the inner difference and the void precisely follow the line or the cut of 
this difference.  Berlin could be considered a noncity city, a city whose identity or 
unity is split along an interrupted line.  To the extent that it is so divided and so 
nonidentical, Berlin could claim to be exemplary.  It is precisely the way every 
nation, every people, when they affirm their own singularity, try to justify their 
avant-garde structure: they say, ‘We are the avant-garde, because in our 
singularity we are witnessing universality, and we bear the responsibility for the 
universal, for humanity as such.’  National affirmation always goes through this 
exemplary logic, and Germans and Jews have thought of themselves as having 
been responsible – for universality, for mankind, in the avant-garde … Sometimes, 
therefore, I am a little anxious about the language of exemplarity.188 
Derrida’s challenge denies Berlin, Libeskind’s museum, and, by extension, Eisenman’s 
memorial and Foster’s parliament, the claim of singularity, universality, or exemplarity.  
Yet, by their unique convergence – these projects in this city – they do, indeed, signal 
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something special, not through avant-garde architecture, but through the collective 
invocation of tikkun olam.  Their relationality makes a collective gesture toward mending a 
world affected by an un-mendable event.  Such is not the mending that allows the 
forgetfulness of reconciliation, continuity, or salvation, but rather the sort that ensures 
remembrance.  It is a kenotic mending.  The city and these projects join to offer an 
emptying and receptive place that permanently holds pain189 – its own and that of others 
– made permanent by its ability to accommodate the indeterminacy and contingency that 
is always present and always in the present; never forgotten.  In that, it is a place open to 
the disturbing otherness of its history, and one that responds with the responsibility, 
hospitality, and caritas of kenosis.  Thus it is kenosis that is finally the avant-garde, an 
unfixed but constantly leading edge.  And, it is the emptying of this collective urban 
offering that finally proves to be ‘kind’. 
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7 
Beyond ‘-ists’ and ‘-isms’: 
The End of Architecture 
The end could be a limit, but also the origin.  Architecture starting from the end 
means that it has to understand itself and its practice by coming back to precisely 
what is its own limit; it must go to its limit in order to start from it.  The end is but 
the edge.  The end might also be death.1 
 
Upon earning his doctoral degree in the USA, and returning to Melbourne, Australian 
priest and artist Patrick Negri attended a function where one of the guests enquired about 
his thesis subject, which Negri happily described as “the spiritual significance of the art of 
the Abstract Expressionists.”  Bemused, the guest responded, “Oh, I wake up in the 
middle of the night worried about that!”2  Perhaps she also worries about whether and 
how kenosis can inform architecture, though she would likely be amongst very few who 
do.  Indeed, most might find it unimportant to explore architecture – as this dissertation 
does – by drawing on notions that seem well outside architecture’s domain, excessively 
theoretical, or unnecessary to its analysis, much less its practice.  But it becomes 
apparent that it is precisely such extra-architectural and interdisciplinary explorations that 
are able to ask of architecture’s essence, its nature, its ontology.  They open-up the 
question: What is architecture?  Such a question is worth worrying about because 
architecture, whether or not designed by architects, is one of the most – if not the most – 
evident and enduring embodiments of culture.  It concretises humanity’s creative 
response to cosmic and evolutionary creation, and thereby to humanity’s being.  To ask, 
then, of architecture’s being – including its origin and its end – is to open-up to the very 
thinking and understanding by which its being is strengthened.  Indeed, an understanding 
of the ways in which kenosis informs human creativity – particularly as seen through 
architecture – effects exactly such strengthening.  Therewith comes the strengthening of 
architecture’s practice, its realisation, its perception, and its use.  That impacts virtually 
everyone.  Hence, it is the intent of this chapter to move toward such an understanding. 
                                               
As noted in the Acknowledgements, some of the concepts included in this chapter represent the development 
and elaboration of work previously published in Lindstrom, "Sustainability by Design: Kenosis as a 
Framework for Environmental, Cultural and Social Dialogue."; and Lindstrom, "Creating Church: Kenosis as 
Protocol." 
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To explore the question of architecture’s being, I look firstly and broadly to 
architecture’s filling – with the fullness of its creators, as well as with the styles and 
movements that come to be critically and popularly ascribed to it.  To some extent, such 
filling is inevitable, but there is a point at which the fullness becomes a barrier to 
emptying; that is, to the emptying (and opening-up) that makes-room to gather-in the 
other and, thereby, strengthen both self and other.  Secondly and more specifically, I look 
to the issue of emptying in architecture, especially against the backdrop of an emptying – 
secularising – world.  That requires thinking about who and what is to be emptied, and 
how such emptying might affect current relationships and practices; indeed, how it might 
affect the production of architecture.  Thirdly and finally, I look to an architecture that 
becomes filled with, or by virtue of, its creators’ emptiness.  In light of a kenosis of 
architecture, I consider the potentiality of an architecture of kenosis.  That requires 
thinking about what architecture’s emptying might say about its end. 
 
FILLED WITH FULLNESS 
In Chapters 3 to 6, various instantiations of kenosis are shown to be concretised in 
architecture, whether evidenced by approach, conception, or realisation – or by all three.  
Equally, aspects of some case studies are seen to concretise the overlooking of, 
ignorance toward, or otherwise self-assertive resistance against the kenotic opportunities 
already present in every situation.  But it must be said that in all cases, even in those 
examples shown to be most evidentiary of kenosis (such as Kahn’s Salk Institute, and 
Pei’s Museum of Islamic Art), buildings can and do remain ‘filled’ to varying degrees by 
their respective creators (architecture’s ‘-ists’, and other aesthetic authors), as well as by 
the design movements and theories with which certain creators become associated 
(architecture’s ‘-isms’).  This filling is not that which results from receptivity to the other, 
that which accompanies kenotic emptying.  It is not the putting of oneself into one’s work, 
which is actually a commitment to attentiveness, derived from emptying.  Nor is it simply a 
case of the creators “actively convert[ing] the invisible throb of impulse into the visible 
language of art,”3 because such impulse also arises out of attentiveness, at least at some 
level.  This is the filling of the created thing with the selves of the creators – to the 
exclusion of others.  Such filling may be the result of the creators’ compromised kenosis 
(an unwillingness or inability to self-empty), but its real harm – its potential ‘violence’ – 
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occurs when it compromises the ongoing kenosis of the architecture thereby filled; in 
effect working to restrict or close-off the architecture’s evolving and enduring relationality 
with the users and perceivers that are its others. 
‘-ists’ 
Architecture is most readily filled with its architects, the ‘-ists’ of architecture, which, since 
the late-nineteenth century, have been labelled not only as Modernists but also as Post-, 
Neo-, Non-, and Critical-Modernists, as well as Regionalists, Environmentalists, and other 
distinguishing derivatives.  The manner of such filling varies and produces varying 
consequences.  History has long witnessed architects producing regional, national, and 
global projects (some the outcome of international design competitions) that bring fame to 
their architects.  For example, the Salk Institute is clearly filled by Louis Kahn, but it was 
not his fame that first filled it.  Although Kahn’s professional recognition became 
significant during his lifetime, his public fame was largely gained posthumously, and 
primarily followed the growing fame of his buildings, not least that garnered by the Salk 
Institute.  The case of Jørn Utzon and the Sydney Opera House offers a similar example 
of an architect’s fame following that of his building.  Equally evident, however, is the 
converse.  It is I.M. Pei’s eminent reputation (and already famous museum projects) that 
secures his position as architect for the Museum of Islamic Art.  Although his fame is well-
known to be met by humility (an aspect of kenosis), his buildings are unavoidably filled 
with something of his aura.  The same must be said for Kahn, Utzon, and many others.  
Indeed, most architects – whether of renown or relative obscurity – are somehow present 
in their buildings.  But that is often a filling, not with the architects’ fullness, but with their 
emptiness; a notion to which I return, later in this chapter. 
Of particular concern, at this point of the discussion, is the filling with fullness that 
stems from the architects’ self-assertion and, consequently, from that of their buildings.  
Such filling is magnified by the phenomenon of celebrity architects, or ‘starchitects’ (and 
their ‘starchitecture’); a phenomenon made increasingly possible and exploitable in an 
era of routinised globalisation, and, thereby, a phenomenon that is, itself, becoming 
routinised.4  The exponential onset and popular acceptance of celebrity status results in a 
radical commodification of professional repute, and that only serves to reinforce the 
privileging of architects and architecture.  Writer and design critic Deyan Sudjic describes 
the situation as “an international flying circus which travels the world leaving signature 
buildings in its wake.”5  The flight of this circus is fuelled by – but also fuels – a seemingly 
insatiable worldwide craving to collect such signatures, as civic symbols of capitalism’s 
                                               
4
 Today, it is increasingly true that celebrity status can also be popularly or critically ascribed, so as to 
manifest not only through self-assertion but also through the assertion of others. 
5
 D. Sudjic, The 100 Mile City  (London: Flamingo, 1993), 76. 
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urbanisation, as corporate symbols of capitalism’s globalisation, and as socio-political 
symbols of capitalism’s self-asserted superiority.  Indeed, the signatures of those still-
practising architects examined in previous chapters – Graves, Foster, Pei, Ando, 
Libeskind, and Eisenman – are, to varying extents, amongst the ever-expanding list of 
coveted trophies,6 and some are amongst that list’s founding members.  Arguably, 
‘starchitecture’ evidences architecture’s filling with a kind of decadence.  One example is 
presented by architects who strategically market their environmental and sustainability 
credentials, and thereby see themselves and their teams unsustainably flown around the 
globe to meet with clients and investigate subject sites – even as the clients and their 
teams are likewise flown back to the architects’ offices.  Such is done in the name of 
producing sustainable and environmentally-friendly architecture, often, however, of a 
typology that inherently restricts its potential to be so.7  Although the environmental 
dimension of this example points to a possible hypocrisy, it is not that which suggests 
decadence.  Rather, it is self-promotion and self-assertion – the grasping at, exploitation 
of, and filling with ‘stardom’ – that can be seen to signal excess and, thereby, stand in the 
way of architecture’s potentiality. 
Architects are not alone in their capacity to fill the architecture they realise.  
Clients can also assume a role of privilege and be equally filling.  True throughout history, 
it is no less so today.  The mere commissioning of an architect is largely a privileged 
luxury.  (In developed countries, that remains the case in connection with many building 
typologies including residential, agricultural, and industrial; while in less developed 
countries, it can extend to virtually all typologies).  And to be a client who commissions an 
architectural celebrity is to gain a measure of stardom for oneself.  Notwithstanding the 
fame of their architects, however, architectural clients – which include a variety of 
personalities, as well as public and private institutions – can also fill architecture with their 
celebrity or some other form of hegemony.  Returning to the example of the Salk Institute, 
as much as it might be filled by Kahn, it is equally (if not more so) filled by Jonas Salk, 
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 The phenomenon of the global architect is explored, with particular focus on Norman Foster, in D. McNeill, 
"In Search of the Global Architect: The Case of Norman Foster (and Partners)," International Journal of Urban 
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whose professional and public fame far exceeded that of Kahn’s at the time of the 
building’s construction.  In fact, the Salk Institute – not least its architecture – has done as 
much to maintain Salk’s fame as it has to establish Kahn’s. 
There are manifold ways in which a building can become known for the client in 
whose name it was built.  Cases of corporate client celebrity can be seen in countless 
high-rise and other commercial structures, worldwide.  Such structures are frequently 
filled by, and best-known for, those entities whose logos they valorise, but whose 
association with the architecture may be nothing more than ownership, tenancy, or, in 
some cases, leased or purchased naming rights.  Amongst the more extreme examples 
of client celebrity pervading architecture are the numerous towers emblazoned with the 
name of entrepreneur Donald Trump.  Few would know the architectural authorship of his 
buildings, but most would know the celebrity of their developer.  Conversely, clients can 
become known for what they build, an example of which is seen in the Chrysler Building 
in New York City.  Outside architectural circles, the name of the building’s architect 
(William Van Alen) is an obscure fact, but the edifice is internationally known as an icon 
of Moderne architecture.  Indeed, it is that fame with which its commissioner, Walter 
Chrysler, has become associated; such fame perhaps even rivalling that engendered by 
his automobile manufacturing company.  Furthermore, in cities like Dubai, Doha, and Abu 
Dhabi, architecture – particularly that authored by celebrity architects – is used to 
establish, enhance, and enshrine the celebrity of its client countries, which often rests in 
the leaders thereof. 
Beyond architects and clients, there are still others who affect architecture.  
Engineers, builders, project managers, financiers, jurisdictional regulators, politicians, and 
others – unknown or renowned – are, in addition to their direct project contributions, 
implicitly portrayed as essential to curbing the excesses of fame-stricken or otherwise 
self-assertive architects and clients (a role not always unwarranted).  They, too, can fill 
architecture, often with measures of self-assertion that ironically meet or exceed that of 
those they are meant to regulate.  Architecture’s filling can be credited to any or all of a 
project’s creators, with celebrity not the sole contributing factor, merely one that increases 
the likelihood of filling.  To varying extents, architecture is always filled by those who 
enable its appearance, and all are ‘-ists’ of a kind, whether one of the architectural style-
ists, or one of many other ‘-ists’: industrialists, liturgists, monetarists, educationalists, 
scientists, specialists, even obstructionists, to name a few.  Amongst all of these ‘–ists’, 
who somehow impact the built environment, those who effect design are often 
differentiated from those who affect it, with effect closely guarded as the purview of 
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design professionals, and affect granted to all of the other “development actors.”8  The 
distinction is clear: there are those who design – in the sense of creating aesthetic 
concepts – and those who cannot, do not, or may not.  It is a distinction and fortification 
that, at least in the West, begins to be established in architectural education.   
Nearly twenty-five years ago, with a reminder that “the attempt to educate 
architects in universities is a twentieth century experiment,” noted US practitioner and 
educator Jack Hartray gave notice: “The educational/licensing complex is a powerful 
cartel, which now totally controls entry into the architectural profession.”9  Such control is 
an attempt to determine who may be – but, just as importantly, who may not be – a 
‘designer’.  It has the effect of establishing an elite, against which Hartray further warned: 
“Education has no value if it is not shared.  It must not be misused to enhance a false 
sense of professional authority.  Instead, it must link the professions to the society which 
they serve.”10  But, to a large extent, the architectural profession maintains the elite that 
education initiates, with further restricted entry into its self-established organisations, with 
self-granted awards, and with (largely) self-laudatory publications, often featuring or 
foretelling such awards, and often giving disproportionate priority to the faction of 
architecture that is (or proclaims itself to be) the current avant-garde.   
Professional practice also does its part to protect entrenched hierarchies.  Key 
participants in the architectural process are typically bound to one another by agreements 
or contracts, which, as such legalities seemingly must, attempt to reserve privileges and 
limit liability for each party; an exercise intrinsically oppositional.  In effect, such bindings 
are often characterised by the terms of disagreement and the commitments not made to 
the other.  Then, there are some participants who are extra-contractual, exerting power 
through the authority of governance, and some who are contingent parties, in many 
instances needing to appropriate power in order to participate.  The situation’s non-
human participants may go entirely unnoticed unless they present as obstacles, in which 
case they may be seen as something to overcome rather than open-up to.  And, 
notwithstanding incrementally greater relationality, moderating practices with labels like 
‘participatory design’ and ‘co-design’11 can render participation tokenistic or manipulative, 
merely masking entrenched hierarchies, not least those that guard architectural privilege 
and sovereignty.  Tendencies to view architecture – especially its creative conception – 
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as something privileged, and as the sovereignty of a privileged group, serve to establish 
and maintain the ‘-ists’ of architecture, and, in so doing, to erect barriers to its emptying; 
that is, barriers to its kenosis and, therefore, its being. 
‘-isms’ 
Just as architecture can be filled by the obsessions with, or of, its various creators, it can 
likewise be filled by obsessions with creating; those theories, movements, styles, trends, 
and fads that establish its ‘-isms’.  Often, such ‘-isms’ are critically ascribed to architects –
even over their objections.  For example, at the cusp of so-called Post-Modernism, some 
critics looked – arguably, in desperation – to Louis Kahn as a ‘founding father’ of the 
movement, citing his formal references to historic precedents, but largely disregarding the 
abstract and reductive Modernism which characterises those references.12  Others 
suggested that German architect Gottfried Böhm was amongst the first of the movement’s 
practitioners, owing to his apparent willingness to eschew open planning and, instead, 
segregate spaces (as if to suggest that Modernism had abandoned all 
compartmentalisation).  When I put the critics’ then-current proposition to Böhm in 1984, 
he impatiently replied, “I am not an ‘-ism’!”13  Notwithstanding such protestations, 
architecture does tend to become filled by its ‘-isms’; movements that claim new ground 
but actually describe inevitable unfoldings, usually the result of incremental occurrences 
rather than abrupt or expansive ones.  Although the duration of such movements varies, 
none endure, each inevitably obsolesced by the perdurance of kenosis. 
An ‘-ism’, of almost any kind, identifies an attempt to move toward a totality 
defined by sameness; that is, by what is seen as being the same in those components or 
constituents that supposedly comprise it.  To retain its identity as something complete 
(and therefore completely valid), an ‘-ism’ must exclude that which is seen as being 
different.  Heidegger establishes this point when he defines identity as “belonging 
together,” but then reasons that the phrase’s meaning depends entirely on which word is 
emphasised.  If ‘together’ is emphasised, belonging means “to be assigned and placed 
into the order of a ‘together’, established in the unity of a manifold … the necessary 
connection of the one with the other.”  In other words, emphasising ‘together’ gathers 
sameness together, and relies on the exclusion of difference.  If, on the other hand, 
‘belonging’ is emphasised, “the ‘together’ is now determined by the belonging.”  
Emphasising ‘belonging’ allows the gathering of difference together, without need for 
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exclusion14 – and therefore no potential or need for completion.  Andrew Benjamin goes 
further to equate the latter emphasis and meaning with the notion of the ‘cosmopolitan’, 
which he grounds in affirmation of the modern impossibility of maintaining community 
and, hence, exclusive community identities.  Benjamin argues that such affirmation 
ultimately renders even the nation state – nationalism – impossible to retain, if ever 
completely attainable.15  Insofar as that is correct, it is apparent that the same must be 
true of more minor ‘-isms’.  Certainly, such is the case with architecture’s ‘-isms’ and, 
more broadly, with ‘-isms’ that attempt to corral the unfolding of creative events. 
Incompleteness 
What, then, is attainable?  Paradoxically, the answer is incompleteness.16 
Incompleteness is always attainable in its only possible state: the permanent state of 
becoming.  Architecture’s incompleteness originates in the vernacular and then evolves in 
manifold and multilinear happenings, whereby the vernacular gradually yields to various 
notions of expertise and style – notions that attracted, and continue to attract, the 
theorisation and labelling by which they posit their own (unattainable) completeness.  
Even a brief and simple sketch of Western architecture’s development reveals that its 
incompleteness is constant, and constantly unfolding through, and despite, the onset of 
styles and movements.  Each pleads for a kenosis with which to attend to architecture’s 
becoming and, at the same time, stands as a barrier against it.  The various periods of 
Classicism are predominantly identified by the sameness of more or less prescriptive 
styles.  Their unfolding is largely linear, based in aesthetics, and generally building toward 
greater complexity.  In a sense, each ‘new’ order or style suggests the incompleteness of 
the preceding.  More disruptive ‘awakenings’ also occur, with pleas to empty architecture 
of perceived excess or misdirection, pleas for a kenosis of style.  Such awakenings often 
produce the ‘Neo-‘ styles, literally meaning ‘new’, but actually proposing a ‘return’ to 
previously known sameness made slightly different.  Eventually, a compendium of 
classical styles is available, and, from that, a style deemed most appropriate to a given 
situation can be chosen and applied, more or less by whim, but also influenced by any 
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number of protocols.  The advent of late nineteenth century Eclecticism, however, begins 
to suggest a liberation from prescription – even from the choice of prescriptions – in 
favour of mixing motifs to produce something that is not ‘traditional’ and, therefore, 
moving toward the ‘modern’.  Modernism is thus revealed as having been already present 
in Classicism, and in every style since.17 
Modernism is, at first, not so much a style, but a plea for an opening-up to rapid 
social, cultural, and political changes – magnified in perception, if not reality, by the 
coincidental onset of the twentieth century.  In many ways, the movement effects exactly 
such an opening-up but, then, gradually closes-down.  It becomes mired in its own 
metaphysical truths, and they become sanctioned in stylistic prescriptions that are not 
only exclusionary but, for many, also excessive.  Some, like Wright, never subscribe; 
others, like Kahn, break free (see Chapter 3); and Post-Modernism begins to reveal itself 
as already present in Modernism.  Post-Modernism is a plea for another kenosis of 
architecture, again a rebuke of perceived exclusions and excesses.  It, too, effects an 
opening-up but, then, through its own assertion of truths and stylistic prescriptions – mere 
substitutes for those it challenged – it closes-down and thus spawns its progeny.  In 
similar fashion, Neo-Modernism reacts against the perceived excesses of Post-
Modernism, but it does so with a plea to return to – and reform – what is perceived as the 
best of a familiar movement.  Being less prescriptive, it survives with less exclusion but 
nonetheless gathers together sameness, even if from a broader range of expression.  
Deconstructivism, which challenges all presumed orders and stylistic precepts, is (like 
most movements, at least initially) portrayed as avant-garde and, therefore, could be 
seen as kenotic.  Ultimately, however, it proves to be reliant on the sameness of 
difference, including that effected by precepts such as disorder, disorientation, disruption, 
destabilisation, and discomfort.  It therefore must exclude, or attempt to overcome, other 
forms of sameness.  And its advocacy against completeness betrays the opposite.18  
Hence, although Deconstructivism stands as an event in architecture’s kenotic unfolding 
– and joins the pleas for architecture’s own kenosis – it is not, itself, kenotic.  Indeed, it is 
the consistent failure of these and all ‘-isms’ to attain their own completeness that 
evidences the ‘attainment’ of architecture’s ongoing incompleteness – and, therein, its 
inherently kenotic nature. 
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In their incompleteness, styles and movements are destined to dissolution, either 
in preceding and succeeding movements – as in the above sketch – or in themselves.  
One of architecture’s more influential modern ‘-isms’ offers an effective demonstration of 
the latter.  Critical Regionalism, as introduced in Chapter 4, is posited by Kenneth 
Frampton in opposition to Modernism’s attachment to “the optimisation of advanced 
technology,” but not its original social and political agenda; in opposition to Post-
Modernism’s reactionary “regress[ion] into nostalgic historicism, or the glibly decorative,” 
but not its fundamental resistance toward Modernism; and in support of 
Environmentalism’s broad goal to effect “a more directly dialectical relation with nature,” 
but with less fervour than many factional ‘-isms’ that the movement goes on to generate.19  
Frampton suggests that Critical Regionalism is to be effected not from the avant-garde 
but from the arrière-garde; a notion that sounds kenotic and, in some ways, is.  Indeed, 
Critical Regionalism is not a prescription for style.  Its criteria allow the embrace of many 
formal expressions, and not necessarily those that might be expected to be associated 
with a particular region.  Frampton’s manifesto constructively grows out of an earlier 
stated concern for “our present all but total incapacity to create place” and the fear that 
“we might have eliminated, once and for all, the possibility of ever being anywhere.”20  It is 
nonetheless an ‘-ism’, with six prescribed points that ultimately define a particular kind of 
‘sameness’ (albeit with room for difference) needed to resist other, different 
samenesses.21  Like other ‘-isms’, Critical Regionalism ultimately dissolves. 
Ironically, Critical Regionalism dissolves amidst the very philosophy of place (or 
topos) out of which it ostensibly grows.  The work of Jeff Malpas, on the subject of 
topology, aids in explicating the dissolution.  First, place can be seen as the relationality 
of region – or regionality – inasmuch as a region is “a set of places that are already, in 
some sense, related to one another in such a way that they do indeed constitute a 
region.”22  Since architecture responds to regionality by the shaping of space, it can be 
said that architecture is one of those activities that gives appearance to places within a 
region.  It is, therefore, inherently regional, even if not always attentive to the region in 
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which it is situated.  Second, place can be seen as bound and limit.  To shape space as a 
response to place – the definition of architecture, just proposed – is to consciously and 
intentionally design in response to the bounds and limits of place.  If design is seen as an 
intentional act that alters, in some way, not only the place being designed, but also its 
relationality with other places, theirs with each other, and therefore the regionality 
comprised by such places, then to design responsively is to design with attentiveness to 
all that design will alter.  Such attentiveness is criticality.  It is questioning, listening, and 
responding.  It is the emptying of self that effects an opening-up to, challenging of, and 
pouring-out of hospitality for a situation’s others and other things.  And it is through such 
criticality that the designer is oriented “towards the place out of which questioning 
emerges, and to which it always turns us back.”23  To design, then, is to be critical; that is, 
to be attentive to the bounds and limits of place, as well as the relationality of places that 
effects regionality.  Design is critical.  Architecture is regional.  Frampton’s promulgation 
of Critical Regionalism may have been, and may remain, a useful admonition to the 
architectural profession, but it never actually described a ‘new’ theory; it merely offered a 
new label for what had been, what is, and what is always becoming.  It dissolves into 
itself, because it offers no more than the profoundly simpler (if not obvious) notion of 
‘attentively designed architecture’, which is always already critical and regional; that is, 
fundamentally kenotic.  Arguably, all movements and styles dissolve in favour of the 
same. 
 
In their incompleteness, styles and movements can also become categories of 
opposition.  Once again, Environmentalism offers a current and useful example.  
Manifested in architecture under the banner of ‘sustainability’, Environmentalism is a 
category that opposes and is opposed.  And, like many other movements, it further 
subdivides to create its own internal categories of opposition, thus presenting as a 
microcosm of the architectural profession as a whole.  In 2001, Simon Guy and Graham 
Farmer labelled the environment “contested terrain” and enframed the contest in a matrix 
of six competing environmental “logics,”24 really ‘-isms’ by another name.  Combined with 
the authors’ call for a “very different dialogue about sustainable architecture” and an 
“enlarged context in which a more heterogeneous coalition of practices can be 
developed,” their matrix alludes to emerging pluralism (also a theme in Venturi’s 
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complexity and Vattimo’s secularisation).25  For well over a decade since the Guy and 
Farmer entreaty, the contest has continued amidst a not-so-very-different dialogue, 
which, notwithstanding greater recognition of a pluralistic and complex reality, still 
operates amidst a paradigm of epistemological competition.  It is not, however, the 
plurality of interpretations that is problematic or contradictory to kenosis.  It is the isolation 
and politicisation of such interpretations – including explicit or implicit claims to truth, and 
the consequent inference of superiority – that can reduce dialogue to debate, exclude the 
other, and thereby become barriers to exchange; barriers to kenosis.  Although an 
‘enlarged context’ – a more inclusive and pluralistic domain – is certainly desirable (if not 
inevitable), mere enlargement offers little gain if the domain remains encumbered and 
compromised by oppositional barriers, especially those that connote victory and defeat, 
superiority and subordination.  Such barriers often present as ‘-isms’ of one kind or 
another.  While they arise in the universal kenosis by which architecture (and everything 
else) unfolds, they nonetheless impede a kenosis of architecture itself.  In so doing, they 
impede not only a turning away from superficiality and decadence but also a turning back 
to that from which the question of architecture’s being emerges. 
Turning Back 
It is not unreasonable, then, to think that an architecture freed of ‘-ists’ and ‘-isms’ might 
be an architecture like that which Derrida invokes in the epigraph to this chapter.  Such 
would be an architecture seeking to understand itself – and thereby consider its future – 
by emptying and turning back to its beginnings, when architecture was a vernacular 
pursuit,26 and neither style nor movement were known.  Indeed, even many of the 
ensuing movements are seen to point back.  Critical Regionalism – though by no means 
trivially vernacular – points back to principles that are readily associated with the 
vernacular.  It thereby suggests a kind of professional emptying that restores an 
emphasis on human experience, responsiveness to nature and context, and prioritisation 
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26
 I use the term ‘vernacular’ in the sense that it is used in Brand, How Buildings Learn: What Happens After 
They're Built: 132. Brand ascribes the first use of the term to architectural historians in the 1850s, who 
appropriated it from the realm of linguistics. There it referred to ‘the native language of a region’, but could 
also convey the ‘vulgar’, as bearing ‘folk wisdom’, and as being ‘common’ (the latter including senses of 
‘widespread, ordinary, and beneath notice’). “In terms of architecture, vernacular buildings are seen as the 
opposite of whatever is ‘academic’, ‘high-style’, ‘polite’. Vernacular is everything not designed by professional 
architects – in other words, most of the world’s buildings, ranging in assigned value from now-precious 
Cotswold stone cottages … to the despised hordes of factory-built mobile homes.” Thus, “old vernacular is 
lovely,” while “new vernacular is unlovely.” I would suggest that what Brand calls ‘old vernacular’ is actually 
cultural vernacular (arising predominantly out of cultural values and motivations), while ‘new vernacular’ is 
better seen as economic vernacular (arising largely out of economic values and motivations). Thus, when 
Brand observes that the vernacular is “so immersed in its culture and its region that it looks interesting only to 
outsiders,” he is referring primarily to old – or cultural – vernacular, where ‘outsiders’ are those outside the 
culture of the vernacular’s origin. 
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of the tactile over the visual.27  However, despite its pointing back toward the vernacular, 
Critical Regionalism remains firmly planted in expert, professional architecture.  It does 
not, for example, point back as far as the vernacular architecture of Heidegger’s 
farmhouse in the Black Forest, a hypothetical example (with manifold realisations), which, 
although both praised and maligned in architectural and philosophical circles,28 usefully 
illustrates an architecture that appears emptied of ‘-ists’ and ‘-isms’.  “Built some two 
hundred years ago by the dwelling of peasants,” this farmhouse empties itself to its 
situation and is consequently strengthened by the concurrent gathering-in of all that is 
needed for ‘dwelling’.29  It is protected from wind, faces the sun of the southern sky, is 
located near the source of water, and features a roof of the required slope to bear and 
shed inevitable snow, with proper overhangs to shield interior spaces from winter storms.  
Inside, it unselfconsciously accommodates the ordinary, everyday activities and routines 
of a multi-generational family.  “A craft which, itself sprung from dwelling, still uses its 
tools and frames as things, built the farmhouse.”30 
Heidegger’s farmhouse is vernacular, not by way of assertion or strategy, but 
rather in its responsiveness; its emptied and open response to regionality and, therefore, 
place.  It is vernacular, not as opposed to being something else, but because, for the 
people who built it, being is vernacular and can be nothing else.  Heidegger proposes 
building and dwelling as a single happening.  He even attributes the construction of the 
farmhouse, not to an improbable designer or builder, nor even to the peasant farmers 
(more probably the designers and builders), but rather to “craft,” because, in this 
example, the notion of craft is intrinsic to dwelling and, consequently, to those who dwell.  
In the “simple oneness” of building and dwelling, it can be said that “dwelling … was able 
to build.”31  It can also be said that dwelling was able to do so by virtue of its emptying in 
response to situation: that is, its instantiation of kenosis.  Yet, even this architecture is 
filled.  Although emptied of experts and expertise, celebrities and celebrity, it is 
nonetheless filled with those who dwell, and especially with their dwelling-ness, as simple 
as that might be.  So it is that, in this emptiness that is fullness, building and dwelling are 
fully integrated. 
                                               
27
 Frampton emphatically “distinguish[es] between Critical Regionalism and simple-minded attempts to revive 
the hypothetical forms of a lost vernacular.” The latter is not the association that I make here. See Frampton, 
"Towards a Critical Regionalism: Six Points for an Architecture of Resistance," 21. 
28
 The farmhouse is famously discussed in Heidegger, "Building Dwelling Thinking," 157-158. Suggestions 
that its romanticism, and notions of ‘authenticity’ link Heidegger to National Socialist thinking is summarised in 
Sharr, Heidegger for Architects: 74-75, 88-90. Such critique is further explored and challenged in Malpas, 
Heidegger's Topology: 17-27. 
29
 The philosophically problematic nature of translating the German word Wohnen into English, as dwelling, 
and the repercussions arising therefrom, are presented in Malpas, "Rethinking Dwelling: Heidegger and the 
Question of Place." For consistency, however, I have elected to retain and use the common translation. 
30
 Heidegger, "Building Dwelling Thinking," 157-158 (my emphasis). 
31
 Ibid., 157-158. 
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However, the globalised barrage of modernity – particularly in the increasing kinds 
and numbers of competing specialists and specialty typologies – constantly challenges 
the inseparability of building and dwelling.  As building and dwelling split, their simple 
oneness, which is a way of being and therefore something responsive, gradually 
transmutes into a strategy for being and therefore something exploitable.  Or, seen 
through Heidegger’s example, as the act of designing a Black Forest farmhouse 
progressively shifts into the purview of an expert, the vernacular becomes a kind of 
Vernacular-ism, providing a set of assertable and exploitable idioms that define expertise, 
that fill the resultant expert architecture, and thus stand as a barrier to that emptying on 
which the vernacular actually depends.  This disintegration of building and dwelling is 
what folklorist Henry Glassie describes as “cultural weakening” and “cultural disharmony,” 
made evident when building becomes marked by “the existence of plans on paper,” and 
is made measureable by the “amount of detail” such plans depict.32  Indeed, the ever-
progressing disintegration of building and dwelling produces ever-more, ever-new, and 
ever-more-strategic factions, each accompanied by the production of ever-more-detailed 
plans, eventually not on paper but on visual display units.  A call to turn back to 
architecture’s vernacular beginnings is a call to see, telescopically, beyond the myriad 
‘-isms’, and to learn from simple oneness, without becoming mired in nostalgic longings 
for either style or a simpler time.  Heidegger so states when he explains that his 
vernacular example “in no way means that we should or could go back to building such 
houses,” only that we can learn from it that “dwelling … is the basic character of Being in 
keeping with which mortals exist.”33  Indeed, any turning back is equally a looking 
forward, applying what is learnt in a milieu of intensifying modern complexities. 
Vernacular-ism 
An emptying and turning back toward the vernacular offers architecture the prospect of 
an ontological view, one that maintains the integrity of building and dwelling.  But if, in 
practice, barriers to emptying remain, the view can be distorted or occluded, and its 
potentiality diminished.  Indeed, the view can stop well short of the vernacular, at yet 
another ‘-ism’; something that might be seen as Vernacular-ism.  A pertinent example is 
presented in the work of “citizen-architect” and teacher Samuel Mockbee (1944—2001), 
and in the unique practice – called Rural Studio – that he co-founded with Auburn 
                                               
32
 H. Glassie, "Vernacular Architecture and Society," in Vernacular Architecture: Paradigms of Environmental 
Response, ed. M. Turan, Ethnoscapes: Volume 4 (Aldershot: Avebury, 1990), 274. Glassie goes on to argue 
that “the more minimal the plan, the more completely the architectural idea abides in the separate minds of 
architect and client.” The fully vernacular, however, would not recognise such a separation, since the 
vernacular idea would likely abide only in the mind of the user/builder, or, more accurately, spring from and 
be crafted into building by the dwelling-ness of that user/builder. 
33
 Heidegger, "Building Dwelling Thinking," 158. 
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University (in the state of Alabama, USA).34  The Heideggerian notions of dwelling and, 
especially, dwelling “poetically”35 – which invoke more than mere dwelling conditions, 
house-dwelling, or dwelling as a house – would appear to undergird the studio’s work.36  
In brief, Rural Studio develops the design and construction skills of architectural students 
(as part of their curriculum), salvages and recycles unwanted or unusual materials 
(including hay bales, tyres, automobile windscreens, waste cardboard, and surplus carpet 
tiles37), and collaborates with benefactors and government agencies to source funding, 
such that in Hale County – second poorest in Alabama – the neediest residents are given 
new houses, and the neediest communities are provided with new public facilities and 
parks.  These architecturally-designed ‘gifts’ generally come without any cost to the 
recipient.38  Thus, Hale County is a social laboratory for an architectural experiment that 
is driven by commendable moral and ethical intentions, and delivers significant outcomes 
of mutual benefit.  For that, the studio has deservedly received widespread praise and 
scant criticism.39 
In its conception, then, Rural Studio and its work would appear to be shrouded in 
the ideals of the vernacular and permeated by kenotic principles – all in a situation where 
both are clearly essential to dwelling poetically.  Such appearances, however, prove 
somewhat ambiguous, if not misleading, largely owing to the project’s premise of gift.  
What seems to be uncomplicated responsiveness invokes the vernacular, but is not 
entirely so; and, what is a kind and charitable gesture invokes kenosis, but is not entirely 
so.  The subject of gift and gift exchange – including the problematics thereof – is well 
explored elsewhere by figures such as Mauss, Heidegger, Derrida, and others.40  For 
                                               
34
 In a comparison of “dispositions of liberal democracy,” Mockbee is named as the “idealised citizen-
architect,” exemplifying an “ontological” approach that values “participation” and builds on “regenerative 
architecture” and “sustainable development.” See Moore and Brand, "The Banks of Frankfurt and the 
Sustainable City," 7. Interestingly, Mockbee and his Rural Studio re-present many key characteristics of the 
architects and projects examined in Part Two (Chapters 3 – 6) of this dissertation. In various instances, 
Mockbee’s work demonstrates the zeal of Kahn, the exaggeration of Graves, the search for essence 
undertaken by Pei, Ando’s focus on architectonics, the distortedness of Libeskind and Eisenman, and the 
environmentalism and high-tech approach of Foster – even if all such characteristics are pursued and 
achieved with humble and low-tech means. 
35
 The expanded term refers to Heidegger's elucidation of dwelling, using a Hölderlin poem, in Heidegger, "'... 
Poetically Man Dwells ...'," 211-227. 
36
 The story of Mockbee and Rural Studio is well-documented. See, for example, S. Mockbee, "The Rural 
Studio," Architectural Design 68, no. 7-8 (1998): 72-79; A.O. Dean and T. Hursley, Rural Studio: Samuel 
Mockbee and an Architecture of Decency  (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2002); and A.O. Dean 
and T. Hursley, Proceed and Be Bold: Rural Studio After Samuel Mockbee  (New York: Princeton 
Architectural Press, 2005). 
37
 Dean and Hursley, Proceed and Be Bold: Rural Studio After Samuel Mockbee: 8. 
38
 Recipient contributions toward construction costs can occur in some instances, particularly in connection 
with larger, civic projects. For example, in the case of the Antioch Baptist Church, the congregation raised 
USD10,000 of the USD35,000 total cost. The balance was ‘gift’. See ibid., 47. 
39
 This point is acknowledged by admirers, as in Dean and Hursley, Rural Studio: Samuel Mockbee and an 
Architecture of Decency: 12; as well as by critics, as in P. del Real, "'Ye Shall Receive': The Rural Studio and 
the Gift of Architecture," Journal of Architectural Education 62, no. 4 (2009): 123. 
40
 A worthy compilation and analysis of major writings on this subject can be found in A.D. Schrift, The Logic 
of the Gift: Toward an Ethic of Generosity  (New York and London: Routledge, 1997). My arguments 
concerning gift exchange, which I propose specifically in relation to the vernacular and kenosis, are given 
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purposes of this discussion, suffice it to say that there is a sense (particularly according to 
Mauss) in which the notion of gifting can be seen as a form of self-assertion toward the 
other.  Regardless of intentions, gifting, in that sense, carries obligations (explicit or not) 
of immediate, deferred, or perhaps ongoing return by someone, at some time, in some 
form, if not with in-kind gifts, then at least with appreciation, affirmation, or indirect 
benefits.  Clearly, however, the gifts of Rural Studio are not given with the overt intention 
to oblige reciprocity.  Rural Studio acts on what Mockbee calls a “foundation of decency,” 
in order to “help those who aren’t likely to help you in return … even if nobody is 
watching.”41  But, of course, many are watching,42 and there are returns – direct and 
indirect – to all of the gift givers (notwithstanding the fact that some returns are 
unsolicited).  In many cases there is a rightful expectation of such return.43  As such, the 
project is not merely responsive to need.  It is also strategic and, in that, its vernacular 
character becomes dubious.  Its kenotic character is similarly challenged in that the 
project’s ‘gifting’, its pouring-out of apparent hospitality in the form of a new building, is 
not necessarily the pouring-out of kenotic hospitality.  Counterintuitively, such hospitality 
is not the giving of any ‘thing’ the self has to the other but, rather, the self’s reception of 
the other, making room for (emptying) and gathering-in (filling with) whatever the other 
comprises – including that which may not be seen as worthy.  Emptying is filling, pouring-
out is receiving; passive is active, and active is passive; none are gift.  The events of 
kenotic hospitality are effected concurrently, in simple oneness, not with any expectation 
of reciprocity, but as a consequential responsibility of becoming human.  Paradoxically, 
then, it is the contingency, vulnerability, and beauty of action-emptied-of-expectation (the 
antithesis of gift exchange) that invites, even fosters, an unexpected response of 
reciprocal kenosis and the potential for mutual exchange and influence that flows 
therefrom. 
Gift exchange can distort relationality, especially if the gift recipients have no 
means of reciprocating, and their participation is thus restricted to passive acceptance, as 
                                                                                                                                             
impetus by a larger, sociological exploration of the subject in del Real, "'Ye Shall Receive': The Rural Studio 
and the Gift of Architecture," 123-126. Citing sociologist, Marcel Mauss, del Real notes that unlike commodity 
exchange, wherein required relationality is defined only by the transaction, “the gift is predicated on a social 
relation, on a bond (like the family) that demands an economy of reaffirmation,” or “exchange systems of 
obligation and reciprocity” that establish “dynamic, two-way relationships.” 
41
 Mockbee, "The Rural Studio," 79. 
42
 Indeed, Rural Studio has attained a level of celebrity status. “The work of the Rural Studio has struck such 
a chord – both architecturally and socially – that it has been featured on Oprah, Nightline, and CBS News, as 
well as in Time and People magazines.” See Dean and Hursley, Rural Studio: Samuel Mockbee and an 
Architecture of Decency: inside front cover notes. 
43
 The university expects and receives a viable vehicle of education and research, as well as the affirmation 
of positive publicity and its consequent recruitment benefits. The studio’s principals expect and receive the 
means to satisfy personal and professional ambitions, and, solicited or not, they receive widespread 
recognition. The students expect and receive an education (that being commodity exchange), as well as the 
extra return of an extra-ordinary, extra-classroom opportunity. The funding agencies and benefactors, by way 
of the program’s inherent economies of labour and materials, expect and receive a greater yield than might 
otherwise be achieved, and enjoy the favourable public image arising from their assistance and philanthropy. 
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is reportedly the case of most Rural Studio recipients.  In that mode, recipients are largely 
unengaged bystanders.  Adding to the disengagement – and contrary to the dynamics of 
the vernacular – recipients are also largely excluded from hands-on participation in the 
realisation of what are ostensibly their buildings.  Since so much of the Rural Studio’s 
work involves unconventional building practices and the use of unconventional materials, 
and because the project is necessarily a disciplinary training ground, opportunities for 
non-disciplinary participation are limited.  According to critic Patricio del Real, “there is 
nothing to do – unless invited to participate – but watch.”44  Insofar as that is true, the 
problem of non-participation is ironically compounded, since, if recipient participation 
were to be invited, such would be at the sole discretion and subject to the restrictions of 
the gift givers.  To restrict participation – especially that of the user – is to compromise the 
integrity of the vernacular, the simple oneness of dwelling and building, the capacity of 
dwelling to build, and, ultimately, the potential for dwelling poetically.  Such limitation 
compromises kenosis. 
Most problematic, however, is the gift itself – neither mere shelter nor necessarily 
shelter with a high degree of responsiveness to place and region, yet frequently seen as 
being aligned with the vernacular.  Mockbee describes the studio’s work as 
“contemporary modernism grounded in Southern culture” with inspiration from “vernacular 
sources.”45 His statement reveals a design strategy, and two glossy monographs of 
professional architectural photographs reveal the same.  The gift of the Rural Studio 
project is the gift of Architecture (intentionally capitalised).46  It presents as an architecture 
filled by a kind of modern Vernacular-ism and the modern Vernacular-ists who design it.  
Notwithstanding modest scale, humble materiality, and noble intentions, it differs little 
from most other expert architecture of one ‘-ism’ or another.  Mockbee suggests that the 
studio’s buildings – small and simple – “remind us of what it means to have an American 
architecture without pretence,” yet he also speaks of their ability (and the desirability 
thereof) to leave the perceiver “awed.”  He likens such ability to that of larger and more 
complex structures,47 those in which the frequent pretence is precisely that of awe.  
Eschewed is the “grand and ostentatious” in architecture, yet the architectonics of the 
studio’s work often appear to mimic, or belie a longing to mimic, the motifs of grand and 
often self-conscious (if not always ostentatious) structures.48  Even many of Rural 
                                               
44
 del Real, "'Ye Shall Receive': The Rural Studio and the Gift of Architecture," 124. 
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 Dean and Hursley, Proceed and Be Bold: Rural Studio After Samuel Mockbee: 8. 
46
 Although by a different approach, del Real reaches a similar conclusion, arguing that “architecture is the 
formidable negotiating table on which the Rural Studio comes to talk to the community.” See del Real, "'Ye 
Shall Receive': The Rural Studio and the Gift of Architecture," 123. 
47
 Mockbee, "The Rural Studio," 79. 
48
 For example, the Yancey Chapel (built in 1995 for USD15,000), also called ‘The Tire Chapel’ (for its use of 
disused tires, rendered in stucco), could readily be seen as a ‘poor-man’s’ version of Faye Jones’ work at the 
Thorncrown and Cooper Memorial Chapels, or Lloyd Wright’s (Frank Lloyd Wright, Jr) Wayfarer’s Chapel 
 288 
 
Studio’s regenerative practices appear to be deployed in service to their Architecture, 
rather than to the residents’ dwelling-ness, and can thereby manifest as self-conscious 
novelties, architectural gimmicks, and, potentially worse, cultural faux pas.49  This filling of 
the studio’s work, with architecture and architects, appears as a barrier to the emptying 
that nurtures dwelling, and that is most worrying with regard to the inhabitants. 
Many of the Studio’s architectural photographs, most notably those of residential 
interiors, reveal what del Real describes as the architecture’s “leash of middle class 
desires” and the “rebellions against architecture orchestrated by [the] inhabitants,”50 both 
of which can be seen as clashes between dwelling and building.  Exemplified is Glassie’s 
cultural disharmony,51 ironically foreseeable in the studio’s design strategy, insofar as its 
espoused contemporary modernism proves not to be so grounded in – not to be in simple 
oneness with – the Southern culture that defines these residents’ dwelling-ness.  In many 
instances, it appears that the architecture provides a dwelling but impedes dwelling 
poetically.  These unintended tensions and impediments appear to emerge from 
architectural dogma.  According to Mockbee: 
                                                                                                                                             
(itself an antecedent of Jones’ chapels). At Lucy’s House (designed by Mockbee before his death, and built 
for USD32,000 in 2002), the ‘tower’ (redesigned by the studio after Mockbee’s death) takes on sharply 
angular and distorted forms, not dissimilar to those of Daniel Libeskind, and consequently has little 
relationship to the modesty or simplicity that marks the balance of the original Mockbee design. (Such 
intentional unrelatedness only strengthens the comparison to Libeskind’s work. See Chapter 6.) The 
Modernist formal composition of the Mason’s Bend Community Center (2000), and especially its dominating 
façade of scalloped glass sheets (actually eighty automobile windscreens), can be aesthetically likened to the 
work of Norman Foster, not least his scalloped glass dome at the Reichstag (also discussed in Chapter 6). 
And, at the Antioch Baptist Church (built in 2001 for USD35,000), the manner in which relatively inexpensive 
galvanised aluminium is used as an exterior cladding belies what appears to be an underlying longing to have 
used much more expensive zinc cladding, a material which has become ubiquitous in contemporary 
architecture. These projects appear in the two Rural Studio monographs, both by Dean and Hursley. 
49
 Deployment of the fashionable trend to use discarded materials – though not without good intentions 
toward economy and sustainability – offers one example of cultural faux pas and disharmony with the 
particular Southern culture of this context. Recycling thrown away materials is an age-old practice employed 
by the economically disadvantaged out of need, not trend, and is not necessarily valorised. When such 
practices are celebrated as contemporary design features – especially as caricatures of more sophisticated 
motifs – they can be seen to “underscore the actions of poverty,” to be an “appropriation of the tactics of the 
poor,” made subject to “architectural disciplinary and elite values” and then “masked behind a common sense 
universalism that sees efficiency as a virtue – as if the poor could never waste resources.” See del Real, "'Ye 
Shall Receive': The Rural Studio and the Gift of Architecture," 124. 
50
 Specifically, del Real cites “the unease with which the furniture of ‘the poor’ inhabit these houses,” as 
exemplified at Lucy’s house, “where the naked concrete clashes with the plush couch in the family room, or 
the baroque wooden dresser/vanity collides with the jagged geometry of the bedroom tower.” See ibid., 123-
126. Arguably, the ‘plushness’ of the couch and the ‘baroque-ness’ of other furniture are, themselves, 
incongruous with the nature of dwelling in Hale County, but the stylistic character of the furniture is no less 
faux than the vernacularity of the architecture. Beyond that, however, I would suggest that there is a far more 
telling incongruity at work. Throughout Lucy’s house are proudly and prominently placed reproductions of 
pious (some would say, sentimental) Christian art, each depicting some dimension of kenosis (inasmuch as 
the Christian story is one of kenosis). This art – despite its ‘inauthenticity’ in one sense – authentically reveals 
more about the poetic-ness with which these residents dwell, or at least that in which such poetic-ness is 
sought, than does the furniture. It is this art, depicting a presumably sincere yearning for openness toward the 
other, which collides with its host architecture, so self-consciously and ‘full’ as to block such openness. That 
collision vividly portrays unease. Other examples of incongruity and unease – of varying degree and manner 
– are reflected in images of the Bryant (Hay Bale) House (1994), the Harris (Butterfly) House (1997), and the 
Goat House (1998), as well as in those of several civic facilities, where unremarkable but indigenous 
‘dwelling’ argues with ‘building’ – with Architecture – and appears to grasp at and assert its remarkability. 
51
 See note 32. 
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There is something divine in a work of architecture, and we must maintain faith in 
the wonder of architecture to bring us into accord with the natural world, the 
supernatural world, with our fellow human beings and the great unknown.52 
Not unlike Kahn, but perhaps more dogmatically, Mockbee speaks about architecture in 
terms that are almost religious.  Initially, he might even be heard to invoke and support 
something of Heidegger’s thinking about the fourfold and dwelling.  But Mockbee is 
obviously speaking of expert architecture, and his notion – one not uncommon in the 
profession – is actually more an inversion of Heidegger.  Notwithstanding any 
accompanying advocacy of social responsiveness and civic engagement, Mockbee’s is a 
notion that tends to privilege architecture (expert building), separate it from dwelling, and 
suggest that dwelling emerges from (expert) building, or that (expert) building is that 
which builds dwelling.  It sees expert building (Architecture) as a gift to humanity.  
Granted, the act of building (expert or not) may, like other acts of creative endeavour, 
serve to nurture humanity’s dwelling-ness, but, insofar as Heidegger correctly orders it, 
the act of building that might do so is that which springs from humanity first dwelling 
poetically. 
 
In its practice of architecture, the Rural Studio turns back toward the vernacular of 
Heidegger’s farmhouse – toward the integration of building and dwelling – but without the 
extent of emptying that fully enables attentiveness to the present and anticipation of the 
future.  Such emptying is, in part, prevented by a view of architecture as celebrated, 
privileged, and therefore ‘gift’.  It is in that view that gift can become an assertion of self 
rather than an opening-up to the other and the other’s dwelling-ness.  Assertion 
precludes fully-engaged participation by those very others whose dwelling-ness is meant 
to be accommodated.  Assertion precludes regeneration, because even when 
regenerative practices are deployed, they are deployed in service to the gift of 
Architecture.  Ultimately, assertion also precludes sustainability, because being 
sustainably is not sustainable without the dynamic balance engendered by participation 
and regeneration.  Although it exemplifies a kind of turning back that is in many ways 
commendable, the Rural Studio view does not appear to be that of architecture’s ontology 
– that is, of kenosis – because that view is seemingly blocked by the fullness stemming 
from a focus on architecture’s epistemology and the privileging that supposedly flows 
from that.  Moreover, Rural Studio’s practice appears bound in a not atypical paradigm of 
strategic quest and attainment, a paradigm unable to recognise that the condition of 
architecture – indeed, of all acts of creation – is always incomplete and unattainable, and 
therefore ‘complete’ only in that condition. 
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EMPTYING 
Letting-Be and Becoming 
Concealed by entrenched paradigms and practices is that which integrates building with 
dwelling; indeed, that which holds architecture’s (vernacular) nature – its being.  
Unconcealment, as Heidegger advises, is not effected by quest or conquest but by 
respectfully attending to the concealment, a form of ‘letting-be’.  In 1993, just as the 
sustainability movement was gaining momentum in architecture, Susan Maxman (then 
president of the American Institute of Architects) addressed the subject, saying: 
“Sustainable architecture isn’t a prescription.  It’s an approach, an attitude.  It shouldn’t 
really even have a label.  It should just be architecture.”53  Her statement is a subset of 
my larger argument that the language of architecture can be emptied of all labels and 
strategies, and thereby be transformed – without jeopardising its fundamental identity.  
Architecture need only be architecture, or, better stated, architecture need only be.  In 
that, it transforms and becomes.  Architecture’s transformation, however, is not merely of 
paradigm and practice, but also of those who effect, affect, and are affected by both.  In 
other words, architecture’s becoming relies on humanity’s.  But, what is humanity to 
become?  Notwithstanding a naive suggestion that a solution to world problems might 
exist, and an inherent Christian bias, the following parable offers an answer to the 
question of humanity’s becoming, even while ensuring that the question is left open. 
A theologian was asked, ‘What should be done about the problems of the world?’  
His answer was at one and the same time both profound and simple.  He said, ‘Do 
as God – become human.’54 
Seemingly anticipated is an epistemological solution to world problems, some 
grand solution that can be known and implemented.  The solution offered, however, is not 
only sparing but ontological, suggesting that the solution is not to know but to be.  It is a 
solution further revealed by the parable’s syntax.  The theologian’s initial phrase avoids 
the past simple ‘Do as God did’, the past participle ‘Do as God has done’, and implies the 
present participle ‘Do as God is doing’, thereby suggesting that the solution is ongoing, 
incomplete, and only occurring in that incompleteness.  Then, employing the verb 
‘become’, the second phrase adds the expectation of ongoing transformation, that of 
those becoming, their becoming relationality, and therefore their becoming situation.  
Both phrases are presented as commands – calls-to-action, calls to become engaged – 
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 B. Bilger, "Shaking the Rafters," Earthwatch July/August(1993): 11 (my emphasis). 
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 J. McIntyre, "President's Address" (paper presented at the Anglican Church of Australia, Diocese of 
Gippsland, Thirty-sixth Synod, Sale, Victoria, Australia, 2012), n.p. (my emphasis). In his address, Bishop 
McIntyre parabolised, but inadvertently misquoted a statement from W. Bardsley, Against the Tide: The Story 
of Adomnan of Iona  (Glasgow: Wild Goose Publications, 2006), 141. Bishop McIntyre's parable is used here, 
for illustrative purposes, but the theologian's reply has been corrected in accordance with the source text. 
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but are without coercion or obligation or expectation of attainment.  The only expectation 
is evolvement.  Thus, the so-called solution lies in always incomplete transformation, 
which cannot be known, only experienced and attended.  Finally, with its reference to the 
incarnation – the particular Christian story of God emptying to become and be human – 
the theologian’s answer reveals its grounding in kenosis.  Ironically, however, it is a 
grounding that defies co-optation by any particular interest, religious or otherwise.  The 
invocation of kenosis opens-up a view of becoming human that transcends categories of 
opposition (the ‘-isms’ of religion or architecture).  It is a view that focuses on the always 
ongoing dynamic by which all of creation moves in and out of relationship, and thereby 
undergoes constant transformation. 
Although the discipline of architecture may not, at first, be seen to rank highly on a 
list of world problems, many of the subjects that would – environment, housing, health, 
industry, consumerism – are so intrinsically connected to architecture that its place on 
such a list is already embedded.55  It is therefore no deceit to suggest that this parable 
points to the potentiality of architecture’s transformation.  As humanity transforms, so do 
its pursuits, not least creative pursuits that include architecture.  Such transformation 
requires, and also effects, the removal of barriers to emptying.  Freed of barriers, the act 
of architectural design can be seen as a kenotic event, an emptying to create; or, an 
emptying that makes ready for the appearance of, and enables attentive response to, 
what it is that a situation is calling for. 
Creativity, Creating, and Creation 
An account of design – seen as an emptying to create – first takes up the approach or 
posture with which a creator comes to create.  Kenosis, however, offers no procedures by 
which to invoke creativity, engage in creating, or manifest creation; instead, remaining 
open to contingent happenings.  In that openness, kenosis eschews any notions that 
creativity can be commodified, learned, and performed according to a process.56  When 
architecture is called to practically transform, for example by changing its ‘modes of 
production’, such a call implies changes to existing processes or the discovery of new 
processes by which architecture can better itself.  Both are always possible, both might 
incrementally improve architecture, and both might somehow transform the (already 
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futile) ‘process-isation’ of creativity – but not creativity itself.  Kenosis calls on the 
participants in creative acts to counterintuitively focus not on process or strategy but on 
ways of being, particularly ways of being receptive to that in which the creative responses 
are already embedded; namely, the situation to which they are responding.  It calls not for 
transformed processes, but for Heidegger’s transformed thinking; not the calculative sort 
but the meditative (as discussed in Chapter 2 and, again, in Chapter 8).  It calls for 
“askesis or ‘non-verbal pedagogy,’” an “open-eyed mysticism” – practised and 
contemplative self-emptying – from which arises a “means of true attentiveness,” 
something that is “more discomforting, more destabilizing to settled presumptions,” than 
any calculated process could possibly be.57  In that call, much of practical import is 
revealed. 
Whether consciously or sub-consciously actuated, creat-ivity begins with the 
creators’ humanity, or approach to being.  Being human begins with becoming a child, but 
the invocation of mere childlike naiveté and innocence, as attributes of creativity, risks 
sentimentality and trivialisation.  Yet, becoming a child, particularly adopting the child’s 
willing vulnerability and distinctly open-eyed envisaging and understanding, is a condition 
of kenotic creativity.  The child, of whom Walter Benjamin writes, is not merely naive, 
innocent, and blissful.58  His is a child who knows the anxiety of anticipating an unknown 
future, one in which everything is seen for the first time.  In such anxiety, however, the 
child is liberated from the more restrictive adult afflictions of habit, desensitisation, and 
myopia.  In the child’s emptiness is the capacity to be filled.  From the child’s perspective, 
objects in the environment appear larger and closer, yet unfamiliarity with such objects 
effectively renders them smaller and more distant, a phenomenon by which the ‘intimacy 
of distance’ is experienced.  In the child’s ability to disrupt and rebel against adult 
certitude, the child challenges self-sufficiency in the other.  But, to Benjamin, the essence 
of the child’s responsiveness to its situation is found in the spontaneity and serendipity of 
discovery, free of strategic intent.  “Finds are to children what conquests are to adults,” 
Benjamin writes.59  Rather than seeking to dominate its environment, the child is content 
with a reciprocal relationship, often delighted to create a miniaturised world using objects 
that adults have rendered obsolete or nature has moulted.60  The child’s approach to 
creativity is not simply ingenuous, it can be profoundly kenotic.  Adults often dismiss the 
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child’s innate self-emptying and attunement to situation as something susceptible to error, 
misperception, and misjudgement, when, paradoxically, the child’s kenosis can effect 
uncanny revealment that remains imperceptible to the self-absorbed.  Kenosis pleads for 
the recovery, in all creators, of the child’s approach – as if ‘at first sight’ – and the 
practicable creativity that ensues therefrom. 
Approaching with kenotic creativity, the child engages not in idle but 
transformative ‘play’, shaping the child and its world without distinction.  Benjamin 
describes such play in terms of transgression, mimesis, and collection, each of which also 
offers insights into the creat-ing that arises out of kenosis.  Such creating invites 
transgression in the form of a willingness to cross thresholds of familiarity; to ‘surrender’ 
to the situation, not through acquiescence, but through rapport; and to become practised 
at, and motivated by, losing oneself in the labyrinth of potentiality presented by every 
situation.  Kenotic creating invites the mimesis of recognising correspondences, partially 
becoming the others or other things of a situation, and abandoning goals of mastery over 
any.  Kenotic creating also invites, through unexpected discovery, the collection (and re-
collection) of lost or forgotten things, not for the sake of possession, but for redemption.  
It thereby challenges value systems that unsustainably esteem the new and eschew the 
obsolete, into the ranks of which the new is forever moving.  Transgression, mimesis, and 
collection are pertinent attributes of creating, when creating is viewed kenotically.  They 
are not so much activities to be undertaken, but ways of being, ways for humanity to 
respond reciprocally to ongoing kenosis.  They foster ways of expressing creativity by 
creating; that is, by letting-go, attending to, discovering, and also by dreaming.  Although 
kenosis entails a willingness to empty oneself of one’s own dreams (in the sense of 
strategies and goals of mastery), it is also a call to join in the dreams of humankind, or 
what Benjamin sees as the repressed dreams of childhood.61  Such dreaming is neither 
delusional nor idealistic when it leads to awakening, and when awakening leads to 
realisation.62  Any idealising indulged in dreaming is the hope for fulfilment, but, in 
awakening – sometimes necessarily jarring – such idealisation dissolves into its own 
practical realisation.  Whereas creativity is the willingness and ability to dream, creating is 
the imagining in dreaming and the imaging in awakening.  Dreaming can remain locked in 
the endless imagining of situational responses unless there is an awakening that enables 
realisation, the practical appearance of response.  But there can be no awakening without 
dreaming.  Both are essential aspects of kenosis. 
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Response to situation, stemming from kenotic creativity and creating, appears 
practically as creat-ion.  Absent awakening, creating can result in the mere production of 
commodities, rather than the realisation of attentive and responsive creations.  Benjamin 
laments modernity’s obsession with commodities,63 which he sees as the “wish-images” 
of undisturbed dreams; dreams that incessantly produce the “perpetually-new,” only to be 
exposed as nothing more than the fashionably dressed-up “always-the-same.”  When 
such wish-images take the form of buildings, commentator Graeme Gilloch summarises 
the Benjaminian view in stark terms: “The architecture of the recent past [forms] the ruins 
of the present,” and that “provides an archaeology of dreaming.”  As the “commodity and 
the processes of its production” are “defetishize[d] and demythifie[d]” by an “outmoded 
object,” the awakening from sleep – the becoming conscious that one is asleep – 
presents the redemptive possibility of realising the “actually new.”64  From another point of 
view, but with a similar conclusion, Paolo Soleri – architect, environmentalist, and 
philosopher – observes that “entropy and pollution are one and the same,” that 
humanity’s “accelerating tempo … works as a grinder, and debris of all sorts – things, 
concepts and conviction – litter our inner and outer landscapes.”  Redemption is realised 
in a “non-expedient environment” and a “world of non-obsolescent character.”65  Kenosis, 
then, is catalysed by Benjamin’s awakening, and obviates Soleri’s entropy.  It is not, 
however, a prescription for the imposition of pristine order, nor of any particular ethic or 
aesthetic, yet it is both ethical and aesthetic.  It calls only for creations that are of, and in 
relationship with, their contingent situations.  Kenosis makes-room for the potential 
messiness of creation and the often clumsy entanglement of relationality, as well as the 
important aesthetic contribution derived therefrom.  It also promotes forgotten, discarded, 
and endangered elements, not as the pawns of fashion or trend, but as resources for 
re-membering and re-creating, by which they are redeemed and more highly valued. 
Creations that emerge from a domain permeated by kenosis are, thus, always 
‘new’ and ‘novel’, in the sense that they are uniquely attentive to a unique situation.  A 
domain permeated by kenosis is one in which creativity is approached with the open 
mindset of a child – free of inhibition, prohibition, and the need for exhibition to validate 
oneself and one’s work.  It is one in which creating is undertaken as childlike play – free 
of the compulsion to dominate or oppose, and from which creations emerge in full 
consciousness, attendant to situation, and transcendent of commodity fetish.  Becoming 
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childlike in order to create does not call for infantilism, but ironic maturity.  In architecture, 
a kenotic approach to creativity calls for radically different paradigms and practices – 
perhaps their ‘end’ or ‘end-ing’ – but still fails to advocate specific processes.  Although 
kenosis may be processional, in that it proceeds forth, it eludes formulation into process 
because it proceeds forth indeterminately.  Nonetheless, the kenosis that animates 
cosmic and evolutionary creation also informs and influences human creation.  In so 
doing, it informs the creating that is architecture, and ongoingly promotes its 
transformation. 
Creators 
A transforming architecture, however, is not to be seen as an independent happening.  It 
occurs against the backdrop of a transforming world.  In fact, it occurs amidst a world 
transforming through secularisation, which, as posited by Gianni Vattimo (and discussed 
in Chapter 2), is ultimately a world transforming kenotically.  A transforming architecture 
thereby necessitates a kenotic world view, one in which the aesthetisation of culture and 
the pluralisation of lifestyles present an opportunity for an aesthetic way of being, one 
allowing the free exercise of creativity, without the violence of self-assertion.66  Such 
aesthetisation, arising out of secularisation, is an opening-up that transcends professional 
declarations of aesthetic privilege and sovereignty, and obviates opposition.  Earlier, I 
argued that a globalised barrage of modernity – with its oppositional forces – works to 
disintegrate Heidegger’s union of building and dwelling, and therefore acts as a barrier to 
kenosis.  That modern barrage, however, is not secularisation (as is often portrayed), 
despite its emergence in secularisation’s midst.  If the barrage of modernity is a barrier to 
kenosis, it cannot also be kenosis; that is, it cannot be secularisation.  While 
secularisation produces the modern pluralism and complexity to which Vattimo refers, 
and to which Venturi admonishes architecture to respond (see Chapter 4), it does not, of 
itself, produce opposing and competing differences, or the various forms of violence 
arising therefrom.  Indeed, it is not secularisation, but inattention to secularisation – by 
way of its being overlooked, neglected, or otherwise resisted with various forms of self-
consciousness and self-assertion – that spawns categories of opposition.  Vattimo 
pleads, in connection with religion and culture, as I do in connection with architecture, for 
the “progressive elimination of walls,” for the “progressive reduction of all rigid categories 
that lead to opposition.”67  Kenosis, manifested in a secularising world, is an empowering 
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permeation with the capacity to reduce and remove such barriers, and thereby progress 
continued transforming. 
In a transforming, secularising, and aestheticising world, it is logical to inquire as 
to those who would be its ‘designers’, or, in a broader sense, its ‘creators’.  The 
pluralisation and secularisation of kenosis challenge contemporary definitions and 
categorisations.  Judeo-Christian notions of humanity as “created co-creators” suggest 
that all of humanity effects, affects, and is affected by the aesthetisation of life on earth.68  
Furthermore, growing environmental awareness has come to highlight the interdependent 
relationship between humanity and its habitat.  Is it the case, then, that everyone is a 
creator?  Paolo Soleri suggests not. 
The notion that, regardless of our personal limitations, we are all ‘creators’, has 
generated the inflationary concept of ‘everything goes’, or ‘my opinion is as good 
as yours’.  It plays into the hands of mediocrity, and we all pay for it.  Now, even 
the environment pays for it.69 
Soleri’s caution about relativism, and preference for exclusivity when granting ‘creator’ 
status, is shared by many, yet secularisation and consequent pluralisation and 
globalisation all point to the inevitability and promise of inclusivity.  Viewed kenotically, 
the apparent discord is reconcilable, because kenosis is simultaneously inclusive, 
demanding of self-restriction, protective of self-identity, and, as a result, able to 
accommodate the premise of all humanity as creators, without countenancing relativism.  
Such is a view of creators, not in the limited sense of aesthetic authors, but in the broader 
sense, as those who enable the appearance of something other than the status quo,70 or 
those who participate as creative actors – in the Shakespearian sense – where “all the 
world’s a stage.”71 
Such a view can be given some sense of structure by an ecclesiastical model 
whereby a meant-to-be inclusive assemblage, participating in an ongoing kenotic event, 
is able to distinguish its parts, their relationality, and the consequent dynamism, without 
diminishing, or placing into opposition, any of its parts.  In this model, all are the church’s 
‘priests’ and ‘ministers’, though some are set aside, or ordained, for particular service, 
and some serve in para-clerical capacities.  If applied to architecture, the model suggests 
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that all of humanity can be seen as ‘lay’ creators, aestheticising existence with each 
negotiation of being that is undertaken.  Although Soleri is correct that manifold creators 
will necessarily vary in aesthetic attentiveness and ability – from disinterest to genius – 
none are without aesthetic impact, just as none possess self-sufficient aesthetic prowess.  
Some, with special interest and competency, may be seen as intermediating ‘para-
creators’, even as those with enhanced aesthesia and skills in manifestation may be 
recognised as ‘ordained’ or ‘vocational’ creators.  In a permeance of kenosis, such 
distinctions are not the elevation to positions of power or privilege, but the yielding to 
increased servitude.  This is a context, however, in which servitude has no connotations 
of weakness but, paradoxically, identifies an increased capacity to affect kenosis – to 
become human.  Within a contingent, plural, and open society, all are creators, in both 
their self-ness and in their other-ness.  They are aestheticians of lifestyle and culture, and 
all can choose to be so, kenotically, in reciprocal response to the aesthetic experience 
that is kenosis.  It is through such choice that creativity is made manifest. 
As inclusive as it may seem, the suggestion that all of humanity are creators is still 
insufficient, as long as the suggestion refers only to those in a situation who effect or 
affect that which is being created.  Such reference excludes – or at least fails to 
specifically include – those others who are affected by such creation, and are therefore 
equally amongst a situation’s creators.  A responsive creative event gathers-in and 
makes-room for, at the time of creation, such others who will be shaped by the created 
thing as a result of their receptivity, use, and experience of it, and who will go on shaping 
or re-shaping the created thing in ensuing creative events.  It is as sociologist Thomas 
Gieryn suggests, that in “the play of agency and structure … we mold buildings, they 
mold us, we mold them anew.”72  Similarly, the creative act already comprises the non-
human, and therefore voiceless, other things of the situation.  Such things include those 
affecting the situation, those to which creators respond, as well as those with which 
creators effect a response.  The latter may even extend to other things that are part of 
another situation altogether, which, by virtue of their extraction for use in the subject 
situation, also alter their original situation and initiate a new need for response there.  
Furthermore, the created thing, even before its creation, is already amongst the 
situation’s pertinent other things because, by its creation, the created thing affects 
situations to which ensuing creative events must respond.  All of a situation’s others and 
other things – not least those seen as irrelevant or lacking the power to accord 
themselves a place in the creative act – are of critical importance.  They comprise the 
complex relationality to which creating is called to be attentive.  The exclusion of any, 
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whether intentional or not, is particularly problematic in architecture, since architecture is 
the creation of things, using other things, for the use – or perhaps only perception, which 
is nonetheless ‘use’ – by a situation’s others. 
If architecture fails to make-room for and gather-in the full plurality of a situation’s 
others and other things, then such others and other things are victims of a kind of 
violence.  They become subject to the prevailing participants, viewed merely as assets or 
resources, either compliant or made to be so.  In the case of others who are users and 
perceivers – perhaps architecture’s most enduring, if not long-suffering, participants – 
their lack of participation in the creative event can result in bystander status, which does 
violence to them and to the creative act from which they are absent (as discussed earlier, 
in connection with Rural Studio).  In the case of other things, their exclusion can prevent 
the kind of mutual self-emptying and opening-up that is said to have occurred between 
Kahn and brick, between Salk and concrete, and between Pei and Islamic essence.  The 
violence thereby done may defy scientific measurement, but it is knowable in aesthetic 
experience.  More fundamentally, and of greater potential violence, such exclusions can 
sanction neglect and ignorance of – or worse, antipathy toward – the cosmic and 
evolutionary elements of the earthly environment; precisely the environment that must 
accommodate and provide the resources for all of humanity’s creative activity.  Viewed 
kenotically, then, a failure to include – to empty, open-up, make-room for, and gather-in – 
can be seen as a failure to create. 
Relationality 
When all are seen as creators, attention properly turns to the relationality of all such 
creators in the context of a transforming architecture.  Alexander Tzonis and Liane 
Lefaivre – who introduced the idea of critical regionalism – understood that transformation 
is reliant on relationality, observing that “no new architecture can emerge without a new 
kind of relations between designer and user, without new kinds of programs.”73  Their 
reference to designer and user is readily extended to include the whole range of a 
building’s creators, just as their reference to ‘programs’ can be extended to include all 
shared events and experiences of creating, by which relations are established.  
Secularisation, as kenosis, not only fosters plurality but also accommodates the 
necessary inclusivity and complex relationality arising therefrom.  It is in attempts to 
achieve and enforce unity through exclusion that the instability of oppositional forces and 
potential violence are to be found.  Contrastingly, kenosis finds all of a situation’s creators 
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mutually committed, especially because of their differing interpretations.  It recognises 
that all participants are servant interpreters, called to be open and attentive to the 
creative event through which a situation and its call for response is invited to approach, 
emerge, and be given appearance.  It recognises that some participants, by virtue of skill 
or talent, may emerge as servant leaders in the event, and others may already be servant 
leaders in whatever ‘human institution’ it is that might deploy a building, if that is what the 
situation calls for.  It recognises that while all are participant creators, in service to the 
situation, not all provide the same service at the same time.  In their kenotic commitment, 
the binding of these participants can be seen as a pact of mutual openness and 
challenge, one which is self-renouncing and thereby self-strengthening, covenantal rather 
than contractual, and vulnerable rather than assertive.  Founding such a pact are the 
engagements that define relationality. 
Engagements 
In Chapter 5, I discussed the kenotic call for ‘conversations’ amongst self, others, and 
other things, which, in architectural terms, was primarily seen to suggest conversations 
between architect and client/user, and between architect and a building’s materiality – a 
correct and, for some, challenging suggestion, but nonetheless a relatively simple 
portrayal.  Kenosis, in fact, points to greater complexity.  Through a kenotic lens, it is 
possible to see creating – including that of architecture – not merely as select players 
having conversations, but as an always incomplete happening, one which finds manifold 
creators in manifold engagements, responding to manifold situations; a complex 
happening that periodically stops to become temporarily materialised (or ‘frozen’, as 
Goethe suggests74) in some kind of form.  Although such engagements are as contingent 
and indeterminate as the situations that prompt them, they are consistent in that they 
always involve all of the selves, others, and other things that comprise each situation.  
Engagements – far more than conversations – demand trust and intensity, especially 
when unprocessed and unrestrained.  Indeed, they require letting-go, or releasement.  
(Distinct from relinquishment, releasement increases the potentiality of the creators, their 
creating, and their creation, which is of eminent practicality in architecture.)  And, 
although these interdependent and entangled engagements cannot be seen as serial, 
those with others and other things are advantaged by an initial, readying engagement 
with self. 
Kenosis is foremost self-emptying, a making-room in one’s self for the gathering-in 
of a situation’s manifold elements.  It is also inherently challenging to all notions of 
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sufficiency (importantly, not just that of the other, but also and especially that of the self).  
Consequently, the engagement with self, necessarily undertaken by all creators, is one 
that poses questions such as: What do I think I already know, and to what extent am I 
prepared to be emptied and filled, to be attentive to that which I do not know and the 
inevitable challenges arising therefrom?  Emptied of self, there is room for the situation.  
As seen in Chapter 3, Louis Kahn says something similar when he advises that a thing’s 
design is not determined by the designer’s wants or wishes, but, instead, is mandated by 
the “order of things.”  And he goes on to say that “everything an architect does is first of 
all answerable to an institution of man, before it becomes a building.”75  Although Kahn 
thus posits a kenotic approach to design, his thoughts can be extended.  First, his advice 
must apply not only to those creators who might currently be named ‘architects’ but to all 
of architecture’s creators, as earlier defined.  Second, all such creators, their creating, 
and their creations are accountable not merely to an “institution of man” – nor merely to 
the situation of that institution – but to the entirety of the situation in which the institution is 
found, and where it may manifest as building.  This more expansive situational view 
incorporates the complex relationality amongst the subject institution and all of the 
situation’s other institutions, and they with all of the situation’s other attributes, features, 
and forces (its boundaries and horizons).  In such a view, the creators’ self-emptying 
initiates the creative happening and simultaneously triggers the engagements by which 
situatedness can be gathered-in. 
Although a commonly-held experience of self-engagement may find creators in 
some kind of relation, they come into relationship through their engagements with – their 
opening-up to – one another.  It is by such engagements that situatedness is gathered-in, 
and without which a response-to-situation can only be attentive to the creators’ self-
logics, or prejudiced interpretations, and the potential opposition they establish with the 
interpretations or logics of others.  A kenotic engagement with others and other things 
sees self-logics as amongst the bounds of an open domain in which collective 
interpretation can emerge, not as tools of debate or proselytisation.  Calling for self-
emptying, while preserving self-identity, kenosis does not call for change to or disregard 
of individual interpretations.  Instead, it reveals the merits of their abeyance, and their 
hybridisation with others’ interpretations, when responding to situations of complex 
relationality.  Kenosis calls on all creators of situational response to be open to 
counterintuitive – indeed, meditative – thinking, perhaps along the lines of the following: 
The response that this situation is calling for may be other than that called for by any of 
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the interpretations offered by its individual elements, and may be quite contrary to what I 
thought was my interpretation.  But because it is the product of mutual exchange and 
influence amongst all elements of the situation, of which I am one, and because it is 
attentive to all of those elements – as it must be since it is the situation’s calling – this 
response is already mine, and I am ever-transforming as part of this ever-transforming 
situation. 
Such reasoning might be seen as a form of compromise, which is an incorrect 
view, or merely as the invocation of hermeneutics, which is an incomplete view.  Indeed, 
a response arising out of reasoning like this is clearly not compromise if that term is used 
to convey its customary meaning: “a settlement … by mutual concession,” or the making 
of “concessions at the expense of one’s integrity or original plans.”76  Heightened 
attentiveness to the entire situation does not lead to acceptance of the ‘lowest common 
denominator’, and is therefore not concessionary.  Undoubtedly, however, such 
reasoning and response are hermeneutical, though not only that.77  They arise from the 
self-questioning of personal prejudice, and emerge through conversation-like 
engagements with others and other things, always recognising the potential merits of the 
others’ interpretations.  Engagements embrace the ‘play-fulness’ of understanding, in the 
sense that ‘play’ grants room for give-and-take, but not in the sense that such give-and-
take leads to the already dismissed notion of concession.  Effected is what Gadamer calls 
Horizontverschmelzung, or a ‘fusion of horizons’.78  Indeed, there is much of kenosis in 
hermeneutics and much of hermeneutics in kenosis.  That becomes apparent as Paul 
Kidder describes the notion of transformation in Gadamerian hermeneutics: 
… such a transformation cannot happen in the abstract, or by simply cultivating 
feelings of openness and sympathy.  The change comes about in the process of 
developing relationships and interacting in the places where different horizons 
hold sway.  The word ‘fusion’ captures some of the sense of what occurs in the 
transformation, but the English word is limited if it suggests that the two horizons 
are simply bonded together.  What in fact happens, to the extent that there is 
success, is that a third reality emerges, something that is born of the two horizons, 
but is equally the product of the new experiences and relationships that have 
formed.  The fusion is never complete, for there is no end to the discoveries that 
one can make about another …79 
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Though certainly not a prescribed process, hermeneutics does encompass the 
process of developing relational interaction – engagements – wherein transformative 
fusing may occur.  The ‘success’ of the process is uncertain.  But if and when it occurs, 
and a ‘third reality’ emerges – perhaps better seen as arising from the kenotic notions of 
hybridisation or radical contextualisation, rather than from fusion – it is precisely in that 
occurrence that kenosis and hermeneutics are seen, most vividly, as conjoined.  It is in 
this third reality, emerging from the engagements of self, others, and other things, that 
abstraction is made practicable.  Nonetheless, such practicability is fleeting since, once a 
third reality emerges, it only effects further openings-up to the situations that its 
emergence is already altering.  These hermeneutic conversations, these engagements 
that occur in the permeance of kenosis, are ongoing.  In architecture, it is the ongoing-
ness of such engagements that sees all buildings become hermeneutical artefacts, 
almost immediately upon completion of construction (Walter Benjamin’s “ruins of the 
present” or “archaeology of dreaming”).  As seen in Chapters 3 to 6, some built artefacts 
instantiate kenosis by virtue of kenotic engagements during the event of creating.  Some 
prove capable of kenotic engagement in their own right, as creations.  Some do both.  
And, it must be said, much of architecture does neither. 
Dynamics 
Engagements are the basis of relationality; indeed, the basis of complex relationality 
amongst situational elements.  But in what dynamic is such relationality held?  Kenosis 
suggests looking to that which is, by its nature, kenotic – nature itself.  Therein, elements 
are not opposed, as much as they are entangled; each retains unique identity in a 
pluralistic and incomplete ‘whole’; local phenomena are addressed locally, but seen in 
light of non-local realities; and both indeterminacy and measurement are in play.80  
Discussing kenosis and nature, philosopher Holmes Rolston (1932-) notes that elements 
can “bubble up ‘from below’” even when “controlled ‘from above,’” making it “hard to say 
which level is prior and which is subordinate.”  It can only be said that each element must 
“operate within the interdependencies, resources, and constraints of its situation,” which 
means that “the survival of the fittest turns out to be the survival of the sharers.”81  Not 
surprisingly, such relationality in the naturally-kenotic world models that envisaged in the 
humanly-constructed world of Vattimian secularisation (as kenosis): a pluralistic, 
entangled, and aesthetic world of manifold situations, calling for manifold responses.  It 
thereby also models the relationality toward which humanity is called as it creates such a 
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world.  Entanglement affirms a sense of complexity and ‘chaos’, without invoking 
anarchy.82  It affirms the diversity of creator skills, roles, and leadership, which can be 
brought into play.  And it affirms the creators’ vulnerability and interdependence, much 
like the elements of nature.  But since humanity, unlike nature, includes the potential for 
morality, it also affirms the creators’ volitional abeyance of self-interest, the limiting of self 
in order to admit others.83  Marked by mutual trust and releasement, entangled creator 
engagements can be seen as spontaneous, improvised, and responsive dance – kenotic 
dance84 – taking place on the dance floor, or in the domain, that is Plato’s chora and 
Heidegger’s clearing.  In such dance, some participant creators may appear to ‘lead’, 
while others appear to ‘follow’, but that arrangement is never fixed and always subject to 
inversion, as the situation evolves.  Indeed, a situation’s already participating other things 
– its extant things, its resources, its nature – may also ‘lead’ the dance, when that is what 
an attentive response warrants. 
In the course of their engagements, all ‘types’ of participants are able to move – 
constantly and repeatedly – to the positions of other participants, partially becoming the 
other (even while retaining self-identity), and thereby becoming yet another type; a type 
that no longer belongs together with either its original or new type but, nonetheless, 
together belongs with all types.85  Formed through these kenotic engagements – the 
hybridisation or radical contextualisation to which I have already referred – is what 
Heidegger calls a “unitary primordial structure.”86  It is “worked out through the articulation 
of the complex interplay between a number of different elements.”87  Not imposed or 
enforced from outside the situation, it is an “internal articulation of the elements,” which 
sees primacy and priority shift from element to element.88  Power pulsates amongst and 
between the participant selves, others, and other things, by which they are constantly 
transforming but never completely transformed.  In this concept of power, entrenched 
hierarchies are abandoned but hierarchical tension is not.  The power of hierarchy to 
make-possible is, in fact, strengthened by the contingent forces that subject hierarchy to 
inversion, rotation, and other dynamics, sometimes spontaneously.  Kenosis can thus be 
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seen as that which both accommodates and perpetuates indeterminacy, that which 
maintains dynamic equilibrium in a wildly pulsating constitution – a kenotic dance.89 
What is it, then, that bounds and limits this kenotic dance floor, this domain of 
secularisation?  Vattimo insists that no legitimate interpretation can represent “an 
ideology that wants to unify [the pluralistic world] at all costs in the name of a sole truth, 
which some academic disciplines would have the task and capacity of knowing,”90 
because such representations would undermine the very pluralism out of which 
interpretation emerges.  It would seem that something must therefore guide the never-
ending hermeneutics and ground interpretative legitimacy.  If kenosis (via secularisation) 
were ‘complete’ and fully permeating the relationality between humanity and the world in 
which it dwells, humanity would have already become fully human, negating the need for 
a hermeneutic limiter.  But since kenosis animates a state of always becoming, humanity 
is always still becoming human; that is, transforming and growing in human-ness.  Human 
response to kenosis manifests reciprocally only by volition, in a giving-over to the 
aesthetic experience that ongoing kenosis presents.  To explain the impetus for such 
volition, Vattimo turns once again to Christian theology and proposes that the impetus lies 
in caritas, or love; what he calls Christianity’s “sole, supreme principle,” and “the norm of 
secularization.”91  His proposition might appear problematically metaphysical and 
indistinguishable from his previous forbiddance of “sole truth,” were it not for his further 
explication. 
This ‘ultimate’ meaning, precisely by virtue of its being caritas, is not really 
ultimate and does not possess the peremptoriness of the metaphysical principle, 
which cannot be transcended, and before which all questioning ceases.  Perhaps 
the reason why nihilism is an infinite never-ending process lies in the fact that 
love, as the ‘ultimate’ meaning of revelation, is not truly ultimate.92 
Thus, caritas, charity, and love are that by which kenosis and kenotic relationality 
are “guided, limited, and endowed with meaning.”93  These traits alone, however, are not 
sufficient to fully represent or define kenosis.  Indeed, self-assertion – the antithesis of 
kenosis – can be carried out in the pursuit of each, and when love is equated with justice, 
the violent enforcement of justice can occur in love’s name.94  Caritas, charity, and love 
foster kenosis, as do Levinasian ethical responsibility and Derridan hospitality.  All are 
essential boundaries of the kenotic domain, which allow it to empty and open-up to 
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happening.  Each is kenotic, and each is an aspect of kenosis, but kenosis is not 
reducible to any.  “Kenosis is not a means of ransom, but ransom itself.”95  It is in the 
domain of kenosis that humanity (and, in the Christian narrative, also divinity) emergently 
becomes more human, as relationality is increasingly marked by caritas.  That is not to 
suggest, however, that kenosis is ‘ultimate’, when caritas is not.  Echoing, but also 
extending Vattimo, kenosis is not ultimate precisely because it is kenosis, always the 
animator of incomplete becoming, bounded and dynamically balanced in the vulnerability 
that is caritas, charity, and love. 
A reliance on love, to mediate the spontaneity and contingency of secularisation, 
is seen by some as vulnerable and dynamically imbalanced.  One critic, Frits de Lange, 
finds Vattimo’s kenotic view of love (in the sense of agápe) to be “asymmetrical,” in that it 
appears to focus on self-sacrifice.  He sees something unidirectional, quite opposite to 
other concepts of agapic love, which relate to justice and emphasise the symmetry of 
“impartiality and reciprocity.”96  I would suggest, however, that de Lange’s interpretation is 
mistaken, first, in equating self-emptying to self-sacrifice and, second, in its failure to 
recognise the essence of kenosis: its paradox.  As I posit, throughout this discourse, 
kenotic self-emptying in no way demands or effects ‘sacrifice’ of self, especially not in the 
sense of forfeiture, surrender, or destruction.  To the contrary, the self-emptying of 
kenosis is concurrent filling and in-dwelling.  Paradoxically, kenosis is also plerosis and 
skenosis.  In a sense, it is symmetrical, precisely because it is asymmetrical; it is impartial 
and reciprocal, precisely because it is not.  Kenosis is the beauty of the vulnerable, 
unnecessary, and unsolicited opening-up to the other (even the Levinasian other, seen as 
unworthy) to which the beauty of a vulnerable, unnecessary, and unsolicited reciprocal 
response is made, and out of which the dynamic of mutual exchange and influence 
arises.  The instantiation of kenosis is that which instantiates kenosis.  Indeed, it might be 
said that, through kenosis, love produces the beauty that produces the beauty of love 
reciprocated in kenosis.  Such is neither the relational imbalance of asymmetry, nor the 
inertia of symmetry; rather, it is the dynamic equilibrium of an ongoing kenotic dance.  If 
kenosis were unidirectional, it could not be kenosis; it could only be some kind of love or 
charity or caritas, each of which can go unrequited.  Thus, it is love’s vulnerable 
entanglement in the kenotic dance that is its strength. 
While love and its synonymous traits may be seen as worthy limiters of 
interpretation, there remains a question as to why love might be chosen over violence; 
that is, over what Vattimo describes as “the silencing of all questioning by the 
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authoritative peremptoriness of the first principle,”97 or the assertion of sole truth(s).  It is 
such assertion that gives rise to relational imbalance.  Guiding the choice, Vattimo 
reiterates his invocation of love but goes further, suggesting that secularisation – and, 
with it, globalisation and multiculturalism – sees the weakening of religious dogma and 
increasing agreement on fundamental human values,98 not least the value of questioning.  
That which attempts to silence questioning, and thereby impede kenosis, is exposed as 
violence, and cognition of violence initiates its rejection.99  Thus, in an event of 
transformation, kenosis fuels secularisation while secularisation produces heightened 
awareness and willingness to name the violence of imbalanced relationality.  Or, seen 
through architecture, the hermeneutic engagements of architecture’s creators – subject to 
caritas, or love – expose, name, and empty those categories of opposition that distort 
relationality and work to silence questioning.  In so doing, they maintain dynamic balance 
and nurture ongoing transformation. 
Vattimo’s promulgation, in philosophy, of love as the interpretive limiter in a world 
of complex entanglement, is not dissimilar to that of Alberto Pérez-Gómez, in 
architecture, who posits that an architecture “built upon love” can counter the distorted 
relationality of materialism and technological preoccupations, with which architecture so 
often finds itself responding to such a world.  Amongst his conclusions, Pérez-Gómez 
promulgates love in two of its multi-layered facets, one facet clearly invoking kenosis, but 
the other more ambiguous.  He suggests that “an appropriate architecture for the present 
world, beyond the utopias of progress and universal civilization, may seek the 
embodiment of compassion and seduction through beautiful form and responsible 
program.”100  It is not difficult to see his advocacy of compassion as being Vattimian, and 
thereby kenotic.  Compassionate architecture presumably would be open and highly 
responsive to its situation.  The nature of seductive architecture is less clear.  If taken to 
mean merely a capacity to attract or draw-in, the notion of seductiveness is benign, even 
commendable.  But a problem arises, insomuch as seductiveness can also be seen as 
the assertion of some preconceived concept or formal expression, strategically designed 
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to seduce its perceivers for the sake of seduction or titillation.101  Certainly, a 
compassionate (kenotic) approach to design promotes a seductive solution, one in which 
seductiveness proceeds from compassion.  Such is an outcome of releasement.  There 
is, however, an important difference between a compassionate and kenotic letting-go, 
which delivers seductive results, and a strategic intention to seduce.102  (I would suggest 
that it is the difference between Kahn’s Salk Institute and Libeskind’s Jewish Museum, 
respectively.)  When strategic, seductiveness can undermine relationality, and an 
architecture of love could be expected to eschew such a strategy.  Perhaps an 
architecture of kenosis avoids the ambiguity, since it is always already built on love, 
compassion, and the propitious aspects of seduction. 
Participation 
What and how is it that a seemingly motley but belonging-together and power-filled 
collective of dynamically engaged creators can practically create?  Since kenosis defies 
process-isation, such questions cannot be answered with any how-to discussions, at 
least none that sustain their applicability in the manifold situations to which architecture is 
called to respond.  These are questions to be opened-up to.  They require a willingness 
to engage in a constant working-out of answers, and an understanding that such answers 
are applicable only to specific spatial and temporal situations.  Hence, what appear as 
answers demand still further openness to ever-shifting situations and the questions they 
raise.  To see the practicability of such abstraction, it may be useful to broadly consider 
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an instance in which architecture emerges amongst the possible responses to a situation, 
and, then, to explore the possibilities by which participants can create.  Although moving 
toward specificity, such consideration can only be seen as illustrating a working-out, not 
as prescribing a methodology.103 
It is important, however, to note that architecture cannot be presumed to be an 
‘appropriate’ response-to-situation.  Kenosis asks for openness toward the situation itself.  
Although every situation presents the possibility of responsive change, not every situation 
necessarily calls for a response beyond that of the situation’s encounter (which already 
effects a kind of change).  The situation may be calling for nothing to be done.  It is 
through attentiveness that the need for response and, then, the response itself, is 
worked-out.  Openness toward each situation precludes presumptions about the 
response that may emerge, including presumptions that architecture is necessarily 
constitutive of the needed response.  There can be no exploration if the destination, or 
the ‘find’, is already known, especially if such knowledge is privileged.  If architecture is 
pre-determined to be the response-to-situation, there is no room – no opening – for those 
participants whose current interpretation does not include that determination.  The 
working-out of a situation invites all of its creators to participate, understanding that all 
interpretations contribute to the revelation of “what should be done,”104 even when such 
interpretations are different or conflicting, and especially because they are.  It is worth 
considering Gadamer’s view of participation as “a strange word.” 
Its dialectic consists of the fact that participation is not taking parts, but in a way 
taking the whole.  Everybody who participates in something does not take 
something away, so that the others cannot have it.  The opposite is true: by 
sharing, or by participating in the things in which we are participating, we enrich 
them; they do not become smaller, but larger.  The whole life of tradition consists 
exactly in this enrichment so that life is our culture and our past: the whole inner 
store of our lives is always extending by participating.105 
Imagining 
Assuming that architecture emerges as part of the response that the situation calls for, it 
is unlikely that all of a situation’s participant-creators – particularly if large in number – 
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can create fully architectural responses.  They can, however, participate in the creating 
that is building and dwelling.  They can dream and imagine architecture, in the manner of 
a child.  In fact, they, alone, can do so with efficacy.  In their engagement with self, they 
empty and concurrently fill with the situation, recognising and becoming receptive to all of 
its others and other things.  In their engagement with, and attentiveness to, those others 
and other things of the situation (by which, they are likewise attended), they no longer 
merely look into and interpret the situation.  They no longer just dream about the 
situation.  They and the situation are radically contextualised.  They awaken in response, 
and, in that awakening, they create an initial iteration of architectural design.  Although 
not yet formal, or manifested in specialised language, their creation is nonetheless a view 
of a building, out of which architectural form can emerge.  It is a practical manifestation of 
their imagining, shaped by shared language into some conveyable form – perhaps 
something heard and seen as ‘word pictures’. 
Such creating by the participant-creators precedes and transcends the customary 
brief (or ‘program’), even though the brief for a building may already be embedded in it.  It 
eschews the brief’s typically strategic methodologies, often some form of: “(1) Establish 
Goals, (2) Collect and analyze Facts, (3) Uncover and test Concepts, (4) Determine 
Needs, and (5) State the Problem.”106  Methodologies of this kind are based in the notion 
that “programming is problem seeking” and “design is problem solving.”107 Such a notion 
bifurcates the creative event and presents the possibility of selective problem-solving, 
insofar as the problem-seekers (not uncommonly architects) may, consciously or 
subconsciously, seek and find primarily those problems they already deem solvable, or 
for which they already have a solution.  Both the bifurcation and the possibility of 
specious problems are antithetical to a kenotic view of creativity.  So is the language of 
solution-to-problem and its connotations of certitude and permanence, when all that can 
actually be effected is response-to-situation, as that situation stands at a particular 
moment.  Further restriction is effected when the brief attempts to shape “the whole 
problem” into categories of consideration such as “Function, Form, Economy, and 
Time,”108 a shaping that either restricts the situation to quantitative considerations 
(essentially client and regulatory needs) or forces qualitative considerations (values, 
beliefs, conflicting views) into quantitative expression, both of which betray any notion 
that they describe the ‘whole’ of anything. 
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Thus, the creators’ initial act – that of imagining – opens-up to all of a brief’s 
typical considerations but recognises that, in their manifold diversity, such considerations 
defy categorisation and standardisation.  It especially opens-up to those considerations 
that are often dismissed as “too general,” or too underlying, conflicting, negative, lacking, 
or irrelevant “to be directly useful,”109 because it is precisely in such dismissals that the 
beauty of an attentive response may be left concealed.  In a sense, by way of their word 
pictures (or other conveyance), the participant-creators’ work-out a prefiguring critical 
review of the situation as it might be after it has been responded to.  But, it is not merely 
some forecast, by the architectural laity, of form and materiality.  It is a critical review of 
the experience of such architecture.  And, since the creators are intrinsic parts of the 
situation, it is also a critical review of their eventual behaviour in the newly-changed 
situation.  Hence, it does not constitute the will of the creators but that of the situation.  Its 
working-out asks of the creators that they engage not in calculative or re-presentational 
thinking, but in meditative thinking.110  The resultant imaginings – the advance critical 
review – can only be created by the situation’s creators, and it is therein that more 
concrete images are embedded; awaiting the attention by which they might unconceal. 
Before turning from imagining to imaging, it is worth highlighting the 
unconventionalities in the creative event presented thus far.  The creators’ initial creation, 
their synthesis of collective design imaginings – which I have described as an advance 
critical review of the yet-to-be changed situation – is something akin to that which 
Thomas Gieryn labels as “a blueprint for human behaviour.”  But, whereas a kenotic 
perspective sees such a blueprint prefiguring the changed situation, Gieryn’s more 
conventional perspective, from the building’s point of view, sees that blueprint emerging 
from the changed situation.  Gieryn acknowledges the mutuality and cyclicality of 
influence between buildings and behaviour, but prioritises the causal relationship 
between a building’s design and the human behaviour it produces (either by design or 
default), once the design is realised.  Such emphasis supports a traditional portrayal of 
the “design process,” as that initiated by a client with a need, and advanced by the 
client’s architect.  It is a process that produces a “representation of an artifact in graphic, 
verbal, or numerical form,” which thereby effects the simultaneous “enrollment or 
enlistment of those allies necessary to move the artifact toward a material form.”111  Thus, 
participants are recruited through the design process; that is, through the emergence of 
architectural design. 
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Without disputing Gieryn’s argument, mine inverts the emphasis and suggests an 
importantly different nuance.  Viewed kenotically, it is the situation that identifies and calls 
its participant creators, who are therefore parts of the situation.  And, it is through the 
participants’ open attentiveness and consequent creation of a critical review, or blueprint 
for behaviour, that the situation is invited to open-up and reveal the response it is calling 
for.  Such a happening is not to be viewed as some sort of introduction, or pre-design 
activity, but as an essential happening in what Vattimo calls the ongoing aesthetisation of 
culture and lifestyle – which is secularisation as kenosis.  In a situation that calls for an 
architectural response, that call is design’s genesis.  Design does not begin after the call.  
It is already underway and continues.  The happening, however, is not linear.  Its starting 
points are indeterminate, and its ‘endings’ exist only as temporary cessations for the sake 
of realising built responses.  Certainly, the so called blueprints for building designs, and 
those for human behaviour, are interrelated and contribute to one another.  Nevertheless, 
a kenotic view of ongoing creation (cosmic, evolutionary, and human) prioritises 
humanity’s reciprocal response to kenosis – in effect, the blueprints for becoming human 
– and sees the blueprints for buildings as being emergent therefrom. 
Imaging 
As the kenotic event of creativity continues, it does so in at least two distinguishing ways.  
First, in the event’s non-linearity, creators’ imaginings are not necessarily concluded 
before imaging begins, and imaging is not merely the reaction to a project brief.  Instead, 
amidst ongoing engagements, imaging is an opening-up of and attending to the 
imaginings, such that the images they already hold are invited to unconceal.  In other 
words, building design is not something needing to be done.  In a sense, the building 
design already exists and is emergent, needing only to be worked-out by awaiting and 
attending.  Such existence of design does not, however, suggest its pre-existence.  
Rather, it exists only by virtue of the ongoing working-out initiated by the situation’s call.  
(As discussed in Chapter 3, Kahn’s view of a ‘pre-existing essence’ can be read to 
suggest that essence is something only needing to be discovered, which tends to 
discount the need for it to be worked-out.)  Second, those creators who, by virtue of talent 
and skill, are particularly able to await and attend, and thereby likely leaders of imaging, 
are already part of the situation and the imaginings thereof.  Consequently they are not 
viewed, nor do they view themselves, as privileged ‘special-ists’ or ‘outside experts’.  
Their leadership is grounded in servitude.  And they serve an event that looks back to 
architecture as something more of the vernacular, something created in response to the 
situation by those who are integral parts of the situation, and for whom the response is 
neither intended nor seen as novel, but as intrinsically fitting (and thereby truly novel). 
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Such hierarchical inversion may be uncomfortable for those accustomed to, or 
reliant on, seeing ‘designers’ at the top of the aesthetisation pyramid.  But, in a kenotic 
event, the role of servant leaders is not trivialised, only moderated and paradoxically 
strengthened, insofar as restriction effects heightened perception and attention.  If true to 
its etymology, education and training in aesthetics – including built aesthetics – would be 
that which teaches and intensifies sensitive perception (both intellectual and sensate), a 
skill requiring self-discipline and self-restriction so as to enable the opening-up to, and 
receptivity of, all that is not self; in other words, to enable kenosis.  Indeed, an 
architectural education can be seen as a kenotic readying, if it is as Jack Hartray 
idealises: 
It is broadly based, directionless, inconclusive, and totally absorbing.  It prepares 
us for little, other than a life of engaged wonderment.  But, it also leaves us with 
the idea that we are makers rather than victims of history, which is a useful belief 
in a democracy.112 
Hartray’s ‘curriculum’ prepares its students to prioritise waiting over doing.  Notably 
absent is any espousal of self-assertion or strivings for fame.  Even in distinguishing 
maker (creator) from victim (bystander), it is the notion of egalitarian participation that is 
invoked, rather than the opposition that can plague democratic politics.  If not deployed 
as a means of exploiting power, education and training in aesthetics promises precisely 
the attunement to situation – the active passivity – which is acutely needed to image 
creators’ imaginings; that is, to serve the emergence of design.  Contemporary 
architectural education may require its own kenosis to meet that promise. 
The ongoing emergence of design calls for ongoing engagement, for questioning 
and listening by all creators, but especially by those who come to lead the imaging of an 
architectural response (in current practice, architects and client representatives).  
Engagements continue with self, others, and other things, and the latter rises to particular 
importance since it is an architectural ‘thing’ that is emergent.  The thing to be imaged 
will, of necessity, be in relation to (even if not in relationship with) the situation in which it 
is placed; in all cases locally but, to varying degrees, also regionally, globally, and even 
cosmically.  It will be in relation to Heidegger’s fourfold – earth, sky, divinities, mortals – 
but its capacity to gather-in the fourfold will depend on its openness and attentiveness to 
the situation, which, in turn, is dependent on the openness and attentiveness shown to 
the situation by the thing’s creators in their ongoing imagining and imaging.  Such is true 
whether the emergent thing is a room, a building, a complex, or a city.  It is therefore not 
unreasonable to argue that emergence is best continued amidst the situation, where all 
creators – especially those who lead the imaging of a thingly response – can continue to 
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be undividedly attentive to that situation, in real time and space.  Emergent imaging is a 
happening of the creators’ continued engagement, not only with the usual things that 
comprise context (environs, site, buildings, materiality, furnishings, art, finances, 
regulations, etc.), but also with the intervals between such things and, perhaps most 
importantly, with still other things that may deceptively appear to be unrelated and 
irrelevant.  Engagement with these things involves on-going ‘conversations’ and 
‘interrogations’ (like Kahn’s with brick) concerning their desires and capacities to fulfil the 
creators’ imaginings.  (The site may not want to be so severely excavated.  The situation 
may not find the designated site capable of achieving the response it is calling for.  The 
fetish of the architect may not be pertinent to the needed response.  The existing building 
may not want to be extended in the manner of any particular ‘-ism’.)  Engagement 
includes being alert to correspondences and being vigilant against infiltration of the latent, 
individual desires of particular creators.  In-situ engagement allows the spontaneous 
testing of emergent images against the situation’s reality, not merely against 
remembrances or representations of it. 
Contemporary practice typically sees architectural design emerge at the 
architect’s office, amidst exactly such remembrances or representations of the situation.  
Of course, various design practitioners are likely to have been to the site, perhaps 
numerous times, perhaps even initiating imaging while on site.  In some instances, 
practitioners might be found employing a practice such as design en charrette,113 but 
unless such an undertaking is sufficiently sustained – so as to allow enough emergence 
to occur – and unless it genuinely embraces non-professional participation that 
challenges the architect’s traditional control, it and other ‘participative’ tactics can prove to 
be sideshows.114  In most cases, much of a thing’s design ultimately emerges at a place 
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other than that where it will be realised, and where it will be asked to establish 
relationship.  That is problematic enough at the local level, but can become more so 
when the situation is in another region or another part of the world.  Some would argue 
that being physically present to the situation during design is impractical, but that need 
not be true when the situation is local.  It need be little more than inconvenient when the 
situation is regional.  And it is not insurmountable when the situation is global.  Such 
debate, however, begs the question as to exactly what it is about a situation’s calling that 
points to a more attentive response if the situation is expanded by importing, and 
attempting to integrate, creators who are not already part of the situation.  Certainly, there 
are situations in which such expansion is warranted, but a kenotic view suggests that the 
warrant would already be a part of the situation and the response it calls for, rather than a 
proviso or conceit arising out of architecture’s commodification and fetishisation. 
Claimed impracticality of in-situ design might also be based on a view that needed 
technology is located at the architect’s place of business.  But technology, itself, is 
making such a claim increasingly untrue, and the claim raises its own questions.  First, it 
raises a question not necessarily related to technology but to the notion that the 
architect’s office is, or should be seen as, the ‘axis mundi’ of architectural design, a notion 
that only reinforces the privileged-ness of the architect and the practice of architecture.115  
It reinforces the mystification of the office as the place where aesthetic gurus or 
magicians dwell.  When the notion is added that even more mystifying technology is 
housed there, the office is elevated to a place of aesthetic wizardry, an image that much 
of the profession is content to tacitly perpetuate.  And, at that point, questions concerning 
technology arise.  What is technology’s actual role in the emergence of a response-to-
situation that emerges from the situation itself?  What is its part in both the enhancement 
and diminishment of human perceptiveness?  What is its culpability as a fetishised 
commodity that effects commodity fetishism?  Indeed, such questions invoke Heidegger’s 
admonition concerning technology, from Discourse on Thinking: 
We can use technical devices, and yet with proper use also keep ourselves so 
free of them that we may let go of them any time.  We can use technical devices 
as they ought to be used, and also let them alone as something which does not 
affect our inner and real core.  We can affirm the unavoidable use of technical 
devices, and also deny them the right to dominate us, and so to warp, confuse, 
and lay waste our nature.116 
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None of this is to say that design legitimately occurs only in-situ, or that it is better 
effected without technology.  Creativity’s indeterminacy precludes any such claims.  But, 
importantly, it does say that creative moments in architecture are not unlike other 
aesthetic moments, in which there is a “willing giving-over” of self to the situation; a 
concurrent commitment and releasement by which one proclaims, “Yes, I am here and 
not elsewhere.”117  Physical, in-situ presence, of course, does not ensure this sort of 
“being here” (despite obvious contributions to its likelihood), nor is it impossible to 
experience such intimacy at distance.  The question goes to what sense of presence best 
avoids the ‘absences’ incited by non-situational distractions, absences which can spawn 
desperate (and futile) attempts to coerce or strategise creativity.  It asks what sense of 
presence best renders the situation real, encourages engagement, and thereby invites 
creativity’s appearance by enabling the creators to “stand imaginatively” in the 
situation118; that is, to “stand under” the situation, and hence under-stand it.119  Such 
discourse points architecture back, once again, to consider its beginnings, when 
architecture was indubitably a product of being present to the situation calling for it.  That 
looking back underscores the fact that a kenotic view of receptivity and attentiveness to 
situation – the sensitive perception that is aesthetics – opens-up manifold questions, 
implications, and opportunities, each of which challenge architecture as it has come to be 
practised. 
Imaging is not merely the ‘drawing-up’ of something that has been imagined and 
described.  When open engagements are sustained amongst self, others, and other 
things, images of the creators’ imaginings emerge in the manner of that hermeneutical 
‘third reality’,120 as a manifestation of under-standing.121 Like imagining, imaging requires 
a kind of dreaming but not a dreaming of new dreams, rather a continuation and further 
opening-up of those already dreamt.  It is in the awakening from these progressing 
dreams that the aspirational experiences imagined therein – those in the creators’ 
advance critical review – are enabled to appear as images.  Appearance comes by way 
of faithful translation, from the language of imaginings to the language of images.  The 
latter, however, is not so much a different language as it is a language of expanded 
vocabulary, expanded to include form, materiality, colour, texture, space, light, and 
whatever other concepts augment communication and perception.  Also expanded are 
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forms of expression, to include not only the verbal but also the graphic and electronic.  
Faithfulness is reliant on all participant-creators – not least those in servant leadership 
roles – remaining emptied, in ongoing kenosis.  Although imaging may be facilitated and 
led by those with extra-ordinary skills, all creators can remain attentive to the situation by 
participating in the assessment of images, as they emerge.  Such is especially true when 
the imaging is an in-situ happening.  Critical, however, is the framing of an assessment 
question, so as to ensure that ‘answers’ do not close it down, and that the question itself 
does not become a barrier to ongoing kenosis.  In assessing things aesthetic, the 
question commonly reduces to some form of: Do you like this image?  Any form of that 
question asks assessors to deliver a personal interpretation based on opinion or mere 
whim.  A more fitting question might be some form of: Are these images faithful to our 
collective imaginings, and, if not, which imaginings appear unattended?  Answering that 
question requires each assessor to measure the proposal against the situation as 
collectively interpreted, and may also require further hermeneutic engagements in the 
event that imaginings require adjustment.  However, if the emergent images are 
convincingly traceable and attentive to the creators’ imaginings, and if the situation has 
not already shifted drastically, they can be met by their assessors – who, in fact, are their 
creators – in what is actually a reacquaintance with some ‘thing’ always already familiar.  
Evincing kenosis, the most profound reaction from assessor-creators might be a smile of 
recognition, or a shrug of the shoulders and an “of course,” rather than the superficial but 
currently prized reaction, “WOW!” 
Imagining, then, is dreaming that includes awakening.  Imaging is awakening that 
includes dreaming.  They are both parts of the thinking that Heidegger sees not as 
something to be actively done but as something more passive, a “listening that brings 
something to view” or, simply, “a bringing-into-view”122 – which is nonetheless active.  It is 
important to emphasise, again, that the creative event is not linear or sequential.  It is an 
overlapping, entangled, complex, and ongoing happening.  Heidegger elucidates the 
notion by referencing a letter attributed to Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, which, although 
later determined to be an incorrect attribution, remains pertinent to Heidegger’s point and 
mine.  The letter describes the manifold happenings to which the composer ‘listens’ and 
by which musical compositions seem to be brought into view.  It concludes:  
… afterwards I look over [the composition] with a glance in my mind as if it were a 
beautiful picture or a handsome man, and hear it in the imagination not at all 
serially, as it must subsequently come about, but as though all at once.  That is a 
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treat.  Everything – the finding and making, now proceed in me in a beautiful, vivid 
dream.  But, the listening to everything all at once is indeed the best.123 
For Heidegger, “this ‘looking over’ the whole ‘with a glance,’ and ‘listening to everything at 
once’ are one and the same.”  They are a “concealed unity” by which the situation is 
attended; by which the called-for response is brought into view.  Unconcealment is made 
possible by the passive activity of attending to the concealment.  Heidegger cautions, 
however, that this is not to be taken as a description of “artistic creation,” a warning which 
reinforces my earlier scepticism toward notions of ‘creative processes’.  Indeed, 
Heidegger sees the concealed unity as “the essence of the thinking that is entrusted to us 
humans who are thinking beings,”124 which, as I am arguing, is the essence of becoming 
human, and is animated by kenosis. 
Realisation 
Although imagining (including listening), imaging (including bringing-into-view), and 
eventual realisation are not exactly serial, and although the responses they produce are 
merely responses to temporary ‘freezes’ of the situation’s ongoing-ness, they are 
nonetheless part of an unfolding.  Thus the continued emergence of ever more 
descriptive images – and eventually a materialised construct – relies on continued faithful 
translation, as measured against the creators’ original imaginings.  And that relies on 
continued vigilance against what Samuel Coleridge saw as “fancy.”  Emphatically 
distinguishing it from the exalted “imagination,” he states that fancy is “no other than a 
mode of memory” that “must receive all its materials ready made from the law of 
association.”125  Those who effect ongoing translation (in current practice, the architects, 
engineers, consultants, and builders, who are ultimately directed by the client, financiers, 
governmental bodies, and building regulators) are already amongst the creators whose 
engagements have produced the imagining and imaging of a response-to-situation.  Like 
all servant creators, they are not from ‘outside’ the situation and their particular 
attunement or expertise, offered in servitude, is not privileging.  The obviation of privilege, 
by the elevation of servitude, also obviates those categories of opposition and 
competition from which violence arises.126 
What can be seen in all of this is a distortion, if not inversion, of the priorities found 
in contemporary architectural practice.  First, kenosis secularises notions of ‘client’ by 
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desacralising and opening-up participation beyond that granted by power, privileged 
position, or delegation.  In so doing, it cuts across the grain of popular ‘participative’ 
processes, often a misnomer for what might be more accurately described as 
‘informative’ (merely informing participants about a happening), or perhaps ‘consultative’ 
(adding, to the act of informing, some measure of participant data-gathering or feedback).  
Particularly when initiated after fundamental determinations have been made, such 
processes risk being nothing more than entertaining gimmicks, with little actual 
opportunity for participation, or, worse, tools of pretence and manipulation with which 
clients (and their architects) elicit ‘participant’ approval of a preconceived outcome.  
Second, kenosis also secularises notions of ‘architect’.  It does so, on the one hand, by 
desacralising the privilege of that position and, on the other, by paradoxically elevating 
those (‘professional’ or not) who are equipped to be especially effective attendants, or 
servants, to the unfolding of creative events.  In fact, such servant-aestheticians may be 
amongst, or perhaps lead, those who first encounter a situation’s call, even before the 
situation identifies any so-called clients.  That radically alters the more typical sequence 
of events, which, if an architect is involved at all, sees the architect commissioned after 
the client has made some (at least preliminary) determination that architecture is to be 
part of the solution to its problem.127  It also makes it possible to envisage architecture (as 
aesthetisation) already underway, long before architecture (as aesthetic construct) is 
seen to be a needed part of the emerging response-to-situation. 
Not surprisingly, the secularisation of ‘client’ and ‘architect’ presents a challenge 
to the customary client-architect ordering, which, today, sees the practice of architecture 
as client-centric, and necessarily so if business success is a goal of practice.  Such 
centricity manifests in countless firm mission statements, which, in varied but similar 
ways, express sentiments such as: “Our belief is that great architecture is the creative 
response to the needs of the client, with a thorough understanding of the particular 
site.”128  Notwithstanding the problematics of defining ‘great architecture’, aspirations like 
this cater to client approval and, more mercenarily, to the approval of prospective clients.  
They say more about marketing than architecture.  They suggest that architecture is 
primarily in service to the client and the client’s brief, as that brief might be applied to the 
client’s site.  (The site is commonly defined primarily by legal or title boundaries – not 
necessarily the limits of the entire situation – and the brief may sanction, even if indirectly, 
possibilities that exploit and dominate the site.)  Beyond the presumed client-architect 
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relationship, such mission statements say little about the complex relationality actually at 
work; for example, that of the client to the others who will be affected by the client’s 
architecture, of the client’s architecture to the other architecture that will influence or be 
influenced by this architecture, and of the client’s site to the other sites that comprise the 
region of which it is a part.  In current practice, it is of course true that client needs are 
frequently altered to conform to arising circumstances, but seldom are client needs 
founded on circumstances other than those most direct and pressing to the client (some 
might also say those most self-serving), and seldom does design begin by addressing 
much beyond those circumstances.129  Furthermore, when conformance reaches the 
point of being enforced, compliance can be reluctant, resisted, and sometimes contested 
to great lengths.  Seldom does kenosis permeate such negotiations.  But kenosis does 
offer an alternative view, one which sees the client and its others, the site and its others, 
the architecture and its others, and, therefore, the architect and its others, all in service to 
the situation of which they are already a part.  In that view, the needs of the client do not 
hold sway over the needs of the entire situation, nor could they, because no such 
prioritisation exists when the needs of all situational elements are the needs of the 
situation itself.  Thus an entrenched relationship, that of client and client needs, architect 
and architecture, dissolves into the dynamic relationality of situation. 
 
This is a view of architecture from the inside-out.130  Unlike so many of the 
‘creative processes’ espoused by modernity’s ‘creative industries’, this view – which 
kenosis opens-up to those willing to self-empty – does not offer a formula for immediate 
implementation, and practical practitioners may therefore dismiss its practicality.  In one 
sense, dismissal is warranted, because such a view is not, in fact, implement-able.  
Ultimately, however, dismissal is rendered irrelevant, because a kenotic view is one of an 
already ongoing event, neither implement-able nor stoppable, only temporarily ignorable 
and resistible.131  In becoming human, humanity inevitably moves toward a kenotic view, 
one that looks back to the events in which it was created, in order to look forward to its 
own creativity and the events in which it is creating.  Such a view empties and makes 
ready to create.  Indeed, such a view recalls the figure of the Japanese enso (introduced 
in Chapter 2), simultaneously empty and full.  Overlaying that figure with key notions in 
Heideggerian, Benjaminian and Gadamerian thinking, the enso begins to image an 
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inside-out view of creativity (see fig. 7.1).  The openness and emptying afforded by 
kenosis can be seen to facilitate creativity’s – and architecture’s – ‘turning back into itself’, 
as well as the ‘awakening’ by which creating and creation come to be, in a kind of ‘third 
reality’.  This inside-out view sees the creative event as ontologically kenotic. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 7.1 
The Japanese enso as an ‘inside-out’ view – a kenotic view – of creativity. 
 
 
FILLED WITH EMPTINESS 
Even purged of its barriers to emptying, and paradigmatically emptied to see itself as an 
open domain in which all are creators and emptying is creating, architecture would 
nonetheless remain ‘filled’.  It would remain filled with all of its creators, not in spite of, but 
because of their kenotic view and approach.  If, as discussed earlier, a kenotically-
unfolding situation is one in which the situation is opening-up and unconcealing the 
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response it calls for, it is so precisely because its creators are already of the situation and 
reciprocally responding to it with their own kenosis, their own self-emptying and opening-
up.  And if the situation is calling for a response that includes architecture, similar 
dynamics see the architectural response also filled by its creators, or, more accurately 
and in keeping with the paradox of kenosis, filled with its creators’ emptiness.  Questions 
arise, then, as to architecture’s grounding, and whether such grounding is necessarily 
substantive.  Can emptiness ground?  What might be this emptiness of the creators that 
fills – and grounds – their architecture?  What is architecture if it were to just be?  The 
notion of the vernacular provides clues, with its invocation of participation, regeneration, 
and sustainability.  Although such traits are worthy and inherent in kenotic architecture, 
they are not ontological and, therefore, unsatisfying in themselves.  It would seem that 
there is something more fundamental to an architecture filled with its creators’ emptiness.  
In a retelling of early Greek thought, Heidegger points to a deeper insight, saying, “… 
what speaks to us only becomes perceivable through our response,” and “our hearing is 
in itself a responding.”132 
At one level, if the creators’ response-to-situation is one of self-emptying (rather 
than self-assertion), it is perceivable that what speaks to them is receptivity and 
openness toward “a more profoundly thought human being”; that is, an attentiveness to 
becoming human.  Becoming human is grounded in (human) being, which has no ground 
but “in itself essentially comes to be as grounding.”133  The creators’ response, their 
opening-up to becoming human, can therefore be seen to be grounded in the creators’ 
being and characterised in their ‘dwelling’, particularly when the latter is seen as 
Heidegger sees it: “the basic character of Being”134 and “the manner in which mortals are 
on the earth.”135  More specifically, it can be said that the creators’ response is grounded 
in their being kenotically; their being emptied and open.  At another level, insofar as 
“building is really dwelling,” and “building as dwelling unfolds into the building that 
cultivates growing things and the building that erects buildings,”136 it can be said that the 
creators’ response – materialised as architecture – is also grounded in the creators’ being 
kenotically.  To be kenotically is to be perceptively, sensitively, and thereby aesthetically, 
or, in Heidegger’s view, to dwell poetically.137  Thus, the creators’ emptiness, and the 
architecture it fills, is a kind of poetry.  The poetry discussed here, however, is not that of 
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literature, fantasia, or ornament.  It is that which “lets us dwell.”138  Or, as John Caputo 
describes it, “poetry is the instituting of a world, the uncovering of the matrix of meaning 
in which an historical age lives and dwells.”139  This matrix, uncovered by poetry, once 
again conjures Plato’s chora and Heidegger’s clearing.  It is the permeance of kenosis. 
Surely, then, what speaks to kenotic creators – whose emptiness is poetic – must 
become perceivable through a response as perceivable, and intended for multi-sensory 
perception, as architecture.  Indeed, the potentiality of their architecture (the limits from 
which it ‘begins’) is revealed by that in which its potential rests (its grounding).140  
Therefore, an architecture that rests in its creators’ poetic emptiness is an architecture 
that can dwell poetically in its situation (though not merely in the physical or stylish 
sense).  More importantly, it is an architecture able to hold the poetic dwelling of its 
inhabitant-creators (though not merely in the structural or functional sense).  Such 
dwelling is characterised by the emptiness of the “rose” that “is without why” and the 
“nothing” that “is without reason.”141  It stands in contrast to much of contemporary 
dwelling, described by Heidegger, in 1951, with words that have grown no less relevant.  
“Our dwelling today is harassed by work, made insecure by the hunt for gain and 
success, bewitched by the entertainment and recreation industry.”142  Buildings that 
emerge from and accommodate that kind of dwelling are, at best, only dwelling places, 
and, at worst, those that “deny dwelling its own nature when they are pursued and 
acquired for their own sake.”143  As such, they represent an architecture filled with its 
creators’ fullness, not their emptiness. 
Heidegger posits that “poetic creation … is a kind of building,”144 and I would 
suggest that the reverse can also be true.  Building can be a kind of poetic creation, 
particularly if created in the permeance of kenosis.  Kenotic architecture is not only filled 
with poetry, it is poetry, and its creators are poets.  Although “it is the way of poets to shut 
their eyes to actuality … [and] dream,”145 they also awaken to effect their creation through 
the building that springs from dwelling.  In What Are Poets For?,146 Heidegger describes 
such poets as “the more venturesome [who] will more strongly in that they will in a 
different way from the purposeful objectifying of the world.”  The will of their awakening 
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and opening-up stands against the will that closes off being – the will of self-assertion – 
which is only able to “will nothing.”  These are poet-creators for whom the nature of 
poetry, indeed, the nature of architecture, “becomes worthy of questioning” because, as 
Heidegger sees it, “they are poetically on the track of that which, for them, is what must 
be said.”  Or, as I have been suggesting, they are on the track of a response that is 
unconcealed in the situation itself, as that which needs to be done.  These are poets “in a 
destitute time,” where destitution is not, however, characterised by hopelessness.  In fact, 
it is precisely the destitution of the time – which, in connection with architecture, I earlier 
referred to as its modern decadence – that prevents such poets, such poetry, and such 
poetic architecture from becoming of the time; from becoming fashionable and thereby 
decadent.  Thus, it is the destitute time that maintains the poet-creator’s relevance, and it 
is in the time of such destitution that servitude (kenotic service to situation) is elevated. 
What remains is to inquire as to what these poet-creators might build, particularly 
in reference to architecture.  Architecture, emerging kenotically, defies stylistic description 
because the barriers of ‘-isms’ and ‘-ists’ are already removed and, with them, the 
language of form and materiality that typically accompanies each.  Therefore, there is no 
checklist of criteria by which to categorise appearance.  Instead, kenotic architecture can 
only be described open-endedly, incompletely, unresolvedly.  It is an architecture of 
simple oneness, which, like the situation of which it and its creators are integral parts, and 
to which both respond, is a unitary structure (not to be confused with a single building), 
unconcealed only through an attentive working-out of manifold elements that are, and 
remain, in complex relationality.  Unity is found within the structure’s internal 
articulation,147 not necessarily reflected in its outer formality.  Its simplicity is neither 
simplistic nor necessarily ‘clean’ (to use a favourite term of Modernism), but is truly that 
“on the other side of complexity.”148  As such, it is open to what Venturi calls complexities 
and contradictions, and even to imperfection.  Grounded in the being of its creators, as 
characterised by their dwelling, its “fundamental character” is therefore like that of 
dwelling itself, “sparing and preserving,” an architecture that “safeguards each thing in its 
nature.”149 
It is possible for this architecture, filled with emptiness, to be ordinary or 
extraordinary, even spectacularly ordinary, but not banal – either in its ordinariness or its 
spectacularity.  And, in either, it may also be radical.  It may manifest in any form 
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(including distorted and disintegrated), but, not being of any ‘-ism’, it resists stylistic 
categorisation and dismisses critique based on commodity-driven fetishes.  It may be of 
any scale, of any appearance (including that resembling known styles and categories), 
and of any degree of grandeur, as long as such characteristics arise from its 
situatedness.  Such architecture is not made novel by eschewing the influence of 
tradition, or as a result of intentional un-relatedness (something quite different to identity) 
and superficial seductiveness (something quite different to drawing-in).  Nor is novelty 
produced by grasping and exploiting (something quite different to committed 
attentiveness) or by the pursuit of a devised ‘process’ (something quite different to letting-
go).  Akin to Heidegger’s poetry, creating an architecture of emptiness is not something to 
be measured, but rather is a measuring,150 a term used again, here, in the same sense 
discussed in Chapter 4.151  It is a measuring of dwelling – its creators’ and its own – 
situationally entangled.  It is thereby a measuring of the open, incomplete, and unknown 
realm of being, a measuring-taking that insists on its constant re-taking.  In that, it is a 
measuring of the mystery of human creativity and, therefore, a demystification of that 
which nonetheless remains a mystery.  Such measuring is kenotic, and kenosis is such 
measuring.  Unlike architecture that is aware and assertive of its something-ness, and 
always seeking to be measured, an architecture arising from the permeance of kenosis – 
from a measuring – is architecture that “pays no attention to itself, [and] asks not whether 
it is seen.”152  Approached from an arrière-garde position, it is such architecture that is 
actually at the front-line of being – the truly avant-garde. 
 
END-ING 
An architecture filled with the emptiness of its creators – an architecture that can just be – 
implies an end to much of architecture as it is currently known and practised.  Indeed, 
there is a case to be made that architecture, unable to just be, has already come to an 
end.  Insofar as metaphysics ends in its fulfilment as science and technology, and art 
ends in its fulfilment as philosophy, it follows that architecture – traditionally being 
something of both metaphysics and art – likewise ends.  Following many other aspects of 
culture, architecture has increasingly come to share an obsession with the 
phantasmagoric, or the “mega-visual,”153 which is utterly dependent on science and 
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technology to determine and realise its graphic, numerical, and material form, and often 
dependent on technological heroics to achieve each.  At the same time, architecture (at 
least certain sectors of it) has developed a heightened interest in philosophy-reliant 
interpretation, to the point of prioritising that over the reality of designing and constructing, 
“substituting a set of readings for the real object” and thereby creating “what [Rosalind] 
Kraus calls a ‘hermeneutic phantom’.”154  Such obsessions may appear to be 
oppositional, one populist and one elitist, but they have in common the potential to detract 
from architecture’s role in building and dwelling.  Together, they present a view of 
architecture’s end, dissolving into science and technology, on the one hand, and into 
philosophy, on the other.   
Indeed, it could be argued, along the lines with which Danto (building on Hegel) 
declared the end of art, that an architecture increasingly desperate to describe style, 
genre, and movement – coining ever-new ‘-isms’ to do so – and therefore also desperate 
to find narrative meaning, is an architecture approaching its end.  Such talk of ‘end’, 
however, is not talk of ‘death’.  Danto does not suggest that the making of art ends, only 
that its continued making is “without benefit of a reassuring sort of narrative in which it [is] 
seen as the appropriate next stage in the story.”155  An end of architecture – whether 
viewed as approaching or fait accompli – does not suggest an end to building, only the 
opening-up of its happening.  Indeed, architecture still builds.  It does not only interpret.  
Much of what it builds is not phantasmagoria, and much is banal.  Thus, claims of its end 
may be premature, even if presaging.  The question raised by this discourse has to do 
with what kenosis might say of architecture’s end.  Although kenosis can be found 
concretised in architecture, it is not the case that architecture is generally conceived or 
realised in kenosis.  Nonetheless, architecture’s unfolding is kenotic (even when 
architecture is not).  In that unfolding, architecture, as it has come to be institutionalised, 
can be seen to be in an ongoing state of end-ing. 
According to Gianni Vattimo, the unfolding is secularisation and secularisation is 
kenosis.  In his project, secularisation sees an end-ing of Christianity, as it has come to 
be institutionalised.  He presumes the Neitzschean ‘death’ of the metaphysical God, as 
he writes of “weakening faith”156 and that which comes “after Christianity.”157  Yet, he 
does not suggest the end of religion or religious experience.  In fact, he suggests the 
opposite.  Religious experience after Christianity rests in a view of being as dynamic, 
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without the “stability ascribed to it by the metaphysical tradition.”  It is therefore able to be 
seen as wide-ranging, pluralistic, always real, not supernatural – a participative 
“experience in the world … in the events of history.”158  Vattimo thus opens-up religion (in 
particular, Christianity) by turning it back to its beginnings; back into itself.  He turns it 
back to the incarnation story, that moment in which the divine becomes human through 
an instantiation of kenosis, and thereby enables the divine to be considered secular.  I 
would suggest that this can also be seen as the moment at which a complex plurality of 
elements gradually began their formation as a ‘unitary primordial structure’, through an 
opening-up to the situation and an internal working-out of relationalities.  The ‘church’ that 
began at this moment was not – as yet – a sacralised structure of hierarchies and 
categories of opposition (though the working-out inevitably involved differing 
interpretations).  And, as the story unfolds, the one element – the one ‘person’ – with the 
potential to dominate and manipulate the working-out (supposedly from outside the 
situation), chose instead to assume the position of servant or slave (very much within the 
situation), in yet another instantiation of kenosis.  But, then, as this structure turns from its 
foundational kenosis, it turns toward power, self-sacralisation, and institutionalisation, 
ironically doing so to insulate itself from the very secularisation it began.  And, it is 
precisely such secularisation, or kenosis, that ongoingly pressures the structure to re-
open-up, to desacralise, and re-embrace its plurality and complexity, even while 
remaining in unitary primordial relation.  In that paradox, Christianity is enabled to move 
toward fulfilment, albeit in a form that might be largely unrecognisable to its current 
institutions. 
Kenosis can be seen to effect a similar ‘end-ing’ of architecture, by constantly 
turning it back to its beginnings, back into itself – much as Derrida suggests in the 
epigraph to this chapter.  What begins, in necessity, as the simple oneness of dwelling 
and building, gradually severs, with shifts toward expertise and its frequent partners, 
exclusivity and privilege.  What begins as the making of things primarily “by nature,” and 
negligibly “by art,”159 gradually moves toward the reverse (the rise of art being less 
problematic than the decline of nature, but becoming grave when art’s rise is at nature’s 
expense).  Architecture moves toward self-sacralisation, insulating itself from the ‘laity’ 
and secular ‘non-professions’ – both of which are essential to its existence.  In so doing, 
architecture joins other human institutions, which, according to Louis Kahn, lose “the 
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inspirations of their beginning.”160  But, whether or not listened-to and observed, kenosis 
persistently speaks of beginnings as it calls to open-up; that is, as it calls to challenge 
entrenched paradigms and practices, “ideologies and xenophobic tendencies,”161 and 
assumptions as to what architecture is.  It turns architecture back to its humanity, and its 
grounding in humanity’s becoming human – its being.  It effects what Heidegger 
(analysing Aristotle) refers to as an “act of self-unfolding emergence [which] is inherently 
a going-back-into-itself.”162  Insofar as that effects the end or end-ing of architecture, it is 
precisely the end – and potentiality – revealed by architecture’s beginnings: the building 
that springs from poetic dwelling.  That is what is possible for architecture, what 
architecture (and all creativity) can be when it is not trying to be; when it makes room in 
itself to just be. 
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8 
Conclusion: 
The Grace of Dis-grace 
May we give up what is worthy of thought in favor of the recklessness of 
exclusively calculative thinking and its immense achievements?  Or are we 
obliged to find paths upon which thinking is capable of responding to what is 
worthy of thought instead of, enchanted by calculative thinking, mindlessly 
passing over what is worthy of thought? 
That is the question.  It is the world-question of thinking.  Answering this question 
decides what will become of the earth and of human existence on this earth.1 
 
Although each includes notions of ‘end-ing’, neither the Vattimian desacralisation of 
Christianity nor my proposition of architecture’s kenosis leads to a calculable or attainable 
end state.  Unfolding kenosis produces effective moment-to-moment functionality, but it is 
always set amidst unceasing and contingent movement (a kind of ‘chaos’) that requires 
constant thinking and working-out.  Vattimo’s sketch of Western searching – the search 
for salvation yielding to perfection and the search for perfection yielding to progress – 
reveals exactly such movement but without any condition ever being fully found or 
sustained.  Indeed, even progress yields to routinisation, as society – so-called 
developed and developing society – becomes increasingly addicted to new and often 
ostentatious routines grounded in calculative thinking.  Such addiction is, itself, a routine.  
And not even routine is an end.  But, if routine is no more ultimate than those conditions 
or strivings that preceded it, to what condition might routine yield?  Beyond routine, to 
what does kenotic unfolding point, particularly in the context of human creativity and, not 
least, in architecture?  As always, kenosis resists definitive answers but is nonetheless 
revealing, because it resides in that realm where, as Heidegger observes, “… one cannot 
prove anything, but one can point out a great deal.”2 
 
Viewed from the diverse perspectives of preceding chapters, kenosis is revealed 
as much in what it is not as in what it is.  Having no end, kenosis is not an end.  
Consequently, neither is it a goal or strategy to be exploited for advantage.  Yet kenosis 
advantages when its advantage is not anticipated or seen to be assured.  Unable to be 
strategised, kenosis is not something to be effected or implemented, particularly not by 
the mere deployment of its individual characteristics.  Self-deprecation, humility, 
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acquiescence, and submission do not, in themselves, constitute kenosis.  Self-sacrifice is 
not a kenotic demand, but nor is it the case that the event of kenosis is something easy or 
risk-free, comfortable or comforting.  And in the call to relationality – the call to open-up to 
others and other things – kenosis is not simply dialogue, diplomacy, or compromise.  
Indeed, there is much that kenosis would seem to exclude.  Yet, by its very nature, 
kenosis must somehow include, or at least open-up to, that which it seems not to be.  
That paradox holds the tension and between-ness and struggle, not only of defining 
kenosis, but also of readying for its potential approach and, then, recognising and 
appreciating its appearance. 
So, what can be said of what kenosis is?  It is, of course, the active-passivity and 
passive-activity of emptying, particularly self-emptying and, more particularly, the claimed 
self-emptying of the divine in Christianity.  As emptying, kenosis must also involve 
emptiness and nothingness, both of which are nonetheless something.  In certain ways, 
kenosis is Pythagorean kenon, Platonic chora, and Aristotelian topos.  More directly, 
kenosis is Lurianic zimzum, and Eckhartian (but also Heideggerian) Gelassenheit.  And, 
to varying degrees, it is embedded in the Aquinian Five Ways, the way of Taoism, the 
sunyata of Buddhism, the yogas of Hinduism, and the pillars of Islam.  And, out of the 
concept of Judaic shekinah, kenosis is seen to be the face of a coin whose other side is 
skenosis.  As such, kenosis is an emptying, but, more than that, it is an emptying that is 
receptive, one that makes-room for skenosis; the concurrent and simultaneous filling or 
occupation, which, in turn, establishes the potentiality of overflowing and pouring-out.  
Thus, kenosis is paradoxically its own complement.  As informative as such descriptions 
may be, kenosis can remain abstract – a mere concept – unless seen to be instantiated 
and made experiential.  Architecture is a vehicle for the latter, one by which kenosis can 
manifest concretely and experientially, even as it remains stubbornly incomplete. 
 
The capacity of kenosis to transcend disciplines, faith traditions, cultures, and time 
derives largely from its intrinsic connection to creating and creation.  Indeed, an account 
of kenosis reveals the ontology of creativity and thereby presents all creativity as kenotic 
potentiality.  As architecture moves from potentiality to actuality, kenotic opportunity lies in 
five aspects of the unfolding.  First, kenosis is at the foundation of every project, calling 
each to become what it will be and be exactly that – kenotically.  But, at a deeper level, 
there are also those projects specifically and fundamentally called to be kenotic, whose 
raison d’être is kenosis.  Second, the inception of each project can be kenotic.  The 
creators’ attitudes and approaches to the project – their ‘creativity’ – can be animated by 
kenosis.  Third, the project’s conception – the act of creating or designing – can be an 
event of kenosis.  Indeed, the resulting concept or design can prove kenotic, as well, but 
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not assuredly.  Fourth, the project’s realisation, its concluding step in becoming actuality, 
can produce a kenotic creation.  But, even then – in the fifth aspect of unfolding – it 
remains to be seen whether the realised project has the capacity to kenotically 
accommodate its utilisation.  The projects explored in Part Two of this dissertation, which 
span across the ‘-isms’ of contemporary style, open-up all five aspects of architecture’s 
unfolding.  To some extent – though, at times, difficult to see – each aspect of each 
project is somehow kenotic, simply because each is part of a creation’s unfolding.  
Moreover, each project is some part of a larger unfolding of human endeavour.  Beyond 
that, however, there are distinct and important differences.  Certain projects begin with 
strong kenotic foundations, only to see kenosis wane or face various forms of resistance 
as the project moves toward actualisation.  Other projects appear to offer little 
instantiation of kenosis until actualised.  Still others seem to reveal kenotic character in all 
aspects of their development, though, as always, such revelation is imperfect and 
incomplete.  In all creativity, kenosis is a given, but, in human creativity, the manner in 
which the arrival and appearance of kenosis is received, interpreted, and attended is 
always a variable – as a brief summary of the findings in Part Two demonstrates. 
At the foundational level, the kenotic potential of the Church of the Light, in Japan, 
could scarcely be greater.  It is a Christian (and therefore kenotic) church in a non-
Christian country, authored by an architect who approaches the project’s inception 
seeking to concretise a ‘bridge’; that between the West, with its Christian notion of 
kenosis, and the East, with its Buddhist/Shinto notion of nothingness.  However, as 
inception yields to conception, and conception to realisation, Tadao Ando’s Neo-Modern 
building speaks more about that which distinguishes kenosis from nothingness than it 
does their commonality.  Moreover, in the project’s fixation on nothingness and the 
resultant attempt to reduce the church to only one primary symbol, its utilisation reveals a 
less than kenotic accommodation of the multi-layered Christian liturgy – the very activity 
that is essential to being church and, itself, a celebration of kenosis.  In this project, 
kenosis initially reveals itself but is later withdrawn by the project’s own work.  
Conversely, it is difficult to find foundational kenosis in the government office building at 
The Hague, known as Castalia, or in the Commerzbank headquarters at Frankfurt, yet 
both reveal instantiations of kenosis in the course of their respective development.  
Michael Graves’ office building originally emerges from Postmodern Historicism as an 
assertive architectural ‘intruder’ on The Hague’s skyline, only to gradually become 
kenotic; a worthy and perhaps necessary ‘bridge’ between the city’s historic district and 
the even more incongruous high-rise office district that follows Castalia.  And, although 
Norman Foster’s high-rise bank building – an iconic milestone of Environmentalism – 
suffers most of the aggressive and assertive characteristics of its typology, elements of its 
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conception, realisation, and utilisation see the building emptied of typical high-rise 
‘efficiencies’.  That, in turn, opens-up aspects of the building to spatial and interpersonal 
relationalities that are both environmentally- and socially-friendly.  In the latter two 
projects, kenosis is initially withdrawn but later emerges, even if limitedly. 
The advance of architecture, from potentiality to actuality, is characterised by 
Louis Kahn as a movement between silence and light, which, in itself, evokes kenotic 
principles.  His work reveals a struggle – an unending dance – of between-ness, not only 
between silence and light, but also between religion and science, sacred and secular, 
intuition and knowledge, unmeasurable and measurable.  Such are the struggles of 
modernity unfolding through kenosis.  And such are the struggles demonstrated in the 
kenotic unfolding of the Salk Institute at La Jolla.  Founded in Jonas Salk’s vision of a 
scientific community open to others, especially those in the arts and humanities, Kahn’s 
approach to the Institute’s design reciprocates with similar openness.  He has no eureka 
moment.  Instead, conception is a demonstration of ever-heightening attentiveness to an 
evolving situation.  Amongst many instantiations of kenosis in the realised project, none is 
greater than the emptying, filling, and pouring-out of the central courtyard; that by which 
the relationality of the entire situation is established, including that of site, architecture, 
and the perceivers and users of both.  Yet despite – and also because of – its kenotic 
nature, the project is neither complete nor perfect.  Indeed, the same can be said of a 
remarkably different work of architecture: the Museum of Islamic Art at Doha, by I.M. Pei.  
Following the Salk by some four decades, this museum’s situation also appears founded 
in kenotic potential; that of opening-up Islamic culture – importantly including its modern 
sensibilities – to a so-called modern world, and building yet another ‘bridge’ to span 
between-ness.  Pei takes on the risk of ‘cultural translation’, understanding the polarity 
between literalism and faithful paraphrase.  His approach is not to assertively translate, 
but to ready for the translation’s approach; to become vulnerable, empty, open, and 
thereby liberated from the task’s inherent risks.  The translation that Pei concretises is 
less important for its architectonics than for what it says of kenosis and creativity.  His 
monumental ‘container’ ultimately finds its identity in the metaphor offered by one of the 
items it contains: a Dervish kashkúl or ‘begging bowl’, ironically a very modest container, 
the potential of which lies not only in emptiness but also in the consequent capacity to 
establish relationality.  Pei and his work – like Kahn and his, before – defy labels, doing 
so by virtue of an openness and receptivity that precludes positioning within stylistic 
categories.  Each of their works occupies its place in an entangled, multilinear – and 
therefore uncategorisable – continuum of architectural tradition. 
Useful to this discourse, but in sharp contrast to the work of Kahn and Pei – 
particularly Pei’s museum – is a museum designed by Daniel Libeskind: the Jewish 
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Museum Berlin.  Transcending concepts of museum as container, Libeskind’s museum 
claims a kind of singularity in its manifestation of void, an absence made present.  
Indeed, such a void can rightly be seen as foundational to this museum, since it refers to 
the void effected by an event of Jewish, German, and world history at the antithetical 
extremity of kenosis.  Indeed, such a void could reasonably be anticipated to instantiate 
kenosis and take the discussion of kenosis to an even deeper level.  At various stages of 
the project’s conceptualisation and realisation, interdisciplinary dialogue, which might 
itself be seen as kenotic, finds observers and critics citing the void as a primary feature in 
the creating of an architecture of uncanniness, hope, and laughter – sufficient to face 
horror.  As fitting as such attributes might be to a Jewish museum in Berlin, a closer 
reading of the Libeskind museum finds that its prioritisation of calculated and self-
asserted spectacularity is an impediment to self-emptying receptivity.  The building thus 
produces more of filled presence than present absence.  Instead of opening-up questions 
and maintaining their openness, the built museum proposes answers.  It is an ‘illustration’ 
mismatched to its ‘caption’; the architecture contradicting so many of its claims and 
ascriptions. 
Also in Berlin, but designed and built several years after Libeskind’s museum, the 
Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, by Peter Eisenman, is the memorial that the 
museum always aspired to be.  It makes many similar claims, is ascribed with many 
similar attributes, and, in many ways, can be seen as self-assertive.  But, in its conceptual 
and realised abstractness, it presents an openness to its others, invites reciprocal 
response, and accepts whatever relationship ensues.  Accordingly, kenosis is instantiated 
in ways not seen at the museum.  Something of the same is true at the nearby German 
parliamentary building – the Reichstag – restored and renovated by Norman Foster.  With 
the extreme transparency of its new glass dome, the project presents what might be seen 
as an ultimate unconcealment, but it does so with ambiguity and contradiction, and not 
without elements of architectural gimmickry.  Yet, kenosis is nonetheless revealed, and 
creative endeavour is thereby informed.  Kenosis manifests and informs most clearly, 
however, not in any one of the Berlin projects but in the relationality of all three.  None is 
the exemplar claimed or ascribed.  In their common context, each relies on the others to 
hold open the questions of un-mendable pain.  In their interdependence, they collectively, 
kenotically, and paradoxically work toward mending; work that is always incomplete, but 
never futile, since it is precisely such incompleteness that precludes forgetfulness and, 
so, preserves memory. 
 
Notwithstanding their various instantiations of kenosis, these projects – like most 
contemporary projects – are produced amidst the entrenched hierarchies and practices 
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that comprise and surround architecture, none of which can claim to be inherently 
kenotic.  To some extent, architecture seems inevitably filled by ‘-ists’ and ‘-isms’.  
Amongst architects and architecture’s various development actors, there is competition 
for hierarchical positions, not least positions associated with design authorship.  And, 
within architectural design, there are competitive theories, movements, logics, and styles.  
Maintainable only by exclusion, ‘-isms’ present as barriers to architecture’s kenosis.  
Indeed, to turn kenotic thinking into an ‘-ism’, and thereby advocate kenotic-ism as a 
movement that can overcome previous movements and ‘save’ architecture from itself, 
would be to propose yet another exclusivist movement.  At any rate, such a proposal is 
rendered impossible, because kenosis cannot accept the suffix.  While ‘-isms’ call 
attention to their self-ness, kenosis is constantly emptying itself of self-ness and opening-
up to an other-ness that is without categories or labels.  Indeed, kenosis opens-up 
architecture to become not what it might be labelled but what it will be, if left to be.  A 
kenosis of architecture is an emptying of so-called movements and styles, a dissolution of 
categories of opposition, and an elimination of ‘walls’ – an end to that which silences 
questioning.  It does not effect an end to the struggles of creating, because that would 
end creativity.  But it does name and successively weaken the sources of architectural 
‘violence’.  A kenosis of architecture is dependent on – and already embedded in – the 
kenosis to which creativity calls humanity.  Kenosis turns humanity and architecture back 
to the questions of being in order to look forward, toward a transforming, secularising, 
and aestheticising world.  In such questions, architecture is asked to consider its being 
when all are regarded as creators, when all creators engage openly, when the 
relationality of all creators is hierarchically dynamic, and when all creators awaken and 
attend to the situation of which they and other things are already an intrinsic part.  
Architecture is asked to consider its being – not emptied of its creators, but filled with its 
creators’ emptiness.  In so doing, it is asked to face its end-ing by going back to its 
beginning – and to understand that as a threshold of its potentiality. 
 
Discussion hereby returns to the matter with which this ending chapter begins.  In 
connection with architecture or, more broadly, human creativity, to what does kenosis 
point?  It might correctly, but incompletely, be said that kenosis points to always ongoing 
unfolding – endings unendingly leading back to beginnings.  That might be seen as 
uninteresting or, worse, as nihilistic, but it does informatively confirm that there are no 
lasting states; that attempts to label and categorise such states may be convenient for 
discourse but are, themselves, contributing to routinisation; and that such attempts cling 
to teleological views.  There is, however, much more to the kenotic event, more to which 
kenosis points.  Paolo Soleri suggests that routine can transform into ‘grace’, and he pays 
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homage to “the artisan, the person capable of transforming routine, the bulk of life, into 
grace.”3  But the ongoing-ness of kenosis insists that grace is also not an enduring or end 
state.  If kenosis is taken seriously – its questions left open and its mystery respected – 
then grace must be seen as something that is only experienced from time to time, amidst 
the unfolding, along the ‘way’.  It is a real experience of the moment, and not – as religion 
might have it – the exclusive purview, promise, or gift of a metaphysical God.  Routine 
emptied of routine-ness is something grace-filled, something filled with humanity and 
creativity, something becoming whole and perhaps ‘holy’ (if that is not but the same as 
wholly).  Grace does not overcome routine but sees it fulfilled. 
It might therefore be said that kenosis points to grace, even if the latter’s 
appearance is often fleeting.  Grace is something of Gadamer’s fusion, Heidegger’s 
poetic dwelling and thinking, Benjamin’s awakening and child-like play, Vattimo’s 
elimination of walls, and Guignon’s situational awareness.  Grace is that which is 
experienced when creativity, whether of nature or humanity, responds to a situation with 
what the situation, in its entirety, is calling for; that is, when the response to kenosis is 
kenotic.  Like the kenosis in which it is embedded, grace is neither a goal nor permanent 
outcome.  It, too, is unattainable by reason or will, only on its own terms.  It is a 
contingent experience amidst ongoing kenosis.  As such, the grace of kenosis actually 
emerges as dis-grace, a dis-tancing from, dis-possession of, or dis-interest in grace – 
certainly its fetishisation.  In that distancing, openness to the other and other things 
includes even those others and other things considered to be disgraced or, in some way, 
disgraceful or ungraceful.  Grace can surely be seen as amongst that which comes to 
occupy the emptiness that kenosis creates.  It is therefore also that which potentially 
overflows a situation, and pours-out.  Thus, grace can be seen as something granted by 
kenosis at particular creative moments, perhaps those moments that fulfil Susan Sontag’s 
longing: “In place of a hermeneutics we need an erotics of art.”4  At such moments, 
kenosis transcends mere ongoing-ness.  It makes possible what Pérez-Gómez calls 
architecture “built upon love”5; and, then, the sensuous engagement of such architecture 
through what Pallasmaa describes as the “eyes of the skin”6; and, finally, the coming to 
know of such architecture by what the apostle Paul (author of the Christian kenosis 
                                               
3
 Soleri also suggests that such capability “is often if not always beyond contemporary Western man. Nor has 
Western man found a substitute, if one exists, for such transformation and such fulfilment. This routine 
remains as it is, an integral part of our lives (automatism), but the ritual of it has withered away.” See Soleri, 
The Bridge Between Matter and Spirit is Matter Becoming Spirit: The Arcology of Paolo Soleri: vii. 
4
 S. Sontag, Against Interpretation, and Other Essays  (New York: Dell Publishing, 1966), 9. Specifically in 
connection with the art of Surrealism, this notion is taken up in M.A. Caws, The Surrealistic Look: An Erotics 
of Encounter  (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997). 
5
 Pérez-Gómez, Built Upon Love: Architectural Longing After Ethics and Aesthetics. 
6
 J. Pallasmaa, The Eyes of the Skin: Architecture and the Senses, Third ed. (Chichester, UK: John Wiley and 
Sons, 2012). 
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passage) calls the enlightened “eyes of the heart.”7  It is at such moments that kenosis 
enables the grace-full transformation of the situation and everything in it. 
But why does the situation need to be transformed, or, to reprise the shouted 
question with which this dissertation began, “Why do we have to change anything?”  
Even the most definitive answer – that we do not have to change anything – fails to close 
the question.  In the very asking of the question, the possibility of change is opened-up, 
and, in its contemplation, change is already underway even if nothing is done, because 
doing nothing is doing something.  Irrespective of the extent or merit of effected change, 
humanity goes about doing.  But, in pointing to grace, kenosis also points to the problem 
of frenetically and recklessly doing, and of doing ever more; of calculating, grasping at, 
and clinging to the doing, without exercising or experiencing grace.  Alternatively, kenosis 
suggests a shift, from doing to being and to being grace-fully, which is always and 
already the most efficacious kind of doing.  In contemplating the doing of anything, a 
kenotic attitude or posture redirects focus away from whether we have to respond 
(usually no) and whether we can (usually yes), instead to consider, first, the worthiness of 
the contemplation and, only when that is established, the worthiness of the doing and, 
finally, the worthiness of a response effected by such doing.  Such contemplative thinking 
is a means of practised kenosis.  To practise kenosis is to open-up Heidegger’s “world-
question of thinking” (the epigraph to this chapter) and, in so doing, to enable, animate, 
and sustain precisely the thinking for which Heidegger pleads.  Kenosis invites humanity 
to invite the approach and appearance of kenosis.  It invites humanity to become human; 
to empty and move toward the fullness of human being.  Similarly, it invites architecture 
and all creative endeavours to empty and just be, to risk letting-go of calculated ‘wow’ in 
favour of being wowed by grace.  As kenosis points to humanity’s more grace-filled being 
– marked by self-restraint and heightened attunement – it consequently points to a more 
grace-filled aesthetisation of humanity’s place.  Yet, amidst its inviting, suggesting, and 
pointing, kenosis always leaves open the question of humanity’s response to the situated 
happenings it permeates; to the unfolding of creative events and, particularly, those of 
architecture.  Unassertively but consistently, kenosis asks whether humanity will 
recognise such happenings as worthy and respond worthily, with the mindfulness and 
creativity of emptying – with the kenosis that is human being. 
                                               
7
 The passage from which this phrase is drawn (Eph 1:18 NRSV) and, indeed, all of the letter to the 
Ephesians is attributed to the apostle Paul, but it is more likely authored by one of Paul’s disciples, writing in 
the apostle’s name, after his death. See Attridge and Meeks, The HarperCollins Study Bible: New Revised 
Standard Version, 1982. 
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Epilogue 
This dissertation was not meant to include an epilogue – not until the situation of its 
writing changed and suggested an addendum.  Just six weeks prior to my planned 
submission date, while pursuing the finer details of the dissertation’s completion, I was 
found to have three coronary arteries with ninety percent blockage; a medical situation 
that called for immediate bypass graft surgery, and one which not only affected my 
academic situation but also related to it in unexpected ways.  Some, who knew of both 
my medical condition and my thesis topic, light-heartedly spoke about an impending 
‘arterial kenosis’.  It is a compelling metaphor, except that arteries – unfortunately – do 
not self-empty.  (In fact, once bypassed, the already-blocked original arteries soon 
complete their self-filling.)  More pertinent and serious was the discovery that many 
aspects of this unexpected experience were facilitated and alleviated by my prior thinking 
about kenosis; for example, through the willing releasement, or letting-go, fostered by 
such thinking, and through the sense of power opened-up by a state of utter 
powerlessness.  Indeed, kenotic thinking proved effective in obviating much of the fear 
and anxiety associated with such an event.  That alone, however, does not necessarily 
make my arising medical situation noteworthy.  The corroborative view it contributes to 
my thesis perhaps does. 
In this dissertation, I have given consideration to situations that call for creative 
response, particularly architectural response.  In hospital, I was presented with a situation 
that called for medical response – and with time to compare it to those situations I had 
previously considered.  Given all that I have posited about the merits of responding to 
situations kenotically, I was struck by the fact that, in virtually all situations calling for 
medical response, the needs, wants, and expectations of the situation’s diverse 
participants appear so precisely aligned with what the situation is calling for; namely, 
heightened attentiveness to the entirety of the situation by each and every one of those 
participants.  In the medical context, situational elements stand ready to empty 
themselves of self, open-up to one another, fill with the situation, and join in the struggle – 
the battle – to respond as the situation requires.  Although certain situations call for 
medical heroics and extreme practices, even those are situationally responsive.  
Excepting malfeasance, there is little place for intentional defiance of the situation, for 
fanciful treatment of the situation as something other than it is, or for assertions that are 
overtly contrary to the situation’s unfolding; its ongoing kenosis.  Yet there is ample place 
– even demand – for creative response to a situation’s contingencies, indeterminacies, 
and need for constant working-out.  Situations that call for medical response are, like all 
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situations, consistently kenotic and, unlike many situations, remarkably consistent in 
eliciting kenotic response.  In that, medical situations model the kind of response that 
architecture could more fully and consistently provide.  What might architecture be if 
every situation was considered vital, and if the response thereto was considered essential 
to the entire situation’s ongoing-ness? 
Not necessarily unique to medicine, but presenting a worthy exemplar, the 
kenosis in a medical situation is evidenced, at least in part, by its ability to shift thinking 
from the calculative to the meditative (as Heidegger suggests).  Or, more precisely, 
perhaps it should be said that, in such situations, kenosis enables essential calculative 
thinking to be meditatively exercised.  Matters such as risk factors, mortality rates, 
complications, and contingencies are seen as neither trivial nor as ends in themselves 
but, rather, as amongst the elements of heightened awareness, attunement, and 
openness to that which is worthy of thought.  Thus, essential procedural knowledge 
enhances alertness and responsiveness to that which is non-procedural and not fully 
knowable but no less essential in manifesting what needs to be done.  Certainly, 
medicine is not without its own questions and, like architecture, may be in need of 
kenosis.  That is a topic that others might wish to research.  But, by intervening in my 
academic situation, a medical situation expanded and, in many ways, corroborated my 
thinking about kenosis.  Although I could have amended the earlier acknowledgements to 
include thoracic surgeon Professor James Tatoulis and cardiologist Associate Professor 
Roderic Warren – both of the University of Melbourne – they had nothing to do with the 
preceding pages of this dissertation.  Yet by having everything to do with this epilogue, 
they enabled the completion and submission of the entire document.  Hence, I 
acknowledge and express my sincere gratitude to both, as well as to all of the situation’s 
participants, including manifold technicians, nurses, and staff, each of whom unfailingly 
responded – kenotically – to a situation that challenged me to do the same. 
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Appendix One: 
Primary Project Investigations 
The following projects were investigated and analysed, by the author, as case studies.  
They serve as vehicles for the discussion of kenosis in Part Two of this dissertation 
(Chapters 3 to 6). 
 
 
 
Project Location Architect Date Visited 
    
The Church of the Light Ibaraki, Japan 
 
Tadao Ando 
 
27 Feb, 2013 
    
The Salk Institute La Jolla, CA, 
USA 
Louis I. Kahn 14 Nov, 2013 
    
    
Castalia The Hague, 
Netherlands 
Michael Graves 02 Dec, 2013 
    
    
Jewish Museum Berlin Berlin, Germany Daniel Libeskind 04 Dec, 2013 
    
    
Memorial to the 
Murdered Jews of 
Europe 
Berlin, Germany Peter Eisenman 05 Dec, 2013 
    
    
The Reichstag Berlin, Germany Norman Foster 
 
07 Dec, 2013 
    
Commerzbank 
Headquarters 
Frankfurt am Main, 
Germany 
Norman Foster 
 
16 Dec, 2013 
    
Museum of  
Islamic Art 
Doha, Qatar I.M. Pei 19 Dec, 2013 
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Appendix Two: 
Secondary Project Investigations 
Although not featuring directly in Part Two of this dissertation (Chapters 3 to 6), the 
following projects were investigated, by the author, for various aspects of their 
relatedness to the primary projects. 
 
 
Project Location Architect/Artist Date Visited 
    
Awaji Yumebutai Awaji, Hyogo, 
Japan 
Tadao Ando 29 Jan, 2013 
    
    
Imperial Hotel 
(partial restoration) 
Meiji-Mura  
Open-Air Museum 
Inuyama, Japan 
Frank Lloyd Wright 31 Jan, 2013 
    
    
Omotesando Hills 
(Shopping Centre) 
Tokyo, Japan Tadao Ando 01 Feb, 2013 
    
    
Watari-Um Museum Tokyo, Japan Mario Botta 01 Feb, 2013 
    
    
Nezu Museum Tokyo, Japan Kengo Kuma 01 Feb, 2013 
    
    
National Museum of 
Western Art 
Tokyo, Japan Charles-Édouard 
Jeanneret-Gris 
(Le Corbusier) 
02 Feb, 2013 
    
    
Fallingwater Mill Run, PA, 
USA 
 
Frank Lloyd Wright 
 
22 Nov, 2013 
    
United States 
Holocaust Memorial 
Museum 
Washington, DC, 
USA 
James Ingo Freed 
Pei Cobb Freed & 
Partners 
25 Nov, 2013 
    
    
Mémorial des Martyrs 
de la Déportation 
Paris, France Georges-Henri 
Pingusson 
29 Nov, 2013 
    
    
Sankt Fronleichnam 
Parish Church 
Aachen, Germany Rudolf Schwarz 03 Dec, 2013 
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Exhibition Hall – 
Deutsches 
Historisches Museum 
Berlin, Germany I.M. Pei 05 Dec, 2013 
    
    
Memorial to the 
Homosexuals 
Persecuted Under the 
National Socialist 
Regime 
Berlin, Germany Michael Elmgreen 
Ingar Dragset 
06 Dec, 2013 
    
    
Memorial to the Sinti 
and Roma of Europe 
Murdered Under the 
National Socialist 
Regime 
Berlin, Germany Dani Karavan 
 
07 Dec, 2013 
    
    
Old Jewish Cemetery Prague,  
Czech Republic 
 12 Dec, 2013 
    
    
Jewish Museum Prague, 
Czech Republic 
 12 Dec, 2013 
    
    
Souq Waqif Doha, Qatar  20 Dec, 2013 
    
    
Souk Al-Bahar Dubai, UAE  21 Dec, 2013 
 
